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ABSTRACT 
Though Dante never read Plato's dialogues on love, when examining the texts of 
Dante one notes the presence of Platonic thought and influence particularly concerning 
the notion of love. This thesis will focus upon the Platonic notion of eros and how it 
changes over time, ultimately being integrated into the Christian notion of love as 
understood by Dante, and how this Platonic influence is instantiated within Dante's 
poetry. 
The inherent ambiguity of the concept of love, evident historically through 
frequent debates concerning its value whether positive, negative or in-between, makes 
any investigation into the nature of love problematic, often aporetic. One aim of this 
thesis is to help overcome some of the aporiai of knowledge concerning love through 
focusing upon one form of love, eros or passionate desire, which we shall use in order to 
understand love more generally through exploring its points of intersection and 
overlapping with certain other types of love, each of which emphasizes different aspects 
of love's character differentiated through culture and period. 
Significantly eros, as perhaps the most ambiguous type of love, is often 
characterized negatively. Taking into account Nygren's negative view of eros which he 
sees as being wholly acquisitive and self-seeking as opposed to the thoroughly selfless 
Christian agape, we shall consider whether this view tells the full truth about eros. 
In this endeavour we shall explore the interrelationship of eros and understanding 
understood as a dialectic directed towards the pursuit of truth, which in both the Platonic 
and Christian traditions involves the permanent possession of the good, beautiful and 
true; these converge in Neo-Platonic tradition, forming a unity which in Christianity is 
identified with God. We shall also explore how various strands of eros relate to and 
articulate the notion of love of the individual. These explorations cast light on the 
transformation of Platonic eros by Christian agape into the Latin concept of caritas. 
In terms of procedure, we shall examine the notion of Platonic eros as presented 
in the Symposium and the Phaedrus and how this conception is reinterpreted in Dante's 
Commedia, these texts together acting as a lens which -will enable us better to 
comprehend the significance of Bros, and of love more generally, through the 
transformation of eros over time. 
Aporoumeno ial l' o uk exaporoumenoi 
(Aicopov wvoi a u, o& f aýcpopovusvoi) 
2 Corinthians 4: 8 
"Our way is difficult, but we are not at a dead end"' 
1 D. Emmet translation. 
INTRODUCTION 
. 
Examination of the texts of Dante reveals what appears to be the presence of 
Platonic thought and influence particularly clustered around the notion of love. Though 
Dante had no direct exposure to Plato's dialogues on love, ' nonetheless the similarity 
suggests a strong influence. This thesis will focus upon the Platonic notion of eros and 
how it changes over time, ultimately being integrated into the Christian notion of love as 
understood by Dante, and how this Platonic influence is instantiated within Dante's 
poetry, with special reference to the Commedia. 
At the heart of this similarity lies an awareness of a difficulty with regard to any 
inquiry into the nature of love arising from the ambiguity of the concept. This ambiguity, 
to a greater or lesser extent neglected in the terms used to designate it, has historically 
brought into question whether love is a god or a daimon, positive or negative, good or 
bad or in-between; all attempts to explicate the concept or define the terms prove 
problematic. Such endeavours result in causing the thinker to find himself in a dark pit, 
an aporia, from which he will struggle to climb out. This difficulty gives rise to one of 
the principal concerns of this thesis, which is to find a poros or way, out of the aporia of 
knowledge with regard to love, which we shall show to be articulated through the passage 
of eros from Plato to Dante. 
Historically, due to the ambiguity of the concept of love, thinkers have 
sought ways of dividing the map of the territory into kinds or types of love. Thus the 
concept appears in diverse configurations, emphasizing different aspects of its character 
depending upon the culture and period. The single term in English "love" finds at least 
three forms in Classical Greek, philia, eros and agape (Markus, p. 141). In the Platonic 
dialogues eros means passionate desire or longing and itself is divided into two types, 
earthly and heavenly eros, passionate desire directed towards the physical versus 
passionate desire directed towards the spiritual which is ethically virtuous, beautiful and 
true. However with the beginning of Christianity, which placed great importance upon 
agape (God ["the Good-in-itself'] is by&rrj), questions arise as to the relation and 
1 See, for example Moore, "Dante and Plato", First Series, p. 156. 
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difference between eros and agape. Nygren sees them as different kinds and opposites, 
pagan eros "the evil" corroding the purity of Christian agape (Nygren, pp. 51-4 and 210). 
Though accurate in some ways, this demonstrates some misunderstanding on the part of 
Nygren2 of the complexity of Platonic eros which we shall explore in Part 1. For the 
medieval mind the distinction between eros and agape was parallelled by the relation 
between amor and caritas as we see in the Commedia. In this context amor is 
approximately equivalent to eros whereas caritas brings together aspects of the Platonic 
notion of heavenly eros and agape, 3 indicating what appears to be a Platonic leaning in 
the Christian notion of love. The term caritas represents an effort to express the 
compassionate loving nature of the Christian God, and hence the standard of Christian 
love; it avoids what has been considered to be the "colourless" neutral quality of the 
Greek term agape (meaning to "be content with", to "like"), while suggesting/capturing 
both "the warmth of phileo" and the "intensity of erao" not present in the word agape 
which refers to the will and therefore action as opposed to emotion. (Richardson, A 
Theological Word Book of the Bible, pp. 133-134) Given that within the overall concept 
of love, each kind of love though distinct participates and interacts with the others within 
the whole, through isolating one type of love, eros, we shall use it in order to analyze the 
overlapping and some of the points of intersection in these configurations, a procedure 
which will give rise to a more complete understanding of love more generally. Given that 
this is our focus we shall not be examining agape in detail as this would demand another 
thesis. 
Our title is Dialectics of Eros. AtaAcicrtKi7 is "the art of debating or arguing" 
(Liddell and Scott; Sza2ricriic6s means "skilled in discourse or argument"). Dialectics is 
the "art of investigating the truth of opinions" (Oxford English Dictionary) to determine 
whether the opinions are accurate or not, thereby involving the pursuit of the truth. Thus 
dialectic should lead towards the truth. As the dialectics which we are going to 
investigate are the dialectics of eros, of passionate desire, we can interpret this title two- 
fold. First, desire is necessary to motivate the individual in the pursuit of truth as one will 
only seek what one lacks (Symposium 200E8-9). Eros and dialectics are for this reason 
2 See Outka, Agape, p. 57 for a critique of Eros as self-seeking. Also see critiques by Vlastos ("The 
Individual as an object of love", p. 32) and Osborne (p. 55). 3 Nygren, p. 56. 
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profoundly connected. Second, as dialectics investigate the truth in opinions we shall 
investigate the truth of opinions about Bros, of which there are many given its ambiguous 
nature. 
For Plato eros, passionate desire, is closely linked with understanding. In the 
Symposium this becomes evident in Socrates' speech in which desire indicates a lack of 
goodness and beauty but simultaneously is the longing for that goodness or beauty. The 
full and permanent possession of goodness, beauty and truth is a state of enlightenment 
and virtue which is the telos of all desire. In contrast with the Platonic dialogues in which 
these three "forms" remain separate though related, in the Neo-Platonic tradition the true, 
good and beautiful converge in the One, a convergence which in Christianity is identified 
and is revealed to mankind as God by whom man is redeemed and enlightened. Hence for 
the Christian, Platonism points towards, finds its questions answered by, and finds its 
completion in Christianity. 
In order to understand Plato's conception of eros, we shall first turn to the myth of 
the birth of Eros in Plato's Symposium in which we shall find Eros to be the child of 
Poros and Penia, sharing in the nature of each. However what initially appears simple 
proves extremely complex and ultimately problematic in that Poros has three different 
and interactive meanings while Penia, though relatively consistent, nonetheless has both 
an intellectual and a physical meaning. Further, the balance of Poros and Penia 
respectively in the understanding of Eros, and the emphasis placed on different meanings 
therein, shifts over time. In this context, we shall examine Socrates' relation to Eros in 
the Symposium, the relationship of Eros to philosophy, and demonstrate how the Socrates 
of the dialogue personifies philosophical eros, further understood through his role as 
intermediary. To throw light on this we shall explore the relation of eros and irony. 
Initially through the Symposium we shall discuss a traditional understanding of irony as 
well as Socratic irony. This will be followed by an examination of Platonic irony 
explored in the Phaedrus through Plato's use of the recantation and its role in the text. 
Through this we hope to come closer to the heart of what Plato conceives to be the truest 
form and expression of love. 
In Part 2, we shall see how the Platonic notion of eros expressed in the 
Symposium and the Phaedrus was transmitted, with modifications, possibly through Ovid 
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and the Troubadours' tradition of courtly love but also, and more deeply, via Neo- 
Platonism-from Plotinus' Enneads to Augustine's Confessions and de Trinitate-into 
medieval culture which nourished Dante's conceptions of caritas and amor as found in 
the Vita Nuova and the Commedia. 
Turning to the Medieval Christian period, in Part 3 we shall focus upon Dante's 
Commedia. The conflict between courtly love, emerging from pagan roots which seem to 
be in part of Platonic derivation, and Christianity, which results in the recantation of 
amor in favour of caritas as expressed in the poetry of the Troubadours and the Dolce Stil 
Nuovo, distinguishes two types of love, amor and caritas, the first of which we shall read 
as emphasizing a certain understanding of penia and the latter of poros. Dante articulates 
these conceptions through Francesca and Beatrice; through interweaving them with pagan 
myth, whereby Francesca is figured as earthly Venus and Beatrice heavenly Venus, and 
with sections of the Bible, Francesca is presented as Eve and Beatrice as a Christ-like 
figure and new Eve. In the latter case given Beatrice's Christ-like role, Christ being the 
Logos, we shall also explore her analogical relation to God, as she is the means by which 
Dante comes to know God. We shall examine how Dante has reinterpreted the concept of 
love through renegotiation of what may be illuminatingly interpreted as the different 
meanings of poros and penia as articulated through Beatrice and Francesca, and consider 
what this shows concerning the relationship of eros to caritas and of Platonism to 
Christianity. 
Through this procedure of inquiry, we shall aim to achieve an understanding of 
Plato's influence upon Dante, how this occurred and to what extent. Within this context 
we shall seek a deeper comprehension of the nature of eros and its relation to 
understanding, and of how within the narrow framework of these two authors, who are of 
course by no means typical of their periods but in different ways set the terms for much 
subsequent understanding, a specific conception of eros has developed through time. In 
this way we hope better to understand its historical significance which in turn will 
contribute to an exploration of its value within contemporary life. 
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PART 
THE DIALECTICS OF EROS 
IN THE SYMPOSIUM AND THE PHAEDR US 
I. POROS AND APOROS: understanding and subverting the Myth 
of the Birth of Eros 
Through an examination of the myth of the birth of Eros, the relationship of Eros 
to aporia unfolds, resulting in a clarification of the Socratic notion of Eros, and an 
explanation of its later interpretations. Beginning with the myth itself, we shall analyze 
the meaning and the uses of the personifications of Poros and Penia. Having identified 
these, we shall examine their relation to the term aporia and how the derivatives of 
aporia are used in the myth. Taken together these will mark out both the sequence and 
stages of eros and also bear upon the latter's relation to philosophy. 
Turning to the myth, it will be useful to begin by identifying the etymological 
significance of the figures represented. 
When Aphrodite' was born, the gods held a celebration. Poros [ITöpas, Resource], the son of Metis 
[Mrjrtäos: Mrjris, cunning], was there among them. When they had feasted, Penia [Mvtq Poverty] came 
begging, as poverty does when there's a party, and stayed by the gates. Now Poros got drunk on Nectar 
(there was no wine yet, you see) and, feeling drowsy, went into the garden of Zeus, where he fell asleep. 
Then Penia schemed up a plan to relieve her lack of resources [a; ropiav, aporian]: she would get a child 
from Poros. So she lay beside him and got pregnant with Love [Eros, Epmra, Epas]. (203b-c; Dover 
edition in brackets. Translation Nehamas and Woodruff unless specified. ) 
A. Poros 
The term Poros is particularly complex in that it has two distinct meanings and is further 
complexified through its reinterpretation in Neo-Platonism, which has a substantial 
bearing upon this thesis which examines Eros the "child" of Poros and its historical 
transformations. For this reason we must begin by examining the different meanings of 
Poros, and how these meanings interconnect, in order adequately to understand Eros. 
1 Aphrodite, rather than the heavenly Aphrodite the earthly Aphrodite, daughter of Zeus and Dione, a view 
supported by Price's (p. 20) analysis of 203el. 
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1. Poros as Resourcefulness/Cunning 
The first meaning of Poros, which has more of an intellectual emphasis, is "a way or 
means of achieving, accomplishing, discovering, " "a means of providing" (Plato, Meno 
78d), and "a contrivance, device, resource" (Liddell and Scott, p. 1256) 
2 Poros involves 
a type of intellectual cleverness and resourcefulness which is "never at a loss, never 
without expedients (poroi) to get himself out of any kind of trouble (aporia)" 
3 This 
intellectual cleverness is entirely different from "the contemplating of immutable 
essences" as it involves dexterity with regard to the manipulation of "shifting, multiple 
and unpredictable entities of Becoming" and is therefore applied to particular concrete 
situations in order to overcome individual aporiai. 
This conception is articulated through Poros' parentage, his mother being Metis or 
Cunning .5 Zeus swallowed 
Metis, his first wife and the mother of Athena, to ensure his 
sovereignty (Hesiod, Theogony 887-901,925-30), given that she was foreseen to give 
birth to a son of great wisdom who would rule over the gods and men, an act through 
which Zeus opposed destiny/fate. As she was wisest of the gods, Zeus put her "inside his 
own belly" so that "this goddess should think for him, for good and for evil" (Theogony 
901, Trans. Lattimore), giving him "the resourceful cleverness which enables [him] to get 
out of inextricable situations" (Detienne and Vernant, Cunning Intelligence, p. 112). In 
her struggle against Zeus which she ultimately lost, Metis' ingenuity, contrivance and 
cunning were demonstrated in that she metamorphized herself into different forms 
beneath his fingers, to camouflage herself and thereby trick him. This shows Metis' 
kinship with the divided, shifting world of multiplicity in the midst of which it operates. It is this way of 
conniving with reality which ensures its efficacy. Its suppleness and malleability give it the victory in 
domains where there are no ready-made rules for success, no established methods, but where each new trial 
2 Strangely, among the references to the various uses of Poros in Liddell and Scott, Plato's Symposium is 
not mentioned. 
3 Detienne and Vernant, Cunning Intelligence, p. 18; compare Odysseus in Homer's Odyssey. 
ibid., p. 144. 
s "The idea of Wisdom (Mrjris) also played a part, as a personified being, in the speculations of the 
theogonists. For it seems, at least, probable that the Orphic theologians had already in Plato's time evolved 
the equation Phanes=Ericapaeus=Metis, and that here as elsewhere in the language of Diotima there lie 
allusions to the doctrines of that school of mystics. "(Bury, xli) "Mrjzis was also an Orphic alias of Eros". 
(Bury, pp. 100-1) 
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demands the invention of new ploys, the discovery of a way out (Poros) that is hidden. (Detienne and 
Vernant, Cunning Intelligence, p. 21) 
Hence Metis and consequently her son Poros demonstrated the ability to think up new 
schemes or ways out of problems, difficulties, lack of ways hence aporiai. 
This understanding of Poros as possessing "cunning" seems to be present in one 
of Alcman's poems, the Partheneion (Louvre Partheneion. Frag. I), one of the earliest 
examples of Greek poetry (c. 700 BC) in which Aisa and Poros seems to be personified 
as primordial deities described as "the most honoured (eldest) of the gods" (Detienne and 
Vernant, Cunning Intelligence, p. 127). Page (Alcman, The Partheneion, pp. 35-6) 
suggests that Aisa and Poros have related meanings in that each personifies the idea of 
"Allotment, powers of predestination". Supporting this reading, Kirk, Raven and 
Schofield (p. 49) view the context as "requiring man's destiny or portion as the general 
sense of both Aisa and Poros". Page's position is given at best partial support by Bowra 
(p. 26) who accepts that "Poros is closely related to Aisa" while arguing that Poros seems 
"to stand for initiative as opposed to destiny". He (p. 41) maintains that as Alcman 
elsewhere makes Poros "a shaping power in his cosmology, and evidently means it to 
signify `Device' in the sense of the intelligence which shapes situations", so in Fragment 
1 he does something similar. Therefore for him "when Aisa and Poros are combined, it 
means that what has to be happens, but the means by which it happens is the wits of men" 
(p. 41). 
This meaning of Poros is also suggested with regard to Fragment 1 by Campbell 
(p. 363) who translates Poros as "the contriver" referring also to Fragment 5,2, col. iii 
and of Aisa as fate, forming the pair "fate and the contriver"). According to Fraenkel's 
reading of the Partheneion7, Poros stands in opposition to Aisa, the principle of Destiny 
which involves "inescapable compulsion" which is absolute constraint, versus Poros 
which is "relative freedom", "remedy" (Fraenkel, Early Greek Poetry and Philosophy, p. 
6 Detienne and Vernant compare this to Parvese who discusses this relation by indicating that "Poros is 
associated with Aisa as the `way' of `destiny'. To say that `Destiny' and `Way' are the most ancient of the 
gods is to recognise that Destiny is always porimos, that it always finds a way and means to be fulfilled". 
Cunning Intelligence, p. 166) 
Fraenkel, Dichtung und Philosophie 1962, pp. 183-184 referred to and supported by Detienne and 
Vernant in Cunning Intelligence, p. 127. 
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163), 8 "the expression of that element of initiative which the future leaves to an 
intelligence which is capable of making the most of every opportunity", implying 
cunning intelligence, a position embraced by Detienne and Vernant (Cunning 
Intelligence, pp. 166-7; also see Fraenkel, Early Greek Poetry and Philosophy, p. 163) 
and a meaning apparent in Plato's myth .9 
2. Poros as Pathway 
The second and perhaps earlier10 meaning of Poros, which is connected to the 
first and which can be either concrete or intellectual, is a path or way through an aporia 
or lack of way. Liddell and Scott (p. 1256) first define z pos [poros] as a means of 
"passing a river, a ford or ferry" (Herodotus 4: 140, and Aesc. Pers. 864), "a narrow part 
of the sea, a strait" (Hes. Th. 292, Aesch. Pr. 531, and Hdt. 7.183), "the paths of the sea" 
(Aesch. Pers. 453 and Soph. Aj. 412) and often rivers, "an artificial passage over a river, 
a bridge" (Hdt. 4.136), "a general pathway, or way" (Aesch. Ag. 910), or "a passage 
through the skin or passages by which the äýoppoat passed" a use which significantly is 
found in Plato's Meno 76c. (Also see Penwill, pp. 15-20. ) 
This kind of poros is exemplified through a commentary based upon what seems 
to be a cosmological poem by Alcman cited above (Oxyrhynchus Papyrus 2390 Fr: 3 col. '" 
Fraenkel ((Fraenkel, Early Greek Poetry and Philosophy, pp. 163-4) makes a convincing case that this is 
the conception of Poros which Alcman intends through his analysis of the subsequent lines of Frag. 1. Aisa 
is expressed several lines later when Alcman writes, "Let no man's striving spirit soar up to the heaven or 
seek to wed Aphrodite" or a "child of the sea-god". Here according to Fraenkel, "Aisa establishes our 
human limitations firmly and places us far below the gods". Then by writing, "the graces with lovely 
eyelashes come to the house of Zeus", Alcman shows that "charis ('charm, amiability, complaisance, 
grace') lead men to the throne of gods" as opposed to violence or being a "presumptuous claimant". Hence 
as West ("Alcman and Pythagoras", p. 9) writes, "the lyre is mighter than the sword" and gains entry. So, 
"even ifAisa, destiny, separates man and god forever, Poros, the possession and graceful use of good gifts, 
builds a bridge over the abyss" (Fraenkel, Early Greek Poetry and Philosophy, p. 164), which points us to 
our second meaning of Poros. 
Furthermore, if seen in this way, "when Aisa and Poros are called most worthy of honour (or 
eldest) of the gods, the implication is that absolute compulsion and relative freedom are the basic principles 
of the world" (Fraenkel, Early Greek Poetry and Philosophy, p. 163), which points towards Fraenkel's 
understanding of Poros and Tekmor in Frag. 5 and which supports his understanding of Fragment 5 as a 
cosmology. 
"By Plato's time the meaning `device' had become common, and it is of this that Poros is a hypostasis. 
One can see the ghost of Plato's Poros lurking behind the common interpretation of Alcman's as `Device'". 
(Penwill, p. 33, note 30) 10 "The use of Poros as `Device' is not particularly common in the fifth century. The earliest uses of Poros 
are all concrete-as a ford or paths in the sea. " (Penwill, pp. 15-20) 
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ii, 7-20; in Cambell, Frag 5). 11 In this commentary, the writer personifies Poros, bringing 
together physical and psychological processes with myth. 12 In the cosmogony, the world 
was originally in a state of formlessness and lack, ü&rl, where "nothing was 
distinguishable", after which Thetis began a craftsman-like, smith-like activity "putting 
13 S? i1 in order" (Bowra, p. 26). While for West Alcman's choice of Thetis, a sea- 
" The commentator on Alcman writes, "In this ode Alcman speculates upon nature" (Frag. 5, col. I, 26; in 
Cambell, Frag. 5). Given that Alcman's original text has not been preserved with the exception of lemmata, 
it is debatable to what extent Frag. 5 represents the thought of Alcman. This is first apparent in that the 
scholia show an Aristotelian influence, assimilating "Alcman to Aristotle's discussion of four `causes'... in 
Physics B. " (Kirk, Raven, Schofield, p. 48; also see West in "Alcman and Pythagoras", p. 4 and Penwill, 
pp. 15-20) Secondly both Page ("Oxyrhynchus", pp. 20-21) and Penwill (pp. 13-14) note that in Frag. 5 the 
commentator is mistaken in associating Skotos with Poros and Tekmor instead of connecting it with 
moonlight and daylight as suggested in the following lemma. However West (p. 154), Fraenkel (pp. 253-4), 
Kirk, Raven and Schofield (pp. 47-9) and Penwill (pp. 14-20) all believe the poem to be a cosmogony. 
Penwill believes that given the unusual and obscure details concerning the natural world, geography and 
biology in his poetry in general it is not surprizing that Alcman produces a cosmology which "displays a 
highly individual character both in terminology and in the motif it employs", as demonstrated in Frag. 20 
where he describes the creation of the seasons (Penwill, p. 14). 
Page states that this is a particular interpretation "put upon Alcman's words" which do not 
necessarily express his opinions which may have been different. The scholium does indicate however that 
he "spoke of Thetis, Poros and Tecmor (how far he personified these two, we do not know) in relation to 
the differentiation of the world-stuff. That it seems to me is almost all we can learn about Alcman's 
discourse" (Page, "Oxyrhynchus", p. 21). This suggests that it is less clear whether Alcman's original poem 
was a cosmogony. However in the scholium of Frag. 1 the commentator has "identified Poros with the god 
called Chaos by Hesiod in his mythologizing [Theogony 116.123]" (Cambell, p. 371), an identity affirmed 
by Penwill. Kirk, Raven and Schofield (p. 49) disagree with the commentator on Fragment 1 in his 
identification of Poros with Hesiod's Chaos. They think it not improbable that "the link with Hesiod's 
Chaos is derived by the Parthenion-commentator from our cosmological fragment". West ("Alcman and 
Pythagoras", pp. 4-5) supports this position stating that the connection between Hesiod's Chaos and 
Alcman's Poros may lie in that both represent the "first movement towards the world's creation". If this 
influence upon the Parthenion-commentator was actual, either he read this fragment or the original poem 
understood as cosmological, or one of the other commentaries then in existence (col. i, 27f. ). Furthermore 
as Kirk, Raven and Schofield (p. 49) mention, the reference to Hesiod's Chaos may show Alcman's 
"awareness of the Hesiodic account". In short regardless of the commentator's misreading and imposition 
of later ideas it does seem that Alcman did speculate on nature. (See Fraenkel, Early Greek Poetry and 
Philosophy, p. 253, note 2. ) 
12 "In the relics of the early Greek cosmologies Alcman's stands independent and alone. It has a mythical 
side, but it also tries to relate myth to physical and mental processes. In his conception of an original 
DArl he is not far from Hesiod's Chaos, but when he sets Thetis to work he seems almost to anticipate 
Thales, who made water the ap/rl of everything. His introduction of ; ropas is confirmed by another 
passage in his poetry, where I7öpos is closely related to 
Mari 
and seems to stand for initiative as opposed 
to destiny. Finally, r6cpwp takes the place of reins in the later philosophers. The combination of Ilopas 
and Aiaa secures the result that light and darkness exist.. . His account of the creation is more than 
mythological and anticipates some of the methods of the first Greek physicists, and incidentally shows how 
much these owed to the speculations of poets. In Alcman we see the first rays of the Ionian Enlightment, 
and watch how he moves forward from Hesiod to something more abstract and more scientific. " (Bowra, 
Greek Lyric Poetry, p. 26) 
13 "As the bronze-worker to unworked bronze, so was Thetis to the undifferentiated matter" (Page, "Oxyrhynchus", p. 20). This cosmogony "differs from Hesiod in that rather than using the analogy of biological reproduction he uses the analogy of the divine demiurge as craftsman" (Penwill, p. 13). 
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goddess, indicates that the 
üirl 
refers to primeval waters and that the poem is a water- 
cosmogony, '4 for Campbell (p. 393) Thetis is not a sea goddess but "creation", her name 
being derived from the verb "to place or set in place". '5 
She is accompanied by the principles16 Poros (Path or beginning, origin) and 
Tekmor (Guide-mark, telos)'7 which she seems to evoke (Detienne and Vernant, Cunning 
Intelligence, p. 150; also p. 310) and which may be "properly aspects of the activity of 
Thetis-the beginning and the end of her demiurgy" (Page, "Oxyrhynchus", p. 20)-- 
which bring the formless void "into shape". 18 While Fraenkel sees a Genesis-like 
creation, 19 Detienne and Vernant describe how this activity opens up a path for the sun, 
enabling light to come into and overcome the dark night of the world through the sun, 
moon and stars (Cunning Intelligence, p. 140). 20 This opening of a path, with Poros as 
both "beginning" and "way", indicates that Poros is "the way of contriving things 
14 West ("Alcman and Pythagoras", p. 2) assumes that given Alcman's date, the single formless element 
referred to is water indicating that this is a water cosmology. West sees this as "confirmed by the use of 
airopos and by the presence of Thetis, the sea-goddess as demiurge". However, Penwill rejects West's 
view which supports early readings of Poros as a waterway and means of crossing. (Penwill, p. 20) 
15 Thetis means "to place or set in place" as efficient cause or caftsman. (Kirk, Raven and Schofield, p. 48) 
However for West, "she was not only chosen because her name refers to the verb indicating her to be "an 
organizer of undefined matter". (West, "Alcman and Pythagoras", p. 3; also see his "Three Presocratic 
Cosmologies", p. 155) 
16 "Now Alcman's Tekmor is neither a concrete and visible sign such as a moon, nor a criterion available to 
men. It is a hypostasis for these things, it exists independently of them; and if we wish to clarify it, we shall 
have to say that it represents a principle or a potentiality rather than a specific event" (West, "Three 
Presocratic Cosmologies", p. 156) 
17 Campbell (Frag. 5) and West ("Three Presocratic Cosmologies", p. 155) translate them as the 
"beginning", "origin" or "ground" and the "end" or "telos". Fraenkel thinks Poros and Tekmor (for him a 
variant of MoiralAisa) represent "open possibility and binding establishment" (Fraenkel, Early Greek 
Poetry and Philosophy, p. 164). Yet "for Poros and Tekmor we must hesitate between more concrete and 
more abstract meanings, with a natural inclination to the former: between physical path or track, and the 
way or means of passage or progress; and between visible signs, mark or limit, and end or culmination 
(both of these being Homeric)" (Kirk, Raven and Schofield, p. 48). Interestingly, Penwill believes Tekmor 
from the "Moira-Aisa group.. . 
is a force primarily responsible for cosmic order" and "fills the role of 
demiurge". 
18 West, "Alcman and Pythagoras", p. 2. "If the world-mass was t ropov irai 
arsxpaprov, trackless and 
featureless, affording neither passage nor orientation, then Poros and Tekmor were the beings immediately 
needed to bring it into shape. " (also see Bowra, p. 40) 
19 This activity results in "the ordering of the world as it comes into being in the sense that the two together 
separate `day' from `darkness' by creating a separate existence for (sun and) moon, and by establishing 
their orbits, phases and seasons upon which all earthly existence depends. " (Fraenkel, Early Greek Poetry 
and Philosophy, p. 164; also see West, "Three Presocratic Cosmologies", p. 156) 
20 "Into the darkness (skotos) of the sky and waters which were originally indistinguishable, [Poros] 
introduces differentiated paths which make it possible to discern upon the vault of heaven and the sea the 
various directions of space which provide orientation in an expanse originally pathless and without any 
point of reference. " (Detienne and Vernant, Cunning Intelligence, p. 148) 
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[which] sets them going" causing differentiation (Bowra, p. 26; also see Lobel, p. 55 and 
West, "Alcman and Pythagoras", p. 2-4, Page, "Oxyrhynchus", p. 20), while Tekmor 
means "to bring things to their final shape, the desired limit in each case" (Page, 
"Oxyrhynchus", p. 20). Poros is therefore a strategy to escape the aporia of lack of way 
in an intellectual sense, while in a physical sense it means passage, pathway or ford out of 
the uXr121 Assisted by Tekmor22, Poros represents "the transition from a chaotic expanse 
of sea to a space which was defined and ordered, " (Detienne and Vernant, Cunning 
Intelligence, p. 152) the plotting of a path or poros over the pontos or "great unknown 
open sea"23 which resembles Tartarus and Hesiod's Chaos. It, therefore, defines "the 
activity of an intelligence entirely directed towards escaping from the aporia of a world 
dominated by confusion" (Detienne and Vernant, Cunning Intelligence, p. 289). 
3. Prior uses of Poros 
There remains some disagreement as to the source of the personification of Poros 
and his relation to Metis and Eros. For Dover (Symposium, 141), there is no reason to 
think that Plato's myth came from "earlier writers; the construction of relationships 
between forces of personified divinities is a common Greek way of characterizing those 
forces (cf. 197d7n. )". However Bury (Symposium xli, 100) notes the probable influence 
21 "Poros, a word which also belongs to the semantic family of perao, to cross, means the stratagem or 
expedient invented by metis so as to open up a path. " (Detienne and Versant, Cunning Intelligence, p. 289; 
see also p. 150) 
22 Tekmor means "a distinctive mark, an indication or sign" related to Poros as it has the "same 
psychological implications; it is synonymous with mechos, plan, remedy for a difficult situation" (Detienne 
and Versant, Cunning Intelligence, p. 150). According to Bowra, "rucpwp means the `boundary' or `end'" 
(Bowra, p. 26; also see Page, Alcman, The Partheneion, p. 35) but "means not only the goal aimed at but 
also the plan or remedy to cope with a difficult situation.... It is a concept which relates to the intersection 
of three separate but complementary domains, namely navigation, astronomy and divination". Tekinor 
means the point aimed at on the horizon, the position of the stars, and which also involves navigation by the 
stars trusting in the signs from the gods revealed by diviners who recognise "signals and choosing guide- 
marks in such a way as to construct a bridge between the visible and the invisible" (Detienne and Versant, 
Cunning Intelligence, pp. 288-9). 
23 "Pontos, which is described as apeiron, no doubt because it is impossible to cross it from one side to the 
other, has its counterpart in Poros, known as a cosmological power ever since the age of Alcman. The 
original sense of Poros was a ford, a passage through a stretch of water, and it thus came to mean the route 
or path that the navigator has to open up through the pontos and across the sea. " (Detienne and Versant, 
Cunning Intelligence, p. 222) "Poros represents paths in the primeval sea, Tekmor signs of direction 
through it. " (West in Kirk, Raven and Schofield, p. 48) 
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of Orphic theologians as well as the use of personifications of Poros and Penia which are 
later used in Aristophanes' Plutus. 
With regard to Poros, in Alcman's Parthenion (Frag. 1,13-15), Poros (associated 
with Metis/Cunning) and Aisa (Destiny) are personified and called geraitatoi. Page 
(Alcman, The Partheneion, p. 36) believes "No other personification of Poros is recorded 
and no other Hellene called Aisa and Poros `eldest of the gods"'. With regard to the 
relation of Poros and Eros, "there is no reason to believe that the genealogy existed 
before Plato, who indeed has probably invented it for his own purpose". Though Inge (p. 
140, note 1) believes that "Greek mythology had no authoritative doctrine about the 
parentage of Eros", Hesiod (Theogony, 120-1), who does not refer to Poros, describes 
Eros as having come into existence just after Chaos with Gaia and Tartaros. Later, 
following the birth of Aphrodite, Eros accompanies her (Theogony, 202). In contrast, in 
Symposium 203b3 Diotima characterizes Eros as "begotten on the birthday of 
Aphrodite", a point which Plotinus extends to mean that he is the child of Aphrodite, 
though at Symposium 178 Phaedrus reports Parmenides' view that Eros is the oldest of 
the gods 24 
Though Hesiod treats Metis/Cunning as a goddess (Theog., 887 and 900), he does 
not associate her directly with the gods, Eros and Poros. Fragments 12-13 of Parmenides 
suggest "that it was not Plato who invented the relationship between Metis and Eros" 
(Detienne and Vernant, Cunning Intelligence, p. 146): "She devised (metisato) Eros first 
of all the gods" (Frag. 13) 25 Hence in Parmenides, the female daimon steering all things 
like Metis created "`as the first of all gods Eros, the cosmic power of love and 
procreation" (Burkert, Greek Religion, p. 310). "The verb metiomai implies a kind of 
creation but one which involves not so much giving birth as a goddess as a mental 
operation carried out by the intelligence typical of a knowing daimon who steers the 
world, plotting out its route in advance, just as a pilot guides a ship over the sea" 
(Detienne and Vernant, Cunning Intelligence, p. 146). Hence in Parmenides' myth we 
have a Metis-like figure creating Eros. 26 
24 "Eros has no fixed parentage in early legend. " (Page, Alcman, The Partheneion, p. 36, note 2) 
25 Barker 2003 translation. Also see Kirk, Raven and Schofield, The Presocratic Philosophers, p. 257. 
26 "In Acousilaos, by contrast, Nux and Erebus give birth to a shining Metis who is associated with Alther 
and Eros. " (Detienne and Versant, Cunning Intelligence, p. 157) 
13 
4. A Third Use of Poros: Wealth/Plenty/Possession in Plotinus 
A third use of poros is due to reinterpretation or misinterpretation of the original 
concepts of poros as involving cunning to resolve an aporia, or as a pathway; this is 
poros as wealth, resource or possession. In order to understand this later interpretation of 
poros, which emerges fully in Plotinian thought thereby informing the Christian tradition, 
we must turn back to the earlier uses of poros. The possibility of this conception, perhaps 
even a strand of this interpretation of poros as wealth, is present in the earlier Greek 
conception of poros. An example of this may be found in the Argonautica. When storm 
causes pontos to return to an aporos state, the Argonauts are saved by Apollo shining a 
light which "is likened to the world suddenly emerging into light out of the primordial 
night, .... Metis-Phanes who by moving her wings .... 
by setting the winds and stars in 
motion, disperses the `shadowy darkness' and thus brings in the `brilliant light"' 
(Detienne and Vernant, Cunning Intelligence, p. 156). Thus it is through the god's action 
that the poros or pathway through the aporia is opened. Similarly in the Odyssey, "Just 
as the pilot makes the agonizing discovery that he has reached a part of the pontos that 
cannot be crossed Athena comes and opens a route for him, indicating a poros which is 
both a solution and a way out of the aporia into which the sea may plunge sailors and 
navigators" (Detienne and Vernant, Cunning Intelligence, p. 222). Thus again it is the 
goddess who through her resourcefulness, cunning and contrivance creates the poros, 
"the solution" as in the first definition and the way out or pathway out of the aporia as in 
the second. Taken one step further, this can be understood as a wealth or resource from 
heaven supplying the lack of the earth which ultimately leads to the Plotinian opposition 
of Poros and Penia as resource, wealth or possession versus the lack or poverty of matter. 
A further potential source, not only of the Platonic opposition of Poros and Penia 
but also of subsequent readings of poros as possession or wealth, may be found in the 
Plutus which probably dates from several years before the Symposium. Aristophanes 
personifies both poverty and wealth, so the more "usual antonym of penia is 2rAovros 
(ploutos) `wealth"' (Dover, p. 141). This opposition of Plenty and Poverty is passed 
down to Plutarch, in De Iside et Osiride, ch. 57,374D-E which is an interpretation of 
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Plato's myth. Plutarch's work represents the parents of Eros to be Plenty and Poverty, 
Poros which he equates with "Form" (MacKenna, Enneads, p. 180, note 67) or 
"intelligible reality" (Armstrong, Enneads, pp. 182-3, note 3), and Penia with "Matter". 27 
However this new leaning in the term poros takes its full form in the work of 
Plotinus. Plotinus develops an elaborate interpretation of Diotima's allegory in which 
"Zeus is voüs (nous), Aphrodite is yrvxrl, (psuche), Poros is 2äy as (logos), Penia is 
iii rl 
(hule); and much more to the same effect" (Stewart, The Myths of Plato, p. 428)28 
Plotinus reads Poros as the Reason-Principle of all that is from the Intellect, which upon 
the birth of beauty overflows, and lies drunk with beauty within Zeus' garden. "These 
Reason-Principles-this Poros who is the lavishness, the abundance of Beauty-are at 
one and are made manifest; this is the Nectar-drunkenness. " (MacKenna, Ennead III. 5, 
9) Like Plutarch, Plotinus interprets the myth as the "intelligible nature" having 
intercourse with matter, a sufficient, definite rational principle merging with an irrational 
"indefinite impulse" (Armstrong, Ennead), and "indeterminate striving" (MacKenna, 
Ennead), producing Eros which, due to its "material" element29 or penia, remains 
incomplete, insufficient (Armstrong, Enneads, III, 5,7). In contrast to the first conception 
of Poros as involving intellectual cleverness and cunning, Plotinus modifies the meaning 
of Poros which is now seen as the fullness resulting from the descending Reason- 
Principle from the One into the Soul, eventually resulting in the "contemplation of 
immutable essences". At the beginning of 111,5,8 MacKenna translates Poros as wealth. 
"Poros, Wealth, is the Reason-Principle of the Universe", while at the start of the next 
section, "This Poros, Possession... [is] the Reason-Principle of all that exists in the 
Intellectual Realm and in the supreme Intellect", implying possession of the good and 
beautiful. 30 Similarly Armstrong translates Poros as "Plenty". 31 Poros is interpreted as 
27 These "unite to form the universe, and [he] assimilates the three to the Egyptian triad Osiris, Isis, and 
Horns. Plotinus, though rejecting the identification of Love with the universe [see III, 5,5], retains 
something from this older allegorical interpretation of his parents. " (Enneads, pp. 182-3, note 3) 28 "Plotinus identifies Aphrodite with `the soul', or more definitely with the soul of Zeus' (Zeus himself 
being ö voüs), but it seems clear from Plato's language that she is rather the personification of beauty 
('AOpo&irgs xaAis ouo-ris 203c). " (Bury, xlii) 
29 "The idea that the soul's Love has a radical incompleteness, a permanent incapacity to be satisfied, 
because of the 'material' element in it, goes rather beyond anything else in the Enneads. " (Armstrong, 
Enneads, p. 190, note 1) 30 Plotinus' reading of Poros in the myth seems to have been derived in part from his reading of Symposium 204A and B. He writes Eros "is not entirely destitute; the deficient seeks more of what it has, and certainly 
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being full of "reason-principles" flowing down from the Good, and therefore satisfied, 
sufficient, 32 yet simultaneously overflowing in "reason-principles" and hence goodness; 
this Christian Neo-Platonists later reinterpreted as the expression of a non-acquisitive 
form of love, which was hardly part of the initial use of Poros as the child of Metis, 
Cunning. 33 All of these translations indicate, rather than cunning which implies a worldly 
wisdom, an abundance, due to the downpouring of the Intellect from the One or the 
Good, of form, beauty, reason, goodness, etc. so that to acquire this type of wisdom 
involves a turning upwards in contemplation of the good, from which one receives a 
"wealth" of goodness, rather than a turning downwards to the world implicit in poros as 
cunning, by which one's ends are achieved. 
Plotinus' view, furthermore, seems to be connected to, and to some extent a 
reinterpretation of, the second meaning of poros, pathway. This seems to be the case in 
that the contemplation of this wealth of "reason-principles", and the tracing and 
following of them back to their source, act as a poros or way through which the 
individual soul is freed from the aporia of the world, resulting in the freeing and/or 
salvation of the soul (depending upon the interpretative tradition). Thus in Plotinus' 
nothing absolutely void of good would ever go seeking the Good" (MacKenna, 111,5,9). In Ennead I. 6,2 
"On Beauty", the "Reason Principles" impress form upon matter making it beautiful. Likewise, in Ennead 
III. *5,9, the "Reason Principles" impress form upon matter making it good (MacKenna, p. 186, note 81). 
Eros being a desire for the good (MacKenna, III, 5,9), and being midway between good and evil, beauty 
and ugliness, seeks goodness and beauty as something which it already in part possesses and feels a kinship 
with (111.5,1). For this reason Plotinus in his reading of the myth sees poros as indicating a possession of 
beauty and goodness, and eros as having a partial possession, the fulfilment of which it pursues. For a 
similar later reading see Ficino On Love, Speech VI, 7, p. 117. 
31 "The rational principles all together are Plenty, the plentitude and wealth of beauties, already manifested; 
and this is the being drunk with nectar. " (Armstrong, Enneads, 111,5,9) 
32 "Soul which is with Intellect and has come into existence from Intellect, and then again been filled with 
rational principles and, itself beautiful, adorned with beauties and filled with plenitude, so that there are in 
it many glories and images of all beautiful things, is as a whole Aphrodite, and the rational principles in it 
are all plenitude and Plenty, as the nectar there flows from the regions above; and the glories in it, since 
they are set in life, are called the `garden of Zeus', and it is said that Plenty `sleeps' there, `weighed down' 
by the principles with which he was filled. " (Armstrong, Enneads, III, 5,9) " An unselfish component in eras however is articulated in the Symposium by Diotima as a "bringing forth 
upon the beautiful in body and soul" (Jowett), or "giving birth in beauty" röxor iv Ka.. l. p, (tokos en kaloi) 
(206b7-8), a view which may be in later readings to some degree conflated with poros. For Plotinus, "the 
One is Eros" (Ennead 6.8,15), by which he understands the Good loves itself working out the dynamics of 
a love relationship within and for itself, though it has no need (Rist, Platonism and its Christian Heritage, 
p. 86, Wallis, 64) as it is "Eros to Himself' (Nygren, pp. 198-99). The One does not care for or need what it 
creates (V, 5,12.40-9; Wallis, p. 64, a point which Nygren (p. 195) disagrees with), nor does it try to 
create, the outpouring being the effortless emanation from itself as light from the sun, and the overflowing 
of other hypostases being the effortless consequence of contemplation of the One. As we shall later see 
when distinguishing eros from agape, eros ultimately degrades on some level as it is focused upon the self. 
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interpretation of the myth of the birth of Eros articulating this process, Poros is the 
embodiment of resource, Penia's beloved, and the object of her seduction as he 
represents the passage by which resource can be achieved, the passage by which Penia's 
lack, lack of passage, or aporia, can be overcome; in this way Poros represents a way or 
means of achieving or providing because he possesses resource. He, for Penia, represents 
her resource. 
Although this third use of poros is at best only implicit in Plato, it represents an 
understanding of the term which was often later accepted, as we see with Neo-Platonist 
readers such as Ambrose and Ficino. Ambrose confusingly and dubiously combines 
Plotinus' reading of Plato's myth of Eros with the Song of Songs which, following 
Novotny's reading, seems to connect Poros' fullness due to the "Reason-Principles" 
coming down from the One with the Logos of God 34 Ficino's view is yet more Neo- 
Platonic, Poros being the descending "ray of God , 35 so that one "receives from Him the 
divine ray, which is Porus, or plenty. In this ray, as though in a kind of seed, the Reasons 
of all things are contained" (Ficino, Speech VI, 7, p. 116). 36 The common component in 
these Plotinian readings of Poros is the interpretation of Poros as the 
outpouring/overflowing of God on what is below, hence man, so that Poros is seen as 
34 Ambrose interprets Plato in terms of the Scriptures which he assumes were known to him. See De Bono 
mortis 5,18-21 "where he combines `the enclosed garden' of the bride in the Song of Songs (4,12) with the 
`garden of Zeus' from Plato's Symposium (203B).... According to Ambrose's commentary Plato took this 
image from that garden in which the bride of the Scripture meets her celestial bridegroom. It is said that he 
called Zeus' garden (Iovis hortum) elsewhere `the garden of the mind' (hortus mentis), because he applied 
the name of Zeus (Jupiter) both to God and to the mind of the universe. Into this garden entered the soul, 
which he calls Aphrodite (Venus)-with Plato this is actually Penia, Poverty, and the event takes place on 
the birthday of Aphrodite-so that she may fill herself with the riches and abundance of the garden, 
wherein the drunk Poros (Porus) was lying, pouring forth nectar. The soul faithful to god, entered the 
garden, wherein there was an abundance of various virtues and flowers of speech. Since in the paradise of 
Genesis there was the tree of the knowledge of good and evil and other trees, Plato arrived at the idea that 
he must transfer this abundance of virtues thence and plant it in the garden of the mind, which Salomon 
called in the Song of Songs also the garden of the soul (hortum animae) or the soul itself. How much more 
beautiful this is, that the soul adorned with flowers of virtue should be a garden, that the soul may be 
watered by the heavenly rain of the Word and by its abundance... may bear fruit. The Word of God then 
feasts on the virtues of the soul.... Hence then were taken those Platonic feasters, hence that nectar from 
prophetic wine and honey, hence sleep, hence that eternal life, which, as he (Plato) says, his Gods enjoy, 
for Christ is life. " (Novotny, p. 198) 
's "When that Poros, that is, the ray of God, descends, once united with Penia, that is, the previous poverty 
of this [lack of light present in the angelic mind], he creates love. " (Ficino, Speech VI, 7, p. 116) 36 Ficino understands "drunk with nectar" to mean that "he overflows with the dew of the divine vitality" 
(Ficino, Speech VI, 7, p. 116). Also see Ficino, Speech VI, 10 (p. 126): "Certainly this great reward of 
Love derives from his father, Plenty, since the ray of beauty which is both Plenty and the father of love, has 
the power to be reflected back to where it came from, and it draws the lover with it. " 
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being of divine origin, a fullness or wealth of creative goodness which in the Neo- 
Platonist Christian context has a selfless aspect and which ultimately, in conjunction with 
Penia or lack, will lead man back to God. The Neo-Platonist conception of Poros, having 
been integrated into the Christian tradition, informed later notions of Eros including that 
of Dante as we shall later see. Thus Plotinus' reading of Poros marked what seems a 
point of departure from Platonic thought in that Plotinus, while believing himself to be 
strictly following Plato, used this Platonic myth and myth in general to suit his own ends, 
a point noted by Armstrong (Enneads, p. 176, note 1). Thus after Plotinus Poros, and 
therefore Eros, has an enriched meaning which we shall consider in the latter part of this 
thesis. 
B. Penia 
Turning now to the other parent of Eros in the myth, Penia personifies Poverty or 
Lack, as it does in Aristophanes' Plutus 388 B. C. written shortly before. 7 This 
personification is developed in that Penia comes begging at the door of the party, as 
traditionally "beggars come to the door when festivities are in progress, hoping to profit 
by the tipsy euphoria of the guests" (Dover, Symposium, p. 142). 
Penia is closely related to aporos; it signifies lack of resource or poverty. 
X, 
ropos 
(aporos; adj. ), in Liddell and Scott (p. 195), means "without passage, having no way in, 
out, or through". On a physical level it means "impassable, pathless, trackless" (Tim. 25d, 
Crit. 108e). In the second usage it describes a state or circumstance which is "hard to see 
one's way through, impracticable, very difficult, " "hard to get, scarce", and the third 
refers to people who are "hard to deal with, troublesome, unmanageable" (Plato, Apol. 
18d, but also in Euripides' Bacch. 800); also "without means or resources, helpless" and 
"poor and needy" (Republic 552a). 4, ropC» (aporeo) means to be 97ropos (aporos), be 
"without means or resource" "to be at a loss, be in doubt, be puzzled" (Plato's Prot. 321c, 
326e, 348c, Polit. 262e, Lysias 115.2, Phaedo 84c, Gorg. 462b, Alcib. 2.142d). In 
dialectic it means "to start a question, raise a difficulty or puzzle" or to be faced by the 
37 This view is supported by Dover (Symposium, p. 142). 
is 
difficulty (Plato, Soph. 243b). It also means "to be left wanting, left unprovided for", as is 
penia. The second type of use for äzopem is "to be at a loss for, in want of' at which 
point we have our first reference to the Symposium 193e. Skipping to the fourth use, 
vropsco means "to be in want, be poor" as in Plato's Symposium 203e. 
Derivatives of the word 
äiropta (aporia) are used three times in 203-4. The first 
use is on line 203b8, &7opiav which Nehamas correctly translates as Penia's "lack of 
resource", Jowett translating it as "penury". When Plato writes "Penia schemed", she 
seems to take on the character of Poros, and therefore seems to show that she is not 
without resource, it pas, herself, to "relieve herself of her lack of resource", to overcome 
her äiropta. 38 This however as Bury points out may well be misleading. Siding with 
Zeller and Stallbaum, he considers that this part of the story is present for "literary effect" 
(Symposium, xli); Detienne and Vernant (Cunning Intelligence, p. 144) suggest that 
"Plato is poking fun". Since these are actual personifications of terms, "Poros could 
never have fallen a victim to the charms of Penia, since she had none; nor could Penia 
ever have hoped to win over Poros by persuasion or force, he being endowed with the 
strength and wisdom of a god" (Bury xli). Instead, on this reading, Penia means poverty 
or absolute lack, regardless of her apparent "scheming" in the action of the myth. 
38 A problem arises when we note that "Penia schemed up a plan to relieve her lack of resources" (203a1) 
while Poros got drunk and "fell asleep" (202b9); this suggests that the myth as a whole functions as an 
aporia. Through their actions, Poros and Penia undercut the qualities they are supposed to personify. Penia 
or Poverty, described we now see more accurately as Need, actually demonstrates the most resourcefulness, 
wisdom, intelligence, intensity, showing herself to be a "schemer after the beautiful and good", a "weaver 
of clever snares, " an "awesome hunter" and "genius of enchantments" and "clever pleadings" and 
"seduction, " identified precisely with the description of Poros (203d3-7). In contrast, Poros, child of 
Cunning, shows his lack of self-possession by getting drunk, and in this vulgarity is not beautiful nor 
delicate but poor, homeless in that he is "lying on the dirt without a bed, sleeping near people's doorsteps 
and.... under the sky" (203c7-d3), thus exemplifying the description of Penia. Thus Poros shows himself 
to be penia while Penia is actually poros, showing that what they are called or appear to be is not who they 
are. Each is its own opposite, and in so doing each undermines itself and the other. This suggests that 
neither Penia or Poros is wholly beautiful nor ugly, wise nor ignorant, good nor evil, immortal nor mortal, 
particularly considering Socrates' characterization of gods as both beautiful and good (201a5-202c10). This 
suggests both to be aporetic, the difference being that Penia knows that she does not know and is conscious 
of her ignorance and aporetic nature which is a kind of wisdom, while the other, Poros, does not recognize 
his ignorance and therefore is wise only in name. This shows that she (or he) who calls herself (or himself) 
penia is a philosopher, while he who considers himself to be wise is the opposite. "Poros", drunk upon his 
own self-importance, perhaps marks one of Socrates' subtle punctures, deflating the sophists (Meno 80a6- 
7; Symposium 198c2-7). This suggests that beneath the surface, received, meaning noted by Bury, Diotima, 
through discreetly weaving aporiai (which undercut her final use of a term associated with aporia [ä'ropou 
(204b7)], meaning not wise, lacks resource, or devoid), renders each term its own opposite. 
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The association of penia with absolute lack, poverty and formlessness remains 
relatively consistent. Turning to the Commentary (Frag. 5) on Alcman's poem, Poros and 
Tekmor who accompanied Thetis, brought a path and thereby light and order into the 
world from a state of 
v %i (hule), formlessness, lack, indeterminacy and void. Thus 
according to this original myth Poros is the way or path out of the aporia of hule, 
39 the 
indeterminacy40 and formlessness which is in a sense penia. 41 This early association of 
penia as lack and hule is later repeated in Plutarch's de Iside et Osiride42 in which penia 
is matter which is formed by poros representing the "intelligible reality" or "Form". Here 
penia refers to hule, brute matter, indeterminate, unreasoned and limitless, "like the first 
hule in Alcman's poem" (Detienne and Vernant, Cunning Intelligence, p. 165, note 45). 
This conception is carried further by Plotinus' interpretation of Plato in Ennead III. 5,9, 
in which Penia or poverty is described as matter and therefore in absolute need43 and 
represents the indeterminate, unlimited and unreasoned element which is conceived in a 
similar way to chaos 44 
Thus in contrast to the term poros which not only had different meanings within 
the Classical Greek culture, but also changed significantly over time, the meaning of 
penia remained relatively consistent. Therefore in order to trace the changes in the term 
eros, which according to the myth is the synthesis of poros and penia, one must pay 
special attention to the meaning of the term poros. 
39 It is only "from Metis and Poros Eros inherits a mind which is ever alert, never at a loss for an expedient 
(poroi) to obtain (porizein) in this universe of barrenness (penia) into which he is plunged all the riches 
towards which he is attracted, in other words the Forms, knowledge and beauty. " (Detienne and Vernant, 
Cunning Intelligence, p. 144) 
40 On a metaphysical level, "Penia represents lack of form and absence of determination" (Detienne and 
Versant, Cunning Intelligence, pp. 144-45). 
41 Detienne and Vernant indicate that before Poros and Tekmor "made their appearance there was a state of 
matter negatively defined as aporon kai atekmarton, by an absence of Poros and Teknor and so, in this 
sense, penid' (Cunning Intelligence, p. 145). 
42 Plutarch, Moralia 374d. 
43 "But his mother is Poverty, because aspiration belongs to that which is in need. And Poverty is matter, 
because matter, too, is in every way in need, and because the definiteness of the desire for the good-for 
there is no shape or rational forming principle in that which desires it-makes the aspiring thing more like 
matter in so far as it aspires" (Armstrong, Enneads, III, 5,9). 
44 "Chaos is conceived in the same negative way in the later Orphic texts. The mega chasma is described 
negatively as a darkness lacking everything: astaton kai apeiron kai aoriston, without stability, without 
limits, without determination.. .. 
Because there are no distinctions everything is confused in a dark fog. It is 
an abyss which has no.... limits nor bottom nor foundation" in contrast to Nereus who in the Orphic Hymn 
is the "foundation and base of the ocean, the limit of the earth and the principle of all things". (Detienne 
and Vernant, Cunning Intelligence, p. 145) 
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C. The Relation of the Preceding Argument to the Myth 
In order to understand better the interpretations of this myth, let us turn back to 
the argument that precedes it. When Socrates, at the beginning of his speech, questions 
Agathon (which ironically is the Greek term for good, agathos), he shows that eros is 
"the love of something, and... that he loves things of which he has a present need" 
(200e6-7), that which he lacks. From Agathon's speech, Socrates accepts the claim that 
as "the gods' quarrels were settled by the love of beautiful things" (201a5) so eros desires 
what is beautiful, but this however implies that eros lacks beauty. Furthermore, as "all 
good things are beautiful, he will need good things" (201c6-7) which shows that eros is 
neither good nor beautiful. At this point he invokes Diotima45 behind whom he effaces 
himself, stating that eros is neither beautiful nor ugly, good nor bad, wise nor ignorant, 
immortal nor mortal, but a Bac1CÖViov (daimonion), an intermediary between gods and 
men, at which point he recounts the myth of the birth of Eros. 
Regardless of which meaning of the term poros is employed, this argument 
rehearses the formation of the conception of eros of the subsequent myth, the coming 
together of Poros and Penia. By Socrates stating that eros is for something, which it 
lacks, Eros is characterized by a lack of something, penia. In the first use of poros Eros 
due to his poros, his cunning and resourcefulness, advances towards that which is full of 
resource, possesses the beautiful and good, from which he tries to satiate his lack, penia. 
As Eros always lacks the good and the beautiful by definition, he will always be poor and 
45 Plato's reasons for invoking a mantic female figure as Socrates' instructor, though perhaps involving the 
description of a real figure, remain open to a wide variety of interpretations. Cobb (p. 71) notes that this 
gesture of making Socrates' philosophical superior a woman would have shocked. He and Sayre (pp. 111- 
2) considers this to be a statement against male sexism, while Cavarero (In Spite of Plato, p. 101) believes 
this to undermine and exclude women. Bury (xxxix) sees her as a fictional personage and as representing 
the prophetic temperament. (See also Bury xl and Stewart p. 428. ) This contrasts with A. E. Taylor (pp. 
224,230-1) who sees her as a historical figure, as does Halperin (p. 120). Diotima doubles or "supplants 
the Platonic Socrates". (Bury xxxix. ) This contrasts with Cornford's reading in The Unwritten Philosophy 
(p. 71) in which her presence is seen as Socrates' courtesy to Agathon which leads to a perfectionist 
reading in which Diotima functions as a perfectionist tool. (Deb, "Socrates and Alcibiades, " p. 5) Though it 
is impossible to establish which reading is accurate, since she responds specifically to each of the speeches 
in her speech, most poignantly exemplified by her response to Aristophanes' speech, whether or not she 
was a historical figure, her speech is a construction of Socrates. (For a more thorough discussion see 
Halperin's "Why Diotima is a Woman", pp. 119-24. ) 
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aporos, yet as he is "resourceful and cunning", indicative of the first use of poros, he will 
always be directed towards the beautiful and good and thereby be the "passage" or "way" 
towards it, indicative of the second use of the term poros. Moreover if, as in Plotinian 
thought, poros is conceived of as "possession", "plenty" or "wealth", the myth still seems 
as fully to depict the argument preceding it. Within this interpretation, Penia represents 
the lack of goodness and beauty, while Poros represents its possession being full of 
"reason-principles". Eros being the merging of these lacks the good and beautiful yet 
possesses it46 enough to know what it lacks. 47 This reading therefore also exemplifies the 
claim that Eros stands midway between good and evil, wisdom and ignorance, beauty 
and ugliness, and is a daimon, an intercessor between the mortals and immortals and 
therefore a passage towards the good and beautiful, simultaneously lacking and 
possessing the good. Thus the prior argument remains depicted through the myth, 48 in 
order to establish the meaning of eros as the synthesis of poros and penia, even though 
on this interpretation the meaning ofporos has shifted. 
46 The presence of the beautiful in relation to eros is illustrated most eloquently by Plotinus when he writes 
of the soul, "when it sees anything of that kin, or a trace of that kinship, thrills with immediate delight, 
takes its own to itself. For the primal source of love is a tendency of the soul towards pure beauty, in a 
recognition, in a kinship, in an unreasoned consciousness of friendly relations... when anything brings 
delight and a sense of kinship, its very image attracts. "(Enneads 3.5.1. MacKenna translation) Clearly 
within the Symposium, "kinship" with the beautiful indicates Socrates' response to Aristophanes' speech 
(192e8-1933; cf. 205d9-e6) implying further a "fallen state" of mankind, a state noted by Cornford, pp. 
128-9 and Guthrie, "Plato, the Man and his Dialogues, p. 393. 
"Plotinus' reading of Poros in the myth seems to have been derived in part from his reading of Symposium 
204A and B. He writes Eros "is not entirely destitute; the deficient seeks more of what it has, and certainly 
nothing absolutely void of good would ever go seeking the Good. " (MacKenna, III, 5,9) In Ennead I. 6,2 
"On Beauty", the "Reason-Principles" impress form upon matter making it beautiful. Likewise, in Ennead 
III. 5,9, the "Reason-Principles" impress form upon matter making it good (MacKenna, p. 186, note 81). 
Eros being a desire for the good (MacKenna, III, 5,9), and being midway between good and evil, beauty 
and ugliness, seeks goodness and beauty as something which it already in part possesses and feels a kinship 
with (111.5,1). For this reason Plotinus in his reading of the myth sees poros as indicating a possession of 
beauty and goodness, and eros as having a partial possession, the fulfilment of which it pursues. For a 
similar later reading see Ficino On Love, Speech VI, 7, p. 117. 
48 Bury (xl), Stewart (p. 428) and Santas (p. 30) all see the argument depicted through the myth. Bury (xl) 
states that while showing Socrates', in the guise of Diotima, ability to rival Aristophanes in "imagination 
and inventive fancy", the myth's use of allegory "puts into a concise picture those characteristic features of 
the love-impulse which are subsequently developed in an abstract form". A. E. Taylor's understanding of 
both myth and scientific description/ logic is that they are similar in that they are forms of knowing, as 
opposed to the forms, which in his reading are beyond knowing. "Because `vision' is direct, the content of 
a 'tale' or `myth' cannot really convey it. A `tale' is as much a mere form of `knowing about' as a scientific 
description, and as a form of `knowing about' it is, of course, inferior" (p. 231). Taken in such a way, Plato, 
aware of the difference in types of language, myth speaking to the poet while the "scientific" account 
addresses the philosopher, brings poetry and philosophy to an agreement with regard to the meaning of love. 
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D. Eros as the Child of Poros and Penia 
In the myth, Eros is the child of Poros and Penia. 49 As the child of Poros, which 
shows Plato to be focusing here upon the first meaning, "he is a schemer after the 
beautiful and the good; he is brave, impetuous, and intense, an awesome hunter, always 
weaving snares, resourceful in his pursuit of intelligence, a lover of wisdom through all 
his life, a genius of enchantments, potions and clever pleadings" (Symposium 203d5-d8). 
He represents "a way or means of achieving, accomplishing, discovering" qualified by 
"contrivance device and resource" (Liddell and Scott, p. 1256) but, simultaneously 
following the second meaning of poros, through this skill he represents a pathway, the 
means by which the lack can be satiated. However as he is simultaneously the child of 
Penia, he remains in a state of lack, poverty and need. "In the first place he is always 
poor, and he's far from being delicate and beautiful... instead he is tough and shrivelled 
and shoeless and homeless, always lying on the dirt without a bed, sleeping at people's 
doorsteps and in the roadsides under the sky, having his mother's nature, always living in 
Need" (Symposium 203c8-d4). Eros, the son of Penia is in penia, "helpless, poor and 
needy", losing what he gains. Because of his intrinsic lack he is aporetic and therefore 
"perplexed" in "doubt, difficulty, hesitation" and therefore is "without passage, having no 
way in, out, or through" his lack (Liddell and Scott, p. 195). Thus Eros is "by nature... 
never completely without resources, nor is he ever rich,,, 50 in beauty and goodness. 51 
49 Guthrie ("Plato, the Man and his Dialogues", p. 375) and Bury (101) note that for Spenser Love is "begot 
of Plentie and of Penurie. " 
50 Price (p. 20) notes that in contrast to Nussbaum's reading of this myth Eros is "a pauper, but not a loser. 
He is `portionless in the beautiful and good things' (202d5) in that none of them is his stable possession, 
but not to the extent that they always elude him. He is the son of Resource as well as poverty 
(203c5).... now living now perishing, now knowing now unknowing, in a manner that may reflect the 
intermissions of genital sexuality (203e1). " Nussbaum (Fragility, p. 179) argues that for Diotima beauty is 
"uniform, the same kind. All manifestations of Kalon must be significantly like one another that if you lack 
one kind it is natural to conclude that you lack them all". This argument according to Price does not work 
as one can have some beauty but want more, disallowing Nussbaum's understanding of the idea of 
homogeneity in beauty. Therefore, saying love is destitute signifies "`what I love I lack', and not `If I love 
anything I lack everything'" (also see Price, Appendix I), which is exemplified by the mixed nature of eros, 
midway between resource and poverty. (See also a modem personification of Eros in Rameau's nephew of 
Diderot's Le Nefeu de Rameau. ) 
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Due to Eros being the child of Penia, possessing this lack, he is consistently 
aporetic with regard to wisdom. Diotima makes this clear when Eros is described as 
"between wisdom and ignorance.... None of the gods loves wisdom or wants to become wise-for they are 
wise-and no one else who is wise already loves wisdom; on the other hand, no one who is ignorant will 
love wisdom either or want to become wise. For what's especially difficult about being ignorant is that you 
are content with yourself, even though you're neither beautiful nor good nor intelligent. If you don't think 
you need anything, of course you won't want what you don't think you need. " Symposium 204a1-5 
Shorey (What Plato Said, p. 194) explains this paradox by stating, "No god is a 
philosopher or a lover of wisdom, for God already possesses it; no hopelessly ignorant 
being, for hopeless ignorance is precisely the false conceit of knowledge with the 
reality-self-sufficiency or self-content. " This passage outlines a fundamental Socratic 
aporia also presented in the Meno (80e1-3). If one knows nothing, one is unaware of 
one's lack of wisdom whereas if one possesses perfect wisdom, one does not need nor 
does one desire it. Therefore those who love wisdom fall between wisdom and 
ignorance. 2 Eros is one of these as he loves beauty, and "as wisdom is extremely 
beautiful" Eros loves Qoota wisdom (203d7), and is a q$t2ocooos, philosophos, "one 
who pursues wisdom" which he lacks 53 and feels he lacks, 54 which is in keeping with his 
parentage, a mixture of a wise father and ignorant mother. Because of his lack he is 
considered like his mother to be ignorant, since in his partial knowledge he cannot 
compensate for the lack. Therefore, given that Eros as child of Poros and Penia is 
51 In response to Agathon, and the others, we are told that Eros is not good and beautiful but Eros is 
attracted to that which is beautiful and good. At C4, Dover specifies this further by saying that 
"ro E'pacrrov (the object possessing the attributes which attract eros) is the one which in reality is 
beautiful, etc.; not just `the object of eros is beautiful'" (Dover, p. 143). Diotima indicates that those who 
think eros beautiful and good have mistaken the beloved for the lover (Cornford, "The Doctrine of Eros", 
122). 
Hence Diotima's discussion at 201e8-10, where she makes "a point about the neutral middle ground 
between contraries such as `good' and `bad', or `beautiful' and `ugly'. The point is then made again at 
202a2-10 for `wise' and `ignorant' and also at 202b8-13 for `mortal' and `immortal'. The aim is partly to 
stress.. . lack of wisdom, the condition necessary for being a philosopher.... The state of being neither one 
thing nor the other, but in between, is fundamental to the theory of love that is being offered" (Osborne, p. 
101). 
53 In Eros is "symbolized the experience of the OiAöxa2as and the Oc26oooos, who by a law of their 
nature are incapable of remaining satisfied for long with the temporal objects of their desire and are moved 
bý+ a divine discontent to seek continually for new sources of gratification. " (Bury xlii) 5 As A. E. Taylor (226) states "They feel hunger for wisdom but they feel it precisely because it remains 
unsatisfied. " 
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between wisdom and ignorance, Eros consistently falls into an aporia and remains stuck, 
due to the presence of the penia element within Eros resulting in the reduction of eros to 
an aporia, a position of no passage in that he knows he does not possess wisdom since he 
feels a lack, yet is wise enough to know what he lacks. This suggests that for Plato 
aporiai are fundamentally a part of eros due to the component of penia. Perhaps for this 
reason Socrates considered himself to know nothing (with the exception of eros (Symp. 
177d9)) and indeed shows the birth of Eros, which as we will see for Plato is connected 
to philosophy as Eros is a philosopher, to involve following the path of Penia which is 
the subject of our next chapter. 
In this context, however, when considering the wisdom of the gods, we run into a 
problem. Within the Symposium, Poros is conceived of as a god, while Eros is viewed as 
midway between the immortals and mortals, a daimon. As Bury (xli-xlii) writes, "Poros 
is clearly intended to be regarded as a god and Penia is the source of the anti-divine side; 
and... we are justified in identifying this anti-divine side with mortality". Poros the child 
of Metis is cunning and resourceful resulting in the fact that his son is "a schemer after 
the beautiful and the good... impetuous, and intense... always weaving snares... a genius 
of enchantments, potions and clever pleadings" (Symposium 203c5-d7). In contrast 
however, when discussing the aporia of knowledge, the gods are said to be wise and 
therefore not in need of wisdom (204a) as well as happy and in possession of the good 
and the beautiful (202c). The latter clearly describes a purer and more perfect form of 
divinity than that expressed in the myth of the birth of Eros, through indicating a different 
type of wisdom possessed by the gods of 204a1-5 when compared with Poros, son of 
Metis or cunning in 203b. Therefore though officially a god, who indeed resembles 
Hermes, 55 Poros represents some features which are not divine. In presenting Poros in 
this way Plato demonstrates an awareness that the wisdom of the gods cannot be 
associated with these non-divine worldly features such as cunning and contrivance 
inherited by Plato through Greek mythologies and cosmologies such as Hesiod and 
perhaps Alcman. In this way Plato implicitly and with subtlety expresses those doubts 
concerning earlier cosmologies and conceptions of the gods that he makes quite clear in 
the Republic 377e-383, also a middle dialogue. By making the god Poros embody a type 
ss Homeric Hymns to Hermes, lines 10ff. 
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of cunning wisdom, he makes poros appear to be a daimon as opposed to a god. However 
so conceived the god Poros acts as a "pathway" by which Plato points to the possibility 
of purer and more divine conceptions of the gods by subverting the inherited 
mythologies. 
Given Plato's critique, suggested by the distinction between the non-divine 
qualities and conception of wisdom of the god Poros of Symposium 203b and the 
description of the gods in Symposium 204a, the seeds of later interpretations appear to be 
implicit in Plato's text. Though it is not explicitly said, the wisdom of the gods of 204a- 
given that it involves eudaimonia and the possession of the good and beautiful-suggests 
"possession, wealth and plenty". This relates to the crux of later interpretations, 
suggesting that Plotinus' view of Poros is a conflation/confusion of the Poros of cunning 
and resourcefulness with the wisdom of the gods (204a), whereby not only the term poros 
but as a result the tradition of eros takes a new turn, making it digestible for, and 
providing a linguistic resource which, Christianity integrates into its tradition, as we shall 
see in the latter part of this thesis with regard to Dante. 
Moreover, this gesture of implicitly subverting mythologies is also present in the 
text with regard to the relative roles of Poros and Penia. As previously noted, in the myth 
Penia "schemed up a plan to relieve her lack of resources" (203a1) showing herself not to 
be totally poor or lacking in cunning, but possessing greater resourcefulness as a 
"schemer after the beautiful and good", a "weaver of clever snares, " an "awesome 
hunter" and "genius of enchantments" and "clever pleadings" and "seduction" (203d3-7). 
Poros, by contrast, in that he gets drunk and falls asleep (202b9) shows a lack of self- 
control and resourcefulness, and hence his poverty (203c7-d3). Therefore in the action of 
the myth the activities of Poros exemplify penia while Penia's activities epitomize poros, 
so that the activities of Poros and Penia undercut the characteristics which they personify 
so that they undermine themselves and each other creating an aporia. These roles contrast 
with the beautiful, good and happy gods of Symposium 201a5-202c10 in that Penia and 
Poros both stand between goodness and evil, immortality and mortality, beauty and 
ugliness, hence seeming to be daimones in their nature which contrasts with and subverts 
our previous description of Poros as god versus Penia as anti-divine. 
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This of course is paradoxical in a further sense for, as Bury insists, Poros by its 
nature can have no lack as it is a personification; as we noted above, Bury sees Penia's 
resourcefulness as purely a literary device which also gives rise to humour. Nonetheless, 
despite Bury's explanation, Plato does present penia and poros as each exemplifying 
features of the other, and in this way seems intentionally to be creating a tension in order 
not only to subvert the divinity of Poros conceived as cunning, but to underline further 
the lack of perfection/spirituality of the gods of traditional Greek mythology. As with 
other such subversions and aporiai we shall consider in the course of this thesis, this 
seems intended to lead the reader of the dialogue to reflect further upon the subject under 
discussion, and hence provoke critical and speculative thought. In this instance the 
subversion points the reader towards the possibility of a purer notion of god than that of 
inherited mythologies, given first that Poros is presented as exemplifying cunning, an 
inferior and worldly type of understanding as compared to the wisdom of the gods of 
Symposium 204a, and second that the action of this god undermines what he represents 
making his opposite seem truer to the characteristic which he is supposed to embody and 
vice versa. Furthermore, given that Eros in this myth is the child of Poros and Penia, this 
technique of Plato likewise undermines the conception of Eros within his own myth 
pointing to the possibility of a higher, more pure form of eros, a form of eros directed 
beyond the physical which is not only Diotima's project but also that of this thesis. 
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H. THE PATH OF PENIA: Socrates as Paradox 
Looking more closely at this path of penia, we shall examine Socrates who, as 
noted previously, seems to exemplify Eros. In this section we shall consider whether 
Eros is justifiably linked with Socrates in the Symposium. In order to do this, it will be 
necessary to examine how Socrates relates to the description of Eros as exemplifying the 
characteristics of both Poros and Penia. We shall examine further how Socrates, like 
Eros, stands between mortality and immortality, wisdom and ignorance which will clarify 
Plato's conception, in the Symposium, of the relationship of philosophy and eros. We 
shall then return to the story of the birth of Eros and read it in relation to the text as a 
whole, focusing upon the relationship of Alcibiades and Socrates. Taken together, these 
explorations point to a very close correlation between Socrates and Eros. 
A. SOCRATES AS EROS 
If Socrates personifies Eros, he will partake of the natures of both Poros and 
Penia. l Turning first to Penia, partaking of his mother Penia's nature, Eros is "always 
poor" (203c7), responding to Aristophanes' speech (191d1-3) in which "love is born" of 
lack or poverty. In order to identify Socrates with poverty we must specify what type of 
poverty. Though Socrates was not wealthy like Plato, Agathon and Alcibiades, he seems 
to have been a hoplite and was therefore not truly poor. He did have shoes (174a4) and a 
normal home and family (Crito, Phaedo) where he slept when he was not on campaigns 
(Protagoras). However, Socrates did claim that he lacked wisdom (Symposium 216d4; 
Apology 21: B4-5). Whether to disprove the oracle of Delphi (Apology 21A8) or simply as 
a lover of wisdom desiring to fill this lack, Socrates was motivated to seek wisdom 
turning to politicians, poets, and orators (Apology 21-24). As a lover of wisdom therefore, 
in a sense corresponding to Pausanias' speech (183a4-b2) in which the lover humbly 
1 Ficino, in his Commentary on Plato's Symposium on Love, Speech VI, (pp. 155-58), systematically seeks 
to show Socrates to be "like Cupid" (though not here displaying his usual exceptional sensitivity to the 
dialogue). His discussion of worldly Aphrodite in relation to the poverty of eros in Speech VI is far richer, 
though clearly influenced more by the Phaedrus. 
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"went to his knees in public view", Socrates openly acknowledged his ignorance 
(Apology 31bc). Furthermore as Socrates felt he knew nothing and therefore could teach 
nothing, he did not set himself up as a teacher and refused to accept fees, though allowing 
all to listen to him (Apology. 33a). Socrates, then, did not seek financial wealth; rather, 
while he sought to disprove the oracle and deflated the false beliefs of others (Apology 
21e4-22a4), his mission represents his desire for the wisdom that he lacks which he 
believes is to be pursued through dialectical discussion with others. 
However Socrates, though historically probably not very poor, in Plato 
deliberately cultivates the impression/image of poverty in order to represent aspects of 
Eros and cultivate an identity between Socrates and Eros, particularly in the Symposium. 
Plato does this through representing Socrates as usually going barefoot (Symposium 
174a4 and 220b7), and wearing only a light himation in winter (219b6-7 and 220b6)2, 
thereby highlighting his disinterest in possessions (Symposium 219e1-2). In this way, 
through his depiction of Socrates, Plato is redefining true poverty. As physical poverty 
normally desires its physical needs to be met first of all, Socrates' disinterest shows that 
he feels that he does not need nor does he value material objects (and physical 
gratification; see Symposium 219c). In this way he subverts the normal understanding of 
poverty and wealth, pointing to wisdom as true riches and lack thereof as poverty. In so 
doing he redefines poverty as pertaining not to the body but to the soul (173c) and in this 
sense he sees himself as poor. 
Diotima describes Eros as "far from being delicate and beautiful" (203c8) and as 
"shrivelled" (203d1) (responding directly to Agathon's speech 195a9-10,195d1-6, 
referring to Iliad 19.92; and 196a9-b3). Socrates was known for his lack of beauty. 
Alcibiades compares Socrates to the satyr Marsyas 215b6 who has a "horse's tail or ears, 
sometimes the traits of goats" (Nehamas, p. 65) and then states "Nobody, not even you, 
Socrates, can deny that you look like them" (214b6). In Cicero, 3 Zopyrus' physiognomic 
study of Socrates supports his lack of beauty, Socrates having a face revealing "a number 
of vices", vices which Socrates attests to having "thrown out" of himself. Kierkegaard (p. 
2 In Symposium 220b8 the other soldiers took offence at this behavior and viewed it suspiciously, 
suggesting that it was not necessary, not out of true poverty, but voluntary asceticism either out of 
disinterest in the physical or to make a point. 
3 Tusculan Disputations, IV, 37; Opera IV, p. 419. 
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212) suggests Socrates' lack of beauty to be one of the ironic devices that he used to 
mislead people. 
As Diotima describes Eros as being "tough" or "harsh" (203d1) (responding to 
the speech of Agathon, 195e1-8 discussing the delicacy of Eros), so Socrates exemplifies 
this aspect of Eros in that Alcibiades describes how he "took hardships of the campaign 
much better" than anyone else (219e9), enduring "hunger" (220a1) and sleepless nights 
(220c5-d4). He was resistant to the cold (220a6) exemplifying Eros in sleeping without a 
blanket, as shown when in Potidaea4 he went out in "frightfully cold.. . weather wearing 
nothing but the same old light cloak" (i u ttov, himation)(220b2,6; Osborne p. 95). 
Also, prior to this excursion Alcibiades, in an effort to seduce him, covers Socrates in his 
mantle as Socrates wore only a "light cloak [ip, uov] which, though it was the middle of 
winter, was his only clothing" (Osborne p. 96 refers to 219b5-7). Not only was he 
shoeless but "in bare feet he made better progress on the ice" (220b7). This toughness can 
be seen as taking the form of self-discipline (in response to Eryximachus' speech 186d6- 
12,187d4-5 who discusses the harmonizing of opposites both internal and external 
resulting in a o4poaüvrl, sophrosune). Socrates was unaffected by alcohol (214a5-6), 
"sober and temperate" (216d7) with regard to boys, and in refusing the seduction of 
Alcibiades is admired for "his moderation, his fortitude" (219d5). 
Furthermore, through the myth Diotima describes Eros as "shoeless" (203d1). 
(This responds to Agathon's speech's positive view of going barefoot 195d2-3; Iliad 19: 
92, "making his home in the characters, and in the souls" and therefore in the heart as we 
see with Alcibiades (Symp. 218a5) who is "bitten in the heart" by love. ) Socrates 
"generally goes about barefoot" (174a4)5 as do his followers (173b2). As mentioned 
Alcibiades describes how Socrates while other soldiers "bundled up their feet in woolly 
socks and sheepskin boots... got over the ice better in his bare feet than others did in their 
boots" (220b). 
Eros is "homeless" (203d1) (responding to Aristophanes' speech 191d6-7 in 
which a sense of homelessness is due to loss of one's other half, and therein a loss of 
4 Potidaea, a city of Thrace allied to Athens, was induced by Corinth to revolt in 432B. C. The city was besieged by the Athenians and eventually defeated in a bloody local war, 432-430B. C. s Also see Phaedrus 229a3-4, Aristophanes, Clouds, 103,362; Xenophon Memorabilia, I, 6,2. 
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completeness. Ficino's interpretation p. 123 of "homeless" concords with Aristophanes in 
that through love the soul "goes into exile. For every thought is devoted not to the 
discipline and tranquillity of its own soul, but to the service of the man beloved"). For 
Osborne (p. 95), as Eros is homeless not in the sense that he lacked "a polis but... an 
öixos, oikos" (a home, house or household) (203d1), so Socrates for her is represented, 
with the exception of the Protagoras, away from home, certainly not "a domestic man 
with a home life or economic interests" (also see Ficino, p. 156 with Cicero Tusculan 
Disputations 5.37.108). Therefore, though strictly speaking Socrates is not homeless as 
he lives in the deme of Alopeke, here again Plato seems to be cultivating the appearance 
of a certain aspect of Eros. Similarly, suggestive of Eros who "[lies] on the dirt without a 
bed"6 (203d2) and "[sleeps] at people's doorsteps" (203d2-3) (responding directly to 
Pausanias' view of the lover 183a4-5), Plato depicts Socrates not as sleeping rough but as 
having long moments of abstraction/philosophical reflection at unusual times and places. 
Among these are moments of thought on the "next-door neighbour's porch (175a8), 
6 Ficino (p. 123) takes the Greek word chamaipetes which means "on the ground or low flying" to mean 
humble. He refers further to Gorgias 494d and Diogenes Laertius 2.5.21 as examples. 
In chapter VI, Ficino examines these aspects of Eros with regard to worldly Aphrodite, in relation 
to the different conceptions of love in the Phaedrus, not identifying Socrates with Eros. With regard to 
chamaipetes, Ficino writes, "For he sees that repeatedly, on account of the abuse of love, `lovers live 
without common sense, and through their trivial preoccupations great causes fail. '" (p. 148) Sears refers to 
Ficino's Oxford manuscript fol. 34v where he cites his reference, Propertius Elegies 2.12. "Lovers give 
themselves up to beloveds so far that they try to be changed into them altogether, and to reproduce them in 
words as well as deed. " Champaipetes seems to point to Pausanias' speech (183a4-b2) in which the lover 
"went on his knees in public view and begged in the most humiliating way. " However, Ficino's reference 
to this section of the Symposium shows an influence of the conceptions of eros described in Phaedrus 
252e1-253c2. This influence extends to Ficino's reading of "without a bed" in that "he has no place to rest, 
and nothing to cover himself with. For since all things seek their own origin, the little blaze of love, kindled 
in the appetite of the lover by the sight of the beautiful body, tries to fly back to the same body, " referring 
to Phaedrus 255c. However it is clear from his description of being "without cover" that he does not 
identify the Socrates of the Symposium with Eros, but uses the description of Eros to explore the Phaedrus 
and his own experience. "Who will deny that Love wanders without cover and naked? For who can conceal 
Love, whom a wild, ox-like, fixed stare betrays, whom stammering speech reveals, and redness or paleness 
of face, frequent sighs, shaking parts, perpetual complaining, inappropriate praises, sudden indignation, 
boasting, flirting, petulance, groundless suspicion, and obsequious devotion, all give away? For just as in 
the sun and fire, light accompanies the heat of its ray, so external evidences accompany the internal fire of 
love. " (Ficino, p. 124; see the lover described by Lysias' non-lover Phaedrus 232b7-233d4) The point that 
Ficino does not identify Socrates as Eros is shown further with regard to his analysis (pp. 123-4) of "bare 
footed, " "sleeps in doorways" which likewise show awareness of the Phaedrus. However in Speech N (p. 
155) equating Socrates with heavenly Aphrodite, Ficino calls Socrates the "true lover" and likens him to 
Eros. 
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which "is quite a habit of his" (175b2) or when outside all night thinking (220d1-4), 
which in some way resembles "lovers who pay no attention to their responsibilities" 
7 
As Eros is the son of Penia which means poverty or need, Eros is "always in 
need" 203d4 (responding to the description in Aristophanes' speech 192e9-10,193a2-3 
of a "longing after that primeval wholeness"; also the ambiguity of love from Pausanias 
180e6-181a6), echoing Socrates' argument for describing Eros in terms of lack (200e8- 
10) of the good and the beautiful (201c6-7). Socrates, of course, states that he knows 
nothing, as noted when Alcibiades says "He likes to say he's ignorant and knows 
nothing" (216d4; also see Theaetetus, 150c4 and the Apology 21b4-5). In the Symposium, 
however he makes an exception saying, "The only thing I say I understand is 
Tä sp ott7&" (ta erotika, the things of love; 177d9-el), that love which 
is a lack of 
beauty and goodness. There is perhaps more than a hint here that Socrates 
does not 
possess the beautiful and good (216d4). 
As Poros is the child of Metis, according to the first definition of poros Eros and 
therefore Socrates are beings of resourcefulness and cunning. Eros "[schemes] after the 
beautiful and the good" (203d4-5) and is "resourceful in his pursuits of intelligence" 
(203d6-7) (responding to Agathon's speech 195a8 in which Eros is "the most beautiful 
and the best" and also to Aristophanes' speech 191d1-3 in which Eros is seeking a 
goodness which has been lost). Likewise, Socrates schemes after Agathon (222b4-7; the 
"good" in Greek) and pursues the beautiful and good, wisdom, evident in his questioning 
of Diotima (201d6; also Ficino, p. 157). As Diotima considers Eros to be "brave" 203d5 
(a response to Phaedrus' speech concerning the army of lovers 178e3-179b3, Alcestis' 
self-sacrifice for the love of her husband 179b4-c7, and Achilles dying for Patroclus 
179d1-10,179e), Socrates saved the life of Alcibiades (220d8-e3, cf. also 221b1-10). In 
refusing to take credit for his heroism, Socrates demonstrates the selfless nature of "true 
bravery" which is reminiscent of Alcestis, a conception which is utterly foreign to the 
hubristic Alcibiades, further underlining the superficiality of fame and reputation perhaps 
for his benefit. The intensity (203d6) of Eros' pursuit of the good (replying to 
Aristophanes' speech's (192c1-3) description of the lover's intense pursuit of his 
"For being completely preoccupied with a single thing, lovers pay no attention to responsibilities. Thus, 
leading their life by chance, they are exposed to all the dangers of fortune, just as those who lead their life 
naked under the sky are exposed to all storms. " (Ficino, VI, p. 124) 
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beloved), is made visible in Socrates' contemplation on the neighbour's porch (175a8) 
and at Potidaea where Socrates "couldn't resolve [the problem], but he would not give 
up" until the following day (220c6-7). Eros is "a lover of wisdom" (203d7) correcting 
Phaedrus' speech which calls Eros wise (178c4-dl), teaching every man how "to live 
well. " Eros as a lover of wisdom is clearly personified by Socrates! Along with 
Alcibiades and the other speakers Socrates undergoes the "Bacchic frenzy of philosophy" 
(218b3-4). Eros "always [weaves] snares" (203d6) and is "a genius with enchantments, 
potions and clever pleadings" (203d8) (responding to Pausanias 183a6-7 in which the 
lover on his knees "swears all sorts of vows"). Alcibiades compares Socrates to the 
Sirens (216b1), and to Marsyas "casting a spell on people" (215c1) as "his melodies have 
in themselves the power to possess and so reveal those people who are ready for the god 
and his mysteries" (215c6-8). "We are all transported, completely possessed (215d4-5), 
like "frenzied Corybantes" (215e2-5) who were "legendary worshippers of Cybele, who 
brought about their own derangement through music and dance". 
9 
Eros as the son of Poros is full of "Resourcefulness" (in response to Phaedrus' 
178c1-2 and Agathon's speeches 195a7-8,197d8, which agree on the point that Eros is 
"the greatest good"). Socrates likewise shows much resource in that though he does not 
know everything, he knows that he does not know, showing traces of recognition of 
knowledge, partial knowledge. More importantly however this indicates that he possesses 
a skill or technique, primarily that of reasoning which he uses to seek the truth. Applying 
this technique he tests and deflates the positions of others thereby showing that he knows 
enough about the subject, whether sophrosune, kalon, or agathon, to demonstrate that the 
8 To follow Socrates (as in the case of Apollodorus, 173a) is to take the road of philosophy, exemplified by 
Apollodorus leaving his home city of Phaleron to travel to Athens, symbolic of "his departure from his old, 
non-philosophical lifestyle to the new Socratic life" (Osborne, p. 88). Though Osborne states that Athens is 
Socrates' home and acknowledges that his home is the deme of "Alopeke, which was just outside the walls 
[of Athens], across the Ilissus valley" (Osborne, p. 98), Osborne does not seem to draw the inference that 
like Apollodorus, Socrates is a fellow traveller towards Athens, which indicates in this context the location 
where wisdom can be acquired through dialectical relationships. Socrates like Apollodorus is journeying 
towards the beautiful and good which has not as yet been achieved, further suggesting that the journey is 
uphill (172a) which "coincides with the motif of the ascent in Diotima's speech" (p. 89; see 210a-e). 
"Hence it is significant that the Symposium starts with a journey up to the city, and that its account of the 
love of truth and beauty takes place in Agathon's house within the confines of the city of Athens. " 
(Osborne, p. 89) 
9 Nehamas, p. 65; see Ion 553e and Laws 790e; also see Ficino, p. 157. 
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other person does not know what he is talking about, i. e. that he is ignorant, which in an 
inverted way is evidence of his personal resourcefulness. 
The paradoxical nature of Eros is further shown in that "he is by nature neither 
mortal or immortal" (203e1). Alcibiades speaks of the hidden inner divine nature of 
Socrates the man: "I once caught him when he was open like Silenus' statues, and I had a 
glimpse of the figures he keeps hidden within: they were so godlike-so bright and 
beautiful, so utterly amazing" (217a1-2, also 215b). Furthermore as Socrates is unique, 
"the best you can do is not to compare him to anything human, but to liken him, as I do, 
to Silenus and the satyrs, and the same goes for his ideas and arguments" (221d5-7). 
Alcibiades' feelings for him border on adoration, as he viewed Socrates as beyond human 
yet below the divine; it can thus be argued that Alcibiades considered Socrates to be 
daimon-like, a messenger "who [shuttles] back and forth between the two, conveying 
prayer and sacrifice from men to gods, while to men [he brings] commands from the gods 
and gifts in return for sacrifices. Being in the middle of the two, they round out the whole 
and bind fast the all to all" (202e3-7; which responds to Eryximachus' speech which 
describes eros as intermediary 188b7-dl, holding the world together 213d2). Socrates 
"enables mortals to perceive their lack of divine qualities and hence to desire to possess 
them, providing a link between mortals and immortals". 10 Thus, according to Osborne, 
Socrates, like Eros, is an intermediary "whose task it is to convey the wisdom of the 
priestess Diotima to the company at the party" (Osborne, p. 101). 
Diotima's myth links Eros' position between mortal and immortal to the state of 
being "between ignorance and knowledge" (204a1). As discussed in the last chapter with 
regard to 204a2-9, Diotima explains that as the gods are wise they do not desire wisdom 
while the ignorant do not desire wisdom because they do not recognize their lack thereof. 
For this reason "without Eros the mortals would not only lack those features but be so far 
from appreciating them that they would not even perceive their lack or the desirability of 
the features they lacked. Eros is responsible for their ability to lack and their desire to 
make good the lack" (Osborne, p. 110). The implication here is that as immortals do not 
lack wisdom, not to mention goodness, beauty and being, they experience no eros, 
indicative of a purer conception of divinity than that found in the Greek cosmogonies 
10 Osborne, p. 110; see also references to Socrates' divine sign in Phaedrus and Apology. 
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discussed in the last chapter. In contrast, Socrates while loving wisdom acknowledges 
that he is not wise (sophos or one of "the wise, " a sophist) and because of his general lack 
is not immortal. However Socrates, though lacking wisdom recognizes his lack of 
wisdom, indicating that he is not devoid of understanding, and therefore to some extent 
partakes in immortality, perfect understanding being an attribute of the gods (204a1-3). 
Therefore Socrates like Eros is neither wise nor ignorant, neither mortal nor immortal but 
between the two. Osborne argues that while this stresses "Socrates' own lack of wisdom, 
the condition necessary for being a philosopher,.... the state of being neither one thing 
nor the other, but in between, is fundamental to the theory of love that is being offered 
(Osborne, p. 101). 
At this point, once again, we encounter the interconnection of eros and 
philosophy in the figure of Socrates. Socrates as Eros lacks the good and the beautiful 
(201c6-7). As Socrates personifies Eros he desires the good and the beautiful (203d3-4). 
Likewise Socrates lacks knowledge but knows that he lacks it (216d3-4) and in so doing, 
is a philosophos, a lover of wisdom (204b5,203d6). Therefore, in Socrates' statement 
"the only thing I understand is the things of love" (177d7-el; Nehamas uses "art" for 
"things"), " we see the relation of Eros and philosophy. As love is the desire for the good 
and the beautiful, and philosophy is the love of wisdom, which comes from the 
contemplation of the good and the beautiful in the Symposium, Plato through his 
depiction of Socrates is implying that love and philosophy are inseparable. In this context 
Eros and philosophy are personified in Socrates who is the ideal lover and the ideal 
philosopher. 12 
Socrates, it seems, has the leading characteristics not only of the first but also of 
the second definition of Poros, as well as the attributes of Penia, which together make up 
the character of Eros. We saw in the last chapter that poros according to the first 
definition means resourcefulness and cunning which is connected here to the second 
definition, "pathway", in that through resourcefulness a path is opened through the aporia 
or "lack of pathway". As aporia means "lack of pathway", it is associated with penia 
11 Osborne (p. 93) suggests that Socrates' stance on his personal ignorance is "perhaps... slightly 
moderated to the extent that he does now claim to have learnt from Diotima, and hence to have some 
knowledge concerning love that is derivative of her expertise in that area. " 
12 Osborne, pp. 93-4. 
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which as "lack" or "poverty" indicates a lack of resourcefulness which results in a lack of 
path. Therefore representing Eros as the child of Poros and Penia indicates that need 
motivates the individual to alleviate her/his poverty, yet requires resourcefulness to 
achieve its end. 13 
In this context, Socrates in being likened to Eros represents Penia in so fat as he 
has no wisdom or "stable knowledge of truth". In this way he is aporos, without resource 
or pathway. However, he does possess a great element or strain in his nature of 
resourcefulness/contrivance in the form of a mental technique/skill which is mainly the 
ability to reason by which he also represents Poros. This mental ability while proving 
useful in showing what is false belief or opinion, thereby opening a "pathway" through 
individual problems or aporiai, causes him to uncover increasingly more problems. So 
while it seems to enable him to gain wisdom, the wisdom he acquires is constantly 
slipping away (203e5-6) reducing him to a state of aporia, "a state of lack", though he, as 
he still possesses this mental ability which provides a pathway through, is not himself 
caught in an aporia. 
13 Osborne argues that poverty causes eros to lead. Penia motivates and for this reason Eros is a leader. 
Though I do not dissent from this position, I am doubtful of Osborne's use of the text to support this point. 
In the text Socrates is guiding Aristodemus to Agathon's party, and Aristodemus fully imitates and submits 
to the guidance of Socrates. Osborne (p. 91) believes there is a reversal (174a3-6); "Aristodemus is actually 
more Socratic than Socrates. Socrates, on this occasion, though never elsewhere, has bathed and dressed in 
his best clothes and party shoes. Aristodemus, by contrast, is not dressed or washed for the party since he 
had not expected to go to one, and, as always, he is barefoot. " Osborne thinks Socrates, professing to be 
Agathon's lover, adopts Agathon's form of dress and lifestyle, thereby becoming the personification of 
Agathon's conception of Eros, shortly to be represented in Agathon's speech. The idea that Aristodemus is 
more Socratic is problematic for two reasons. First, Socrates arrives later at Agathon's home because he 
was detained due to his tendency towards deep philosophical reflection, which may be likened to the 
twenty four hours he spent in contemplation on the campaign at Potidaea (220c3-d4), a tendency which 
Alcibiades admired (220c1; also see Odyssey 4: 252; A. E. Taylor (p. 233) interprets this as being the 
moment Socrates beheld the vision of the form of the good, though this seems an over-speculation on 
Taylor's part). Second, Agathon's house (agathon meaning good) only becomes the site where the 
beautiful and good will be manifested once Socrates arrives, Socrates being the accoucheur by which the 
beautiful and good will be delivered. 
However in partial support of Osborne, Socrates may adopt a more formal dress to honour 
Agathon though for a different reason and towards different ends than she proposes. It seems more likely 
that Socrates' conformity is a tactic by which he hopes to lead Agathon to philosophy. Socrates, speaking a 
different language from Agathon, the language of philosophy, and knowing that Agathon did not 
understand the terms of this language and therefore would be unable to penetrate into the content of this 
language (the message), used terms which Agathon could understand. Socrates established a common 
language, which was not his own and in so doing came down to Agathon's level in order to teach him a 
truer language of philosophical reflection. Though this element of disguise may represents a moment of 
impiety, as Socrates represented himself as other than himself, this gesture, nevertheless formed a potential 
bridge by which Agathon could likewise become a pursuer of wisdom, a philosophos, like himself. 
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Nonetheless because of the presence of a penia element which is aporos, Eros 
can never be full of resource but by definition will always be lacking and therefore 
partially poor. Similarly, regardless of his faculty of reason, Socrates, in that he lacks 
knowledge except for the knowledge of eros which likewise indicates a lack (177d7-el), 
demonstrates the continued presence of the penia element which, though not reducing 
him to an aporia, suggests a certain dominance of the penia element regardless of his 
efforts to overcome it and which in turn motivates his efforts. Thus the way of love and 
philosophy come together in the Symposium as the path of penia, embodied by Socrates. 
B. SOCRATES EXEMPLIFYING THE PATH OF PENL4 
Returning to the myth, the action within the myth comments upon the interaction 
within the Symposium as a whole. To set the scene, Osborne notes the resemblance 
between the feast of the gods at the birth of Aphrodite and Agathon's banquet. 
Just as poverty, the mother of Eros, hangs about the door at the party to celebrate the birth of Aphrodite, so 
people keep turning up outside the door at Agathon's party, [which represents] the vision of beauty that 
everyone yearns to be included in... Just as Aphrodite, at whose birthday party Eros was conceived, is a 
beauty to which Eros is devoted, so Beauty itself, and the vision of it revealed at Agathon's party, is the 
object of Socrates' passionate devotion. (Osborne, p. 96) 
Alcibiades arrives, mythologically speaking in the role or the place of Penia, intending to 
seduce Agathon (the good) but finds his place changed and himself praising and perhaps 
trying to seduce Socrates. In this interaction, Socrates is Poros as "resource" in that he 
opens a "pathway" to the beautiful and good which Alcibiades as Penia lacks. However, 
though Alcibiades thinks Socrates is the pathway to the good and beautiful, Socrates 
acknowledges that he lacks knowledge to Alcibiades (216d3-4; "He likes to say he's 
ignorant and knows nothing") and to the other speakers (177d7-el) saying he only knows 
love which is the synthesis of lack and contrivance. So Socrates cannot properly be 
considered to be in possession of the good and beautiful but is rightfully described as 
Eros as he is between the beautiful and ugly, good and bad, wisdom and ignorance. 
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Following the first definition of Poros Socrates is "a cunning contriver" which Barker" 
points out is more like Hermes (see the Homeric Hymn to Hermes lines 10ff and passim) 
than like Apollo who in his perfect wisdom is the knower of all truth. Further, the 
implication in Alcibiades' attempted seduction of Socrates is that Socrates represents 
Poros as "contrivance" and "pathway" which Alcibiades needs in order to attain what he 
desires. 
However, Alcibiades arrives drunk resembling Poros in the garden of the myth. ls 
Though it may be argued that the drunkenness is only a motif, a "literary effect", as did 
Bury (xli) concerning the role reversal of Penia and Poros discussed in the last chapter, 
nonetheless this present case of Socrates and Alcibiades likewise reflects an inversion of 
roles which seems to bring about an underlying tension, apparently in order to make a 
point about eros. Returning to the discussion of the previous chapter, Penia in the myth 
turned out to be more resourceful than Poros; 16 Penia becomes the entity who weaves the 
schemes to capture the beautiful and good, in order to enrich herself (203b7-9). Poros or 
Resource in contrast shows himself through his drunken abandon to be the less 
resourceful, and to display poverty with regard to "cunning intelligence". This inverted 
version of the characters of Poros and Penia appears to be far more in keeping with the 
actual relationship of Alcibiades and Socrates as expressed in the Symposium. 
In his drunkenness and excess Alcibiades, although in his drunkenness echoing 
Poros, actually shows his penia. This inversion is enacted through what Alcibiades 
conceives to be his role reversal. Though Alcibiades was never the beloved of Socrates in 
that Alcibiades never possessed that which Socrates lacked and desired, Alcibiades 
initially perceived himself to be the embodiment of beauty and therefore the beloved of 
Socrates (217a4-8,222b3-4). Ultimately however Socrates came to represent the object 
14 Barker, Personal Communication, 2003. 
15 The imagery used to describe Poros' entrance into the garden in Plotinus' Enneads III. 5.9 ("What could 
these divine splendours and beauties be but the Reason-Principles streaming from him? These Reason- 
Principles-this Poros who is the lavishness, the abundance of Beauty-are at one and are made manifest; 
this is the Nectar-drunkenness. ") resembles the colourful imagistic sensuous manner in which Alcibiades 
enters the house of Agathon (212c4-el) far more than the comparatively purely abstract intellectual 
revelation of the form of the beautiful (210e5-6), a difference which will be the focus of the next section. 
16 Osborne does not note that Poros' resourcefulness is actually the characteristic of penia, and that penia 
undercuts poros. In her account of this myth, as in her reading of Aristodemus leading Socrates, she reads 
the text at surface level, whether by the terms of personification, Penia and Poros, or by the dramatic action 
of leadership as in Aristodemus, without looking at the undercutting of these emblematic representations. 
In her reading Osborne does not take into consideration the ironic tension of the dialogue. 
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of his desire hence his beloved, so that the lover became beloved and the beloved lover 
(222b3-4) pointing to the undermining of the erastes (lover)/eromenos (beloved) 
relationship from Alcibiades' perspective. In this context it is relevant that Alcibiades, 
who on a superficial level at the party enacted the role of Poros by contriving to be near 
Agathon (the good), had previously through his "cunning" devised a disreputable scheme 
which showed him to be reduced to an aporia'7 like Penia. In this way Alcibiades under 
the guise of "Poros" showed himself to be more like Penia due to his lack and ethical 
poverty. 
In contrast Socrates, while claiming to know nothing, which likens him to Penia, 
remains sober all night. This enables him to assume the role of contrivance maintaining 
the upper hand as in the myth, though through his rational ability which in the case of 
Socrates is always in an effort to seduce others not physically but to philosophy. In this 
Socrates demonstrates a form of eros directed beyond the body in pursuit of 
philosophical truth. Hence as in the last chapter Penia acts more like Poros and Poros 
like Penia, whereby each undermines the other and itself. However in contrast to the 
myth in which Penia successfully seduces Poros, Socrates is not successful in leading 
Alcibiades beyond his absorption with the physical to philosophy. And similarly, though 
Alcibiades tries to seduce Socrates ("Poros" tries to seduce "Penia"8), as Alcibiades 
never possessed what Socrates felt he needed and desired which was philosophical truth 
and virtue, Alcibiades was necessarily unsuccessful in his attempted seduction which was 
of no interest to Socrates. In this way therefore the undermining in the myth articulated 
by the reversal of roles within the action acts as a method by which Plato points the 
reader beyond a physical notion of eros, conceived of here as aporos, towards a 
philosophical notion of eros which transcends the physical thereby functioning as a 
pathway towards truth. This brings us back to the beginning of this chapter in which Plato 
through Socrates was shown to be concerned about the poverty of the soul as contrasted 
with that of the body. For this reason, in his penia Socrates shows himself to have the 
17 Of particular consequence, Socrates reduces Alcibiades to an aporia (219e1): "How could I possibly win 
him over? " "I had no idea what to do, no purpose in my life; ah, no one else has ever known the real 
meaning of slavery. " (219e5-6) 
18 Clearly however, Socrates possesses a deeper kind of resource (218e1-7) which causes this reversal to 
occur, though Socrates immediately subverts it (218e8-219a3). 
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true resource, thereby representing what for the Symposium is the perfect exemplification 
of the aporetic nature of Eros. 
C. THE SYMPOSIUM'S CONCEPTION OF EROS 
The equating of Eros and Socrates represents the Plato of the Symposium's view 
of Eros, regardless of the fact that the myth of the birth of Eros is contained in Diotima's 
speech, and comes from Socrates' mouth. This is demonstrated by the fact that every 
significant aspect of Eros in the myth responds to one of the other speeches and 
conceptions of love in the dialogue, while being traced through and materialized in the 
character of Socrates (though not restricted to Socrates as described by Alcibiades). 
19 
Without going into the full details of the speech and the precise issues to which Diotima 
responds in her formulation of eros, which would complexify the issue too much, we 
shall rather focus upon the fact that her conception of Eros does respond to all the 
previous speeches in an effort to formulate a complete conception of Eros that takes into 
19 A summary of the connections between the earlier speeches, Diotima's definition of Eros and its 
embodiment in Socrates may be useful here. Eros is "always in need" (203d4), responding to Aristophanes' 
speech (192e9-10,193a2-3; also the ambiguity of love from Pausanius 180e6-181a6) compare Socrates as 
shown in (201c6-7; 177d9-el). Eros is "always poor"(203c7), responding to Pausanius' speech (183a4- 
b2), and Alcibiades at (218c10-d2), and exemplified by Socrates in (221a3, perhaps 20b1-5,220e7, 
Apology 23b-c, 30a). Furthermore, Eros "far from being delicate and beautiful" (203c8) is "shrivelled" 
(203d1), responds to Agathon's speech (195a9-10,195d1-6), and is exemplified by Socrates at (215b6; 
214b6). Eros is described by Diotima as being "tough" or "harsh" (203d1) responding to the speech of 
Agathon, (195e1-8) which Socrates exemplifies at (219e9; 220a1; 220c5-d4; 220a6; 220b2,6; 219b5-7; 
220b7). This toughness can be seen as taking the form of self-discipline in response to Eryximachus' 
speech (186d6-12), which Socrates exemplifies at (214a5-6; 216d7; 219d5). Eros as "shoeless"203d1, 
responding to Agathon's positive view of going barefoot 195d2-3) and Alcibiades (218a5), is demonstrated 
by Socrates at (174a4; 220b). Eros "[lies] on the dirt without a bed" (203d2) and "[Sleeps] at people's 
doorsteps" (203d2-3), responding to Pausanius speech (183a4-5), and as exemplified by Socrates at (175a8; 
175b2), who also stands outside all night thinking (220d1-4). Eros is viewed as "brave" (203d5) in 
response to Phaedrus' speech at (178e3-179b3; 179b4-c7; 179d1-10,179e) shown through Socrates at 
(220d8-e3,221b1-10). The intensity (203d6) of Eros, replying to Aristophanes' speech (192c1-3), is made 
visible in Socrates at (175a8; 220c6-7). Answering Pausanius' speech (185a6-b6), Eros, "a lover of 
wisdom" (203d7) is clearly personified by Socrates, (218b3-4). That Eros "always [weaves] snares" 
(203d6) and is "a genius with enchantments, potions and clever pleadings" (203d8) is demonstrated 
through Socrates at (216b1; 215c1; 215c6-8; 215d4-5; 215e2-5), responding to Pausanius' speech at 
(183a4). That "he is by nature neither mortal or immortal" (203e1) addresses the speech of Eryximachus 
(188b7-dl; 213d2), and is demonstrated through Socrates at (215b; 217a1-2; 221d5-7; also see 202e3-7). 
And finally that Eros is "between ignorance and knowledge" (204a1), responding to (185b1-cl) is 
exemplified by Socrates at (177d9-el). There are numerous other correlations which can be made as Plato's 
writing is intentionally deeply layered with multiple interconnections on each level. This summary can act 
as a beginning from which specific points can be drawn, but is clearly only an initial layer of investigation 
in the area. 
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account all the parts. As Diotima was not present at the speeches of the Symposium while 
her speech responds to them each individually, it seems that Plato through Socrates is 
speaking under the guise of Diotima, trying to formulate a true conception of eros, which 
he also shows to be embodied in Socrates. This confirms that the many commentators 
who make the identification of Socrates with Eros are correct. ° 
Ferrari partially objects to this correlation of Socrates and Eros. Ferrari, arguing 
that, as in the other speeches, Socrates presents a type of love reflecting that person's 
distinctive sensibility, which in the case of Socrates is philosophical eros. 21 However, in 
Plato's understanding, eros is by definition inseparable from the philosophical as we have 
seen in our discussion of poros and penia, and analysis of Socrates as Plato's ideal lover 
and philosopher. Diotima's myth illustrating the characteristics of eros, the integration of 
penia and poros, acts as a systematic response to elements of all the previous speeches 
and incorporates them within itself as if to indicate that the notion of Eros which Diotima 
is presenting is "true". Further, this understanding of Eros is fleshed out through Socrates 
representing as elements of eros all the partial truths of the different speeches, which 
Diotima could not have heard, into one "true" conception of eros. This indicates that 
Socrates is not one kind of Eros but, according to the Plato of the Symposium, the only 
kind of Eros, "the greatest Socratic paradox [being] Socrates himself'22 the 
personification of Eros. 
Thus far we have shown that Socrates is the personification of Eros through 
demonstrating, first, that the descriptions of both Poros and Penia, who are the parents of 
Eros, are "fleshed out" (Osborne, p. 94) in the life of Socrates. Secondly we have looked 
at the correspondence between Eros and Socrates as intermediaries between wisdom and 
ignorance, and mortality and immortality in the dialogue. This allowed us to see the 
20 Bury maintains that the main purpose of the speech of Alcibiades is "to present us with a vivid portrait of 
Socrates as exemplar of Eros" (Symp. lx; also see A. E. Taylor, p. 233). His view that Socrates represents 
Eros is supported by Cobb, pp. 82-3; Ficino, Speech VII, Santas, p15; Sayre, pp. 126-7; Robin, La Theorie 
Platonicienne de 1'Amour, pp. 161-4; Gould, Platonic Love, p. 45. Osborne (p. 101) correctly notes that, 
"Plato chooses to stress certain features of Socrates in this dialogue as part of his definition of love. " Also 
see Kierkegaard (Concept of Irony, p. 47) "In the Symposium a complement is sought to what is lacking in 
the dialectical view [of love] by having love exemplified in the person of Socrates, and thus the eulogies on 
love end in a eulogy on Socrates. Now even if the exemplification of the idea in a personality is a mere 
element in the idea itself, it nonetheless has its importance in the exposition. " 
2' Ferrari, "Platonic Love", p. 261. 
22 Guthrie, "Plato, the Man and his Dialogues", p. 395. 
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connection of eros and philosophy and to better understand what Plato actually means 
when implying that eros and Socrates articulate the synthesis of poros and penia and how 
this results in the path of penia, exemplified by Socrates. Thirdly, we examined the action 
of the dialogue specifically with regard to the relationship between Socrates and 
Alcibiades through the myth of the birth of Eros, which pointed towards a form of eros 
directed towards philosophical truths, represented by Socrates. Lastly we saw how all the 
views of eros in the dialogue are embodied in the figure of Socrates, showing that for the 
Plato of the Symposium, Socrates acts as the personification of Eros. 
We shall now turn to examine in more detail Socrates' role as an intermediary 
through an analysis of the relation between Diotima's revelation of the beautiful and the 
arrival of Alcibiades, which will permit us to explore this identification of Socrates with 
Eros by one who perhaps knows him better than is normally admitted. 
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III. SOCRATES AS INTERMEDIARY: THE MOMENT OF 
VISION AND THE MOMENT OF ALCIBIADES 
The end of Diotima's speech and the beginning of Alcibiades' speech create a 
juxtaposition that further defines Socrates as Bros. The ascent to the form of the beautiful 
concludes with a description of the revelation of the Beautiful: "There bursts upon [the 
initiate] that wondrous vision" (210e5-6). Once experienced this enables the initiate to 
"give birth not to images of virtue.. . but to true virtue (because 
he is in touch with the true 
Beauty" (212a6-8; trans. Nehamas'), and perhaps achieve immortality which is the 
ultimate object of eros. This revelation is followed by the entrance of Alcibiades. 
"Suddenly there came a knock at the door)" (212c4). Moments later, "Alcibiades who 
was shouting in the courtyard, evidently drunk... stood in the doorway, with a mass of 
ribbons and an enormous wreath of ivy and violets sprouting on his head" (Symposium 
212d4-el; trans. Joyce). The suddenness of the arrival of both the Beautiful and 
Alcibiades draws a connection between these two opposing images/events, the vision of 
an abstract reality contrasted with the vision of symbols (ivy symbolizing Dionysus and 
violets being symbols of Aphrodite and the Muses). 
A. FIRST LEVEL: TWO TYPES OF LOVE 
On the most basic level, Plato wishes to draw a comparison between the Beautiful 
and Alcibiades which appears to demonstrate the presence of two types of love-object. 
The form of the Beautiful which is "ever-existent" and therefore not finite (211a1-2), 2 is 
1 Nehamas translation unless specified. 
2 Plato writes, ouSe Tts Xäyos ou5e Tts ento-ri. 40 lpTl (oude tis logos oude tis episteme), translated as "It will 
be neither word nor knowledge" (Jowett) or "It will not appear to him as one idea or one kind of 
knowledge" (Nehamas) (211a6-7). The inherent ambiguity in this statement has caused great division 
concerning whether the Beautiful is knowable or beyond knowledge, the epitome of being or beyond being. 
Seemingly contrary to 211a6-7, Cobb states "that the ascent to the final level does not lead to a 
transcendence of knowledge and reason. Diotima explicitly speaks of this achievement as a knowledge of a 
single sort" (ttvä 
eatatrjµriv t(av totaütriv, Lina epistemen mian toiauten, 210d) in which the lover 
achieves an "understanding which is none other than the understanding of that beauty itself, so that in the 
end he knows what beauty itself is" (211 c). The Greek term used is yv `, gno, a form of the verb meaning 
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to know, recognize or realize, and for this reason, as the beautiful is an object of knowledge, Cobb claims 
that it does not go beyond human understanding (Cobb pp. 77-78). 
Cobb (p. 79) thinks that the misunderstanding of the verb theasthai leads to the view of "a 
transcendent reality and a life of withdrawal from the world in mystical contemplation. " Theasthai, 
normally translated as "to contemplate", Cobb retranslates as "to study" as it is used in 211d ("To 
contemplate the beautiful life") which he says is a rational activity not involving religious awe. He cites 
theasasthai to contemplate/study laws and traditions at 210c; theasthai with regard to contemplating the 
beauty of handsome boys (211d), and theasasthai in terms of watching Socrates at Delios (220e, 221a), and 
in Aristophanes' speech 190e concerning the circular people's ability to look at their own scar. From this 
Cobb concludes that neither the forms nor the "mystical" experience of them transcend reason and speech, 
logos (Cobb p. 80). 
Friedlander might be argued to support the knowability of beauty when he writes, "The 
pronouncements of the priestess could not be the end of the work. There had to be a concluding part in 
which the ascent to the heights would be depicted in the reality of actual life. The Symposium reaches its 
climax in the episode involving Alcibiades" (Plato, vol. 3, p. 28). In noting the importance of virtues in 
application to actual life as the climax, similar to the philosopher king going back down into the cave in 
Republic 519d, Friedlander indicates that the ascent is within the world, or at least involves a return to the 
world. 
In contrast to this view that the form of beauty is knowable, Vlastos (Socrates, Ironist and 
Philosopher, 72ff. ) reads the passage (21Oe) (like Aristotle Metaphysics XIII. 1078b9-32,1086a37-b5) as 
being radically transcendent and hence not directly accessible from within this world. Thinkers, such as 
Bury, by affirming that Plato is discussing a religious mysticism that focuses on the transcendent, divine 
reality, conceive of the beautiful as unknowable. A. E. Taylor (pp. 230-1) believes the vision of the 
beautiful is beyond being, reached through going beyond science, and cannot be communicated or 
rationalized. "Science here passes in the end into `direct contact, ' or, as the school men say, `vision, ' an 
apprehension of an object which is no longer `knowing about' it, knowing propositions which can be 
predicated of it, but actual possession of and being possessed by it. In the Republic, as in the Symposium, 
the thought is conveyed by language borrowed from the `holy marriage' of popular religion and its 
survivals in mystery cults. Here it is `Beauty' to which the soul is mated; in the Republic it is that good 
which, though the cause of all being and all goodness, is itself `on the other side of being' (Republic, 
508b)". Guthrie ("Plato, The Man and his Dialogues", p. 392) supports this position when he writes, 
"Philosophical reasoning must precede its apprehension, which however is an instantaneous act of mental 
vision transcending thought, just as it is not itself a thought or knowledge". 
This understanding of the good and beautiful as being beyond being ultimately points forward into 
Neo-Platonism. Watson (p. 24) writes that "the famous sentence, and the phrase epekeina tes ousias, 
beyond being, was taken by some thinkers as applied directly to God, not just the good, by Plato, and was 
seized on eagerly by those who wished to emphasize God's transcendence". If the revelation of the 
beautiful and good had no transcendental property, it perhaps would have been more difficult to appropriate 
it in this way, since they are clearly distinct from the notion of God (pp. 24-25). This reading of beyond 
being seems to resemble Plotinus' movement from intellect (Enneads 6.9.4) to the One (Enneads 6.9.10); 
however the forms are subordinated to the One (A. E. Taylor, p. 232), seemingly relegated to the intellect. 
Therefore it can be argued that as this "`knowledge about' is only preparatory to a direct scientia 
visionis.... Socrates reveals the fundamental agreement of his conception with that of the great mystics of 
all ages". (A. E. Taylor, p. 231) 
This position of beauty going beyond being assumes that beauty and the good are interchangeable. 
The good "is identical with the beautiful-an identification axiomatic for Plato, first stated in this dialogue 
by Agathon (197c, 201c, 204d-e)", according to Markus (p. 224). Cornford ("The Doctine of Eros", p. 122) 
also assimilates the two. For A. E. Taylor (p. 231), noting the identity of kalos and agathos discussed in the 
dialogue, states that the good in the Republic and the aütrö tö ica? Sv (auto to kalon) in the Symposium are 
absolutely identical, as are their ascents to "being and reality". Singer (p. 59) supports this stating that 
"This is the Good or the Beautiful, absolute goodness and absolute beauty, the highest of the forms, the 
pinnacle of being, the ultimate category in terms of which all other realities are to be explained" Guthrie 
("Plato, The Man and his Dialogues", p. 392) agrees with the view but specifying that at 204e they are interchangeable, and that Plato commonly equates them "though not always fairly", at which he refers the 
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indispensable for the initiate to "[give] birth in beauty whether in body or in soul" 
(206b8-9, also 206e), which is procreation (tiktein) in order to achieve if possible the 
ultimate object of Bros which is immortality. The initiate procreates "true virtue" (212a) 
as a result of this vision, so vision and begetting are here indissolubly connected and the 
reader to Lysis 216d, Protagoras 360b, Timaeus 87c, Meno 77b. (Also see Moravcsik, "Reason and Eros" 
p. 295 for a different view. ) Ferrari ("Platonic Love, p. 260), however, most convincingly, proposes that "in 
view of such passages as 201c and Phaedrus 250c-d, let us say that the Beautiful is thought of as the 
quality by which the Good shines and shows itself to us. We can then claim that the ascent to the Beautiful 
itself is indeed also an ascent to the Good itself, but described so as to bring out at every turn what it is 
about the good that captivates us", which seems to validate Singer's analysis (p. 55) that the ascent involves 
attraction which is asthetic rather than sexual. 
In contrast Santas (p. 41), opposing this linking, states, "I take the ladder of love to be about eros 
proper rather than generic eros", the beautiful rather than the good. "But as eros proper, the love of beauty, 
is a part or species of generic eros, the love of the good, we should expect to find some relation between 
beauty and the good ... This relation 
has an important bearing on our main question about criteria for 
ranking" (Santas, p. 41). He concludes (p. 47) that the distinction between specific and generic shows a 
difference between beauty and goodness, though admits it is unclear. Dodds in his commentary on the 
Gorgias accomplishes this more effectively, showing the lack of identity between beauty and goodness. 
It is necessary to ask how the form of the good relates to the form of the beautiful particularly as 
each, whether in the ascent to the beautiful in the Symposium or the good in the Republic, is posited as an 
unmoved mover (the origin of being and the `thing in itself, ' the `real'), of which, it could be argued, there 
could not be a plurality. In Greek kalos means beautiful, noble, fine and stands in opposition to aischros 
meaning ugly or base. These are distinct from agathos meaning good, useful and beneficial, which opposes 
kakos or bad. This distinction in word signifies a difference in values, in contemporary terms the aesthetic 
as contrasted with the moral. Although the good and the beautiful regularly appear side by side, particularly 
in the pursuit of eudaimonia (Symposium, 201c), their distinction represents a potential conflict in values by 
the time of Plato, which is not fully resolved within the Socratic dialogues. These two ascents culminate in 
what, given this contrast, appear to be different goals, so the possibility of harmonizing the concepts 
becomes pressing. It is important to note how the actual end of desire is not entirely resolved in Platonism. 
What, however, is significant in this section of the Symposium is that the ascent to the beautiful describes 
an ascent which often seems to blend with the ascent to the good, so that at times the two appear 
interchangeable, and that the means of intellectual ascent is eros, rendering understanding and eros 
inseparable. 
The distinction of being and beyond being, knowing and beyond knowledge, influences the 
understanding of agathos (good) and kakos (evil) which Plato endorses. Plato views agathos as limited and 
determined while kakos is indeterminate and limitless. If the beautiful is beyond knowledge and therefore 
being, it is limitless and undetermined and therefore evil (the good, it seems, must be knowable in order to 
be good). However as the good and beautiful are inseparable, this point seems to violate Symposium 211 a6- 
7 in which the beautiful seems to be called unknowable in that it is not knowledge, unless to be knowledge 
essentially and to be knowable are different things. If this latter hypothesis be allowed then although the 
beautiful is knowable in that it is good, it is not knowledge. If not, then we find ourselves in an aporia 
formulated through the contrast of agathos versus kakos and limited versus limitless, in which the limited is 
equated with kakos and the unlimited with agathos, which undermines Plato's normal use of the terms. 
This contradiction is the site of an interminable debate which when considered in relation to our past 
discussion of poverty and aporiai, points to the understanding that the beautiful is in the realm of the 
unknowable. Faced with the ambiguity of this problem with regard to the beautiful and the good, Socrates 
acknowledges his poverty, his lack of knowledge and inability to understand except negatively, while 
Alcibiades, as if recognizing the difficulty, uncertainty and perhaps unanswerability of the problem, turns 
away from the aura rö Ka ov, focusing on his involvement in the material world, therefore prioritizing 
concrete physical beauty over immaterial intellectual beauty. 
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object of the vision may be considered a transitional object of eros in its own right 
3 
Alcibiades, the ideally beautiful man who in his beauty partakes of the form of the 
beautiful (211bl) and therefore is the reflection of the form, the appearance of beauty 
rather than beauty itself, is finite (211b2-3). Further, this shift between 210e-212c in itself 
indicates a movement from the pinnacle of the ascent of Diotima's speech to its lowest 
rung represented by Alcibiades. Beauty as described by Diotima is reflected as by a 
mirror in the ideally beautiful man, a material reflection of the beautiful. 
This difference in object denotes a difference in eros because eros, though always 
the same, is manifested differently depending upon its object (Cornford, "The Doctrine of 
Eros", p. 121). The eros behind the ascent to the good and the beautiful seeking 
immortality through procreation of virtue is clearly an eros of the yrvX? 7 (psyche, soul) 
being directed towards a non-finite object. The eros associated with Alcibiades is an 
appetitive desire directed towards the o3pa (soma), the finite body of his beautiful 
person (210a9), or in the case of Alcibiades towards Socrates' body and soul 
(Kierkegaard, Concept, p. 218; Alcibiades loves Socrates' soul but is limited to the 
appetitive in his means of expression thereby showing himself a slave to the body) 4 This 
can be seen as the opposition of the poros-dominant heavenly Aphrodite (181 c) to penia- 
dominant earthly Aphrodite (180d7-e2 with Pausanius; redefined in 186a2 by 
Eryximachus). 
Sayre (p. 120) suggestively interprets the juxtaposition of the effects of eros in 
terms of Plato's effort "to dramatize the vast disparity between the philosopher's love of 
Beauty and the love of power and wealth that motivated the political life of Athens 
during this stage in its history". The celebration banquet for Agathon's prize occurred 
3 While Barker (Personal Communication, 2002) notes that the form of the beautiful is not the ultimate 
object of love, Beauty nevertheless stirs the individual "transmuting the physical excitement into 
imaginative and intellectual energy" (Vlastos, "The Individual as an Object of Love", pp. 22-3) until he 
reaches the form of the beautiful. The individual sensitive to beauty "substitutes forms of erotic response" 
and is erotically drawn towards the forms (Vlastos, "The Individual as an Object of Love", p. 26). Vlastos 
stresses this when he notes that in the Timaeus neither people nor the gods "stir awe or love.. . while the 
severely impersonal Ideas evoke both, especially love, so much so that he speaks repeatedly of communion 
with them as an act of blissful and fertile conjugal union" (Vlastos, "The Individual as an Object of Love", 
p. 26), showing passionate desire directed towards principles (Watson, pp. 24-5) rather than people. 
Later in Neo-Platonic thought the Good, which in a sense is the coming together of the good, the 
beautiful and the true, will be perceived as the ultimate object of eros, though for Plato it is immortality 
through the procreation in body and soul which is the telos of eros. 
4 Guthrie, "Plato, the Man and his Dialogues", p. 395. 
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when Athens militarily was at its height prior to the hubristic self-serving military 
expedition to control Syracuse 5 A. E. Taylor notes that Apollodorus' narration is dated 
several years after Agathon had left Athens (see 172c), which places it close to the 
disastrous defeat of Athens that ended the Peloponesian War" (see Taylor, p. 210,520). 
As Sayre remarks, 
It could hardly be an accident that the time of Agathon's party itself and the time of Apollodorus' 
subsequent retelling of the event respectively mark off almost exactly the period during which Athens 
slipped from its position of cultural and military supremacy in the northern Mediterranean to that of a 
ruined polis on its knees before a victorious Sparta. Nor can it be an accident that the character who 
interrupts the party with his boisterous revelry was a recently elected young general destined to play a 
major part in the events that brought Athens to this ignominious position. (Sayre, p. 120) 
In reaction to accusations concerning the mutilation of the Hermae, to avoid standing 
trial, Alcibiades defected to Sparta, after which Athens lost its fleet at Syracuse, finally 
resulting in the surrender of Athens to Sparta in 404 B. C. In the Symposium Alcibiades' 
role is not specifically intended by Plato to demonstrate Athen's political failure and 
fortunes in war as resulting from the improper uses of eros in the polis, a position held by 
Sayre (pp. 121-2) 6 Alcibiades rather represents the obsessive pursuit of an appetitive 
form of eros directed towards pleasure "self-serving gratification, and power" which 
proved disasterous for him personally and for Athens consequentially (Barker, Personal 
Communication, 2003). Alcibiades' uncontrolled eros is contrasted with the 
philosophical Bros of Symposium 212 directed towards true virtue and therefore wisdom, 
the latter form of eros being little tolerated within the polis. 8 Thus the juxtaposition of the 
auto to kalon and Alcibiades highlights the two potentialities of eros as being either 
intellectual or appetitive, each having distinct consequences. Eros directed towards the 
5 A. E. Taylor, p. 519. 
6 Nussbaum appears to be greatly indebted to this reading of eros in her discussion of the recantation in the 
Phaedrus, in Fragility of Goodness (1986), though she makes no reference to Sayre's Plato's Literary 
Garden (1928) in her bibliography. 
Barker holds that the Symposium is primarily focused upon "the ways in which the pursuit of various 
kinds of eros affects the lives of individuals". 
8 This lack of tolerance is further demonstrated by the polis' intolerance of Socrates and eventually his 
execution "only a few years after the dramatic date of Apollodorus' narration" (Sayre, p. 121). This reading 
can be seen to support A. E. Taylor's position that the Symposium was written to disprove accusations 
made against Socrates, with respect to his involvement with Alcibiades, for corrupting the youth. 
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intellectual object, heavenly Aphrodite, is constructive, while uncontrolled earthly 
Aphrodite is destructive. 
B. SECOND LEVEL: SEEN THROUGH THE SYMBOLIC, THE DIONYSIAN 
AND THE APOLLONIAN 
The juxtaposition of the beautiful of Diotima's speech with Alcibiades is further 
complexified through Alcibiades' representation of Socrates as the eros directed towards 
the beautiful of Diotima's speech. This indicates that the eros of Diotima's speech has 
crossed over into Alcibiades' speech and become embodied in Socrates so that the 
interaction between Socrates and Alcibiades is that of two conflicting types of eros. This 
results in their difficulty in communication in establishing a common language; Socrates 
tries to lead Alcibiades to the good directly while Alcibiades is trying physically to 
seduce Socrates in order to learn what Socrates knows. 
This difficulty in communication is shown through the movement between the 
two speeches, with regard to the Dionysian/Apollonian elements. 1° Alcibiades seems to 
represent Bacchus" physically, standing "in the doorway, with a mass of ribbons and an 
9 This opposition precedes the subtlety of the development of the image of the charioteer and his horses as 
representing the soul in Phaedrus 253c7-256e2, which can be argued implicitly to incorporate the 
reforming of Alcibiades. 
10 Within Greek culture a polarity between the Apollonian and Dionysian exists, the Apollonian which was 
typically Greek involving the "rational and civilized" (Hall, p. 25) "well-formed personality" (Burkert, p. 
162), versus the irrational frenzy of the Dionysian, which involves the surrender of personal identity. 
cBurkert, p. 162) For a highly influential account of this relation, see Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy. 
I Bacchus relates to both the votary and the god Dionysos. ("The merging of god and votary which occurs 
in this metamorphosis is without parallel in the rest of Greek religion"; Burkert, p. 162; also p. 163. ) "The 
god alone is called Dionysos; bakcheia denotes the frenzy" (Burkert, p. 412). Though commonly called the 
"god of wine and of intoxicated ecstasy, intoxication [denotes]... a change in consciousness... interpreted as 
the interruption of something divine". The experience of Dionysus extends beyond or may be entirely 
distinct from drunkenness. "Madness becomes an end in itself. Mania, the Greek word, denotes frenzy, not 
as the ravings of delusion, but.... as an experience of intensified mental power. " It is an infectious group 
phenomenon and results in the abandoning of one's individual identity into the madness, which is 
considered "divine and wholesome" (Burkert, pp. 161-2). 
"A challenge to the established order" (A. Henrichs, in Hornblower and Spawforth, Oxford 
Classical Dictionary, p. 479), Dionysos' cults were violent and disturbing involving drunkeness, orgies, 
and acts of violence, suggestive at times of cannabalism. Chased by Dionysos, women left their looms in 
divine frenzy running into the mountains and dismembering animals such as fawns as a ritual sacrifice. See 
Euripides' Bacchae for where the King Pentheus is torn apart by the maenads and his mother (Burkert, 
p. 165). The drinking of the wine in the Anthesteria festival may have secretly alluded to "the death of the 
god himself.... the association of wine and blood, with wine being described as the blood of the vine" 
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enormous wreath of ivy and violets12 sprouting on his head" (Symposium 212d4-el; trans. 
Joyce). This is further implied by his drunken frenzy, 13 disorderly comportment14 and 
epitomized by his passionate uncontrolled obsession with and adoration of Socrates. This 
is contrasted with the more Apollonian representation of the pursuit of the beautiful in the 
ascent of Diotima which is demonstrated by Socrates as the lover of wisdom who seeks at 
bottom a pure intellectual relationship with Alcibiades. Apollo is, according to Greek 
mythology, the "revealer of the truth" and the healer and "cleaner of the soul, "ls 
Socrates' preferred or "patron" god. 16 Apollo relates more closely than Dionysus to the 
priorities of Diotima's ascent which seeks to enlighten the soul, as does Socrates. '? 
(Burkert, p. 164). Hall (p. 37) believes that the tearing of the animal to pieces and the eating of its raw flesh 
are "a symbolic eating of the god himself". 12 Both Aphrodite and the Muses have crowns of violets and violets are also symbols of Athens. Ivy, 
"symbolizing immortality" (Hall, p. 163), is associated with Dionysus the only god who dies and is reborn, 
and his maenads and satyrs (Burkert, p. 166). 
13 While Dionysos in this period is not drunk, and is often represented as entirely unfrenzied standing in the 
midst of drunken Bacchae, frenzied male and female votaries, satyrs, maenads or thyiades, Burkert states 
that "the madness of the frenzied god himself can be traced to the anger of Hera. Hera represents the 
normal order of the polis-the inversion of this order is her anger" articulated by the full nature of 
Dionysos (Burkert, p. 165). 
14 This is exemplified through the accusation against Alcibiades that the night before the fleet set sail for 
Syracuse he, along with Phaedrus and Eryximachus, "profaned the mysteries" (through doing a mock 
performance of the rites in a "private house" (Thucydides, The History of the Peloponnesian War, ch. 28) 
and "mutilated the Hermae" (which were pillars with prosopa (faces)) and phalli, household gods and 
boundary markers. The prosopa were mutilated and most probably the phalli, though not mentioned. 
(Thucydides, ch. 27). 
is Apollo is A, rioi s, Haplous, "the speaker of truth. As purifier of the soul by means of mantic 
fumigations, washing, and aspersion (KaOapnKos) and of the body by healing medicines (arpzKär, he is 
the god who washes away (&; roioünv) and delivers (ä'roAufov) from evil. " (Comford, Principium 
Sapientiae, p. 88; also see Fritz Graf, in Hornblower and Spawforth, Oxford Classical Dictionary, p. 122) 
Apollo is Apolouon, 1r'ro2ovwv, meaning he who heals, "washes away. " As the "god of healing.... Apollo 
the Helper, Epikourios, [also] accorded the epithet Doctor, latros" (Burkert, p. 147), is god of purifications 
and cryptic oracles. "With disease and bane, nosos in the widest sense, being interpreted as pollution, the 
bane is not personified, but objectified; knowledge and personal responsibility come into play: the person 
must discover the action which has brought about pollution and must eliminate the miasma through 
renewed action. This, of course requires super-human knowledge: the god of purifications must also be an 
oracle god". (Burkert, p. 147) As the revealer of truth, this explains why along with his infinite superiority, 
as "something absolute", from the "fifth century onward Apollo began to be understood as a sun god". 
(Burkert, p. 149) Apollo is also leader of the Muses, Mousagetes. A statue of Apollo on Delos has in the 
right hand the Graces and in the left the bow (arrows in the Iliad "signify pestilence: the god of healing is 
also the god of plague"; Burkert, p. 145). According to Callimachus this signifies that "the favour of the 
god is prior and stronger that the destructive power" (Burkert, p. 146). 
16 Socrates dedicated himself to Apollo (Apology 20e4-22b2, Kierkegaard, Concept of Irony, p. 38) and because of his hard service to Apollo rendered himself poor (Apology, 33a). 17 This is not a direct correlation involving classical Greek theology, but only concerning the symbolic 
value ultimately pointing towards the opposition of sophrosune and mania. 
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However, Alcibiades opens his speech by comparing Socrates to a statue of 
Silenus, a companion of Dionysus, father of the satyrs who carries "pipes or flutess18 
(215b2) as well as the satyr Marsyas (215b11-c9). Satyrs were horned with hairy legs, 
hooves, tails and were "supposed to be hybrid creatures combining the mentality of 
humans with the sexual appetites of beasts and were typically depicted with oversized 
and characteristically tumid male organs. 19 When Alcibiades goes on to point out that 
Socrates cannot object to the comparison, because in fact he resembles a satyr, one is 
reminded of the remark to the same effect in Xenophon's Symposium (iv. 19),, 2° This, 
however, misrepresents Socrates as we shall see, particularly given that in Republic 399d- 
e he says "we are not innovating... in preferring Apollo and the instruments of Apollo to 
Marsyas and his instruments". 
It would appear that Alcibiades' arrival dressed as Bacchus, and subsequent 
comparison of Socrates to a satyr and to Marsyas, have several implications. Socrates 
resembles Marsyas making melodies with the "power to possess and so reveal those 
people who are ready for the god and his mysteries" (215c5-7) without instruments but 
with words. Nonetheless simultaneously as Marsyas is a creature punished by Apollo for 
hubris'21 Alcibiades may be implying (perhaps in jest) that Socrates through his words is 
competing with Apollo and through this pride is guilty of hubris. Alcibiades asks the 
listeners to "sit in judgment of Socrates' amazing arrogance and pride" (219c7-8), 
because he "turned [Alcibiades] down" (219c5), suggesting that Socrates had committed 
'a According to Nehamas (p. 65) an aulos is a reed instrument, not actually a flute, which was "held by the 
ancients to be the instrument that most strongly aroused the emotions". As Alcibiades says that Socrates' 
words have the same effect as Marsyas' music, he implies that Socrates has the power to arouse the 
strongest emotions. See West, Ancient Greek Music, pp. 1-2. 
19 Satyrs and sileni are "imaginary male inhabitants of the wild ... with some animal features, unrestrained in 
their desire for sex and wine, and generally represented naked.... the ambiguity of the satyrs as grotesque 
hedonists and yet the immortal companions of a god, cruder than men and yet somewhat wiser, combining 
mischief with wisdom, lewdness with skill in music, animality with divinity" (Richard Seaford, in 
Hornblower and Spawforth, Oxford Classical Dictionary, p. 1361). This ambiguity is reflected in Dionysos 
whom they follow, who was "perceived as both man and animal, male and effeminate, young and old; he is 
the most versatile and elusive of all Greek gods" (A. Henrichs, in Hornblower and Spawforth, Oxford 
Classical Dictionary, p. 479). 
20 Sayre, p. 122; also see Nehamas p. 65 which describes satyrs as having "horses' tails or ears, sometimes 
the traits of goats" (also see Hall, p. 274; as a costume see Burkert, p. 104 and 166), this sheds some light 
on the figuring of Bottom in Shakespeare's A Midsummer's Night's Dream. 
21 Nehamas (65) states that "Classical tradition did not clearly distinguish between a satyr and a silenus. 
Marsyas, in myth, was a satyr who dared compete in music with Apollo and was skinned alive for his 
impudence. " See Diodorus Siculus U1.59, Apollodorus 1.4, and Hall, p. 273. 
50 
a crime against his beauty in refusing him and, as beauty is of divine origin, it is as if 
Socrates had committed a crime against the gods. 
2 While leaving Alcibiades somewhat 
bewildered, Alcibiades seems to hope that Socrates will ultimately succumb to his desire, 
suggesting that the undermining of the Dionysian by the Apollonian is to be countered by 
Alcibiades' effort to seduce Socrates yet again, the Dionysian undermining the 
Apollonian. 
However while Bacchus and Marsyas are friends, Alcibiades through this use of 
terminology shows early on that he sees Socrates as his friend/kin, but only according to 
his own particularly self-centred understanding of friendship, a utilitarian notion in which 
he wishes to exchange his body for Socrates' logoi and understanding. This notion 
undercuts the ethics implicit in Socrates' philosophical logoi showing how little 
Alcibiades, coming from the Dionysian framework, understands them and Socrates' 
intentions. Nonetheless, that Alcibiades is drawn to Socrates specifically because of what 
is hidden within him, the "godlike" precious figures (216e7-217a2) which as logoi are 
Apollonian, is of consequence because he realizes that they render his Dionysian mindset 
futile and his life meaningless, which creates a tension in Alcibiades' feeling towards 
Socrates. Thus through the imagery of Dionysus and Apollo, Plato displays a partial 
inability by Alcibiades to understand Socrates in tension with an appreciation of Socrates 
and his logoi. 
However, this difficulty in communication is not the fault of Alcibiades alone, but 
likewise may also involve Socrates' mode of communication. Alcibiades' comparison of 
Socrates to a satyr may be symptomatic of a deeper problem. Sayre puts it rather 
strongly: "Socrates' physical appearance may not have been ideal for the role of a 
teacher. Not only was his physical presence unduly distracting to young men like 
Alcibiades and Charmides, but he actually made a point of leading them on with his 
banter about being attracted to handsome young men" (Sayre, p. 123). Following this line 
of thought, Alcibiades seems initially to have taken seriously Socrates' "overt teasing" 
22 Alcibiades accused Socates of "insolence (hubrisen: 219c5) and `arrogance (huperephanes: 219c7), 
properties that notoriously characterized Alcibiades himself" (Sayre, p. 124). Nehamas (p. 66), noting 
hubristes means vile, states "In sexual contexts the word would normally be used of one who sexually 
abuses another, but Alcibiades here accuses Socrates of a different sort of abuse, as at 222a, where the point 
is that Socrates has mocked at Alcibiades' beauty". Clearly Alcibiades associates beauty with sexuality and 
partially feels deceived by Socrates because of the means by which Socrates teased and misled him. 
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about being "erotically disposed to beautiful boys (216d2-3) and, since [Alcibiades] 
considered himself to be exceptionally beautiful, he thought it only natural that Socrates 
might want" to seduce him, as would a satyr, which he physically appeared to be. 
Alcibiades proceeds to give Socrates every opportunity (217c3,217c8,219c1), to no 
avail (219d1-2). However given that "this kind of flirting is entirely absent in the 
interaction between Diotima and Socrates" which demonstrates a more successful 
example of philosophical instruction, we receive our first overt hint that this type of 
flirting may be counterproductive, both distracting and blocking the student from the 
pursuit of philosophical truths. (Sayre, pp. 122-4)23 
This tension between Alcibiades' view of Socrates' satyr-like appearance and his 
recognition of the philosophical logoi he possesses within, indicates that though he 
physically appears and acts Dionysian he is actually Apollonian/rational in orientation. 
Given this conflict of inner and outer, Sayre inquires as to whether Socrates is able "to 
lead others along the path to wisdom" (Sayre, p. 124) 24 Considering Eros is a lover of 
wisdom (203d7), he has no share in "good and beautiful things" (202d4-5). Socrates, who 
is equated with Eros in the Symposium, does not yet in full possess the beautiful and 
good. Sayre ties this to Diotima's doubt as to whether Socrates is capable of 
understanding the higher mysteries, (210a2)25 for if Socrates had not had the-revelation of 
23 Sayre maintains that Alcibiades discusses Socrates' production of images of beauty rather than true 
beauty because the "dynamics of his emotional interaction with Alcibiades prevent Socrates' true virtue 
from being displayed" (Sayre, p. 124). This reading however appears questionable when it is noted that 
Alcibiades specifically introduces his comparison of Socrates with Marsyas by stating "I'll try to praise 
Socrates, my friends, but I'll have to use an image" (215a5-6). This conscious use of an image is 
reminiscent of Socrates' discussion of the nature of the soul in Phaedrus (246a4-5) when he states "most 
assuredly a god alone could tell it, but what it resembles, that a man might tell". This suggests (if we may 
use the Phaedrus as an indicator of Plato's conception of Socrates' procedures) that Alcibiades, following 
Socrates' method (which he understands at a far deeper level than many are willing to admit though clearly 
he resists) of using images to describe that which exceeds human understanding and description, is simply 
honouring/idolizing Socrates, indicating the way Socrates would speak of the forms or the soul, that which 
goes beyond his understanding. 
24 "Whereas Diotima is represented as the ideal teacher of philosophy, Socrates is portrayed as notably 
deficient in the traits needed to guide a student along the pathway to wisdom. " Sayre resolves the difficulty 
by concluding that Socrates is not represented as a guide/teacher to philosophy but as a personification of 
eros. He is "instead the paradigm of the love of wisdom [as the son of poverty, Eros "falls short of 
wisdom"] which inspires one to follow the path set by Diotima" (Sayre, pp. 126-7), and pursue wisdom 
(Sayre, pp. 128-9) while having no wisdom himself. 
25 This interpretation stands in opposition to the majority of classical and contemporary scholars who hold 
that Socrates is portrayed as having seen the beautiful. Both A. E. Taylor and Guthrie believe that Socrates 
saw the vision of auto to kalon, after which he has "bearing as being not of their world though he is in it". 
(Taylor, p. 232) A. E. Taylor (p. 229) believed that Diotima's uncertainty shows that "Plato here is guilty of 
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the beautiful, Sayre feels Socrates can not successfully lead others (Sayre, pp. 124-5), as 
he might be seen as being in the realm of true opinion. 6 This position Sayre supports 
through the apparent irony of Socrates' claim of ignorance (Theaetetus, 150c4) under 
which he believes there is a "core of truth" indicating for Sayre that "in Plato's view at 
least, Socrates was arrested at the third level of Diotima's philosophical ascent" (Sayre, p. 
125). On this view, not only is Socrates unable to lead others because of his mixed nature 
of having the outward appearance and comportment of a satyr while generating 
philosophical and therefore "Apollonian" logoi, but also, and unconnectedly, because he 
himself may not have reached the vision of auto to kalon, so does not know except 
through true opinion where he is leading the youths and- therefore possesses no 
knowledge to teach them. 
However, for Plato there is a distinction between the revelation of the beautiful 
and ultimately possessing beauty and goodness, the first being the domain of the 
philosopher and the latter that of a god. Given, as we have noted before, that the vision 
changes the initiate and causes him to bring forth true virtue, the full vision seems 
inseparable from true virtue. 7 While the inquiry into whether Socrates saw the vision is 
ultimately speculative, Sayre through demanding that a guide possess full knowledge 
eliminates everyone from being guides in philosophy. As no mortal has perfect wisdom, 
Socrates lacks the full possession of the beautiful and good. This does not mean that 
Socrates can not guide a "student" like Alcibiades towards the truth given that such a 
pursuit is dialectical, an interactive journey in pursuit of wisdom shared by individuals 
who each, as a philosopher, necessarily does not possess goodness and beauty. As, 
according to Barker (Personal Communication, 2002), Socrates "knows the shape of the 
the arrogance of professing that he has reached philosophical heights to which the `historical' Socrates 
could not ascend". Comford ("The Doctrine of Eros, " p. 129) partially supports him saying "Plato might 
mean that his own philosophy, centered in another world, lay beyond the explicit doctrine of his master, 
though it might be implicit in his life and practice". (Also see Cornford, Sapientiae, p. 69) Contemporary 
commentators do not support Taylor and Cornford in thinking Plato's Socrates is historically accurate. 
26 True opinion: "Judging things correctly without being able to give a reason. Surely you see that this is 
not the same as knowing-for how could knowledge be unreasoning? And it's not ignorance either-for 
how could what hits the truth be ignorance? Correct judgement, of course, has this character it is in 
between understanding and ignorance. " (202a7-12) Regardless of how close to full resource/possession of 
the beautiful and the good an individual may be, the presence of any lack of understanding exemplifies 
aoros, and hence liability to aporia, between ignorance and knowledge. 
2r Republic 7: 531d-4d also suggests that "vision" is not the final resting place; yet as it is necessary for the 
initiate to beget true virtue, the two are inseparable. 
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route" and is more advanced on the path than Alcibiades, his help would prove invaluable 
if fully understood and accepted. 
Taken overall in terms of a symbolic reading, it would appear the difficulty to 
communicate at the linguistic level occurs in both directions. On one side Alcibiades, 
misreading Socrates through Alcibiades' Dionysian field of reference, adopts a 
comportment with Socrates which conflicts with what he desires from Socrates, his 
Apollonian logoi, showing that he does not fully understand him or his logoi and as a 
result of this comportment makes Socrates flee. From Symposium 213D (trans. Joyce) 
when Socrates says "I shudder at his madness and passion for love", we see that 
Alcibiades does not change his strategy which would have enabled him to draw closer to 
gain better access to that which he desires, Socrates' inner logoi and understanding by 
which he hopes to become a better person. This appears to be because he is incipiently 
aware that if he accepts these logoi and applies them they will fully undermine and 
subvert the Dionysian life of pleasure, the Dionysian not being an end in itself concerning 
virtue for Plato. For this reason, unwilling to let go of either, Alcibiades remains 
Dionysian fleeing Socrates while remaining fixated upon him. 
On the other side, regardless of Socrates' considerable effort to guide Alcibiades, 
evident in First Alcibiades and in his insistence upon maintaining purity in their 
relationship, at times Socrates wore the mask of a satyr and used the Dionysian symbolic 
language in order to attract the "initiates of Dionysus" and lead/convert them to 
philosophy, the Apollonian practice of reason. In so doing he appears to have confused 
Alcibiades by giving him mixed signals (for its consequences see 213c8-213d9) 
distracting him from pursuing purely philosophical ends by encouraging the Dionysian 
side, and thereby increasing and perpetuating an inner struggle and tension, which draws 
into question whether this mixture of conflicting languages is the most effective method 
for leading someone to full wisdom. Taking this into account, the complex symbol 
structure of this part of the dialogue points to the inference that the difficulty in 
communication lies both on the side of Alcibiades and of Socrates. 
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C. THIRD LEVEL: SEEN THROUGH THE CONCEPTUAL CONCERNING 
LOVE OF THE INDIVIDUAL 
In order to understand this difficulty in communication in Apollonian terms, and 
reach a conceptual understanding of the juxaposition of these opposing figures, we must 
examine more deeply the actual relation of Alcibiades and Socrates through their 
conceptions of eros and the light this throws on their visions of each other. In Chapter II, 
we showed how Socrates is the embodiment of the Plato of the Symposium's conception 
of Eros, which is a philosophical love directed towards universal intellectual objects, the 
forms, in view of begetting virtue to reach if possible immortality. Socrates' personifying 
of Diotima's notion of Bros, the union of poros and penia, becomes in Alcibiades' speech 
the beloved of Alcibiades demonstrating his inability to distinguish love from the 
beloved, showing that he missed Socrates' speech 28 Alcibiades according to Nussbaum, 
Markus and others, seems to exemplify passionate love, directed towards the particular 
beloved as a unique object of love: "This is the love which Socrates finds a burden (213c- 
d)-which conforms most precisely to the literal meaning of eros and its analysis by 
Aristophanes" (Markus, pp. 227-8). Aristophanes' understanding of love, of course, is the 
"longing for and following after that primeval wholeness" (Symposium 193a2-3; trans. 
Joyce), achieved through an "utter oneness with the beloved" (Symposium 192e8-9; trans. 
Joyce). However, the contrast of the climax of Socrates' speech with the entrance of 
Alcibiades opposes the desired universal form of the beautiful with Alcibiades' erotic 
pursuit of a particular instantiation of earthly beauty, though his infatuation with the not 
physically beautiful Socrates who is the lover of wisdom shows this dichotomy not to be 
straightforward. 
i. Vlastos' and Nussbaum's Critique of Plato's Love of the Individual 
Vlastos in "The Individual as an Object of Love in Plato" put forward a major 
critique of Plato's view of love, that the individual is loved not for himself but as a means 
28 This shift seems paradoxical: How can Eros who is poor find himself continually surfacing as the 
beloved? This paradox will be analyzed in the next chapter through Kierkegaard's analysis of irony, which 
can be seen as showing the coherent linkage of poverty and irony. 
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to the end of the beautiful; analogous concerns can be found elsewhere. 29 The individual 
is not loved as a person but as a conglomeration of qualities, in so far as they participate 
in the beautiful and the good (Singer, pp. 72,87; Vlastos pp. 28-9,31). As each thing is 
loved for something else, there is an infinite regress to the only true object of love, the 
good (Gorgias 467c5-468c7), which alone can be loved for its own sake or as an end in 
itself, showing that (in the terms provided by the Symposium) all things are loved as 
means to the end of the form of the beautiful. Thus for Vlastos, Plato's love does not 
focus upon an individual's concern and love for the specific individual but only in so far 
as the individual is useful and beautiful, "good producing" with use-value. For this reason 
Vlastos (p. 8), Osborne (p. 102) and Santas (p. 42), believe Platonic love is selfish, 
motivated by self-interest. Furthermore Vlastos argues that as 
all too few human beings are masterworks of excellence, and not even the best of those we have the chance 
to love are wholly free of streaks of the ugly, the mean, the commonplace, the ridiculous; if our love for 
them is to be only for their virtue and beauty, the individual, in the uniqueness and integrity of his or her 
individuality, will never be the object of love. 
This represents for Vlastos "the cardinal flaw in Plato's theory"; 30 that "the high 
climactic moment of fulfillment the peak achievement for which all lesser loves are to 
be `used as steps'-is the one farthest removed from affection for concrete human 
beings" (Vlastos, pp. 31-2). Vlastos believes Plato's philosophy demonstrates a 
fundamental selfishness and incomprehension of the importance of human relations and 
how to love. 31 
Nussbaum reads this into her interpretation of Alcibiades and Socrates believing 
29 See Cornford, "The Doctrine of Eros" p. 126: When eros is channelled towards one object it lessens its 
force towards other objects, and because Eros as the divine/daimon is directed towards the beautiful and the 
divine, rather than human experience (see Plotinus' Enneads), it is stripped away from the individual in its 
pursuit of the good. (Republic 485; Comford, Unwritten Philosophy, p. 72; Guthrie, "Plato, the Man and 
his dialogues", p. 394). 
30 "It does not provide for the love of whole persons, but only for the love of that abstract version of 
persons which consists of the complex of their best qualities. This is the reason why personal affection 
ranks so low in Plato's scala amoris. When loved as congeries of valuable qualities, persons cannot 
compete with abstractions of universal significance, like schemes of social reform or scientific and 
philosophical truths, still less with the Idea of Beauty in its sublime transcendence, `pure, clear, unmixed, 
not full of human flesh and color and other mortal nonsense' (Symposium 211el-3)" (Vlastos, "The 
Individual as an Object of Love", pp. 31-2). 
31 See also Kosman, p. 55; W. Price attacks the Vlastos/Nussbaum interpretation in Love and Friendship in 
Plato and Aristotle, pp. 45-49 and in "Loving Persons Platonically", p. 25-34. 
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that Alcibiades' understanding of love is a passionate devotion to Socrates as a particular 
embodied human being as opposed to Socrates' conception of eros which focuses upon 
the "dry" (Fragility, p. 216) rational pursuit of the forms. She rehearses Vlastos' 
argument saying, 
Despite our needy and mortal natures, we can transcend the merely personal in eros and ascend, through 
desire itself, to the good. But we are not yet persuaded that we can accept this vision of self-sufficiency and 
this model of practical understanding since, with Vlastos, we feel that they are omitting something. What 
they omit is now movingly displayed to us in the person and story of Alcibiades. We realize through him, 
the deep importance unique passion has for ordinary human beings; we see its irreplaceable contribution to 
understanding. (Fragility, p. 197) 
According to her interpretation, Socrates as sophrosune represents a form of love aimed 
at the forms in which love of the individual is expendable and transferable while 
Alcibiades as mania exemplifies irrational and total devotion to an individual in his 
entirety. She concludes that these types of love represent "two mutually exclusive" 
visions which are incompatible and demand a choice. 32 
ii. Applicable or Not? 
Such an account facilitates reading the entrance of Alcibiades as follows: after 
Socrates has "been `saved' by `scanning beauty's wide horizon, ' in walks the 
embodiment of a slavish and illiberal devotion to the individual loveliness of a 
single... man"-Alcibiades. 33 In order to understand this juxtaposition, we must turn back 
to the ascent in order to see how Socrates, the exemplaire of Platonic eros, figures as the 
initiate in his pursuit of the forms. In the description of the ascent to the beautiful, the 
initiate having fallen 
32 This "story brings a further problem: it shows us clearly that we cannot simply add the love of 
Alcibiades to the ascent of Diotima; indeed, that we cannot have this love and the kind of stable rationality 
that she reveals to us. Socrates was serious when he spoke of two mutually exclusive visions.. . 
We see two 
kinds of value, two kinds of knowledge; and we see that we must choose. One sort of understanding blocks 
out the other. The pure light of the eternal form eclipses, or is eclipsed by, the flickering light of the opened 
and unstable moving body". (Nussbaum, Fragility, pp. 197-8) 
33 Nussbaum, Fragility, Ch. 6. 
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"in love with the beauty of one individual body... must34 consider how nearly related (akin: adelphon, 
a8c? 
ov)35 the beauty of any one body is to the beauty of any other, when he will see that if he is to devote 
himself to loveliness (beauty: kalon, xaXöv) of form it will be absurd (quite ridiculous: polle anoia, 
7to?. Xtj 
ävota) to deny that the beauty of each and every body is the same. Having reached this point, he 
must set himself to be the lover of every lovely body, and bring his passion for the one into due proportion 
by deeming it of little or of no importance (trivial of no account: smikron, ßµixpöv)" (Symposium 210a-b, 
trans. Joyce; Dover translation of Greek words). 
The initiate devotes himself to the loving of one particular body. In contemplating the 
relation to each other of particular instances of beauty, one loved as a unique instance 
compared with another likewise beautiful, though separate instances they are related in 
their beauty which establishes a kinship between the two, and makes them adelpha. If the 
initiate devotes himself to the pursuit of kalon, or as Dover (Symposium, p. 155) states "if 
beauty (sc. manifested) in appearance is to be pursued", then the instances of beauty are 
34 It is unclear what type of mental process the "must" implies. Ferrari ("Platonic Love", p. 257) notes the 
sense of obligation to visit the different stages through Plato's use of dei (210a4) which translates as 
"must". A. E. Taylor (p. 229) uses the expression "he must" even more strongly which implies an intention 
and determination by will rather than a natural progression. Guthrie ("Plato, the Man and his Dialogues", p. 
395) writes "the purification of Eros is achieved by conscious effort, " indicating that it is willful like 
Republic 516e5-6, though in the Republic Socrates describes another's intention as the initiate is "dragged" 
from the cave. Here Eros as between good and evil becomes more godlike as Eros is capitalized. Guthrie 
expresses this in terms of the active groping, giving it an almost tactile quality. He writes, "the mind first 
becomes aware of the shared Forms in sets of particulars, then, discarding the senses, ascends `by itself to 
the grasp of higher (more universal) Forms. " 
Guthrie (392) considers that "the progress from perception of particulars to apprehension of a 
form, which vividly describes a progress of Love, is equated with anamnesis at Phaedrus 249 b-c, " a 
statement which links the Symposium and the Phaedrus, as well as assuming that they share a common idea 
of love, a position which Ferrari argues against in his paper "Platonic Love. " Though anamnesis is not 
directly referred to in the Symposium, this is not problematic with regard to Guthrie's reading as he views 
the dialogues as interrelated and informing each other, so that for him it does not have to be directly 
referred to. For Guthrie, the mental process involves the intentional pulling forth of forgotten knowledge 
from a primordial existence through a dialectical relationship with another person; as anamnesis is by 
nature a blind venture, it explains the tactile quality of the language Guthrie uses. 
Moravcsik ("Reason and Eros, " p. 285) is sensitive to the shifts in the text, dividing the phases of 
the ascent into steps of eros, reason and creativity, demonstrating in depth the reflective process of the 
ascent as a continuum, in contrast to Ferrari ("Platonic Love", p. 257) who thinks that, though obliged, "we 
are not told how he snakes the transitions. " Santas (pp. 41-2) following Moravcsik agrees that the steps of 
the ascent involve "cognitive, emotional, and creative" aspects though he complains that Moravcsik does 
not contextualize his findings. Furthermore, he specifies that "We should expect to find all the elements of 
eros proper at each step: a lover, the perception of an attracting beautiful object, the desire to beget 
offspring on the beautiful object, and the desire for immortality for the sake of which the begetting takes 
place, " though he thinks that this is not absolute as the lover does not create on all levels. 5 Dover (Symposium. p. 155) suggests comparing this use of adelphon to Republic 402c. 
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recognized as being akin. 6 Beauty ceases to be recognized as multiple instances of kalon 
because the initiate's intellect recognizes them as one, unifies them, as through focusing 
uniquely upon what is shared, the beauty of their bodies, their differences drop away, so 
that the love for the beautiful bodies becomes transferable, not attached to the particular 
but to beautiful bodies in general. Thus the importance of the particular beauty of a 
unique individual's body is disregarded or minimized in favour of the more general 
category of beauty. Through disregarding the infinite variations of what is beautiful in an 
individual body, in favour of an integrated understanding of physical beauty, Diotima 
moves beyond/transcends the idea of love focused upon the unique individual body. Then 
going a step further the initiate proceeds 
"to grasp that the beauties of the body are as nothing to the beauties of the soul, so that wherever he meets 
with spiritual loveliness, even in the husk of an unlovely body, he will find it beautiful enough to fall in 
love with and to cherish-beautiful enough to quicken in his heart a longing for such discourse as tends 
towards the building of a noble nature. And from this he will be led to contemplate the beauty of laws and 
institutions. And when he discovers how nearly every kind of beauty is akin to every other he will conclude 
that the beauty of the body is not after all, of so great moment... And thus, by scanning beauty's wide 
horizon, he will be saved from a slavish (hosper oiketes, 
ätCp of&cc1s)and illiberal devotion to the 
individual loveliness of a single boy, a single man. " (Symposium 210b8-d3; trans. Joyce) 
Though the text does not explain how this occurs, 37 the initiate recognizes that the 
beauties of the soul are superior to those of the body. 38 This may indicate a movement 
36 "That all beauty is `akin' is thought likely to strike anyone who makes comparisons; that it is `one and 
the same' is a claim that perhaps only the Platonist would find it `very foolish' to deny. But that is surely 
the point: This lover is marked out for philosophy, the preserve of the few (cf. 209e5-210a2), by the 
peculiarity in his reaction... The lover who comes to be more occupied by thoughts and expressions of 
beauty than by the beauty of the body that prompted them, being marked thereby as a reflective and 
cultured type, will naturally be open to the attractions of the soul. " (Ferrari, "Platonic Love", p. 257) 
37 Santas (p. 42) asks "how Plato conceives of the change of attachment or emotion: is the original 
attachment to a single beautiful body transferred to the beauty of bodies, and later to the beauty of souls, 
and so on, or is the original desire extinguished and a new one takes its place"? He feels it unanswerable in 
the Symposium as the latter provides no clear evidence though the Phaedrus and Republic show eros to be a 
growing desire which ultimately encompasses all that is beautiful and good, the very essence of beauty and 
goodness. 
Ferrari in "Platonic Love" (pp. 255-7), discussing the Symposium, suggests that the ascent to the 
beautiful results from the act of abstraction from the particular/empirical, as does Singer (Vol. I. pp. 57-8). 
This contrasts with Comford's reading in Principium Sapientiae that no abstracting from the phenomenal is 
possible as knowledge is achieved through anamnesis (pp. 51-53), so abstracting cannot account for 
goodness and virtue (pp. 48-49), opening the problematic of the one versus the many, bringing into 
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from physical beauty to inner beauty as virtue or goodness, 39 or to a "nobility", not 
necessarily moral, of higher and greater value than that available to the body alone. 
Considering beauties of the soul as superior to beauties of the body, thus ascending from 
body to soul, Diotima moves progressively towards a higher and more "noble" and 
incidentally more impersonal type of beauty, such as custom, institution or knowledge, 
until the initiate reaches the revelation of the form of beauty, though it is subject to 
debate as to whether he gives up worldly attachments in the process. 40 
In either case, Diotima views the permanent attachment to one particular body, 
soul, or institution as slavish. Transcending fixed relations with particulars saves the 
initiate from slavery. Dover (Symposium, p. 156) states of ri'; rsp oi, ccrr7s (hosper 
oiketes) that the 
notion that it is `slavish' to be content with the beauty of particulars resembles the argument of Tht. 172c- 
173b, where those trained in law and politics, contending always with a multitude of pressures, are 
contrasted as `slaves' with free men, with philosophers who have time to think about abstract issues. D3 
vµixpoXoyos (smikrologos): in Tht. 175a aµucpokoyta (smikrologia) is the `pettiness' of those who attach 
importance to what is, from a philosophical standpoint, trivial and transitory. 
question again the aporia of how we know. Ficino provides a different reading: "the splendour of the 
celestial majesty shining through bodies" (On Love, Speech 11: 6), particular instances of beauty. Though 
extremely rich and passionate, this reading shows hints of the Neo-Platonic tradition as found in Plotinus 
(Enneads 1,6,3) and Augustine (Confessions. X, 8-9), though not entirely succumbing to its full influence 
as does his commentator Allen in The Platonism of Marsilio Ficino. 
39 The closeness of the terms is brought out by Dover's use (p. 143; Symposium (204a5)) of 
uaXov xayaOov as a "general lauditory term used predominantly, though not exclusively, of men; it 
differs from good in taking account not merely of moral disposition (as manifested in courage and 
generosity) but also attributes (e. g. wealth, good physique and skills) which enhance one's value to the 
community. " Love of the higher mysteries demands, after examination, a conscious understanding that 
"beauty, whether of body or soul, is instrumental to their virtuous (that is, socially esteemed) conduct" 
(Ferrari, p. 255). 
40 There is some disagreement among commentators as to whether or not the lover of the forms definitively 
gives up all worldly attachments, particularly as Symposium 211d2-5 states, "And there in life... there if 
anywhere should a person live his life, beholding that beauty. If you once see that, it won't occur to you to 
measure beauty by gold or clothing or beautiful boys and youths. " 
Santas, with Vlastos and Moravcsik, believes that the lover of the form of Beauty has "given up, it 
seems all earthy attachments" (Plato and Freud, p. 69), a position which, with Nussbaum (Fragility, Ch. 7), 
Santas sees as corrected in the Phaedrus. According to Cobb (pp. 80-4), although Vlastos in "The 
Individual" pp. 33-35 and Moravcsik in "Reason and Eros" (p. 293) think the lower levels are "transcended 
in a final and permanent way, it seems more likely that the lower stages continue to be recognized as 
genuine, though limited, manifestations of beauty and hence to be appreciated for the beauty they 
contain.... [Thus] reaching the highest levels does not mean one is unappreciative of the beauties focused 
on the lower levels. " This position is also supported by Santas (p. 42). 
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This is reminiscent of Symposium (173c5-d3; trans. Joyce) in which the financiers are 
described as "being very busy when they're really doing absolutely nothing" and who are 
judged by Apollodorus to be themselves "the unfortunates. " This in turn points forward 
to Alcibiades' comment that Socrates "makes him admit that while [he is] spending [his] 
time on politics, [he is] neglecting all the things that are crying for attention in [himself]" 
(216a5-6; trans. Joyce). However this figure is inverted when Alcibiades says Socrates, 
"[turns his] whole soul upside down and [leaves him] feeling as if [he] were the lowest of 
the low" (215e5-6; trans. Joyce) so that he "[dashes] off like a runaway slave" (216b7; 
trans. Joyce), implying that his political life represents his freedom/rebellion against the 
bondage of Socrates' presence and logoi. 
Yet is Alcibiades a slave to his worldly nature or to Socrates? Cobb notes that 
"Alcibiades confesses that, although he feels the enormous attraction of Socrates and 
believes that `whatever Socrates commands must be done' (216e), he himself 
nevertheless turns away, a slave to the desire for popular fame (216b)" (Cobb p. 82). In 
this sense, Alcibiades is a slave to fame (the spirited part of the soul/thumos) "[pleasing] 
the crowd" (216b7)4' and to the appetite. Alcibiades knows that he ought to be governed 
by the intellect which accords with the justice of the soul, but he rebels against this sense 
of order and harmony succumbing to the temptations of both his spirited and appetitive 
parts, and is thereby enslaved by the desires of the lower parts of the soul. A. E. Taylor, 
anticipating Cobb's position, discusses the tension between Alcibiades' appropriateness 
to philosophy and his resistance due to uncontrolled earthly eros and pride, causing him 
to chose worldly victory. 42 "We are made to look at the two types side by side, and listen 
to the confession of the triumphant worldling in the full flesh of triumph, that he has 
chosen the worser part. " (A. E. Taylor, p. 233) This suggests that though his actions 
suggest otherwise, Alcibiades still acknowledges Socrates to be his rightful master, and 
acknowledges himself to be Socrates' "runaway slave". 
Through admitting that the way of philosophy is "true" Alcibiades acknowledges 
himself to be the slave of Socrates. Nussbaum thinks that this slavery is not due to his 
41 See also First Alcibiades 124b5-6. 
42 "Alcibiades, naturally endowed with all the gifts required for `philosophy, ' but a prey to lusts of the flesh 
and the eye and the pride of life, is the man who might have `seen' if he would, the man who made the 
great refusal of sacrificing the reality for the shadow. He has chosen for the world and has all the world can 
give. " (A. E. Taylor, p. 233) 
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admiration purely of Socrates' logoi, but is an utter passion for the person of Socrates. 
Faced with Socrates, Alcibiades is "staggered", "bewitched" (215d5), "smitten with a 
kind of sacred rage" (215d9), "tears start into my eyes" (215e1-2). Socrates is compared 
to a "Siren" (216a7), and "Marsyas" (215e6). "I simply could not go on living in the way 
I did" (216a1; trans. Joyce), and further he is "the only man in the world that can make 
me feel ashamed" (216b3-4; trans. Joyce), giving Alcibiades "snakebites" in the heart and 
soul (217e6-218b5,216b7) 43 As Alcibiades is enslaved by his infatuation with Socrates, 
he is "stuck" or "fixated" upon Socrates. 44 
However in contrast with this view, at 216e6-217a1 Alcibiades describes a 
moment of seriousness when he had a "glimpse of the figures [Socrates] keeps 
within... godlike... bright and beautiful". As in line 217a6-7, Alcibiades expresses that 
what at the time he desired (and what he still seems to desire) is for Socrates to "teach 
[him] everything he [knows]"; this would indicate that the inner figures are Socrates' 
logoi. Alcibiades desires these so much that he would purchase them in exchange for his 
own body. For this reason terms like "bewitched", "smitten" and "staggered" apply not 
primarily to Socrates as an individual but to his philosophical logoi which he alone in the 
circle of Alcibiades produces. In this sense though the logoi are objective truths, Socrates 
is unique for Alcibiades. It must be added however that when others like Apollodorus 
43 Cf. Nussbaum's (Fragility, p. 197) account of Alcibiades enslaved by Socrates. 
"This fixation relates to that identified in perfectionist theory discussed by Stanley Cavell, in Conditions 
Handsome and Unhandsome, pp. 6-7). According to Cavell, the perfectionistic framework is that of a 
dialogue between a younger person or student and an older person who exemplifies traits of what the 
younger person wishes to become or embody, a framework existing in almost all Platonic dialogues. This 
desiring to become other than what one is represents a split of the self, a moment when the student finds 
himself alienated from his reality. In his attraction to this future self, represented by the teacher, the student 
"becomes enchained or fixated". This relation enables the student to change through education which takes 
the form of an ascent into a truer self. 
This perfectionist view of the Symposium forcefully critiques Alcibiades because, through 
becoming fixated upon Socrates, he renders himself incapable of advancing towards the good; he does not 
perceive his relation with Socrates as an occasion for transformation as shown in Symposium 216a7-8 when 
Alcibiades says "He always traps me... and he makes me admit that my political career is a waste of 
time ... so I refuse to 
listen to him; I stop up my ears and tear myself away from him". Because of this 
resistance, rather than understanding that Socrates' inner beauty is a reflection of the beautiful and pursuing 
that, Alcibiades feels extreme passion, reverence and fear towards Socrates, creating an idol of him while 
running from him which allows no transcendence. 
Cavell (pp. 6-7) demonstrates this notion of perfectionism in the Republic, likewise Deb 
("Socrates and Alcibiades: Plato's Perfectionism" pp. 4-15) argues for this relation in the Symposium, while 
Warner uses it in his analysis of the structure of the Phaedrus ("Appropriating the Phaedrus", pp. 7-10). 
However, unlike Cavell, the state of being stuck for Nussbaum has a particular beauty and provides a 
unique and essential kind of understanding which transcendent form-centred thought cannot penetrate 
(Fragility, p. 218 with regard to the Phaedrus). 
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recount Socrates' logoi, though his words consistently bewilder and stagger, the speakers 
themselves seem to have less appeal while Socrates and all details about him remain 
fascinating (thanks to the art of Plato) and objects of examination for Alcibiades, whether 
it be Socrates' conduct in war or at parties, how he dresses, where he goes, or whom he 
sits next to, indicating that Socrates as a person had much appeal and that Alcibiades does 
have strong feelings for him as an individual. Nonetheless, Alcibiades is "bitten" (218a5) 
and "smitten with a kind of sacred rage" (215d9; trans. Joyce) by the logos of philosophy 
of which Socrates as accoucheur seeks to deliver Alcibiades and others, and this remains 
the main hold which Socrates has upon Alcibades. Yet given that he prefers fame and the 
praise of men to Socrates' logoi which involve the pursuit of wisdom, he runs away from 
the man. Thus Nussbaum's analysis seems to be flawed. Alcibiades does not love 
Socrates strictly as an individual but is enslaved by the strife between two conflicting 
spheres, his fame and his love of the logos, a position which remains dominated by self- 
interest. 
Therefore we begin to see that Vlastos' and Nussbaum's critiques are problematic 
both with regard to Alcibiades and concerning Socrates. It seems that Alcibiades better 
exemplifies relatively selfish motives in that Alcibiades would exchange sex for 
Socrates' teachings and loves Socrates mainly for his logoi, not wholly but chiefly for 
what he possess as opposed to for himself, which weakens Nussbaum's position that 
Alcibiades exemplifies passionate love of the individual in his relation to Socrates. 
In contrast it seems that Socrates better exemplifies a workable notion of love of 
the individual. Though if taken in isolation Diotima's ladder of ascent may seem to make 
Vlastos' critique appear convincing, it becomes problematic when taken in context since 
Socrates does embody Diotima's eros directed towards the Beautiful yet spent his life 
seeking the well being of the souls of others, trying to beget virtue in them and trying to 
help them along the path of wisdom through his philosophical logoi in view of his own 
and their ethical perfection. This point is evident when Alcibiades says 
"He always traps me, you see, and makes me admit that my political career is a waste of time, while all that 
matters is just what I most neglect; my personal shortcomings, which cry out for the closest attention. " 
(216a4-7) Because of this, "when I see him, I feel deeply ashamed, because I'm doing nothing about my 
way of life, though I have already agreed with him that I should" (216b7-10). 
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Both here and in First Alcibiades (121a1-124b3), Socrates has clearly been concerned to 
help the decadent Alcibiades to change his life. Furthermore, having been physically pure 
with him, exemplifying sophrosune, Socrates has tried to guide him towards goodness 
and virtue, though he has failed as shown from the history of Athens as recounted at the 
beginning of this chapter. Like the philosopher king who must return to the cave after 
seeing the sun in order to help those still in darkness, so the goal of heavenly Bros in the 
Symposium is, following the revelation of the beautiful, the procreating (tiktein) of true 
virtue (arete) in other individuals so that the initiate's goal is the perfection of their 
knowledge and understanding and hence the ethical perfection of others as well, so that 
both for initiate and others good may be their own "forever" (207a). For this reason 
Plato's view of love is not purely selfish or egocentric as Vlastos and Kosman suggest. 
Vlastos and Nussbaum have not appreciated that aspect of Plato's view of love 
demonstrated by Socrates' caring for the well-being of the souls of Alcibiades, and other 
individuals elsewhere, showing for Plato the individual not to be expendable as an object 
of love; this type of care Plato esteems worthy of being the major part of the "ideal" 
philosophical life. Nor is love of the individual incompatible with sophrosune as 
Nussbaum suggests, the two being synthesized and acted out by Socrates. Clearly the 
Plato of the Symposium does have some reservations concerning "Dionysian" mania, 
which Nussbaum notes. Overall, however, given this selfless serving element in Plato's 
representation of Socrates' effort to help Alcibiades, Socrates plays out effectively his 
role of Eros as daimon, intermediary between the divine and the mortals. Socrates does 
not fail to help Alcibiades due to any major inability to communicate on his part. The 
responsibility lies ultimately in Alcibiades' unwillingness to respond, his preference for 
fame and the approval of others which encourages his decadence and causes his demise. 
Returning to the beginning of the chapter, we have seen through a comparison of 
the revelation of the beautiful with the entry of Alcibiades that Socrates is intermediary 
with regard to the opposition of the presentation of abstract reality versus symbolic 
representation. We have explored these images on three levels: through types of loves 
and love-objects, through the conflicting symbolic languages of the Dionysian versus the 
Apollonian, and through the conceptual with regard to love of the individual. Given 
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Diotima's definition of eros as intermediary and messenger between the mortal and 
divine (202e), and given the above view of Socrates as the personification of eros, 
Socrates acts as the messenger and intermediary. "Being in the middle of the two, [eros] 
rounds out the whole and binds fast, the all to all" (202e6-7; part of Socrates' response to 
Aristophanes' speech, 191d). This can be read to suggest that Socrates, the 
personification of eros, though unable to convert Alcibiades, structurally connects these 
two opposing focuses of love, through acting as intermediary and thus building a bridge 
between the extremes of the finite and the non-finite, through the structural and imagistic 
transition between Diotima's and Alcibiades' speeches. Thus Socrates, representing 
Platonic eros, embodies a choice to seek the beautiful beyond the particular which 
through the Beautiful returns to serve individuals and help them in turn ascend to the 
Beautiful in view of immortality, and thereby does not fall short of his role as 
intermediary between gods and men holding the world together. 
Given that Socrates was unsuccessful at converting Alcibiades, it is left to be 
explored as to why Alcibiades moves from beloved to lover. This will become clearer in 
the light of the discussion of Eros and irony in the next chapter. 
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IV. EROS AND IRONY 
In the concluding section of our discussion of Socrates in the Symposium, we shall 
focus upon the interrelationship of Socratic eros, the child of poros and penia, and irony. 
Irony is "a way of speaking (or writing) which is meant to point to what is not spoken 
(written); it cannot be exercised without suggesting that something is held 
back.... concealed by its author" (Griswold, "Irony", p. 88). Thus far we have argued that 
Plato's conception of eros in the Symposium is eros in pursuit of the Beautiful, 
exemplified by Diotima's description of the ascent to the form of the Beautiful, which as 
we saw in the last chapter is exemplified by Socrates. Given, as we have also argued, that 
Socrates seeks to bring forth arete in youths, and hence the well-being of their souls, 
through dialectic, it is appropriate for him to employ irony since it forces youths to look 
beyond appearance and dig within themselves, thereby developing the ability to reflect. 
In order to understand how the concept of eros and irony interrelate in the Symposium, 
we shall then explore Alcibiades' traditional use of irony concerning Socrates which will 
be seen as contrasting with Socratic irony which articulates a penia-dominant form of 
eros. Both these types of irony fall into a larger framework of Platonic irony which in 
turn displays a poros-dominant form of eros which seeks the well-being of the reader. 
This latter feature will serve as an introduction the second half our examination of Plato 
which will focus upon the Phaedrus and Plato's employment of the recantation within it. 
A. Traditional Irony 
Following the eulogy in which he shows Socrates to be the personification of 
eros, Alcibiades ends his speech paradoxically with a warning to Agathon. 
"Well, this is my praise of Socrates, though I haven't spared him my reproach either, I told you how 
horribly he treated me-and not only me but also Charmides, Euthydemus, and many others. He deceived 
us all: he presents himself as your lover, and, before you know it, you're in love with him yourselil I warn 
you, Agathon, don't let him fool you. " (222a7-222b5; Nehamas translation unless specified. ) 
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According to Alcibiades, Socrates pursued him, behaving like a lover thereby causing 
Alcibiades to fall in love with him. Alcibiades counts this as deception because in reality 
Socrates is not his erastes, a point which becomes eventually apparent in Symposium 
217a-219d. 
Socrates is portrayed by Plato as a lover of physical beauty. The quality 
Alcibiades, Euthydemus, Charmides, and Agathon have in common is their physical 
beauty. Alcibiades is "captivating... a handsome man" (309a2-3), and "famous for his 
good looks" (Nehamas, p. 65). "Euthydemus [is] ... 
beautiful, as is clear from Xenophon 
Memorabilia. 1.2.29,4.2.1" (Dover, Symposium, p. 176)1. In Charmides 154a5, Critias 
describes Charmides, the son of Glaucon, as "the great beauty of the day". Socrates is 
"astonished at his beauty and stature" (154c2), as if he had been a "statue" (154c7-8), 
also causing the "amazement and confusion" of the other boys (154c3). Also Agathon is 
described by Socrates as "a good-looking man" (174a8-9), confirmed by Alcibiades who 
accuses Socrates of "[figuring] out a way to find a place next to the most handsome man 
in the room! " (213c6-7) Alcibiades' reproach of 222a7 is perhaps supported by the 
opening of the Protagoras, when Socrates is asked "where do you come from Socrates? 
No doubt from the pursuit of the captivating Alcibiades? " (309a1-2) Given that in the 
Symposium Agathon seems more the centre of Socrates' concern than himself, even after 
his arrival, Alcibiades' reference to the fake seduction of himself, Charmides, 
Euthydemus, and his warning to Agathon suggests that Socrates tends at least initially to 
focus his attentions on the "great beauties", whom he actively pursues, thereby causing 
confusion. 
However Alcibiades is deceived in that it is not his physical body which Socrates 
desires but the well-being of his soul. Returning to the ladder of Diotima's ascent through 
eros to the Beautiful, the type of eros which according to the last chapter is personified 
by Socrates, we see the first rung to be concerned with love of the beautiful body 210a7- 
10. Barker (2002) points out that this concern with handsome youths represents the norm 
both culturally and also in so far as a Platonic thinker is "attracted to beauty wherever he 
finds it". However, as Barker also notes, Socrates like the initiate does not remain fixated 
1 "The sophist after whom the dialogue Euthydemus is named is another person". (Dover, Symposium, p. 
176). 
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upon love of the individual body but quickly moves up to love of the soul (Symposium 
210b7-c3). The beauty of the soul "quickens in his heart the longing for such discourse as 
tends towards the building of a noble nature", hence demonstrating in this ascent, contra 
Nussbaum, the lover's concern for the well-being of the beloved's soul. This is 
demonstrated in Charmides 154d-e in which Socrates rather than desiring to see the 
beautiful body of Charmides states, "before we see his body, should we not ask him to 
strip and show us his soul? " indicating that Socrates sees the beauty of the soul as 
superior to that of the body echoing Symposium 210b7-8. This point is reinforced in 
Republic 402d1-el in the discussion of education, where Socrates further maintains that 
love of the body must allow no physical contact other than what is appropriate between 
father and son (403b4-cl), and must be directed towards "honourable ends" being "a 
sober and harmonious love of the orderly and the beautiful" (403a4-5). While Socrates 
demonstrates his physically pure intentions in Symposium 217a-219d, in Alcibiades I he 
goes to great lengths to humble Alcibiades through showing his insignificance when 
faced with the greatness of the kings of Sparta and Persia. Rather than depending upon 
"beauty, and stature, and birth, and mental endowments" (Alcibiades I, 123e4-5) Socrates 
points him towards the acquisition of virtue and tells him he must "rely ... upon his 
training and wisdom-these are the things which Hellenes value" (Alcibiades I, 123d3- 
5). Thus as we saw in the last chapter, while initially being attracted by physical beauty, 
Socrates moves beyond it quickly to his real interest which is the well-being of 
Alcibiades' soul. 
Nonetheless through this interaction, as we saw in the last chapter, Alcibiades and 
others though initially conceiving of themselves as the beloved fall in love with Socrates. 
"Before you know it you are in love with him yourself! " (Symposium 222b4-5) 
Alcibiades recognizes a deep beauty and virtue within Socrates, his logoi. "But I once 
caught a glimpse of him when he was open like Silenus' statues, and I had a glimpse of 
the figures he keeps hidden within: they are so godlike-so bright and beautiful, so 
utterly amazing-that I no longer had a choice-I just had to do whatever he told me" 
(216e6-217a3). Alcibiades believes he has seen some unique good, a truer deeper inner 
virtue within Socrates, which perhaps only he has been privileged to witness (as 
suggested by Joyce's translation). Specifically because of these logoi, Alcibiades is 
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inextricably bound to Socrates who generates them. Lines 222c2-4 read: "Alcibiades' 
frankness [provoked] a lot of laughter, especially since it [was] obvious that he [was] still 
in love with Socrates". This suggests that Alcibiades had strong feelings for Socrates as 
an individual and as bearer of the logoi, also suggested by his absorption in Socrates' 
every movement, showing that the beloved has become the lover, though as we discussed 
in the last chapter his feelings for Socrates remain self-focused and selfish. 
However, we must also note that though Alcibiades extensively praises Socrates 
for his self-control (sophrosune) and rational ability he, feeling deceived, also accuses 
him of playing his little "game of irony". 2 When Alcibiades states "In public, I tell you, 
his whole life is one big game-a game of irony" (216e4-5), he means, silenus-like3, 
Socrates acts as if "he's crazy about beautiful boys; he constantly follows them around in 
a perpetual daze" (216d3-4), however in actuality, "You can't imagine how little he cares 
whether a person is beautiful, or rich or famous in any other way that most people 
admire. He considers all these possessions beneath contempt" (216d10-216e3), rejecting 
their advances, indicating that beautiful physical bodies and the physical are not what he 
desires to possess in the first place. It seems reasonable that as the first level of the ascent 
to Beauty is the beauty of the body that this recognition of beauty in the youth articulates 
that first step and acts as a starting-point from which, as in Charmides 156d-159a, 
Socrates can lead the youth from his preoccupation with the body to that of the soul. 
However regardless of whether or not Socrates intends to deceive, his actions and words 
are misunderstood and therefore function ironically. Analyzed by Griswold as one of six 
forms of irony found in the Platonic dialogues, not only does this indicate a "divergence 
between Socrates' public words (to the effect that he loves beautiful youths or deeds) and 
2 Though with Barker (2002) I agree that Alcibiades' speech in the Symposium is focused upon the praise 
of Socrates' "sophrosune and mental ability", Alcibiades while clearly annoyed that his plan of seduction 
has failed is also disturbed by Socrates' rejection of his physical advances because his body represents what 
he most values about himself which would suggest that at least initially he may have taken it personally. In 
contrast Barker feels the strong language used by Alcibiades in Symposium 219c is undercut by his 
addressing the others present at the Banquet as jurors in a court of law. However as Barker rightly points 
out Socrates is not rejecting Alcibiades as an individual, given that Socrates conceives of the body as 
having less value than the soul as is apparent above. With Alcibiades' plan foiled and his priorities deflated 
he is himself humbled, and perhaps his pride hurt, which causes him to idealize Socrates. 
3 Alcibiades' use of the image of the Silenus statue is of consequence precisely because it does not appear 
to be what it is. Likewise Socrates outside appears to be attracted to the youths physically, but inside he is 
indifferent to their physical beauty and is concerned with virtue. For this reason, Alcibiades says that 
Socrates fooled everyone, and in this duplicity he accuses Socrates of playing his game of irony. 
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his private ones, [but]... what ever Socrates may say about his erotic interests, he 
ultimately does not follow through in practice.... 'deeds speak louder than words'... The 
public words and deeds, rather than the private ones, are ironic" (Griswold, "Irony", p. 
90); in this way for Alcibiades, the person Socrates appears to be conflicts with and veils 
the person he actually is and his actual priorities. The discovery that Socrates is more 
interested in the beauty of souls than bodies acts as the unveiling of truth, a traditional 
understanding of irony, which Kierkegaard in the Concept of Irony classifies as his first 
type of irony, a separation of essence from existence which allows for the progressive 
unveiling of essence. 4 
B. Socratic Irony 
Putting aside this initial traditional type of irony, Socrates' overall use of irony 
(though as with all true ironists we can never know what Socrates really thoughts) can be 
seen as its inversion. Rather than an appearance of ignorance dissolving through the 
revelation of the essence of the truth, as in the case with Alcibiades' traditional 
understanding of irony above, in Socrates' strategy of irony by stating that he knows 
nothing and thus presupposing personal ignorance, he seems to substitute ignorance or 
emptiness for essence, while replacing false beliel7the belief of wisdom for appearance. 
As essence in this latter form of irony is ignorance, the ironic method of Socrates is to 
reveal this ignorance or emptiness through his rational ability in order to open the way 
towards wisdom and truth 6 So Socrates' mission is through reason to check the validity 
of all claims of wisdom or truth whether concerning convention, tradition, or personal 
40n this first level Kierkegaard suggests that irony can be seen as exemplified by Socrates' physical 
appearance, which is ironic in that essence does not inform "nor fully negate" appearance. "The 
phenomenon exists not to disclose the essence but to conceal it. if one bears in mind that in happy Greece 
essence and phenomenon were united as an immediate, natural qualification, then one also perceives that as 
this harmony is broken, the separation must be cut so deep that a unity in a higher form is brought about. In 
this case, it might be possible that Socrates interpreted this contradiction between his essence and his 
appearance ironically. lie considered it entirely appropriate that his exterior suggested something quite 
different from his interior... But if we rather bear in mind the ironic delight Socrates took in being so 
equipped by nature that everyone inevitably was mistaken about him, there will be no need to go any 
deeper into physiognomic profundities" (Kierk-egaard, Concept of Irony, p. 212; henceforth called 
Concept) 
' Nor shall we try as this is not the historical Socrates but Plato's "fictional" Socrates. (Griswold, "Irony", 
g85) 
Kierkegaard, Concept, p. 211. 
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conviction and thereby reveal the "genuine" ignorance underlying all false beliefs of the 
sophoi, thereby opening the way towards truth. 
In Kierkegaard's strong reading irony is defined as emptiness as opposed to 
speculative fullness. 7 The speculative method presupposes that the essence is a fullness or 
plenitude and therefore seeks after that fullness through progressively deeper questioning 
which in turn reveals "deeper and more significant... answer[s]", a method which 
Kiekegaard ascribes to Plato. The Socratic ironic method presupposes that there is no 
answer, an emptiness, and seeks to suck out all possible content through questioning in 
order to reveal that emptiness, negative or void. For this reason, Kierkegaard sees 
Socrates' questioning as ironic, as he claims he knows nothing, and believes others know 
nothing, and through his questioning (which in itself indicates a resource) revealed both 
to himself and to them that both they and he were ignorant, knew nothing! According to 
this line of thought as Socrates begins with the presupposition that he, like all men, 
knows nothing, he ends with the conclusion that he individually and men communally 
know nothing. 9 
In retrospect the recognition of a personal lack of knowledge by Socrates and a 
demonstration of the like in others indicates the presence of penia, a poverty or lack. 
Thus Socrates in trying to demonstrate his own and man's ignorance aims at 
demonstrating man's poverty and lack. We saw that this poverty is traced in the 
7 "The intention in asking questions can be twofold. That is, one can ask with the intention of receiving an 
answer containing the desired fullness, and hence the more one asks, the deeper and more significant 
becomes the answer, or one can ask without any interest in the answer except to suck out the apparent 
content by means of the question and thereby leave an emptiness behind. The fu-st method presupposes, of 
course, that there is a plenitude; the second that them is an emptiness. The first is the speculative method; 
the second the ironic. Socrates in particular practiced the latter method. " (Concept. p. 36) 
So both for himself and to others, "Socrates' questioning was essentially aimed at the knowing subject for 
the purpose of showing that when all was said and done they knew nothing whatever. Every philosophy 
that begins with a presupposition naturally ends with the same presupposition, and just as Socrates' 
philosophy began with the presupposition that he knew nothing, so it ended with the presupposition that 
human beings know nothing at all" (Concept. pp. 37,40). With regard to his "divine mission" see Apology 
23b-c, 30a, 33c; and Concept. pp. 38,175; "Socrates' irony was not turned against only the Sophists; it was 
turned against the whole established order" (Concept. pp. 213-4) Thus Socrates was justly accused to be in 
conflict with the state religion, being in "entirely polemic relation to the Greek state religion to substitute 
something completely abstract for the concrete individuality of the gods" (Concept. p. 160), and show the 
Greek state that their conception of the gods was finite and therefore transitory, which was to undermine 
and discredit them. 
' It is not always so clear as Kierkegaard suggests that Socrates begins with a belief in the telos of ignorance. Socrates begins with a recognition of his personal ignorance and ends with the conclusion that 
man knows nothing. 
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Symposium through eros as a longing for that which one lacks and which is therefore 
negative (200e3-6). 10 For Kierkegaard, "this is the substance of love. The desire and the 
longing are the negative in love, that is, the immanent negativity... This definition is also 
the most abstract itself, not in the ontological sense but in the sense of what lacks 
content" (Concept. p. 45-6), as does knowledge for Kierkegaard. " Thus 
acknowledgement of ignorance, lack of possession, or poverty within himself and others 
is the beginning of, motivation behind and an integral part of the essence of both eros and 
philosophy. Therefore rightly viewed Socrates' use of ignorance as associated with 
essence is entirely consistent with his understanding of eros and philosophy, as both 
involve a negative element. 
We saw poverty or need personified as Penia in the myth of Eros (203c1-2), the 
mother of Eros, so that Eros has a negative element: Eros is an intermediate being, is 
neither rich nor poor (203c7-d8). For Kierkegaard, "this negative element... is the eternal 
restlessness of thinking, continually dividing and combining, this negative element that 
thought can not hold on to since it is the propelling element in thought" (Concept. p. 
106), which articulates Eros' philosophical nature (204b2-9) and the correlation of eros 
and philosophy (177d8-el). Eros is neither poverty nor resource, wise nor ignorant, but 
between the two and therefore is partially negative. Similarly, Eros is related to irony, as 
irony involves the tension of essence and existence likewise seen as resource and need, 
and therefore involved in the dynamics of unveiling and/or undermining. "The ironist 
lifts the individual up and out of immediate existence. This is his liberating function, but 
thereafter he lets him float [as if]... between two magnets-one attracting and the other 
repelling" (Concept. p. 48), an account which relates the ironist to the inciter of eros or 
seducer, showing the interconnection and perhaps identification of the ironist and 
lo Kierkegaard, Concept. pp. 45-6. 
" "But neither is the case with Socrates. He does not call the relationship [of love] back to the categories. 
His abstract is a totally empty designation. He starts with the concrete and arrives at the most abstract and 
there, where the investigation should begin, he stops. The conclusion he comes to is actually the indefinable 
qualification of pure being: love is-because the addendum, that it is longing, desire, is no definition, since 
it is merely a relation to a something that is not given. In the same way, one could also take knowledge 
back to a totally negative concept by defining it as appropriation, acquisition, because this, after all, is 
manifestly the sole relation of knowledge to the known, but beyond that it is also possession. " 
(Kierkegaard, Concept. p. 46) 
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seducer, 12 through the intermediacy of both eros and irony, in that each by definition 
stands between emptiness and fullness and is aporetic due to their penia. 
However taken overall, given this interconnection between eros, philosophy and 
irony, Kierkegaard's view seems inaccurate. Regardless of his recognition of personal 
ignorance, Socrates possesses the ability to reason, and therefore, as we discussed in 
Chapter II, he is not devoid of knowledge and poros (a way through). As Griswold 
("Irony", p. 89) writes, though "Socrates professes ignorance... it is false that he is 
simplistically ignorant, but perhaps true that in some deeper sense he is indeed ignorant- 
and in a way that shows a certain kind of knowledge". In examining what he defines as 
the first form of Socratic irony Griswold discusses how "Socrates' public deeds and 
words [within a given dialogue]... contradict his humble claim to ignorance and his 
(ostensible) desire to be instructed". Furthermore he examines the tension between 
Socrates' 
aporia about issues fundamental to the polis.... and his equally public and quite arrogant claim that he 
represents the god.... in the Apology as the messenger of god sent to benefit the citizens of 
Athens,... [implying that he] knows well the truth about virtue [etc. This creates the]... suspicion that he is 
dissimulating about his ignorance.. . 
[While] not wise, he has learned a great deal along the way, as 
manifested by the ability to put the right questions and conduct the conversation. (Griswold, "Irony", pp. 
89-90) 
One could even that say through maintaining his claim to ignorance, lack of wisdom, 
Socrates actually accentuates and emphasizes the understanding and rational ability he 
does possess, which is ironic. 13 In this way Socrates leads youths along the path towards 
philosophical truth. This path, Barker notes, is always incomplete and the knowledge or 
understanding gained, which as content represents plenitude, is "partial and provisional" 
because as philosophers are lovers of wisdom they always are in lack. Nonetheless 
through the ventures on this path articulated in the dialogues, both participants and 
readers gain understanding given that they more fully understand what they lack and how 
12 See Kierkegaard's The Seducer's Diary. 
13 In a manner closely related to Griswold's sixth kind of Socratic irony: "Silent about a definition or 
concept which would significantly contribute to the success of the dialogue. The result is not that the 
argument is invalid but that it is incomplete. " (Griswold, "Irony", p. 92) 
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they "might approach it more closely" (Barker, 2002), hence gaining the means by which 
their lack might be satisfied. 
Seen from a more critical perspective, Kierkegaard unfairly portrays Socrates in 
an underlying negative manner as an ironist seeking to reduce others to an aporia, 
making it difficult to understand why "almost every one of Socrates' associates" 
"inevitably" became the lover of Socrates (Concept., p. 48). Kierkegaard ascribes this 
phenomenon to Socrates' irony as "it is the nature of irony never to unmask itself and 
also to be a Protean change of masks" which is elusive, "extraordinarily seductive and 
fascinating... [holding] one prisoner in inextricable bonds" (Concept., pp. 48-9). Through 
not giving explicit answers with regard to philosophy and his personal life, and using 
temporal delay to create a sense of expectancy, Kierkegaard believes Socrates maintained 
an ambiguity which caused Alcibiades to become enthralled by him. 
14 However as we 
have seen Alcibiades loved Socrates less for his manipulation than for his logoi, though a 
certain elusiveness may have added to the appeal. 
Alcibiades did experience an initial liberation and broadening (Concept., p. 49) as 
a result of Socrates' calling into question Alcibiades' past beliefs and deflating them (p. 
191) leaving him with an emptiness, an aporia, 15 which initially is experienced as 
freedom (217a1-7). However according to Kierkegaard's reading, Socrates did not 
respond to this emptiness which he had caused with "a rich exchange of ideas, or a 
copious outpouring on one side and a grateful receiving on the other" (Concept, p. 48) as 
'a Among his pupils, "Alcibiades must be an exemplar instar omnium [worth them all]. This reckless, 
sensate, ambitious, talented young person must naturally have been a highly flammable material for 
Socrates' ironic sparks" (Concept. p. 189). Rather than giving abundantly to Alcibiades which would have 
been "a rich exchange, " producing an idea which would have joined them, Socrates seemed to present 
himself as lover but then never gave, never opened up and poured himself out into the beloved, never 
"unmasked himself" fully. In response to Alcibiades' attempted seduction Socrates said "You are right 
about that ,.... 
In the future, let's consider these things together. We'll always do what seems the best to the 
two of us" (219b1-3). This ambiguous response made Alcibiades think Socrates was "smitten with [his] 
arrows" (219b5) but to his amazement "lay there all night with this god-like and extraordinary man.... [and] 
when [he] got up next morning [he] had no more slept with Socrates, within the meaning of the act, than if 
he'd been [his) father or an elder brother" (Joyce, 219d1-2). As a technique of both seduction and irony, 
temporal delay created the hope of future fulfillment, which perpetuated his desire into the future. For this 
reason his presence remained ambiguous and undefined, Protean-like. This ambiguity, responding to 
Agathon's speech in which Eros has a lightness of foot (195d3-196a1) and the duplicity inherent in 
mischievousness (Nehamas translates ate as mischief. See Iliad XIX, 92-3), generated in Alcibiades much 
passion and agitation due to Alcibiades' desire to possess and define Socrates, to limit him, which 
significantly corresponds to the Platonic definition of good as limitation. In this understanding, precisely 
because Socrates eluded Alcibiades' conception of the lover, Alcibiades became enthralled by him. 
15 See Meno 80c6-e6; also Concept. pp. 175-6. 
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he had none (177d8-el; 216d4-5), but left Alcibiades in emptiness resulting in the 
transferring of his neediness from ideas which had filled his void to Socrates who had 
torn down these illusions (219d7-e5), explaining why Alcibiades' eulogy is not dedicated 
to Eros but to Socrates (214d2-e). Socrates had, as Kiekegaard puts it, made "the 
idea... personal property" (Concept. p. 49). 16 Against this it needs to be pointed out that 
this claim that Socrates refused to interact is false in that Socrates did exchange ideas 
with Alcibiades, both in Alcibiades I and in the Symposium. Alcibiades' idealization of 
Socrates, as we saw in the last chapter, resulted from the high value he placed on Socrates 
as the generator of philosophical logoi in conflict with his own emotional rejection of this 
path when faced with the temptations of his lower nature; it is this which may be said to 
cause a conflation between Socrates and his logoi whereby the idea seems to become the 
personal property of Socrates. 
On Kierkegaard's reading, this transference of neediness onto Socrates rendered 
Alcibiades unable to extricate himself from Socrates, reducing Alcibiades to an aporia as 
to how to win over Socrates. '7 This aporia proved a state of growing intensity, insecurity 
and discomfort for Alcibiades, like a "wasting disease" (Concept., p. 48-9)18 In this way 
16 In so doing, while Socrates claimed that he was ignorant, Alcibiades thought that he possessed the truth 
(217a1-3; 221d3-7). With regard to Socrates' arguments Alcibiades says, "They're truly worthy of a god, 
bursting with figures of virtue inside. They're of great-no, of the greatest-importance for anyone who 
wants to become a truly good man" (222a4-6). Alcibiades' state was intensified through Socrates' 
continued teasing, maintaining the ambiguity through "[giving] with one hand and [taking] away with the 
other" (213c-214e), a tendency which suggests to Alcibiades that Socrates may become his lover (219b1- 
3), which for Alcibiades simultaneously signified access to the beautiful and good, ie, the truth (218d2-4; 
also 221d3-7). 
'7 Though humiliated he was in a state of admiration. "Here was a man whose strength and wisdom went 
beyond my wildest dreams! How could I bring myself to hate him? I couldn't bear to lose his friendship. 
But how could I possibly win him over? ... 
The only trap by means of which I had thought I might capture 
him had already proved a dismal failure. I had no idea what to do, no purpose in life; ah, no one else has 
ever known the real meaning of slavery" (219d5-e6). Alcibiades too resembles Eros in his desire for 
Socrates. Alcibiades in his pursuit of the good and the beautiful (203d4-7) embodied in Socrates has 
exhausted his resources to win over Socrates (203d3-4). However like "Love [which is] never completely 
without resource, nor is he ever rich" (203e5-6), and therefore is aporetic, Alcibiades wants Socrates yet 
cannot win him over, desires to possess yet lacks possession. As such he is "without way", in an aporia. 
This lack of way reduces him to purposelessness that makes him feel limited and trapped in a negative 
sense (thus suggesting an opposing meaning of 'limitation' which typically is seen by Plato as positive). 
18 In this state of aporia, the relation of Alcibiades and Socrates is "held at the abstract, vacillating initiation 
of a relation, was held at the zero point and never increased in strength and inwardness, so that while the 
intensity increased on both sides, this intensity nevertheless was so exactly balanced that the relation 
remained the same and Alcibiades' growing vehemence continually found its master in Socrates' irony" 
(Concept. p. 189). This heightening of intensity surfaces in the irony and sarcasm of the interaction of 
Alcibiades and Socrates (213c-214e). With growing intensity the aporia is maintained, perpetuating and 
increasing Alcibiades' state of torture, whereby Alcibiades' inner aporiai or emptiness of Socrates became 
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Kierkegaard charges Socrates, the ironist, with sucking all the life out of his lovers, and 
manipulating Alcibiades while he thinks he is being soothed and comforted19 through the 
prolongation of this intensely provoking flirtation. 20 On this reading Socrates distances 
himself from others, deflating their false beliefs then withdrawing21 thus limiting his 
interactions with others thereby enabling himself to remain in control and be self- 
sufficient 22 Though "as an accoucheur, he was unrivalled" for Kierkegaard, given 
Socrates' distance and self-sufficiency he did not seem to be truly involved with or have 
any selfless concern for his students, 23 which suggests to some extent a selfish utilitarian 
love, the interpretation of Platonic eros heavily criticized by Vlastos. 24 
the "wasting disease" (Concept pp. 48-9). Thereby Alcibiades is happiest yet most tortured when he is 
closest to Socrates (ibid. ) who in turn is aporetic, the personification of Eros (Osborne, p. 101), therefore 
partially embodying negativity and lack (203c7-d4). 
1' "In this manner there quietly develops in the individual the disease that is just as ironic as any other 
wasting disease and allows the individual to feel best when he is closest to disintegration. The ironist is the 
vampire who has sucked the blood of the lover and while doing so has fanned him cool, lulled him to sleep, 
and tormented him with troubled dreams. (Concept. pp. 48-9) 
20 Concept, p. 188; See The Seducer's Diary for an elaboration of Kierkegaard's view of the 
interrelationship or identification of the ironist and the seducer, a position clearly branching from this 
section of his Thesis. Further note the role of The Seducer's Diary as an act of deception to alleviate the 
pain caused by his breaking his engagement to Regine Olsen. Also see Hong and Hong introduction and 
notes to Fear and Trembling/Repetition. 
21 Considering that Socrates not only reduced others to ignorance but maintained personal ignorance which 
identifies him with the many, Socrates must necessarily distinguish himself or impose a distance in order to 
win the devotion of his pupils. This distancing was possible practically because Socrates accepted and was 
satisfied with his state of ignorance, embracing instead "the eternal unrest" while others fought it. This 
resulted in his emotional "distance" or ambiguity whereby Socrates necessarily separated himself from 
Alcibiades (Concept. p. 178) (as contrasted with the vision of the Phaedrus where one knows oneself 
through the other). Viewing it as his mission (as emissary of Apollo) while fulfilling his aporetic role, "he 
placed individuals under his dialectical vacuum pump, pumped away the atmospheric air they were 
accustomed to breathing, and left them standing there. For them, everything was now lost, except to the 
extent that they were able to breathe ethereal air. Socrates, however, had nothing more to do with them but 
hastened on to new ventures" (ibid). This process, the deflation of the beliefs of others by which he forced 
them to recognize their ignorance, meant that Socrates separated himself and withdrew from everyone. 
22 He limited himself to a single sort of relationship, midwifery (see Concept p. 192 "having emancipated 
himself from every other real relation, had concentrated on one, " midwifery), which was maintained at a 
relatively superficial level and over which he exercised complete control as if to render himself self- 
sufficient (Concept. p. 182). 
23 This for Kierkegaard is demonstrated in the fact that he did not "assume any real responsibility for the 
later lives of his students, and here again Alcibiades provides us with an example" (Concept. p. 191). 
Alcibiades' subsequent demise appeared to support the accusations in the Apology 33a-b that Socrates 
corrupted the youth of Athens, a position discussed in Xenophon's Memorabilia I. Ii. 12-16 and 
commented upon in Republic VI 494b (see Nehamas p. 65). Many have suggested that the writing of the 
Symposium was Plato's effort to vindicate Socrates from accusations of corrupting and therefore being 
responsible for the demise of Alcibiades. (Also see Bury) 
24 "The Individual as an Object of Love", pp. 8,19,26; Santas, p. 42; Kosman, p. 54. 
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Though an ambiguity is present within the text facilitating the development of this 
view of Socrates and Platonic eros, the ascription of purely selfish love to Socrates has 
been criticized at the beginning of this chapter and in the last, though shown to be true of 
the "unproductively narcissistic" Alcibiades (Sayres, pp. 126-7). While Greek virtue- 
based ethics does involve the central quest of self-perfection, Socrates is far from being 
completely selfish. 25 Seeking to subvert Plato's idealization of Socrates as ideal 
philosopher and lover, 26 Kierkegaard does not seem to take full account of the importance 
Socrates attributes to people (hence his high valuation of Athens, a place where he could 
freely communicate, Osborne p. 88; also Phaedrus 230d4-6) resulting in the devotion of 
his whole life to the service of trying to benefit their souls (Apology 36c), and pursuing 
virtue himself in accordance with his representation as the personification of Eros. This 
ambiguity seems therefore to point to a slight ironic aloofness on the part of Socrates, not 
intending to hinder or injure as Kierkegaard suggests, but to create a caesura by which 
Socrates forced those he sought to aid not to be dependent but to think for themselves and 
call on their own inner resources. Meanwhile Socrates stayed close at hand moving them 
forward with endless well-situated and leading questions. 
Furthermore, as we demonstrated in the last chapter, Alcibiades is ultimately 
responsible for his obsession and subsequent demise. It is evident from Symposium 
216e6-217a3 that Alcibiades, though perhaps not understanding fully, deeply appreciated 
Socrates' logoi, 27 grasping the implications involved and the crucial need to apply them 
to his life (216a3-216c1). However he veered away emotionally from this intellectual 
desire giving way to the dominance of appetitive desires and the thumos28 resulting in 
strife within his soul evident in Symposium 216c1-4. There is an echo here of 
Thrasymachus in Republic I and, perhaps more clearly of Callicles in the Gorgias29; this 
25 Barker, Personal Communications, 2003. 
26 See Griswold, "Irony", p. 85; this is exemplified when Kierkegaard describes this questioning and 
deflation of others as an "annihilating enthusiasm of negativity" (Concept. p. 175). Kierkegaard's reading 
subverts the idealization of Socrates much further than Sayre who simply seeks to show how Socrates' 
appearance and conduct indicate that he has not seen auto to kalon and therefore is not a teacher of 
philosophy but the personification of Eros. 
Cf. Griswold, "Irony", pp. 93-4. 
28 See the tripartite soul in Republic IV, IX and Phaedrus 253c-254e. 
29 In the Gorgias 481c-482c, Socrates argues that both he and Callicles are in love with two objects; 
Socrates with Alcibiades and philosophy, and Callicles with the Athenian demos and Demos, son of 
Pyrilampes. Ruled by his beloveds, Callicles constantly changes his opinion influenced by Demos' point of 
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phenomenon Barker (2002) suggests has a bearing on why Socrates sees "pre-rational 
training towards virtue" (Republic book 2-3) as crucial as well as the prescription of 
"virtuous" poetry (Republic 395b-c) and the exclusion of the wrong type of poet 
(Republic 398a). Clearly "no matter how much (ethical) content Socratic argument 
carries, its `rational' strategies cannot by themselves persuade or coerce the non-rational 
appetites and emotions". 
Furthermore, Plato's strong attachment to individuals as objects of love is clear 
through the presence of Socrates within his dialogues, particularly those of the early and 
middle period. Plato mobilizes the entire structure of seduction which is the dialectical 
structure of the texts around Socrates and makes the figure of Socrates himself serve his 
ends, identifying Socrates with Eros in the Symposium. Though in a certain sense this 
figure is a literary construct serving a structural purpose, through his centrality and 
consistent presence Plato shows his "awe" for and fixation upon Socrates, feeling greatly 
in debt to him. 30 Socrates, portrayed as midwife by which true ideas are brought forth in 
the dialogues, seems to act as accoucheur for Plato enabling him to bring forth his own 
inner richness, beauty and goodness which manifests itself through the creation of his 
dialogues which in turn seek the well-being of the soul of the reader, desiring to beget in 
beauty. In this way the texts act as intermediaries like eros between Socrates, Plato and 
the reader. 
Nonetheless, though misreading the intentions and heart of Plato's Socrates, 
Kierkegaard correctly notes that Socrates uses irony to clear away the weeds of "false 
belief' and truth claims31 in order that new seeds or "principles already present as 
possibility" (Concept, p. 214) may take root. Socrates in this way is acting as a midwife 
for the true idea (Theaetetus 150c4). As Socrates' ironic deflation32 opened the way for 
further thought and reflection so clearly this exposure of ignorance laid the ground for the 
view and likewise adjusts his position to accord with that of the Athenian demos, seeking praise of men, 
thus resembling Alcibiades. In contrast Socrates allows himself only to be led and possessed by philosophy 
which is far more stable, and holds to the same argument or position regardless of whether what he says 
displeases people, Alcibiades included. Philosophy as his master enables Socrates to know and remain in 
harmony with himself. 
30 Concept. pp. 31,188-9. 31 His "irony, in turn, is the glaive, the two-edged sword that he swung like an avenging angel over 
Greece. " (Concept. p. 211) 
32 Cf. Concept. p. 214. 
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possibility of the pursuit of true virtue and understanding, thereby enabling the aporia to 
become a poros or pathway. 
C. Introducing Platonic Irony 
It appears, then, that though for Kierkegaard Socratic irony presupposed 
emptiness and ended with emptiness, in actuality Socrates presupposed ignorance while 
having as his resource the faculty of reason and this faculty moved him forward beyond 
the aporia on the path of reason, so that though still not possessing wisdom he 
understood better what he lacked and how it could be achieved. Though Socrates claims 
he knows nothing and Kierkegaard believes he begins in ignorance and moves towards it 
(reducing others to ignorance on the way), Barker (2002) rightly claims "Plato's Socrates, 
even at his most `aporetic', always has something more than mere ignorance to offer [: ] a 
firm conviction of the value of arete, or the existence of a strong nexus between arete 
and knowledge; an assurance that reasoning can test the credentials of beliefs, and that 
we owe it to ourselves to examine our lives", among others. Though Socrates ironically 
remains slightly aloof and reduces others to ignorance, in fact he does not leave them in a 
state of emptiness in that through calling into question their beliefs, reducing them to 
aporiai, he teaches them how to reflect for themselves, rather than "reeling off a list of 
`truths' for Alcibiades to memorize" (Barker, 2002). This reduction to ignorance is an 
essential, indeed a recurring, feature in the path towards wisdom in that one must 
constantly recognize one's imperfection and lack in order to be motivated to take a step 
further to fill the lack and to seek betterment of the soul. Kierkegaard's suggestion that 
we are "ironically teased" is misleading since we are left "far from `empty'... in that we 
have acquired a massive battery of conceptual and argumentative resources, and a 
profound sense of direction" (Barker, 2002), and therefore rather than emptying us, 
through deflating false belief the dialogues leave us fuller than we began though never 
completely so, hence showing us to have advanced another step along the path of 
understanding. 
Kierkegaard's reading of Socratic irony in terms of emptiness is then, although 
suggestive, so exaggerated as to be misleading. His contrasting concept of speculative 
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fullness, though also an exaggeration in the context of the Platonic dialogues, is perhaps 
more illuminating. To claim Plato presupposed and had the telos of fullness, though 
extreme, points to something important in the overall experience of the dialogues in that 
each element is meaningful33 and directed towards the inducement of the reader to 
reflective philosophical thought with the goal of the well-being of their souls through 
procreating true virtue. The presupposition is that virtue and understanding are possible 
and the path towards an unachievable goal of perfect understanding is the gradual 
resolution of problems along the way, which though opening new problems and exposing 
new aporiai, does move the philosopher forward along the path of understanding, while 
simultaneously increasing in virtue. As this understanding of eros presupposes and is 
directed towards fullness, it can be conceived of as a poros-dominant tendency in eros 
emphasizing that part of eros focused not upon lack but on a pathway through lack, 
which is Plato's overall project. 
Platonic irony is the means by which Plato (understood as the implied author of 
the dialogues) introduces and leads the reader along this pathway. As "Plato is absent 
from his texts" (Griswold, "Irony", p. 84), neither represented through Socrates or 
another character, nor attached to a specific point of view (ibid., p. 88), this leaves him 
free to sculpt the dialogue as a whole in order to communicate an overall message to the 
reader. Unlike Socratic irony which involves "`living' conversation", Plato's irony which 
encompasses it is "as much a way of revealing as it is of concealing, a way of teaching 
and motivating the reader / auditor to look further" (ibid., p. 88, also see p. 92). Platonic 
irony, which Griswold ("Irony", p. 87) characterizes as "dramatic irony", focuses upon 
speeches and actions as distinct from characters, whereby "the author [communicates]" 
with the reader. Resembling the Greek notion of Fate34 or destiny, all elements within the 
dialogue whether dramatic elements, arguments, speeches, silences, and also I would 
argue characters, are meaningful coming together for a central purpose of communicating 
a central message (ibid., p. 88), which I agree with Griswold ("Irony", p. 100) to be that 
of "educating his readers into leading reflective, possibly philosophical lives", and which 
33 Written dialogues, it may be argued, are more perfect than real conversation as everything within them is 
meaningful and nothing is by chance, indicative of "logographic necessity" (Phaedrus 264b7). 34 "A design of which [the characters] are ignorant (personified in Greek tragedies by god and fate) guides 
their conversation" (Griswold, "Irony", p. 87). 
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is focused on the well-being of the soul 35 Though this is also true of the Symposium, in 
the next chapter we shall use the Phaedrus to explore this gesture on Plato's part to 
induct the reader into reflective thought, thereby seeking the well-being of the reader's 
soul as an act of love to enable him to seek true virtue. The Phaedrus, a late middle (or 
early late) dialogue, is fully engaged with the poros-dominant aspect of eros 
exemplifying Platonic irony in pursuit of the well-being of the soul of the reader. 
D. Conclusion 
To conclude this chapter, though Kierkegaard in his distinction between the 
Socratic irony versus Platonic speculative thought provides an exaggerated and 
sometimes inaccurate contrast, through his analysis two potentialities of eros can be 
extracted. Eros has two strands, a poros-dominant strand and a penia dominant strand. 
The tendency of Socrates to affirm that he knows nothing, indicating a poverty or 
emptiness presupposed at the starting point of Socrates' inquiries in pursuit of wisdom 
and virtue, is at the heart of Socratic irony. Nonetheless within this penia-dominant 
tendency, which by focusing upon lack indicates a subversion of the poros strand in eros, 
the poros element of rational ability is always present and pointed to. Therefore, the true 
inverted irony of Socrates' thought lies in that while it seems to presuppose and be 
directed to penia hence to an aporia, this lack once acknowledged points beyond itself 
highlighting the reason element and an awareness of what it lacks, understanding and 
virtue etc., which move the thinker further along the path towards their acquisition. 
Hence it is through the exploration of lack that the path is opened so that the thinking 
moves beyond lack; hence the path of penia. In contrast through referring to Plato as 
exemplifying speculative thought presupposing fullness and moving towards it, 
Kierkegaard notes a genuine thrust of Plato's thought overall. The presence of a poros- 
35 "This strategy seems obviously connected with the notion that philosophical learning is a form of 
`recollection', a kind of knowledge to be brought out by the learner `from within'. Irony in its various 
guises, on both Socratic and Platonic levels, seems fairly obviously to be one way to compel the reader to 
rediscover on his or her own... an understanding of what it would mean to be a perfected, complete human 
being 
.... The Platonic 
dialogues have an ethical point to make to the effect that the unexamined life is not 
worth living.... We [should] understand `the point' of irony as connected to Plato's wish to invite the reader 
into a life of self-examination. " (Griswold, "Irony", p. 100) 
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dominant eros which acts as the overriding all-encompassing force, motivated by the 
belief in virtue and understanding, directs all elements in the dialogue towards the pursuit 
of virtue and understanding, hence the well-being of the reader's soul. Plato achieves this 
through his use of Platonic irony as we shall now see with regard to the Phaedrus. The 
site of negativity or the central aporia of the Phaedrus is the recantation. It is therefore 
here that we shall open the next phase of our discussion of Plato's understanding of the 
relation of eros and aporia, before examining the relation of the recantation to the text as 
a whole. 
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V. RECANTATION; SIMULTANEOUSLY THE MATRIX AND 
APORIA OF MEANING 
The recantation creates a site or fold in the text through which the various 
speeches are reinterpreted and weighed against each other. Not only is it a site of 
meaning, a chameleon-like multiplicity of shifting interpretations, but through recanting 
and reversing the recantation produces an aporia of meaning, a liquidation of meaning 
which causes a continuous oscillation between meaning and lack of meaning, a 
movement between potential meanings which in turn points to a continual 
reinterpretation of the speeches and the dialogue as a whole. 
After his first speech which he recited veiled Socrates, stopped by his divine 
sign/daimon, ' recognizes that he has blasphemed against Eros by implying love is evil 
(kakos). That this is blasphemy becomes clear when we discover that for the Socrates of 
the Phaedrus Love is a god (242e3), 2 and as he is a god must therefore be good 
'The intervention of the daimon produces the recantation both formally and with regard to content. 
Formally, like Hackforth (p. 54), Rowe (p. 164) believes the divine sign "here is used essentially as a 
literary device, a kind of deus ex machina to explain the sudden reversal in the plot". The entire scene is a 
theatrical production in which the "divine" sign is a dramatic device to manipulate Phaedrus into changing 
his view of love and philosophy. With regard to content, the daimon causes Socrates to experience guilt 
after his first speech for though he may not have "sinned" (Hackforth, p. 48), for the reason that he only 
formally reconstructed Lysias' speech, a position opposed by Rowe who believes Socrates was committed 
to the contents of his first speech in that he recanted (p. 164, supported by c3), nonetheless he has led 
Phaedrus into error. Further, the daimon who only intervenes when Socrates has gone (Phaedrus 242c3-4) 
or is about to go (Apology 31c-d) wrong makes him recognize his error and correct it. "The action of the 
['divine'] sign is here only formally inhibitory: it forbids him to depart without making atonement, but in 
effect it commands him to make one" (Hackforth, p. 54). Nonetheless, though the sign awakens him to a 
recognition of error, Socrates is left to determine what is wrong and how to correct it (Rowe, p. 164). The 
divine is intervening and Socrates is being attentive to it, as if, following Rowe (p. 164), it signifies 
simultaneously an amalgamation of divine admonition and conscience, the interweaving of the traditional 
and the Socratic. 
2There seem to be many faces of Eros (and the gods) in Plato. The view that Eros is a god represented in 
the Phaedrus supports traditional Greek theology as expressed in Hesiod, Theogony 201. This view differs 
from the Socrates of the Symposium's (201 d) position that Eros is a daimon, and particularly from later 
Neo-Platonic readings such as Plotinus (where Enneads 3: 5 represent an amalgamation of Hesiod, the 
Phaedrus and the Symposium), in that in the Phaedrus love is divinely inspired. Rowe (p. 166) without 
perhaps adequately recognizing that Hackforth is referring to the Symposium, suggests that Hackforth tries 
to reconcile the two notions of eros through the daimon-Eros view, showing not that Eros is a god but that 
eros is of "divine origin" which seems to support the Phaedrus (242c3-4), love being "what belongs to the 
gods". In Hackforth's view (p. 55) however, Plato starts in the Phaedrus from a notion of divine 
possession, mania, which posits a personal divinity, which by the end of Socrates' second speech has 
developed into a full conception of love as a progression. It can be argued however that the Platonic 
conception of eros is developing overall from the Symposium, in which eros as daimon expresses a 
progression towards the good, to Eros as god in the Phaedrus, expressing possession by a divinity. Though 
mentioned neither by Rowe nor by Hackforth, this progression can be seen not only as the personal 
development of Plato's notion of eros (as we shall discuss with regard to Nussbaum), but more crucially as 
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(Symposium 202c, Republic 379a) and cannot be evil (Phaedrus 242e4), an 
understanding embodied in Socrates' second speech. 
In this context, when comparing Socrates' two speeches we see Socrates presents 
contradicting logoi, the position implying that love is evil in his first speech versus the 
view that love is good and a god in his second speech. This may be interpreted as an 
ironic device consciously applied whereby Socrates uses his first speech in order to bring 
Phaedrus to the point of "accepting on his own terms the position of Socrates" (Griswold, 
"Irony", p. 92) expressed by Socrates' second speech, classified by Griswold as his fourth 
form of Socratic irony. 
Recognizing that he has blasphemed against Eros, Socrates vacillates when trying 
to determine (or if taken as a gesture of irony, playing with the idea of) whom to blame. 
"I for my part am anxious to wash out the bitter taste, as it were, of the things we have 
heard" (243d3-4) with a sweet taste that will come from a positive speech on love. 
Though "bitter taste" marks the negative speech's source to be from within him 
(contrasting with Rowe, p. 164), Socrates speaks as if already distanced from this speech 
in that he speaks as if having only passively "heard" it, as if his mouth and ears did not 
belong to the same person, as if at the moment of the first speech he was divided from 
himself. Revealing that he feels it is from some source other than himself, he persists in 
trying to find someone to blame, Phaedrus (242e1; see also 238d5), Lysias (257b2), Pan 
and the Nymphs (263d5-6), the location (262d2-6), and the Cicadas (235c2-d3 and 
262d2-6). In doing so Socrates, in contrast to his normal self which is rational and self- 
sufficient, taking personal responsibility for himself, 3 represents himself as a subject 
upon which forces act, a victim, and ultimately blames the error on mania. This is 
particularly significant given the forthcoming role of the mantis in Socrates' second 
speech with regard to truth and purification, taking account of the claim in Timaeus 
(71e3-4) "No man, when in his wits, attains prophetic truth and inspiration". 
As the soul or mind (psuche) has the power of divination according to Socrates, it 
enacting the stages of the ascent to the beautiful in Symposium 210a-e, the transition being at line el which 
foreshadows the gap between the two dialogues, and represents that between the phase of seeking and that 
of receiving or even perhaps being sought. This reading partially resembles Markus' view of eros ("The 
Dialectic of Eros in Plato's Symposium, " pp. 138-9), a lack progressing until it becomes an overflowing 
abundance, and is reminiscent of and underlies Lewis' initial division of types of loves (Four Loves, p. 7). 
Hackforth (p. 55) seeks to resolve the contradiction however: "The discrepancy, then, between the two 
dialogues may fairly be said to be due to the fact that in order to bring out two complementary (not 
contradictory) aspects of love it seemed natural to Plato to employ two different personifications of it, the 
"daemon" with his function as intermediary, and the god filling his worshipper with his own super-human, 
super-natural power. " 
3The contrast between Socratic sophrosune and mania will be explored in my discussion of Nussbaum's 
analysis of the recantation. 
84 
has the power to recognize or unveil the error, to recognize this offence as an offence. 
Socrates refers to himself in this context as a seer (242c4-6), attributing to the power of 
the seer the ability to recognize an offence (242c7-d3) 4 This foreshadows the second 
type of mania in Socrates' second speech. The mania finds 
"the necessary means of relief, by recourse to prayers and forms of service to the gods; as a result of which 
it hits upon secret rites of purification and puts the man who is touched by it out of danger both for the 
present and for the future, so finding a release from his present evils for one who is rightly maddened and 
possessed. " (Trans. Rowe 244e1-245a1) 
Taking account of the transition between Socrates' first and second speeches, this 
suggests that one form of madness drives out another; a positive divine madness gives the 
mantis the power to drive out the negative madness due to "divine anger from some 
ancient cause" (244d7), perhaps supporting Robin's (POdre, xxxiv) comment, "C'est 
1'admonition demonique qui a vraiment permis ä Socrate de prendre enfin pleine 
conscience de son peche. Il est donc docile de ne pas voir la une coupe significative 
dans le developpement du dialogue: a une inspiration qui vient den bas sen substitue 
desormais une autre, qui vient den haut. "5 Robin supports the role of Socrates as mantis, 
which Diotima likewise holds in Symposium 205d8-el, in that he uncovers an ancient 
lack. 
Moreover Barker (2002) notes that in the Timaeus 71 d-72b, Plato distinguishes 
between mantis and prophetes, "the true and inspired mantis is `out of his mind' (not 
ennous); his utterances are unclear even to himself, and need to be interpreted rationally" 
by the prophetes. "While he continues demented, he cannot judge of the visions which he 
sees or words which he utters... Only a man who has his wits can act or judge about 
himself and his affairs" (Timaeus 72a5-8). Thus the mantis needs an interpreter of his 
inspired madness. Though we have suggested that through irony Socrates tries to lead 
Phaedrus from the position of his first speech to that of his second speech, recanting one 
state of madness with another state of madness, he seems to defer the role of interpreter 
to first Phaedrus but then most definitely the reader in an effort to get him and us to 
consider for himself and ourselves what love is. 
4He calls himself impious (242d7) and says he needs to purify himself (243a4). "`That for offences against 
the gods, I win renown from all my fellow men' but I realize my offence" (hamartema, half way between 
injustice and misfortune, c. f. Liddell and Scott) (Phaedrus 242d1-3; trans. Rowe). 
5Hackforth (p. 54) disagrees with Robin's position with regard to the demonic influences because of 
Socrates' late references to the Nymphs and Pan (263D) and the final prayer to Pan (279B). 
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However Socrates, describing himself as a mantis of a lesser type6, is also being 
ironic. "I am a seer (mantis); not a very good one, but like people who are poor at reading 
and writing, merely good enough for my own purposes" (242c4-6; trans. Rowe). This 
comment is ironic as Socrates condemns writing (275d7-e6,276a9), referring to the 
written word as a phantom (perhaps like Helen's phantom that journeyed to Troy), and 
condemns the reading of texts as a means of acquiring knowledge (275a5-b4). As writing 
and reading pivot around the appearance of wisdom rather than true wisdom itself 
(275b4), to say he is a seer like these implies that he has the appearance of wisdom rather 
than wisdom itself, , 
that he sees physically but does not see spiritually thus implying a 
form of subjective wisdom (242c6), an implication enjoined by the analogy with the 
"poor" reader. This expresses either humility, or irony in that only he is troubled by the 
trespass, which someone like Phaedrus who focuses on appearances 
7 overlooks. Though 
Socrates considers his sight dim like poor writing and reading, thus twice removed from 
the truth (Republic X), he sees and maintains his concern for the truth, thus maintaining 
his personal aporia that he does not know the truth, yet knows enough to know he does 
not know the truth (Meno 80d, Kierkegaard, Concept of Irony I). Socrates is thus 
simultaneously recognizing that he sees and does not see. 
Socrates, as a seer of the second type of mania (244e1-245a1), at this point in the 
text responds with an appropriate cure. Motivated by fear of the wrath of the god of love 
(243d3) he recants. He says, "I... must purify myself, and for those who offend in the 
telling of stories there is an ancient method of purification" (243a3-4; trans. Rowe). 
Socrates admits that he must be cleansed for telling an impious story. He recants through 
reciting verses by Stesichorus. In doing this however he tells or alludes to with, 
apparently, a significant degree of irony, and therein brings himself into relation to, 
another story which is likewise a partial untruth, impious in the moral sense. 
Through the production of verse both Stesichorus and Homer lost their sight 
because of their defamation of Helen, 8 yet unlike Homer, Stesichorus recanted because 
"as a true artist he understood" and wrote 
False, false the tale: 
Thou never didst sail in the well-decked ships 
6 For Rowe (p. 165), the true "seer or diviner (mantis) possesses or claims to possess an insight into things 
which are obscure to ordinary men" involving the past, present and future, while he sees Socrates to be 
identifying himself as a lesser type of mantis since his error does not need a clairvoyant to detect it. 
'Ferrari (Listing to the Cicadas, pp. 4-9) refers to Phaedrus as an impresario. 
8According to de Vries, the Life of Homer confirms that both Homer and Stesichorus have the same source 
for their blindness. 
86 
Nor come to the towers of Troy. (243a8-bl; trans. Hackforth) 
In reversing the story, Stesichorus received his sight back while Homer did not. 
Many versions of this tale exist. In the Homeric version, Helen voluntarily is 
seduced by, abducted and taken back to Troy by Paris. When Stesichorus writes "false 
the tale", he refers to his "roughly Homeric" account 
E2svrl (Bowra, p. 109; also see 
Lattimore, p. 483), the type of version which Greek youths memorized and enacted 
(Republic 3; cf. Hackforth, p. 26). In Stesichorus' recantation, 17a2tvo 
ä, he denied 
that Helen went to Troy. It was "not Helen herself but her 
eiöw2ovor phantom" (Bowra, 
p. 110; Rowe, p. 166) that went to Troy. 9 Herodotus in the Histories, published at most a 
decade before Euripides' Helen (412 B. C. ), 10 recounts that according to the priest of the 
temple of Hephaestus in Memphis, Paris had "entered into the wife of [his] host... made 
her fly with [him] and stole her away" (Herodotus, trans. Godley, II, 115) but because of 
bad weather they were forced to land in Egypt. There, King Proteus of Memphis, being 
"deeply shocked", detained both Helen and Menelaus' property which Paris had stolen, 
until Menelaus could come to collect her. Following this line Nussbaum writes, "All 
during the war she was instead living peacefully and piously in Egypt" (Fragility, p. 
212). 
Herodotus was fully convinced that this version, given to him by the priests in 
Memphis, was authentic on rational grounds. "Had Helen been in Ilion, then with or 
without the will of Alexandrus [Paris] she would have been given back to the Greeks". 
(Herodotus, trans. Godley, II, 120) The Trojans would never have endangered 
themselves, their children and city for such folly, particularly later after experiencing 
heavy losses including many of Priam's sons. Furthermore as Hector, who was a better 
man, was heir, he would not have accepted "his brother's wrong-doing.. . the cause of 
great calamity" to all. The Trojans did not hand over Helen as she was not "there to give 
back, yet though they spoke the truth the Greeks would not believe them". (Herodotus, 
trans. Godley, II, 115) Although Herodotus in general is disputable, " this seems a 
rational alternative. 
Herodotus was convinced that Homer was aware of this version of the story given 
9 Jevons, A History of Greek Literature, p. 144. Lattimore describes Stesichorus as the "successor" to 
Hesiod who "apparently" in his lost works had earlier written that Helen's phantom not the queen herself 
had journeyed to Troy. (R. Lattimore, "Introduction to Helen" in Euripides' Helen in The Complete Greek 
Tragedies, Volume 3, p. 483) 
10 See Lattimore's (p. 483) discussion of Herodotus, Il, 115. 
"Herodotus was known as the Father of history, as well as the Father of lies in that when evidence was 
lacking he recorded popular beliefs. See A. R. Bum, Introduction The Histories, pp. 28ff. 
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to him by the Egyptian priests. While Herodotus (Trans. Godley, II, 116) cites three short 
passages from the Iliad and the Odyssey which refer to Egypt, Odyssey IV contains even 
more extensive evidence through its references to Egypt: Odyssey IV, 83,128 (perhaps), 
226-31,618-19, and 352-585 which contains an imaginative and sly reinterpretation of 
Proteus (notably the King of Memphis who detained Helen) as a metamorphic, illusive, 
and prophetic sorcerer, who tells Menelaus to return to Egypt to make proper sacrifices, 
an allusion to Menelaus' actual offence against Proteus by his illicit sacrifices prior to his 
departure from Egypt (Herodotus, trans. Godley, II, 119). Therefore though Homer seems 
to have been aware of the version of "the Egyptian priests, " he chose not to use it but 
represented Helen in Troy and (if Herodotus is accurate) deliberately ventured from "the 
truth" under the auspice of artistic licence (II, 116). 
Homer, however, represents the standard reading, and even if we hold to 
Herodotus' account, seen in another way there is some truth in Homer's version. In 
permitting Paris to abduct her, her heart and her eros were in Troy, 
12 "for it is obvious 
that no young woman allows herself to be abducted if she does not wish to be". 13 In this 
context the phantom represents her heart directed toward the object of her desire which 
caused her to sail for and reside in Troy though she was physically detained in Egypt. 
Therefore regardless of her presence in Egypt, that her heart desired to go to Troy caused 
her to abandon her home which caused her husband and the rest of the Acheans to leave 
their lands and make war on Troy. Thus it is her piety which begins to appear the 
phantom. Here lies the shame of the Greeks, that Troy was where she desired to be, and 
therefore analogically where she was. 14 
Others like Gorgias and Euripides strive to reduce Helen's blame through 
argument and rhetoric. Gorgias maintaining that Helen went to Troy in "In Praise of 
Helen"15 endeavors to clear Helen through rational argument involving what seems to be 
12 As Gorgias ironically argues in Encomium of Helen 19 (Trans. D. M. MacDowell), "So if Helen's eye, 
pleased by Alexander's body, transmitted an eagerness and striving of love to her mind, what is surprising? 
If love is a god with a god's power, how would the weaker be able to repel and resist it? But if it is a human 
malady and incapacity of mind, it should not be blamed as an impropriety but considered as an adversity; 
for it comes, when it does comes, through deceptions of mind, not intentions of thought, and through 
compulsions of love, not contrivances of skill. " 
13 Herodotus, trans. de Sellincourt. I, 4. A statement clearly not universally true but defensible in this 
particular case. 
'4M. Heidegger in "Building Dwelling and Thinking" (Basic Writings, p. 335) discusses the power of 
thought in similar terms as this manner of conceiving desire. "From right here we may even be much closer 
to that bridge and to what it makes room for than someone who uses it daily as an indifferent river 
crossing. " 
1$ In Gorgias' "In Praise of Helen", though he believes Helen went to Troy, Gorgias systematically tries to 
"refute those who rebuke Helen", whom he considered to have become "a memorial of disasters" (Gorgias, 
p. 284), exemplified in Agamemnon 689 in which Aeschylus plays upon the name Helen writing "Hell to 
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rationalization and blame-shifting. Euripides strives "to remove the stain of dishonour" 
attached to Helen in his tragedy Helen by mixing two versions of the tale; that of 
Herodotus and that of Stesichorus, affirming both. Her phantom image goes to Troy 
while she is spirited away to Egypt. Although "he used the Herodotean variant, he 
contrived, through the old idol-story, to remove that stain of dishonor which the Egyptian 
version had re-attached to Helen [while exploiting].... the tragic futility of that utterly 
unnecessary Trojan War" (Lattimore, p. 484), thereby manipulating history to a specific 
end. 
However, by stating that neither did Helen "sail in the well-decked ships" nor did 
she "come to the towers of Troy", Stesichorus betrays ulterior motives. Socrates refers to c 
the story concerning the alleged blinding of Stesichorus after his E2cvr7 placed Helen in a 
bad light, seen an act of hubris. "Blinding is typically, though not exclusively, associated 
with offences against the gods", according to Buxton (Rowe, p. 167). Helen, daughter of 
Tyndareus of Sparta was considered to be the daughter of Zeus who transformed into a 
swan to fool her mother Leda. 16 Helen, married to Menelaus, is represented in the 
Odyssey and Riad as a mortal (Rowe, p. 166). However as Helen was the daughter of 
Zeus, her husband Menelaus through his connection with her upon his death went to 
dwell in the Elysian plain (Odyssey IV, 563-70), and she "had cults, at Sparta and 
elsewhere, '? apparently as a goddess. "18 Thus given this understanding of the nature of 
Helen, Homer has offended a goddess and is punished as he does not recant, whereas 
Stesichorus recants thereby alleviating the wrath of the gods and receives back his sight. 19 
Regardless of whether the blinding of Stesichorus seems folkloric to us (Bowra, p. 108), 
ships, helljo men, hell to the city" (see note 1, p. 284); this of course is a paraphrase-the play in Greek is 
between E2Bvq and EEA vans. Gorgias writes in his Epilogue (Encomium of Helen 19. Trans. D. M. 
MacDowell), "So how should one consider the blame of Helen just? Whether she did what she did because 
she was enamoured <by sight> or persuaded by speech or seized by force or compelled by divine necessity, 
in every case she escapes the accusation. I have removed by my speech a woman's infamy, I have kept to 
the purpose which I set myself at the start of my speech; I attempted to dispel injustice of blame and 
ignorance of belief, I wished to write the speech as an encomium of Helen and an amusement for myself. " 
With regard to the last word "recreation" in note 10 we are reminded that the Greek word used was 
paignion, `sport, play' (see Rutherford, p. 243). Thus, at the end Gorgias plays at "undercutting a serious 
purpose in the speech". However, writing playful arguments does not mean that he does not take his 
arguments seriously. See"Wardy, The Birth of Rhetoric, Ch. 2, pp. 50-51. 
16Euripides, Helen, lines 17-21,48. 
'7Herodotus (2: 112) reports the temple of Athena the stranger in Memphis as being dedicated to Helen. 
18Rowe, p. 167. Rowe citing Buxton's reading of Plato ("Blindness and Limits: Sophocles and the Logic of 
Myth", p. 22) maintains that Plato appears to treat Helen as a goddess, pointing to the comparison between 
Stesichorus and Socrates. 
19 Given that Plato, as we have seen in Chapter I, referring both to Republic book 2 and Symposium 203, 
sees the limitations of the Greek conception of the gods, this can be read as a tongue in cheek allusion to 
Plato's moralizing attitude towards the Greek gods suggesting he too should be blinded. 
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it appears to be punishment for hubris though simultaneously this reference may be in 
part ironic, pointing to a political offence. 20 
This tale opens a contradiction with regard to the relation between piety and 
integrity. Plato calls Stesichorus a mousikos, (243a8) "a true follower of the Muses" 
(Rowe) or "as a true artist he understood" (Hackforth). If the Herodotean account is 
credited, Homer intentionally disregarded the true Egypt story as it "did not suite epic 
poetry as [well as] the tale of which he made use" (II, 116). In recanting the Homeric 
version Stesichorus went against tradition in correcting a fictitious tale and was honest 
according to Herodotus to this extent. However he went further in that by recanting the 
version that judged and brought dishonour to Helen, he flattered the gods contending that 
she never went to Troy nor even boarded the boats in contrast to the other variants. 21 
Therefore as a true artist and follower of the Muses22 he created a version to please and 
honour the gods, whatever the cost to his personal integrity, which healed his sight 
through undoing that action by which he had originally committed hubris. 
In contrast, Rowe (p. 167) refers to Homer as "the leader of the tragic, i. e. 
"serious" poets. " The Socrates of the Republic (598d9-e2) states "Have we not to 
scrutinize tragedy and its leader Homer, since some people tell us that these poets know 
all the arts and all things human pertaining to virtue and vice and all things divine? " This 
stance represents a historical position prior to Socrates which brought together the poet, 
the philosopher and the seer, a valuing of the poet which the Socrates of the Republic (X) 
and the Ion sought to undermine and which he claimed to have disproved in the Apology 
22. Nonetheless in this context this suggests that Homer is both poet and philosopher in 
his concern for and knowledge of the truth, and is morally irreproachable, sophos. This 
implies that he will tell the whole truth about Helen, regardless of personal consequences. 
However Herodotus' reasoning (II, 116-120) and the references in the Odyssey and Riad 
20 Stesichorus in the Msvq fr. 17d. discusses the punishment of Tyndareus, father of Helen, due to his 
omission of a sacrifice to Aphrodite. Aphrodite in her wrath "made [the daughters of Tyndareus] to be wed 
twice and thrice and to forsake their husbands". Furthermore Pausanius (2.22.6) refers to a story by 
Stesichorus which indicates that Helen had an illegitimate child with Theseus prior to marrying Menelaus. 
As one or both of these stories would have caused great offence to Sparta, particularly as Helen had 
"festivals and special duties" and where a "particular glory" attributed to her would have been appropriate, 
Bowra (p. 111) concludes that this Stesichorus palinode was written to pacify the Spartans, deifying Helen 
and recanting what he had previously said for political reasons. On a different level, Plato's reference can 
be read as pointing towards the fact that like Stesichorus Socrates could have recanted his alleged impiety 
towards the state gods and survived, but like Homer chose not to and suffered. On some level, Stesichorus 
seems to have bent the truth to smooth over a political offence. 
21 He is one of the few if not the only poet who fully vindicates Helen from all guilt saying that she never 
even left Sparta. 
22 The Muses are associated with Apollo the god of healing. On some level Stesichorus' palinode acted as 
medical potion or a counter-spell, recalling the second form of mania in Socrates' second speech. 
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to the Egyptian version suggest that despite this claim to virtue and wisdom Homer, 
knowing the inherent ambiguities and disputes with regard to Helen still composed an 
elaborate tale situating her in Troy, while alluding to her residence in Egypt, both stories 
which inevitably have negative implications as to her moral character. Though Homer 
may have been honest with regard to her physical location, or simply truthful with regard 
to Helen's inner motivations and intentions, nonetheless he shamed Helen, daughter of 
Zeus and therefore was blinded for hubris and impiety. 
Socrates' citing "False, false the tale" seems to reflect back on all possible 
readings of the Helen story creating a sense of uncertainty as to what is true and what is 
false. Although, then, on these accounts, while each poet reveals some aspect of the truth, 
each through his story simultaneously conceals truth or is on some level hubristic and/or 
impious. Furthermore according to this theological scheme, the "offenders" of the corrupt 
anthropomorphic gods' pride, who acknowledge, represent and judge their imperfection, 
must be blinded, while those who flatter them regain their sight. 23 This indicates an 
ethical contradiction: he who tells pious stories in speaking the truth is 
condemned/blinded while he who wants to be purged of blindness/the wrath of the gods 
must deceive, in order to be pious with regard to the gods 24 
Moreover, through Socrates' citation of Stesichorus we find ourselves faced with 
the fallibility of our understanding of the story of Helen itself. Although in the context of 
the multiple and conflicting versions of the Helen story, the Herodotus version seems to 
present the most plausible account, there is no way to prove that what Stesichorus 
recounts in his palinode was untrue particularly in that this "truth" pertains to epic 
legend, an issue relevant to, and pointed to by Herodotus concerning, Homer's 
construction of his epic. What is important is not whether Stesichorus or Homer told the 
"factual" truth but whether Socrates believed Stesichorus told the truth, or thought he did, 
as this has significance in the context in which he cites him. Given that Plato does not 
make this apparent, Socrates' very statement thrust us into the heart of the ambiguities 
and uncertainties with regard to the reading of Stesichorus and by consequence that of 
23To see spiritually, to be a mantis, results in blindness physically, exemplified not only by Homer, but also 
by Oedipus and Teiresias in Oedipus the King, while spiritual blindness produces physical light, as 
demonstrated by Stesichorus. If this opposition between sight and blindness is read in relation to 
Nussbaum's discussion of the dichotomy of mania and sophrosune in the middle dialogues, it can be 
interpreted as the inability to focus on the physical and spiritual simultaneously, as if physical sight 
excludes the possibility of spiritual vision while mental vision demands and results in a negation or cutting 
off of the physical body, a point demonstrated in the "Myth of the Cave, " (Republic 518c6-7) with regard 
to the necessity of "turning one's whole body" from the darkness to light. 
24For a sustained analysis of contradictory moral systems in aesthetics see Hegel, Aesthetics, Volume II, 
"Greek Comedy and Tragedy" with reference to Antigone. 
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Homer, which in turn opens the question of alternative versions such as those of 
Herodotus, Euripides and Gorgias. By emphasizing the uncertainties concerning the facts 
behind the Helen legend, consequentially causing various poets' piety to recede into the 
background, the citing of Stesichorus by Socrates becomes increasingly enigmatic and 
rife with possible contradictory meanings and hence aporetic, allowing no passage. This 
uncertainty in turn reflects back on the nature of love pointing to its ambiguity. 
In the same vein as Stesichorus, trying to beat the game, Socrates states "I shall 
show greater wisdom than these poets: I shall attempt to make my due palinode to Love 
before any harm comes to me for my defamation of him, and no longer veiling my head 
for shame, but uncovered" (243B). Thus in the spirit of Stesichorus, Socrates recants his 
blasphemy against love, claiming instead that love is a god and man's greatest good 
(248d4,249d4-el). While Socrates may be recanting to honour the god of love as 
Stesichorus recanted to honour Helen daughter of Zeus, suggesting that both are 
blameless and untainted, simultaneously the multiplicity of conflicting accounts of Helen 
raises further doubts. Stesichorus' recantation could reasonably be considered by Plato's 
readers to open a nest of uncertainties concerning both the Helen "stories" and the poets 
responsible for the versions, variants which undermine each other leaving the reader in an 
aporia of meaning as to whether Socrates by saying "false the tale" really means the tale 
is true. This in turn reflects upon Socrates' speeches creating an ironic reversal 
suggesting that Socrates' first speech may be true while Socrates' second speech is false, 
hence love may actually be bad as opposed to good and a god. This suggests that 
Socrates' two speeches may be either true or false and consequentially that love may be 
either good or bad, indicating that in both speeches whether not recanting, recanting, or 
recanting the recantation, Socrates is telling a partial or uncertain truth concerning the 
nature of love. This returns us to his ironic statement, "I am a seer; not a very good one" 
(242c4-5), ironic particularly as he claims that the only thing he understands is love 
(Symposium 177d9-el). 
This recantation or reversal acts in two directions. The recantation formally 
recants Socrates' first speech. Socrates claims to have sinned against Eros through 
showing the negative side of eros. However through the reference to the story of 
Stesichorus, which is uncertain and opens conflicting meanings, Socrates implies that his 
recantation is likewise uncertain and rife with contradictions hence aporetic. In so doing, 
Socrates and also, it seems, Plato, recants the recantation. This creates an aporia between 
the first and the second speech, simultaneously suggesting that each is true and false, 
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indicating a more objective aporia of interpretation. 5 Adding a further level of difficulty, 
if we take it that the accounts of Stesichorus and Homer may be each both true and false, 
then it would seem that each of Socrates' speeches are partially true and false, both true 
and false. Furthermore, the motivation behind the recantation is piety, yet it seems 
uncertain whether piety can be achieved through recanting nor through recanting the 
recantation, which likewise leaves Socrates, Plato and the reader in an aporia; at which 
point, one may ask, where does the true blindness lie? Thus while maintaining its role as 
a matrix of meaning, the recantation simultaneously induces an evacuation/confusion of 
meaning, as in an aporia the individual necessarily knows that he does not know but does 
not know what he does not know which indicates a position of partial knowledge, a 
position between knowledge and ignorance (Symposium 202). This leaves the question of 
meaning concerning love in flux and therefore open to possible reinterpretation, calling 
the reader to be interpreter. 
251f the reversal had been complete, as would have been the case if Stesichorus fully lied and Homer's 
version had been the historical truth (a position put in serious question by Herodotus), then this would have 
produced an aporia resulting in a complete evacuation of meaning, similar to but more intense than the 
technique used by Socrates as demonstrated by Plato's early dialogues, the method for which Socrates was 
ultimately condemned to death. However, given the presence not of absolutes but of half truths, recantation 
after the manner of Stesichorus does not produce a desperate inner void (except as a part of or a moment in 
the process) though still resulting in an aporia of meaning with regard to the truth. As elements of the truth 
are present in each version as in each speech, this aporia leaves the reader with the objective belief that 
truth is possible, that there is a way out of the aporia, which is much more in keeping with Platonic thought 
and indeed with the later commentary at 266a. 
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VI. THE TALE OF NUSSBAUM 
Nussbaum reads this recantation as a redefinition of Bros transcending the 
dichotomy of sophrosune and mania, good and evil, into a constitutive element of an 
orderly and pious life. Though the setting of the Phaedrus is dated normally between 411 
and 404 B. C., according to an inscription found in this century, Phaidros Murrhinousios 
was implicated with Alcibiades for the desecration of the statues of Hermes and the 
Mysteries (as discussed by Sayre pp. 120-122) and was accordingly sent into exile from 
415 to 404 B. C. For Nussbaum accordingly, he was not in Athens at the time the dialogue 
is set. Viewed not as inconsistency nor a "tale" because of the "notoriety of the events 
and the precision with which Plato dates the dialogue" (Fragility, p. 212), Nussbaum 
reads the Phaedrus as 
Plato's own Egypt-legend. That story wasn't true. You did not get led into disorder and impiety through 
your appetitive passions, your devotion to mania. You did not go into exile. All the time in spite of 
appearances, here you were in Athens, living a good and orderly life, and living a good life without closing 
off the influence of eros. ' (Fragility, p. 212-3) 
According to this interpretation, Bros does not necessitate impiety and irrational conduct, 
mania, as is implied by Nussbaum's interpretation of the Symposium's portrayal of 
Alcibiades with regard to Socrates. Though Phaedrus2 and Alcibiades went into exile due 
to the misuse of eros, and though Stesichorus could well have believed Helen did go to 
Troy, the nature of eros did not determine their negative moral choices and therefore did 
not necessitate the tragic ends of Alcibiades, Phaedrus and Helen. The negative end was 
not determined through the presence of eros, indicating that eros is not exclusively 
' Nussbaum seems to have missed Plato's apparently deliberate ambiguity in his use of Stesichorus; that 
Helen may not have gone to Troy and that she might have been living "peacefully and piously in Egypt". 
Clearly she could not have reached Egypt nor left Sparta without eros, as Herodotus' report of the priest in 
Egypt makes clear (nor for that matter gone to Troy). This does not affect the point she wishes to make 
concerning eros with regard to the recantation. However, it would prevent her from calling the Phaedrus 
"Plato's own Egypt-Legend", as a clear indication that Plato's view has changed, because Stesichorus' tale 
is ambiguous, this version is neither true nor false but indeterminate in regard to truth and falsity. This 
however draws into question Nussbaum's understanding of eros, particularly with regard to mania. 
2 "We know virtually nothing of Phaedrus outside the pages of Plato. " (Hackforth, p. 12) 
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negative. Therefore, "both Plato's Phaedrus-legend and Stesichorus's Egypt-legend 
attack the deep moral that has been drawn from Helen and Alcibiades. They claim that, 
although perhaps literally false, their stories will express, metaphorically, a deeper truth 
about eros: that it can be a constituent of an orderly and pious life dedicated to the 
understanding of the good" (Fragility, p. 213), which supports the claim that eros is a 3 
necessary ingredient of the best kind of life (248d4,249d4-el). Illustrated by the 
description of the charioteer in Socrates' second speech, eros when controlled in a 
philosophic love relation leads toward the good and beautiful (253e6-254e9,256a7-b7), 
and is the only hope the soul has of attaining immortality as eros for the particular 
individual causes the wings of the soul to grow, which enables the soul to contemplate 
the Forms. This type of controlled eros as an essential part of the philosophic life is 
already present in the middle dialogues as demonstrated in Republic 403b as well as 
through our discussion of Socrates in the Symposium as the example of philosophical 
eros, seeking to procreate virtue in others hence seeking the well-being of their souls. 
A. SOPHROSUNE VERSUS MANIA 
Nussbaum, however, argues that with the Phaedrus Plato's conception of love 
radically changes. What for her had appeared to be a dichotomy in the middle dialogues 
is now expressed as a more complex synthesis of elements. For Nussbaum, Lysias' and 
Socrates' opening speeches set up the straight dichotomy of rational/good contra 
irrational/evil (implicitly opposing Hackforth) which she associates with the middle 
dialogues while the second speech, following a recantation of Plato's past views 
supporting the sophrosune/mania dichotomy, redefines love as madness inspired by the 
gods (245c1-2) and a state of the highest goodness for man (248d4,249d4-el). This new 
thesis represented in Socrates' second speech, which Nussbaum considers to be Plato's 
ultimate position, indicates that as philosophy is a type of mania, mania is necessary for 
the pursuit of the truth as is the individual love relationship which in turn produces the 
3 This analysis of eros and of Alcibiades' desecration echoes Sayre's analysis (pp. 120-122) which we have 
previously discussed. Strangely, as previously noted, Nussbaum makes no mention of Sayre in her 
bibliography to The Fragility of Goodness. 
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best kind of life 4 Thus mania, erotic love relationships and philosophy are inter-linked in 
the pursuit of truth. 
Already however we see a problem here in that the conception of eros in the 
middle dialogues is far more complex than she acknowledges. 5 As we saw in Chapter 3, 
the Plato of the Symposium has difficulty with "Dionysian" mania, uncontrolled eros, 
which he opposes with the Apollonian position favouring reason and sophrosune. Again, 
at Republic 402d if., after agreeing that beauty of the soul is better, fairer and more 
lovable than beauty of the body, reminiscent of Symposium 211, Socrates discusses the 
opposition of "soberness" and "virtue" with "extravagant pleasure", "insolence and 
licence" and sex. Socrates then opposes uncontrolled erotic mania with the "right love, a 
sober and harmonious love of the orderly and the beautiful" which is "directed towards 
honourable ends" and involves sophrosune and physical purity. Thus we see in the 
Republic that Plato already resolves the dichotomy of sophrosune and mania through a 
form of philosophical eros governed by sophrosune. 
In what Nussbaum conceives of as a new thesis on eros found in Socrates' second 
speech of the Phaedrus, which as we have seen above is not so new, eros directed 
towards the individual contradicts Vlastos' critique of Plato's conception of the love of 
the individual. Rather than being loved for their "utility value" according to "utility love" 
(Vlastos, "Individual", p. 7), in so far as they are "the images of the Ideas in them", 
"congeries of valuable qualities" (Vlastos, pp. 31-2) and not loved for their "own sake" 
4 Fragility, p. 201. 
S Nussbaum gives an oversimplified reading of this shift from the Symposium's dichotomy to the Phaedrus, 
in that there is not a straight dichotomy in the Symposium since reason and madness are interrelated. This is 
brought out by Cobb's comment that "The association of Socratic dialectic with the Bacchic enthusiasms of 
the Corybantes may be a bit startling (215e), but this association of what we may think of as religious 
inspiration and enthusiasm with Socratic rational enquiry is common in the dialogues" (Cobb p. 83). 
Complexifying this further, 212a4 alludes to "the tale of Ixion and the cloud which was imposed on him in 
the place of Hera, and from which the Centaurs sprang" (A. E. Taylor p. 230 note 1). Also, "Socrates 
explicitly appeals to religious motivation in his defence of himself in the Apology". One could also argue 
that the intellectual ascent could occur through the possession by eros, the ascent involving as Moravcsik 
points out the interaction of reason, eros and creation. This shows that "Perhaps Plato does not think of this 
element of the religious as something antithetical to the rational. The appeal of the beautiful occurs at many 
levels, not just at the level of intellectual analysis" (Cobb, p. 83). The Symposium, it would seem, does not 
comply fully with Nussbaum's reading of the dichotomy. Furthermore, Nussbaum's dichotomy can be 
read, with Cobb, as breaking down with the entry of Alcibiades. "This outburst of drunken revelry in the 
dialogue, the introduction of the aspect of madness that will be connected with love in the Phaedrus... [is] 
explicit in Alcibiades' description of Socrates and the effect Socrates has on him. In the famous image at 
218b he compares the impact of Socrates' arguments to the bite of a snake that will not loose and speaks of 
`the madness and Bacchanalian frenzy of philosophy'". (Cobb, p. 82) 
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(Vlastos, pp. 3,5,32), for Nussbaum from Socrates' second speech onward individuals 
are loved uniquely and specifically in a non-transferable way. 
6 In Chapter III we cast 
doubt on Nussbaum's judgement of Plato through showing how in the Symposium 
Socrates, representing philosophical eros, strives to procreate virtue in youths in view of 
eternity, seeking the well-being of their and his own souls. The difference between the 
conception of philosophical eros found in the Symposium and the Republic compared 
with that of Socrates' second speech simply involves the intensification of certain 
elements in the latter as we shall see. While resembling the understanding of eros as 
desire of the unique beloved in Aristophanes' speech (191d1-6), though not perceived as 
blocked and fixated like Alcibiades' obsession with Socrates (219d2-e5), Nussbaum 
believes that love of an individual in Socrates' second speech is conceived of as a 
growing and moving relation/interaction. This involves participants appreciated for their 
intrinsic value who are developing as a product of their historical inscription, their 
passage through time and space, and their growing awareness of each other and 
themselves through the other. 7 By this she maintains that the individual for the first time 
in Plato's Phaedrus does maintain a significant value and is not expendable, though as 
we have demonstrated this was to a certain extent true all along. 
There are various problems associated with Nussbaum's reading8 in which she 
seems to be "appropriating the Phaedrus", using it to support her own agenda. Among 
these, she focuses upon the empirical relationship of the lovers as opposed to the ascent 
through eros fostered by virtue to the Forms. Differing somewhat from Nussbaum, 
however, the lovers of the Phaedrus see their journey as an ascent or movement towards 
virtue in which, continuing after death, the inspiration of eros fostered with intellectual 
and moral enlightenment (256b3) (virtue: sophrosune) causes the regrowth of their wings 
(256b4) and the ascent to the Forms (246d6). This is particularly important because, in 
the text of the Phaedrus, Plato shows a clear coupling and interweaving of sophrosune 
and mania which does seek to resolve the dichotomy. Nussbaum however, although she 
6 Fragility, p. 218. 1 Also see Lacan, "Mirror Phase" (Ecrit 1, pp. 1-3) compared to Phaedrus 255b-e, Rowe p. 88, and 
Hackforth, p. 108. 
8 The value of Nussbaum's account is not dependent upon the accuracy of her readingther fidelity to the 
text, but in the fact that she addresses the subject of the recantation directly and in the questions she poses 
which open areas up for exploration in a new light. 
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acknowledges this, favours the empirical relation even though such weight is not present 
in the text. 
Also her understanding of divinity within the individual stresses difference as 
opposed to unity. Although illustrating an important shift from a movement towards self- 
sufficiency to one that attributes value to the individual as a source of insight, this section 
seems to show a using of the Phaedrus to support her own agenda. Implicitly Nussbaum 
in her analysis of the Phaedrus (see Fragility, p. 218)9 concerning the "divinity" within 
the other, which for her seems to be the essence of the other person, likewise focuses not 
so strongly on the similarity of the lovers and increasing unity in their devotion to each 
other in seeking immortality, but on their awareness and appreciation of essential 
differences. Nussbaum conceives the "divinity" in the other person, as not so much what 
god they resemble (Phaedrus 252e1-253b4) or their ideal, but what is unique about them, 
what they are in themselves, which determines their particular responses and interactions. 
The basic distinction observed here is Nussbaum's implicit tracing of different divinities 
in the other and the self, as opposed to a Platonic notion of divinity in which divinity is a 
unity operating in different ways, causing unity in that in which it operates. Thus, the 
divine, rather than being universal finding its source in the Forms, focuses on 
particularization or individual manifestation of beauty and virtue. Knowing the particular 
beloved fully leads the lover to trace the divinity in himself, by which Nussbaum seems 
to mean knowing his ideal, what is good and beautiful, to what he attributes value, rather 
than a metaphysical reality. 
Although there seems to be some connection for Nussbaum leading from the 
lover's understanding of the beloved to the lover's understanding of himself, the essences 
9 She writes in this context, "Not least of the lover's learning is learning about another person. Each, 
through complex responses and interactions, comes we are told, to understand and honor the `divinity' of 
the other person (252D); his effort is to know the other's character through and through. This leads, further, 
to increased self-understanding, as they `follow up the trace within themselves of the nature of their god'. 
In his state of possession (252E), the lover learns the other person's `habits and ways', and through these 
his own (252E-253A)... But some of their truths may well be more particular and more like stories. If we 
ask what sort of understanding this is and what truths the lovers can tell, we get a complicated answer. No 
doubt they will know some general truths about character of a certain type and some of their knowledge of 
habits and ways may reveal itself not so much in speeches as in the intuitive understanding of how to act 
towards the other person, how to teach, how to respond, how to limit oneself. But Socrates (like Alcibiades 
of the Symposium) insists that it is insight nonetheless, insight crucial to moral and intellectual 
development. The lover owes gratitude for his insight to the beloved, whom gratitude causes him to love 
more. Once `looking to the lover' was opposed to looking to philosophy (239A-B). Now the lover's soul is 
a central source of insight and understanding, both general and concrete. " (Fragility, p. 218) 
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of the two individuals appear to be distinctly different though historically connected and 
participating in each other's becoming. Nussbaum refers to the other person's "habits and 
ways" as if they belong to the other person primarily, deriving from his essence. In the 
text (253a4), these are of a god, though the lover "attributes it to the beloved" implying 
that he mistakes their source and idealizes his beloved and is inspired by his beauty 
which he in turn pours back into the beloved. This justifies to some extent Nussbaum's 
comment on the gratitude the lover feels, though this gratitude is for insight into his god 
and into the form of beauty, though this is not apparent in her discussion. 
Therefore though Nussbaum does suggest in accordance with the text an 
understanding of similarity and commonality in relation to the common god of the lover 
and beloved (252d1-6, el) and the attributes they have in common with that god which 
makes them attracted to each other (252d5-6,253a5), this notion of divinity appears to 
integrate a greater degree of difference than is present in the text. A major problem with 
Nussbaum's understanding of "divinity" or essence in the individual in its purest form is 
that it seems to refer to a difference rather than a unity. '0 
As the individual is not fully acknowledged to be chosen as beloved for his 
likeness to the patron god nor as a reflection of Beauty, Nussbaum stresses particularity 
too strongly. This analysis by Nussbaum (p. 216) is problematic as she, through 
10 Nussbaum's reading of Plato in her interpretation of love of the individual seems to be coloured by 
feminist writers on difference such as Helena Cixous, specifically "The Laugh of the Medusa". Cixous 
writes the lover "does not `know' what she is giving", nor does she measure it, meaning that her love is not 
governed by reason. Though both Plato and Cixous believe that love is the desire for that which the 
beautiful effects, Nussbaum's interpretation of divine madness, mania, in the Phaed us is much closer to 
Cixous' "desire that gives", and irrational selfless generosity as when Nussbaum writes, "Without the 
generosity of madness, the soul is imprisoned not in the body but within itself and therein devoid of love's 
colour and insight in some way" (Fragility. p. 221). Plato's understanding of erotic madness is always 
based on a rational foundation, self-controlled. Furthermore, Plato's understanding of eros is always 
directed towards unity, as we see in the ascent of Diotima's speech and in the ascending relationship of the 
lovers in Socrates' second speech in the Phaedrus tending towards a greater unity. Cixous' understanding 
is a relation of difference that intentionally maintains the difference. Nussbaum in her analysis of the 
Phaedrus concerning the "divinity" within the other, or the essence of the other person, likewise focuses 
not so strongly on their similarity and increasing unity in their devotion to each other in seeking 
immortality, but on their awareness and appreciation of essential differences. Thus Nussbaum, with regard 
to madness and difference, seems to read contemporary and feminist concerns into her interpretation of the 
Phaedrus. 
I mention Cixous for the reason that the title "The Laugh of the Medusa", 1976, written 
approximately ten years prior to The Fragility of Goodness, seems to be echoed in Nussbaum's more recent 
book The Therapy of Desire in the seemingly autobiographical chapter "Serpents of the Soul". Both 
Cixous's paper and Nussbaum's chapter address in different ways the problems of eros and self- 
sufficiency, showing that even if Nussbaum had not read Cixous' article, which seems unlikely, they 
address similar concerns. 
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personalizing the love relation of Socrates' second speech, appears to have deviated from 
Plato's text. This straying is made evident by her pointed stress on the individual, 
neglecting the fact that the individual is not only chosen as an image of the patron god 
252e, but that the beauty of the individual is above all a reflection of the form of the 
beautiful (250d, 254a-e). 11 Through focusing almost exclusively on the particular in 
reaction to the traditional readings, she swings to the opposite extreme, giving a partial 
reading in terms of particularity. 
Through this emphasis on particularity, she misses the framework of the Forms 
and ascent to the Forms hence the movement towards unity as contrasted with 
difference. 12 Though she seems to view this ingredient of difference as new compared 
with the earlier dialogues, it has always been an integral component of Platonic thought 
in that the movement towards the Forms occurs through anamnesis which involves 
dialectical activity which is based on the interaction of two individuals and therefore 
difference. 13 Nonetheless, regardless of her over-simplified view in the middle dialogues, 
" See Ficino, Plato on Love, 2: 6; also Watson, Greek Philosophy, pp. 24-5 for analysis of the assimilation 
of forms to the Judeao-Christian God. 
12 Furthermore, she seems to miss the Platonic framework of the Forms and the ascent to the Forms 
behind/underlying/informing the empirical world which gives order to the Platonic world. The ascent to the 
Forms is a movement towards unity, whether concerning Ideas or whether conceived of as a metaphysical 
unity, pure being (while the Forms are not unitary, it can be argued that their source is the form of the good; 
see A. E. Taylor pp. 230-231; and Plotinus, Enneads 6.9). This movement towards unity is categorized as a 
movement towards pure being and truth while multiplicity is grouped with semblance, falsehood, ignorance 
and becoming. Thus in Nussbaum's movement away from unity into multiplicity, semblance and 
becoming, for the Platonist she is moving into falsehood and ignorance regardless of whether the dialogue 
is middle or late. Although Plato expresses an awareness and respect for difference as other in the Phaedrus 
contrasted with the Symposium, in the Phaedrus Plato seems to place a much greater emphasis on likeness 
and unity than Nussbaum suggests, difference being an engaging and motivational aspect of the greater 
unity. For this reason, Nussbaum seems to be weaving her own concerns for difference into the text, 
formulating perhaps her own dialectic with and from Plato. (Warner notes Nussbaum's tendency to weave 
herself into the Phaedrus with regard to philosophical mania and a transformation of the senses 
("Appropriating the Phaedrus", p. 12). He does not in this context mention Nussbaum's self-abandonment 
to multiplicity which tears away or at least causes a rift with with Plato's pursuit of unity. ) 
13 Contrary to Nussbaum's reading of the Phaedrus and its overdrawn contrast with earlier dialogues, 
difference had long been an intrinsic component of Platonic thought with regard to learning through the 
other. Learning through the dialectical relationship is fundamentally Platonic, a tendency fully present in 
Socrates' second speech; virtually all his texts are dialogues and wisdom, gained through anamnesis, is a 
process involving a dialectical activity. Learning through the other is not new in the Phaedrus but was 
always already present, indicating that self-sufficiency was never a possibility unless as with Kierkegaard it 
is achieved through deflation and irony. In the Phaedrus, the lovers' souls are the source of insight, not 
because of their essential difference but because of anamnesis; this disrupts Nussbaum's thesis that the 
recantation of the Phaedrus shows the change from self-sufficiency to the individual being the source of 
insight, for in a sense he always was. 
Barker (2002) notes that this is supported in the Gorgias through Socrates' effort to induce or 
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she does recognize that the philosophical pursuit involves the integration of sophrosune 
and mania in the Phaedrus. 
This integration is "complex" in that it involves multiple kinds of knowing and 
learning incorporating both the particular instance and a desire for the universal, 14 which 
Nussbaum undervalues. In this pursuit of truth, philosophical truths are reached or striven 
for through dialectical structures, forming multiple dialectical relations on all the levels; 
not only intellectual but emotional, which Nussbaum categorizes as spirited, 15 and 
appetitive, which together point to the importance of the individual and particular relation 
as fundamental. Interpersonal relations contaminate what she conceives of as the 
"hygenic purity" of the sophrosune/mania dualism in that understanding is connected to 
the appetitive in general and the spirited parts; mania, emotion and physicality cross over 
"convert" Callicles into following philosophy. See Gorgias 481c-482c for a discussion of the relationship 
of love of philosophy and love of Alcibiades which in Chapter IV we contrasted with Callicles' love for 
Demos son of Purilampes and the Athenian demos hence "political power". The role of difference in 
dialectics is demonstrated by "Socrates' contention that in order to assure himself of truth he must get the 
assent of a totally different kind of individual" (Barker, 2002). 
14 In contrast to Fragility, p. 218, see Ficino's reading of Phaedrus (254a-e) in On Love Speech 2: 6. Read 
together they suggest a third view, an oscillation between universal and particular. 
15 Nussbaum aligns emotion with the spirited element of the tripartite soul explicitly when she calls "the 
thumos-the `second' or emotional part of the soul" (p. 230, also pp. 214-215). This reading is inaccurate in 
that it limits emotion to one part of the soul. However the dark horse/ appetitive part (254a3-6) and also the 
charioteer/intellect (254b4-c2) also experience emotions, those of the latter possess the greatest force and 
intensity of feeling bringing the whole soul under its control. The dark horse tends to experience emotions 
of passionate desire, anger (254c6) and anguish (254e5-6). The white horse feels shame, horror and anxiety 
(254c4) while the charioteer experiences resentment towards the dark horse (254e1-2) and indignation 
(254b 1) and the strongest and most overpowering of all emotions, awe towards the form of beauty (254b6) 
the feeling by which he ultimately tames even the dark horse (254e9-10). Moreover, Plato writes that the 
sensation of warmth "suffuses the whole soul" (253e6), meaning both horses and charioteer (253c7-8), 
showing that feeling is not limited to one part of the soul. 
The limitation of emotion to one area of the soul results from the reading of the soul as bipartite, a 
position suggested in the Phaedo and which Hackforth (pp. 107-8) argues to be likewise suggested in 
Republic IV. Barker (2002) notes that Plato also employs the bipartite conception of the soul as thumos and 
philosophon in Republic 2-3. It can be argued that not only does this tendency to view the soul as bipartite, 
relegating emotions to one part, surface and become dominant in Neo-Platonism, evident in the Gnostic and 
ascetic tradition's endorsing of the renunciation of the body and the sensuous world, poignantly 
demonstrated in Plotinus's Enneads (see "Problems of the Soul", IV3.15; "The nature and Source of Evil, 
1.8.14; also Gerard Watson, Greek Philosophy, Ch. 6 and Armstrong, "Plotinus" in The Cambridge History 
of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy, pp. 223,230), but that this tension with, yet dominance 
over, the conception of the tripartite soul may be argued to resurface in Augustine's struggle through 
various models to formulate the trinitarian soul as the image of God in de Trinitate (XVI, 4-6) in which 
emotion seems to be limited to one area of the soul. Yet regardless of its validity in expressing a tension 
between the tripartite and bipartite in the Platonic conception of the soul, this Neo-Platonic view is not 
purely Platonic as, according to the Republic XI, "each part of the soul has its proper desires" and by 
implication emotions. This perhaps explains why, when discussing Plotinus, Armstrong (pp. 206-7) states 
that "the Gnostic contempt for the physical world was so profoundly shocking to a Platonist". 
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into and contaminate rational understanding (Fragility, p. 216). 
Rather than blocking the soul from the beautiful, this holistic and multi-levelled 
reaction of the soul to beauty allows "eros to set its sights very high" (Fragility, p. 217) 
as it permits the transformation of the sensibility of the lover, 16 including the intellect 
through sensuous experience. 17 However, by showing the appetitive faculty directly to 
alter the intellect, and the intellect as pursuing such alteration, she suggests the violation 
of Plato's notion of sophrosune, harmony in the soul resulting from the intellect's 
dominance over its appetitive and spirited parts, thus inviting chaos within the soul, 
brought about by the contamination of sophrosune by mania. 
Although Nussbaum' account of the recantation of the dichotomy of sophrosune 
and mania in favour of a philosophical mania of multidimensional levels of knowing18 
moves away from the Phaedrus in terms of the understanding of the movement towards 
unity, the beloved and particularly with regard to the ascent to the Forms, 19 Nussbaum is 
correct in identifying a shift in the text which however seems more subtle than she 
16 This reaction to beauty... develop[s] and educate[s] the personality as a whole, making it both more 
discriminating and more receptive. " (Fragility, p. 215) 17 Nussbaum (p. 217) states that "in people with more complex aspirations, eros sets its sights very high, 
searching for a sensual experience that will lead to the mysterious transformation of the entire soul, 
including the intellect". Sensuous experience not only transforms the soul but alters/metamorphizes the 
intellect. For her the philosophical thinker should seek sensuous experiences which transform the intellect. 
' When she states that "eros sets its sights very high", though intentionally alluding to the Forms which are 
so integral a part of Platonism, rather than a dichotomous vision of sophrosune versus mania which she 
suggests is the opposition of the rational/intellect versus irrational/appetitive and emotional, Nussbaum's 
reading of the Phaedrus prescribes that the two become integrated as one to produce a transformation 
through philosophical mania, a position which Nussbaum considers to be heretical for middle period Plato. 
19 It can be asked whether Nussbaum's account of self-transformation actually corresponds to the Platonic 
ascent as described in the Phaedrus; while this is admittedly distinct from the Symposium's ascent, both 
ascents are by eros for an individual (Symposium, 210a6-8; Phaedrus 255c7-10), and the conversations 
instigated by the same individual, Phaedrus (Symposium 177a4-8; Phaedrus 227b6). Plato's middle 
dialogues propose an ascent not so different from that of Socrates' second speech (246d7). The latter 
indicates they will recover their wings (256b4); the purpose of the wings is to "carry (the heavy) aloft to the 
region where the gods dwell" (246d7), an ascent to the summit of the arch of heaven (247b1) where 
"reason alone, the soul's pilot can behold" (246c8) "true being... without colour or shape, " (246c6-7), the 
Forms of justice, temperance and knowledge. (246d6; At 250b5 beauty is described as a form along with 
justice and temperance). Both in the Symposium and the Phaedrus, understanding is gained through the 
pursuit and contemplation of the Forms. However Nussbaum's use of "sights very high" seem 
playful/clever and her text implies an ascent which does not extend beyond the empirical. Given this, what 
kind of a self-transformation does she hope to achieve? Clearly she is concerned with living the best life 
and respect for difference. These questions venture beyond the scope of the concerns of this thesis. What 
remains significant however is that she proposes an "ascent" consciously opposing that of Plato of the 
middle dialogues and further, in her veering in her conception of ascent, as with her conception of 
difference (as opposed to Plato's movement towards unity), Nussbaum seems to have moved away from 
Plato's text in her reading of the Phaedrus. 
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believes. This shift is overstated in Nussbaum's reading in that she unlike Warner does 
not recognize that mania "draws on one's non-intellectual elements in a 
disciplined... framework" ("Appropriating the Phaedrus", p. 12; cf. Cornford, "Eros", p. 
128, with regard to the Symposium)20 in a way which indicates the underlying presence of 
sophrosune. When seen in the light of Timaeus 71d-72b with regard to the distinction of 
mantike (mantis) and prophetes, the relation of mania and sophrosune is illuminated in 
that rather than "the `rational' [controlling] the `irrational' or 'crazy',... it interprets the 
latter's inspired visions; [so] each is essential to the other" (Barker, 2002). Hence this 
relation of mania and sophrosune puts into question Nussbaum's understanding of 
Platonic eros. 21 Plato's understanding of sophrosune is more subtle and sophisticated 
than Nussbaum acknowledges, creating a site for the abandon of mania to occur in that 
being inseparable from mania it interprets and therefore rationalizes it. 
Nonetheless, Nussbaum's claim that, through the recantation, Plato was seeking 
to show that the erotic life can be the good life through containing an element of 
sophrosune, which prevents eros from moving into sheer excess and decadence, is 
accurate. However this manipulation of the concepts of sophrosune and mania is less a 
product of a radical change than an evolution. These elements were seeds in Plato all 
along (as we shall see through examining Hackforth's analysis) only coming to be 
20 Warner in "Appropriating the Phaedrus" (p. 12-13), likewise sensitive to the role of the non-intellectual 
elements in the transformation, manages to stay closer to the text and Plato's conception of the ascent when 
he writes, "one gives oneself over to a vision of philosophy with a power that draws on one's non- 
intellectual elements in a disciplined yet imaginatively open framework, inviting one to interrogate the 
vision in an active progress which may draw one beyond it as one's sensibility is transformed", nourishing 
the growth of the wings which, through a contemplation of "joy, awe, and reverence" like the charioteer 
(254e9-10), result in an ascent. "Giving oneself over" suggests a self-abandonment involved with mania 
but this mania draws in a "disciplined" way (254e7; 256b3; 256a5-9) indicative of the underlying presence 
of sophrosune which likewise is echoed by "framework" indicative of the harmonious ordering of the 
intellect creating order in the soul, meaning that, though transformed, intellect/reason is 
controlling/supervising the other parts of the soul (Cornford, "The Doctrine of Eros", p. 121) drawing them 
closer to itself. For Warner, in drawing from its own elements the soul is personal, individual, yet it is 
drawn beyond itself by the mania of eros controlled by intellect towards the universal Idea and is thereby 
transformed while remaining itself, perhaps becoming its true self, which occurs through a dialectic with 
another individual (a transformation insisted on by Nussbaum). 
2' This puts into question Nussbaum's understanding of eros, particularly with regard to mania. Nussbaum 
originally set up dichotomies between mania versus sophrosune and eros versus sophrosune, ordering the 
Platonic progression in a way that appears to be a product of her own agenda. (Compare the way she sets 
up a similar opposition between Aristotelianism and the passionate life, embodied in Medea, in "Serpents 
in the Soul". ) Plato views sophrosune as self-control, justice in the soul which is governed by intellect and 
in which each part of the soul is permitted its expression without hindering the rest, and mania, though 
fully indeterminate if released, is inseparable from sophrosune both in the Republic and in the Symposium. 
Nussbaum understands mania as a fully irrational state brought on by divine possession. 
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articulated explicitly as sophrosune governing mania-inspired eros in the Phaedrus, 
where an awareness of love of the individual as such becomes more acute. Nussbaum's 
reading of Socrates' recantation of his first speech as embodying Plato's recantation of 
his past views is thus flawed; his thought is better understood as a gradual growth 
process. 
B. THE VALUE OF THE INDIVIDUAL 
Through the integration of sophrosune and mania into eros in Socrates' second 
speech, the individual as an object of love gains value. In Chapter III we saw that 
Vlastos, Kosman (pp. 54-5) and Singer (pp. 72,87) criticized Plato's view of love of the 
individual viewing Plato's understanding of love to be utilitarian and selfish, and the 
human being expendable as love is transferable. According to Nussbaum, in the middle 
dialogues Socrates' eros for the individual is limited/controlled, sophrosune, while in 
contrast Alcibiades' notion of eros is unlimited mania. Determinate and limited eros, 
sophrosune, is good while unlimited indeterminate eros is evil. However, entirely 
determinate eros, if construed as involving self-control and hence self-concern, can not 
be considered true eros of the individual, as an essential quality of such eros is 
selflessness (Vlastos, p. 32). 22 As such a love is based upon an amalgamation of qualities, 
22 Plato's ranking of personal love suggests for Vlastos ("Individual", pp. 29-32) that he has not understood 
true love of the individual. "Since persons in their concreteness are thinking, feeling, wishing, hoping, 
fearing beings, to think of love for them as love for objectifications of excellence is to fail to make the 
thought of them as subjects central to what is felt for them in love" (p. 32). Furthermore to love well 
"kindness, tenderness, compassion, concern for freedom, respect for the integrity of the beloved are... 
essential ingredients of the highest type of interpersonal love" (p. 29), elements which for Vlastos Plato 
was scarcely aware of in his desire to ascend to the Forms and achieve a kind of perfection. In viewing 
people as expendable, he shows his inner imperfection with regard to virtue, suggesting an intrinsic 
imperfection in his conception of the ascent. "The fashioner of this utopia has evidently failed to see that 
what love for our fellows requires of us is, above all, imaginative sympathy and concern for what they 
themselves think, feel, and want. He has, therefore, missed that dimension of love in which tolerance, trust, 
forgiveness, and respect have validity. Apart from these imperatives the notion of loving persons as `ends 
in themselves' would make no sense" (p. 32). For this reason Vlastos viewed Plato as a utilitarian 
(concerning the Republic's utilitarian project, see Karl Popper's Open Society, also Vlastos p. 15), using 
the individual to serve universal ends so that the individual derives value from use and is therefore 
expendable, not loved as an end in himself (p. 32) so that for Vlastos, Plato's view of love shows that he 
does not understand love. 
Whether or not Plato's notion of love undervalues the individual, it is for Vlastos the only 
conception of love which is coherent and workable within Plato's system. For Plato, "to make flesh-and- 
blood men and women terminal objects of our affection would be folly or worse, idolatry, diversion to 
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and as these qualities are transitory, it is not true love. Thus a limited or conditional love 
In this way Nussbaum of the individual is not love of the individual (Kosman, p. 56)23 
suggests the limitation of the middle dialogues' notion of love of the individual is among 
other things selfishness, fear of finitude, a fear of loss of control or mania. 
Though in the Symposium this type of love has some similarities with the love of 
Alcibiades, to fully attribute this critique of love to Plato's Socrates is incorrect. As we 
have seen, like the lover in Diotima's ascent who seeks to procreate true virtue, Socrates 
does love individuals in so far as he holds an educating role seeking the well-being of the 
souls of those he speaks with. Barker (2002) correctly points out that Diotima's 
description of the lover procreating true virtue and Socrates' "educative, soul tending 
aspect" point towards the resolution of this aporia in that eros, even if acquisitive shows 
an aspect of selflessness. For Barker (2002) "love for an individual is not directed at 
existing qualities that he/she only conditionally has, but involves the aspiration that such 
qualities may be developed in him/her", the perfection of the individual. Given that in 
this context of Greek virtue-based ethics "the quest for self-perfection is at the core 
images of what is due only to the divine original". Vlastos implies that as only this theory of love fits into 
Plato's theory this indicates that the theory needs to be reworked; Nussbaum in her essay shows Plato's 
recantation and reworking of this theory of love through the Phaedrus, a paper which she had Vlastos read 
prior to its publication. 
3 According to Kosman, "conditional love of the individual is not love of the individual" as it is "bestowed 
in response to and on the condition of qualities which the individual happens to have, whatever the 
independent relation of these qualities to the lover". As these qualities are transitory, so then is the love 
showing it not to be true love. In order to have a true love of the individual therefore love must be 
"unconditional, given regardless of the worth or worthlessness of the object. As long as love is in response 
to or conditional upon the object's worth, or in general its being lovable, then it would seem to be those 
features in virtue of which the object is lovable which constitute the true and proper objects of love, not the 
individual who happens to have them" (Kosman, p. 56). 
In order to respond linguistically to this need of unconditional love, Kosman suggests agape 
refering to Nygren's Agape and Eros. This is disputed by Vlastos who criticizes Nygren for not recognizing 
the subtle relation of philia and "a near synonym" agape and not recognizing that the Greeks were "as 
capable of genuine, non-egoistic affection as we are" (Vlastos, p. 6; for some contemporary arguments in 
favour of altruism see Nagel's The Possibility ofAltruism). Vlastos (pp. 5-6) uses instead Aristotle's notion 
of philia to represent the standard of unconditional love against which he compares Plato's eros, which is 
also more appropriate considering this use of philia is chronologically and culturally closer to Plato than 
Christianity. 
For Barker (2002) Vlastos and Kosman hold views which are problematic in that they assume love 
of the individual must necessarily be unconditional. If a woman ceases to love a man because some 
significant aspect of him has changed, this does not mean that she never loved him and likewise if the 
woman changes while the man remains the same, this does not prove that she never loved him. "None of 
this implies that `unconditional' love is impossible, or that it is not admirable; but the logic by which some 
writers makes unconditionality an essential feature of absolutely any love for an individual seems [very 
problematic]". 
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of... the Greek ethical project" and functions as the "ethical ideal" (Barker, 2003), to help 
another in his or her quest for ethical perfection, while involving the perfection of the 
self, is a great act of love. In this sense to be virtuous necessarily involves the begetting 
of virtue in others. Nonetheless in this context it "becomes difficult, if not unintelligible, 
to conceive `selfless' love as an ethical ideal" (Barker, 2003), hence Platonic eros' 
radical distinction from agape. 
Thus Socrates, while and in seeking self-perfection, does show a love of the 
individuals in that through sophrosune his eros remains pure and constructive, focused on 
the well-being and ultimate perfection of the other. This is opposed to Alcibiades 
exemplifying uncontrolled Bros, a destructive form of mania which indicates that he has a 
poor understanding of true love of the individual. Thus while Nussbaum was correct in 
her opposition of Socrates exemplifying sophrosune-dominant Bros and Alcibiades mania 
as uncontrolled eros in the Symposium, her account of Socrates' understanding of love of 
the individual was deficient. 
For Nussbaum Socrates' second speech marks a shift in that for the first time in 
her view a proper conception of love of the individual and a love relationship is fleshed 
out which articulates the virtues of love articulated by Vlastos ("Individual", pp. 29,32). 
This indicates for her a change from eros for the individual conceived of in the middle 
dialogues as negative and evil, to good and essential for the well-being of individuals and 
the ascent to the forms. As we have seen above, she was incorrect in believing Plato of 
the middle dialogues had no conception of the love of individuals and that eros directed 
towards the individual was negative, though for Plato positively conceived eros must be 
governed by sophrosune as we saw in Republic 403b. However Nussbaum was correct in 
that she does note a shift in which Plato more fully integrates sophrosune and mania into 
a form of eros allowing eros to be mad yet simultaneously controlled. This, as we have 
seen, is in keeping with Timaeus 71d-72b in which an integral part of mania is its 
interpretation. Though in the middle dialogues mania had not been fully integrated or was 
less intense, its integration and intensification is evident in the psychological graphically 
passionate description of and language concerning the charioteer in Phaedrus 253c7- 
256e, and particularly the sexual imagery in Phaedrus 255b3-256a3 in which there are 
allusions to liquid and to Ganymede. These elements in this section of the Phaedrus 
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suggest a melting and therein on some level a surrender and abandon which indicates a 
new level concerning the integration of mania into philosophical eros in the text. 
Though this seems valid, the means by which Nussbaum backs up her argument is 
problematic. She supports her argument by explaining these aspects of the Phaedrus with 
a specific episode in Plato's life conceiving of this as the background to the Phaedrus 
which though imaginative weakens her argument. Nussbaum argues that the source of 
these changes is found within Plato's personal life. "What brought it about that this most 
intolerant of human beings would decide, at some time around 365 B. C., that he had been 
too simple in his condemnation of madness? " (Fragility, p. 228) Linking what she 
conceives of as a reversal of Plato's views, which we have seen to be far less radical than 
she suggests, to Plato's personal experience, Nussbaum suggests the possible impact of 
one individual on Plato by exploring the linguistic ways in which Plato's reference to 
Phaedrus seems to allude to Dion of Syracuse. 24 She interprets the relation of Plato and 
24 Nussbaum here takes etymological liberties. She writes, "The name Zeus, as we see clearly in its oblique 
cases, has the root Di-: the genitive "of Zeus" is "dios". The soul of the younger man, furthermore, is 
described at 252E as "dion"-"brilliant" or "shining"-a word derived from the same root. Plato strikingly 
juxtaposes the two words in this passage, signalling to us that he wishes us to think of them as 
etymologically connected: hol men de oun Dios dion tina einai zetousi ten psuchen ton huph hauton 
eromenon, `Those who are followers of Zeus seek that the soul of their beloved should be brilliant (Zeus- 
like). ' Interpreters have not hesitated to see in all this a reference to Dion of Syracuse--and, by extension, to 
see the love described here as an account of Plato's own passionate devotion to Dion. We can go even 
further, however: for we notice that the name "Phaidros" has the same meaning as the name `Dion'. Both 
mean `brilliant' or `sparkling'. Given the prominence accorded to the actual name of Dion within this 
dialogue, it seems impossible that this fact about "Phaedrus" could have escaped Plato's attention; it seems 
virtually certain that Plato is telling us, in this way, that Phaedrus in some sense represents Dion. " 
(Fragility, p. 229) Barker (2002) comments that "the connection between the names Phaedrus and Dion is 
forced; `dios' does not mean `sparkling', but `divine', `noble', `heavenly'.... while phaidros connotes 
primarily things that are visually apparent, the glitter of smooth surfaces". (Examples of Plato's 
etymological playfulness are also found in the Cratylus, not lending support to her argument though 
showing Plato's tendency to evoke levels of meaning through playing with the meaning of words. ) 
"We know virtually nothing of Phaedrus outside the pages of Plato" (Hackforth, p. 12). Ryle in 
Plato's Progress writes a particularly provoking section called "the real Dion" in which he attempts to 
prove that Plato's Letters are contemporary forgeries (Ryle, p 69). "Chronology by itself proves that Letters 
III, VII and XIII were not written by Plato; and Letter VII carries Letter VIII with it. Plutarch, Diodorus 
Siculus, Diogenes Laertius and later historians and scholars have relied on these Letters for their accounts 
of Dion's virtues and of the young Dionysius' vices. If the Letters are forgeries, then the traditional story 
about Dion is without any authority" (Ryle, p. 68-9). Furthermore, he argues that Dionysius was not a 
tyrant (Ryle, p. 69; allowing Dion to draw his income according to Plutarch, Dion XV, p. 71; "political 
rather than unprincipled" p. 72; 346 B. C. restored to his post and later "voluntarily resigned"; also on good 
terms with Plato in Laws 710-711) while Dion through historical action appears more tyrannical (Ryle, 71; 
force almost entirely mercenaries; Syracusans voted to "displace their professed liberator" p. 73, "Plutarch 
has to admit that his idealist hero was suspected by many of aiming at the tyrany himself' pp. 73-4 ); the 
"intimate alliance between the two idealists, Plato and Dion, was fabricated by the author of the Letters" (p. 
82). "Dion's party... did, however, achieve one long-term success. By means of a few forged letters it 
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Dion as represented in Socrates' second speech, in terms of the erastes and eromenos, the 
philosophical couple, the followers of Zeus (252e1-253b1), 25 an interpretation to which 
she believes Plato's epitaph for Dion26 lends support. 27 She uses this epitaph to support 
her view that Plato is commenting upon and rethinking his position of the Republic in the 
Phaedrus, giving Nussbaum, in the Fragility of Goodness, the opportunity to rethink her 
conception of love of the individual in Plato. 28 She believes that through undertones of 
attached to Dion for two thousand years the glory of having tried to realize in Syracuse the Ideal state of 
Plato" (p. 80). If accepted, Ryle's account would undermine significant aspects of Nussbaum's "tale". 
25 Nussbaum notes that the ages of Plato and Dion fit more accurately than those of Phaedrus and Socrates 
into the conventional/appropriate ages of erastes and eromenos at the probable time of the dialogue's 
composition, "this then looks like Plato's way of playfully telling us that the "boy" to whom he is speaking 
in this piece of writing is his beloved pupil, like him both a political and philosophical character... [thus] 
this dialogue has the character of a love letter, an expression of passion, wonder and gratitude". (Fragility, 
p. 229; similarities in the philosophical and political character of Plato and Dion are brought out in the 
Seventh Letter (if it is authentic) 325-327; Plato, 325c5-b3, Dion, 327a3-b2, application of Plato's teaching 
327b6-d5, attempted actualization of Plato's thought, 328b1-c2) Although Nussbaum works out with 
fascination and detail the relative ages of Socrates and Phaedrus and Plato and Dion, it is virtually 
impossible to gauge with any accuracy their ages at the time of Phaedrus' composition. However, this 
exploration of the etymology of Dion and emphasis upon it may explain why Nussbaum attributes little 
importance to the ascent to the form of beauty, which we discussed earlier, focusing instead on its beautiful 
reflection, Dion. This concentration in some ways echoes the gesture of Alcibiades (219d2-e5) and the 
narrowing of his vision. The imbalance that this strong emphasis produces perhaps explains why at 
moments Vlastos' criticism of Plato's notion of love of the individual is challenged. 
26 "Tears were the portion that the Fates spun out / at birth for Hecuba and the Trojan women. / But you, 
Dion, had built a monument / of noble actions, when the gods spilled / your fair-flowing hopes upon the 
ground. / You lie there now, in the spacious earth / of your fatherland, praised by citizens. Dion, / you who 
drove my heart mad with love. " (Plato 353 B. C.; quoted Fragility, p. 200) 27 "Upon the sudden death of Dion at the hands of his enemies (around ten years after the composition of 
Phaedrus), Plato wrote the elegiac verses... which contrast the unrelieved misery of the women of Troy 
with Dion's surprising and premature death in the midst of happiness, make mention of eros, of mania, and 
of the thumos-the "second" or emotional part of the soul. (The last line reads, literally, "0 Dion, you who 
drove my thumos mad (ekmenas) with eros". ) "This intense passion expressed in these verses has been 
noticed; what has not been noticed is that this passion, and its poetic expression in the form of conventional 
lamentation, directly contravenes the prohibition of the Republic against the lamentation of the deaths of 
beloved individuals. Indeed, they contravene the whole moral scheme of the Republic and the Symposium: 
for if one saw persons, and their value, in the way recommended by these two dialogues, one would have, 
in the death of the individual, no basis for grief. One `drop' of the good and beautiful more or less-it 
should not affect us if we have correct beliefs. Furthermore the good person's stable activity should not be 
risked by the formation of intense particular attachments that would bring the shock of this deep grief. 
Therefore the Republic banishes both grief and poetic lamentation, leaving them, at most, to the `not-very- 
good-women. '" (Fragility, p. 230) Plato according to Nussbaum's reading, places himself in the position 
not of "a self-sufficient philosopher, but a not-very-good woman" (Fragility, p. 230). Plato is unashamed 
of his grief, shown in the publication of his poem (353 B. C. ) a public acknowledgement of mania produced 
from being overcome with passion, opposing his advancing of sophrosune in the middle dialogues. 
28 This epitaph contains a confession of eros, mania and deep grief going contrary to the small value of the 
individual as described by Vlastos (p. 26; when he refers directly to Dion) derived from both the Republic 
and the Symposium and the restrictions put on love in these two dialogues, individuals being loved for their 
use-value as congeries of qualities. 
Nussbaum is clearly rethinking Vlastos' criticism (p. 28) of Plato's view of love of the individual 
as a "complex of qualities". In showing Plato mourning Dion with eros directed at Dion as a unique 
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Plato's relation with Dion the Phaedrus expresses "why this mania is now something that 
can be praised and acknowledged and how the experience of mania has left the 
philosopher with an altered view of self-sufficiency". Plato had always been aware of the 
power of Bros and its resulting mania demonstrated by what she conceived of as his 
wariness of eros of the individual in the middle dialogues; "What he had not seen was its 
power for goodness" (p. 231) as he had not truly experienced reciprocated love in his 
own life, 29 prior to his relation with Dion. After this she believes eros is considered a 
constitutive element in "the truly blessed life" (Fragility, p. 232). We have shown that 
this radical shift did not occur with regard to the value of the individual but was always 
present in the Platonic dialogues. What did occur in Socrates' second speech however 
was an intensification of the mania element of the philosophical eros articulated in 
Symposium 210-211 and Republic 403b. However in this context, if Dion had influenced 
Plato, Plato's love for Dion in showing him the "`power of goodness' of love for an 
individual... would also show him how love for an individual can illuminate one's 
philosophical understanding of universals (the `nature' of love, the shape of the route [for 
example])" (Barker, 2002). Implicit in this is the sense that love for an individual 
constitutes both the first and the second step in Diotima's ascent to the beautiful which 
leads us back to the Symposium weakening Nussbaum's argument. Furthermore as we 
have already seen (see note 24 above), Nussbaum's argument rests on the inaccurate 
etymology that both Phaedrus and Dion mean "sparkling". As "`dios' does not mean 
`sparkling', but `divine', `noble', `heavenly'.... while phaidros connotes primarily things 
that are visually apparent, the glitter of smooth surfaces" (Barker, 2002), their 
etymologies emphasize their difference. This difference is further accentuated in that the 
individual, resembling to this extent Alcibiades' love for Socrates as interpreted by Nussbaum, Nussbaum 
shows Plato to love Dion not for the good Dion gave Plato only, but contrary to Vlastos (p. 32) as an end in 
himself, indicating to her a shift from or recanting of the view of love of individuals as a means to the end 
of the good to the love of individuals as having intrinsic value in themselves, as ends in themselves and 
therefore contributing to the good life. 
29 Nussbaum tries to draw a loose correlation between the relationships of Phaedrus and Socrates with Dion 
and Plato. Nussbaum reads Plato's relationship to Socrates as unrequited love. If we substitute Plato for 
Phaedrus, "we might see the Phaedrus as a wish, per impossible, for the deep mutual love of teacher and 
pupil, a wish that Socrates had been a little more mad, receiving and teaching insight of eros. The double 
reference also tells us that Plato now claims to be the Socrates that Socrates should have been but refused to 
be; that he found what eluded his teacher, a fusion of clarity and passion. " (Fragility, p. 232) 
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Dion of the Seventh Letter 327a30, unlike Phaedrus who maintains a certain superficiality 
faced with Socrates31, was persuaded by Plato to pursue philosophy. Therefore though 
fascinating and imaginative, Nussbaum's reading in terms of scholarship is inaccurate. 
C. RECANTING NUSSBAUM 
We might attempt to rescue Nussbaum's reading of the recantation by pointing 
out that she correctly writes "the ethical value of passion is itself an unstable 
achievement... Plato indicates... `This story isn't true', so that it can equally, at any point, 
be turned against Socrates' second speech, or against the whole of the action of the 
dialogue" (Fragility, p. 232). Nussbaum, though ultimately using the recantation and its 
aporetic structure to avoid drawing a conclusion (spinning the possible readings through 
the word "perhaps"), here responds on a different and far more vulnerable level by 
pointing through the recantation to the fragility of goodness. This position emphasizes the 
fragility of human relationships, suggesting that she may be more influenced by the 
epitaph than the dialogue. The specific fragility which Nussbaum's reading brings to 
Plato is the fragility of human life, finitude, which she brings out through her allusion to 
the historical Dion who is not directly mentioned and may not even be referred to in the 
dialogue. Regardless of its imaginative power, this reading of the recantation of the 
Phaedrus appears to over-emphasize finitude. 2 When looked at in relation to the actual 
30 "Dion, who was very quick of apprehension and especially so in regard to my instruction on this 
occasion, responded to it more keenly and more enthusiastically than any other young man I ever met, and 
resolved to live the remainder of his life differently from most of the Greeks in Italy and Sicily, holding 
virtue dearer than pleasure or than luxury. " (Seventh Letter, 327a7-bl) 
31 Phaedrus though initiating the discussion in the Phaedrus (227b6; as in Symposium 177a5-8) responds to 
Socrates superficially, particularly after Socrates' second speech according to Rutherford (p. 258), Cobb (p. 
143) and Warner (p. 12), comportment which causes Ferrari (Cicadas, pp. 4-9) explicitly to describe him as 
an impresario. Strangely, Nussbaum does not note the lack of receptivity on the part of Phaedrus, as she 
seems to envision or depict him as the ideal student in which philosophical thought and life are inseparable 
and interpenetrating in the erotic dialectical mania (p. 212; involving receptivity and openness). Though 
profound and illuminating her reading can not explain the superficiality of Phaedrus' response which in 
itself might function as a Platonic technique to elicit the participation of the reader as a means of 
conversion. 
32 In the Platonic and Neo-Platonic tradition, personal finitude was emphasized in order to drive the 
individual to look beyond the self in order to recognize the truer more real being lying beyond the empirical 
world, whether Plato's forms, Plotinus' the One, or the Judeo-Christian God. Truth being eternal is beyond 
the natural/phenomenal world which is in flux (Symposium, 207d4-208a2) and is that in which all things 
participate. Through cleaving to the physical reality (Republic 518c6-8,515e5-6) the individual cannot 
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text, though aware of finitude, Plato ultimately in his "quest for certainty"33 is constantly 
underlining rather than undermining the immortality of the soul, a tendency constantly 
resisted by Nussbaum. This is evident in his movement towards unity and universality, in 
contrast to Nussbaum who embraces difference, particularization and multiplicity, 
symptomatic of her concern for finitude and indeterminacy, and who lacks interest in the 
ascent to the Forms whether metaphysical or Ideas, valuing instead the individual and 
non-transcendental. This leaning is evident in her interpretation of Alcibiades (supported 
by her understanding of Medea)34 which is similar to her reading of the fragility and 
mortality of Dion, as an object of love, which she projects onto the Phaedrus, giving new 
meaning to "false, false the tale". 35 Nussbaum's is in a sense a tragic perspective as it 
suggests loving the individual involves the acknowledging and accepting of finitude, 
which though in a sense true, from a Platonic perspective can be interpreted as the tale of 
initiate an ascent (involving the interaction of both mind and eros) to this mental realm without releasing 
his grasp on the phenomenal. The recognition of finitude, a temporal limit on the life span of all 
constitutive elements in the life of the individual causes/provokes a recognition which can initiate this 
change in perspective (Republic 518c6-8), whether the Socrates of the Phaedo, or the description of the 
physical and mental state of flux of the individual in Symposium 207d4-208a2, or following the Neo- 
Platonic line of influence (see Watson Greek Philosophy, pp. 24-25). One of the most effective illustrations 
of this transition is made in the fourth century by Augustine, a Christian Neo-Platonist, in his description of 
the death of a friend after which he wrote "my heart was black with grief.... I became an enigma to myself' 
(Confessions 4: 4). In loving his friend he was joined to and shared his being with his friend indicating a 
lack of self-sufficiency. Through this death, Augustine's heart which belonged to his friend died with him 
and became black, filled with death, absence, a negative lack or void. For this reason, paradoxically 
housing both life and death, he ceased to know himself, and became unknown to himself, an enigma. 
Through this time of contact with death, he became aware of finitude and according to Watson (Greek 
Philosophy, p. 96) though "he gradually recovered from his grief could never forget the wound", ultimately 
directing him beyond the physical because "wherever the soul of man turns, unless towards God, it cleaves 
to sorrow. All things rise and set: in rising they begin to be, and they grow towards perfection, and once 
come to perfection they grow old, and they die: not all grow old but all die. Therefore when they rise and 
tend towards being, the more haste they make towards fullness of beings the more haste they make towards 
ceasing to be" (Confessions 4: 10). All creation is transitory, coming into being and dying away. To attach 
oneself to these dying leaves is to cling to death, to embrace the void, as without fail the object will fall 
away and the soul will be left with its tears as its only consolation (Enneads 3,5,1). Thus exemplified 
through Augustine, the purpose of the emphasis on finitude within the Platonic/Neo-Platonic tradition is to 
direct or move the individual beyond the finite, through beauty to the infinite (see the Symposium ascent 
209e-211b; Enneads 2,9,16 and 6,9,9; Confessions X: 9 and 34). This use of finitude is substantially 
different from Nussbaum's who seems to see it as an end in itself. 
33 Plato's ascent and search for absolute being is a "quest for certainty" reacting to the flux of nature. 
(Singer, pp. 57-8) 
34 Symposium 222c; Fragility, pp. 199,230; "Serpents of the Soul" pp. 442-57. 35 Although the Phaedrus is a recantation, indeed a recantation of a recantation as we shall see in the next 
chapter, it is less clear that "the Phaedrus as a whole has the form of this Palinode" (Fragility, p. 212) and 
that Plato is simply recanting his past views. Given his use of aporiai, Plato is far more complex. While 
Nussbaum seems to have clear ideas of what she wants to do with him, I fear that she has missed his full 




VII. THE PATH OF IRONY 
Contrasting with Nussbaum's interpretation of the recantation as demarcating a 
radical change concerning Plato's philosophical position on eros, Hackforth envisages 
the Phaedrus as a gradual uncovering of the truth, attributing to the recantation far more 
subtle implications. 
The main site in which this distinction becomes apparent is Hackforth's handling 
of Socrates' first speech. Unlike Nussbaum who tends to group Lysias' speech and 
Socrates' first speech together, Hackforth shows their subtle distinctions which prepare 
the way for and lead into Socrates' second speech, seeing it not as a full recantation and 
reversal of past views, but as a necessary step in the unveiling of the truth which for 
Hackforth is represented in Socrates' second speech. In order to appreciate this unveiling, 
we shall begin with Lysias' speech and follow the full progression. 
A. LYSIAS' SPEECH' 
In Lysias' speech, deceitfully the non-lover, selfishly motivated by a desire for 
pleasure, tries to convince the youth that it is more in his interest and "less dangerous" to 
give himself to a non-lover than a lover. 2 Such a position presupposes a conception of 
' Commentators dispute concerning the authorship of "Lysias' speech". Hackforth (p. 17) thinks it is 
"Plato's own invention". Guthrie ("Plato the Man and his Dialogues", p. 433) endorses Dover's argument 
(Lysias, pp. 69-71) ascribing it to Plato. A. E. Taylor (pp. 301-2), unlike Hackforth, thinks it genuine as 
given that "the dialogue ends in a severe and formal censure of Lysias... it would be self-stultifying to 
publish a severe criticism of a well-known author based on an imitation of him which the critic had 
composed for his own purposes and could not expect readers to take as authentic". Friedlander (p. 221) 
thinks it Lysias' authorship, then cites Grillparzer "the occasion was chosen only to go far beyond it". 
Many commentators remain undecided. "The style of the passage is Lysias', not Plato's, but Plato was a 
skilful parodist... and perfectly able to imitate Lysias at a superficial level; the question of authorship must 
therefore remain open" (Dover, Greek Homosexuality, p. 44), a position also held by Shorey (What Plato 
Said, p. 131), Guthrie (p. 433) and de Vries (Phaedrus, p. 12-4). 
2 "Lysias' doctrine if you take it seriously is that the deliberately selfish sensualist is less dangerous to the 
equally self-interested object of his pursuit than the lover inspired by passion, who is liable to be carried 
away and behave imprudently. " (Cornford, Sapientiae, p. 70) 
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earthly eros3 as involving "unrestrained sexual desire" (Hackforth p. 31), tyrannous, 
4 
destructive and therefore a sickness (231d)5, exemplifying the uncontrolled appetitive 
eros embodied in the dark horse of Socrates' second speech (253e1-5; 254b1-3). 
The non-lover wants his sexual gratification without the erotic attachment 
involved in love, 6 articulated in his expression "grant a favour' .7 As this proposal 
eliminates the traditional courtship, it comes close to prostitution, the buying of sex, 8 a 
thesis "offensive even to Athenians who approved'of pederasty" (Guthrie, Plato the Man 
and his Dialogues, p. 398). 9 Given that this is basically a proposal for the youth to 
3 For both Hackforth and Cobb, both Lysias' and Socrates' first speech describe love conceived as the 
common Aphrodite (Cobb, p. 144), Pandemos (180e1), a reference with Santas (p. 59) to Pausanias' speech 
in the Symposium. 
4 See Cornford's discussion of "Plato's despotic man whose whole nature is dominated by the lowest part 
of the soul. " (Cornford, Sapientiae, p. 71; also see Republic (588c5-7, d3-6) concerning the tyrant as related 
to uncontrolled eros. ) 
5"The lover's passion is a kind of madness or sickness, transient and unreliable, and.., one would be better 
off having as a lover someone free of such a malady. This kind of eros reminds us of the `bad' eros of 
Pausanias in the Symposium" (Santas, p. 59). 
6 "The essence of his proposal is that he has discovered a way of attaining the desirable effects of the 
conventional erotic relationship without the undesirable effects that stem from the lover's being in love" 
(Ferrari, Cicadas p. 91). 
"This is shown in passage (230e-234c) [where] no explicit anatomical or physiological word, but rather 
such expressions as kharizesthai, `grant a favour (to... )', [233de, 234b][are used]... In this context, where 
the man makes it plain that he is not in love with the boy, there is no room for doubt about the nature of the 
`favour' which he wants. No linguistic distinction is drawn here between the desire of the non-erastes for 
bodily satisfaction divorced from eros and the obsessive, more complex desires of the erastes. It is assumed 
that the erastes is initially aroused by the sight of the boy's beauty, even if he knows nothing of the boy's 
character (232e). The erastes `follows' (akolouthein, 232a) the boy conspicuously and `begs' from him 
(implied in 233e, by analogy of the beggar at the door, cf. [Symposium 203b6,203d1-4 and] Xen. Mem. I. 
2.29) but will one day 'cease from his desire' (234a)". (See Pausanias in Symposium 182a; also in terms of 
Fratification 217a, 218d. ) (Dover, Greek Homosexuality, p. 44) 
"One of the functions served by conventional erotic behavior was to mark off sexual relationships 
between erotic peers from those commercially procured from social inferiors-male and female courtesans 
and prostitutes. The elaborate emotional antics and rituals of courtship expected from the lover, extending 
even to stylized limitations of the sexual act itself, were in effect a badge of rank for both partners. 
Accordingly... the non-lover by pooh-poohing the traditional agonies... comes close to using the boy as his 
whore. He is buying sex from him" (Ferrari, Cicadas, p. 92). 
Lysias represents "bad rhetoric, as well as bad ethics" (A. E. Taylor, p. 302). Lysias' "ethical ticket, to 
the extent that he can be pinned down to one, is hedonistic" (Ferrari, Cicadas, p. 96). He "appeal[s] to 
considerations of `utility' in the most sordid sense of the word" (Taylor, p. 302; also see Hackforth, p. 111). 
Hackforth (p. 31) objects to Taylor (p. 302), stating that 233b "does betray some faint consciousness of the 
desirability of appealing to moral sentiment, however unreal the appeal may be". However Ferrari objects 
to Hackforth stating "The non-lover reasons only about the means to ends, not about the ends themselves. 
Indeed, he does not in the least question whether the respective goals of lover and beloved in the traditional 
relationship are proper goals for them to have" (Ferrari, Cicadas, p. 91). 
9 Therefore, "the thesis of Lysias... would be an offensive paradox, even to the section of Athenian society 
which practiced `unnatural' aberrations. The fashionable theory was that the relations in question are 
enobled when they are inspired by genuine romantic attachment, but not otherwise... To suffer the 
advances of an erastes from calculations of advantage was regarded as the basest thing a Greek lad could 
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prostitute himself, in succumbing to this proposal, the youth is complicit in hubris against 
himself and thereby sinks to the basest level in society losing his standing in the 
community as a citizen, thereby in a sense excluding himself from society. '° 
Regardless of its negative ethical implications, Lysias might expect his speech to 
be accepted in terms of both form and content. In form it is confusing and repetitive, and 
therefore does not encourage rational thought" which would ultimately lead to ethical 
contemplation of the telos of this proposal. With regard to the argument, given the 
conventional homo-erotic relationship in which the elder experiences pleasure and sexual 
arousal while the younger derives "not sexual pleasure but social advancement and the 
friendship of an adult mentor", the non-lover expects to have some success as this 
proposal is parasitic on the traditional roles and on the reason for the erastes entering into 
this type of relationship. 12 In this way the non-lover blurs the distinction between a 
traditional eromenos and a prostitute in order to win his suit. 
do" (A. E. Taylor, p. 302). "None of the earlier speeches of the Symposium sank to this level" (Guthrie, 
"Plato the Man and his Dialogues", p. 398). 
10 Hubris is "any kind of behavior in which one treats other people just as one pleases, with an arrogant 
confidence that one will escape paying any penalty for violating their rights and disobeying any law or 
moral rule accepted by the society, whether or not such a law or rule is regarded as resting ultimately on 
divine sanctions" (Dover, Greek Homosexuality, p. 34), and "anyone who attached the highest importance 
to the satisfaction of his own bodily desires could reasonably be called hubristes" (Dover, Greek 
Homosexuality, p. 37), indicating the involvement and baseness of both participants, though particularly the 
eromenos. "It is not only by assimilating himself to a woman in the sexual act that the submissive male 
rejects his role as a male citizen, but also by deliberately choosing to be victim of what would be, if the 
victim were unwilling, hubris. The point of the fierce sanctions imposed by the Attic law on hubris was 
that the perpetrator `dishonoured' (atimazein) his victim, depriving him of his standing as a citizen under 
the law, and standing could be recovered only by indictment which in effect called upon the community to 
reverse the situation and put down the perpetrator. To choose to be treated as an object at the disposal of 
another citizen was to resign one's own standing as a citizen" (Dover, Greek Homosexuality, p. 104). 
Therefore, he is excluded from citizenship because his true nature is revealed by and simultaneously 
henceforth determined by the prostitution (Dover, Greek Homosexuality, p. 109). Thus through succumbing 
to the proposal of Lysias' speech, the youth not only reduces himself to the basest level of Athenian society 
but excludes himself from his society. 
" Lysias' speech is a "tedious piece of rhetoric... flat monotonous, repetitive... the mechanical piling up 
of disconnected points... [having] a banality of sentiment", "stitched together by repeated connectives, 
rather than logical order-or organic form (264C)" (Cobb, p. 144; also p. 146). In terms of form, "Lysias 
might have judged his own speech as more effective than that of Socrates for its specific purpose-the 
purpose of persuasion-precisely because it was less strictly organized and less logically grounded" 
(Friedlander, p. 224). 
12 "It is rather the voice of reason than the urging of passion that counsels his entry even upon a 
conventional relationship in the first place" (Ferrari, Cicadas, p. 90), (showing that "the non-lover's 
proposition leaves the traditional goals of the erotic partnership in place, and is indeed wholly parasitic 
upon them", p. 94). For this reason the speech of Lysias shows "love madness from the outside, from the 
viewpoint of the boy, who is not expected to share in its intensity and who can therefore be made to find it 
alien and off-putting" (Ferrari, "Platonic Love, " p. 263). 
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Furthermore the non-lover, regardless of apparent deviations, remains inscribed 
within tradition representing not the non-lover but the ex-lover13 who loves no longer. 
The non-lover's resemblance to the ex-lover explains the speech's banality in that he is 
"posing without real belief in this thesis and therefore [is] unable to give it life or do 
more than string together conventional sentiments" (Hackforth, p. 31), without any 
feeling behind them. He echoes the ex-lover whose feeling has been exhausted leaving 
him indifferent and selfish. '4 
As Socrates assimilates Lysias to his text, exemplified when he states "Much as I 
love you, I am not going to let you practice on me when Lysias himself is present" 
(228e), 15 so Lysias can be interpreted as identified with his non-lover. It can be argued 
that Lysias' subject was not to be taken seriously, it being a paignion16, however, in the 
spirit of the Republic, Taylor (p. 302) correctly notes that though the non-lover's 
argument is not an "argument to be taken seriously" but a means to exhibit "cleverness", 
it suggests a "deep-seated moral depravity" in Lysias, particularly as Taylor believed that 
Lysias himself wrote the speech. '7 
13 "The non-lover (as his label would suggest) has nothing but negation to add to the traditional mix. He 
intends not to reform love, but to opt out of it... Indeed, so little does he attempt to alter tradition that his 
description of the likely behaviour of the lover who has fallen out of love can be seen to encapsulate his 
own position. The ex-lover, he claims, will scrutinize the dissolved relationship with a now coolly 
commercial eye, putting in the opposite pan of the scales for the first time all those favours and sufferings 
which he considered it a privilege to confer and undergo. " (Ferrari, Cicadas, p. 94) 
14 See Cornford, Sapientiae, p. 71; Hackforth, p. 31. 
15 "This identification of Lysias with his book paves the way for the critique of written works at the end of 
the dialogue, for as Lysias is in fact not present, he cannot defend himself or reply to Socrates' questions 
and criticisms.... Phaedrus' unsureness of his ability to recall the speech word for word anticipates the 
objection that books make the memory lazy and the mind uncritical of what it has learned (275ab), an 
objection well illustrated by the carefree enthusiasm of Phaedrus, which is so easily deflated when he is 
made to look more attentively at Lysias' composition (263d-4e)". (Rutherford, 243) 
16 "Its argument is paradoxical... This is a typical sophistic paignion ('plaything')... it exploits a wide 
range of rational arguments in order to convince the listener of a proposition which at first seems contrary 
to all common sense". (Rutherford, p. 243) "It is probably unfair to Lysias (or to the way he is being 
portrayed by Plato) to take the content of this speech too seriously. It seems more reasonable to take it as 
the sort of display piece represented by Gorgias' famous defence of Helen's virtue. " (Cobb, p. 144; a 
comment particularly interesting given the recantation of Stesichorus. ) 
17 "There are theses which cannot be defended and arguments which cannot be employed, even in jest, 
without revealing deep-seated moral depravity or insensibility; the kind of cleverness which sustains such 
theses by the use of such arguments is a real moral danger to the community and requires to be countered, 
as it is by Socrates, with better morality and superior wit". (A. E. Taylor, p. 302) Taylor, conceiving the 
authorship of Lysias' speech should be attributed to Lysias and not Plato, and though not thinking the thesis 
should be taken as Lysias' own, thinks it reveals an inner impiety and "moral depravity" within its author to 
which Socrates must necessarily respond. Barker (2002) views this sort of position as expressing "priggish 
self-righteousness in its high moral tone" which even if perhaps correct demonstrates "what Nussbaum was 
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B. SOCRATES' FIRST SPEECH 
Following Phaedrus' enthusiastic rendition of Lysias' speech, 
18 Phaedrus 
challenges Socrates to make a better speech on the same topic which "admitted [the] 
`madness' of the lover's passion better than Lysias has done" (A. E. Taylor, p. 303). 
Responding to the challenge, Socrates in his first speech takes on Lysias' thesis, 
improving upon it through defining his terms and systematizing its form into a coherent 
structure and argument, 19 thereby proving that he is a greater "orator and rhetorician" 
than Lysias (see Friedlander, p. 221; also see Rutherford, pp. 250-1 with regard to 
Isocrates). "In this first speech at least, Plato intends the reader to take Socrates' effort as 
an example of good rhetoric with a bad content" (Cobb, p. 145-6), in that without 
qualification he identifies "pleasure-driven passion with eros" (Barker, 2002)20 
In terms of content in his first speech, Socrates emphasizes the harm of the 
gratification of a lover possessed by uncontrolled eros. Eros, a desire for pleasure 
aroused by beauty, he reasons is a form of hubris as opposed to doxa leading to 
sophrosune, and is therefore indicative of appetitive desire's subversion of judgement and 
reacting against in her various celebrations of physical sexuality-the `rhetoric' of philosophy that was 
characteristic of their era and social class can become obstructive in different times. " 
la "Phaedrus and Lysias are initially grouped together, criticized by Socrates as they attach too much value 
to written works" (Rowe, p. 137). Phaedrus as Lysias' student begins from his position which justifies this 
grouping. Sceptically, Rowe and Cobb question "to what extent Phaedrus overcomes his initial 
superficiality" (Cobb, p. 142). This leaves the question open as to whether Phaedrus is really "sparkling" 
and "brilliant" (Fragility, pp. 211-12) as Nussbaum suggests or whether Plato is being ironic. 
19 Socrates begins with a "mutually agreed upon definition" (237C) which is sustained through the speech. 
He writes an orderly speech, "[possessing] praiseworthy rhetorical characteristics" elaborated on at the end 
of the dialogue particularly with regard to "organic structure" (Cobb, p. 146). Thus Socrates "gives 
Phaedrus a lesson on how to investigate such a topic, namely by classifying and defining eros first and then 
going into its effects" (Santas, p. 59). 
20 Friedlander (p. 223) claims that these are "not Socrates' own views nor his own definition". In contrast 
Nussbaum, as we have discussed, sees this as representing Plato's conception of morality in the middle 
dialogues (i. e. the Symposium and the Republic) involving a sophrosune/mania dichotomy, sophrosune 
being moral while mania is immoral. For her in his second speech the crossing over of the irrational into 
the rational, the complexification of this dichotomy, shows the beginning of a new form of morality 
resulting in Plato forming a new conception of love through a new valuation of the love of the individual. 
For Barker (2002) while "the radical distrust of the pursuit of bodily pleasure does indeed match Plato's 
earlier views, as Nussbaum says", it differs from the Symposium and the Republic with regard to "its 
unqualified identification of this pleasure-driven passion with eros". Given that Socrates covers his head 
and later recants it, the view expressed in his first speech should not be attributed to Socrates. 
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reason. 21 To the question of the harm or benefit involved with the gratification of the 
erastes' desire, Robin22 believes Plato lists all the "harmful effects of this kind of relation 
on the body, mind, and estate of the beloved" (which according to Friedlander (p. 223) 
are "the three Platonic realms of being") then goes on to elaborate on the feelings of the 
beloved both before and after the affair (Hackforth, p. 47), allowing no benefits. 3 
Furthermore, in order to emphasize these evils and render the relationship more 
unappealing, he enumerates the various areas of potential good of which the eromenos 
will be deprived due to the erastes' selfishness and pleasure. 24 However in making this 
opposition between the pleasurable and the good, Socrates "makes no attempt to integrate 
pleasure with the good" (Ferrari, Cicadas, p. 97) which is clearly an oversimplification. 
Socrates' first speech systematically analyzes Lysias' conception of eros in order to 
establish/pin-point his error after which he will be able to combat and correct it 25 
Given this view of eros as a form of hubris, the notion of eros in Socrates' first 
speech can be identified with that of Lysias' speech. Hackforth affirms this but goes 
further by stating that Socrates "only uphold[s] the Lysian thesis in so far as it 
condemned unrestricted sexual passion; so like the great second speech it condemns the 
21 "`Love' is, of course, a desire or craving for something. Now there are two principal types of desire-the 
`inborn' craving for the pleasant [which Ferrari (Cicadas, p. 96) calls "natural desire" translated from 
epithymia], and the desire for the `best', which is not inborn, but has to be acquired, and is based on 
judgment (86ýa [doxa])-and there is often a clash between the two. The victory of judgment (8 cc) in 
this conflict over appetitive craving is what we call sophrosune; the victory of appetite over our judgment 
of good we call `lust' or 'passion'(ü'(3pis, [hubris]). `Love' (2p( os, [eros] sexual passion) is one special 
variety of E4ipts or `lust'. It is the prevalence of violent desire for the pleasant uninformed by rational 
judgment of good, when aroused by physical beauty (238c). The question before us, then, is whether it is 
for the benefit or for the hurt of the party who has aroused such passion to gratify iL" (A. E. Taylor, pp. 
303-4; also see Guthrie, "Plato the Man and his Dialogues", p. 400; Cornford, Sapientiae, p. 72) 
22 Plato, Ph? dre, trans. L. Robin. 
23 "Because he has directly opposed pursuit of pleasure to the pursuit of good, he is unwilling to see the 
lover as bringing any good to the relationship; and for him the expectation of fickleness comes simply as 
the last straw in a long catalogue of evils (240e8-9)". (Ferrari, Cicadas, p. 97) 
24 "Throughout the speech he contrasts the selfish pleasure sought by the lover with a list of goods which 
the boy has the sense to pursue, but of which the lover's selfishness will deprive him. These goods are not 
presented as themselves pleasures (albeit more lasting pleasures) that the boy seeks in turn; rather, they are 
tagged with such epithets as `good' (agathos), `upright' (orthos), `divine' (theios), `most dear' (philtatos), 
`valuable' (timios), and invariably contrasted with what the lover fords `sweet' or `pleasurable' (hedys) (see 
238b7-cl; 239b4-8; 239c4-5; 239e3-240a2; 241c4-6)". (Ferrari, Cicadas, p. 96) 
25 Socrates' first speech is "at the same time an effort to clarify the human or all too human content of the 
sophistic product that is all the more dangerous when it is left vague. Only after this danger is plainly 
shown can Socrates fight against it". (Friedlander, p. 225) 
118 
false (266A) as left-handed (Hackforth, p. 37), 26 which implies that the negative 
implications attached to uncontrolled physical eros are consistent throughout the entire 
dialogue. 
Having taking upon himself the content of Lysias' speech, the negative 
conception of Bros as uncontrolled desire, Socrates distances himself from this position to 
protect himself from the misconception that he is in agreement with Lysias' thesis and 
content. He does this through blaming Phaedrns27 and the inspiration or madness induced 
by the Muses. 28 Socrates further distances himself from this conception of eros by 
covering his head, marking a moment of misinterpretation and therefore deception, 
accompanied by the recognition that Phaedrus has misunderstood this action, and the 
ongoing allowance for Phaedrus' misunderstanding. 29 Most significantly, however, 
Socrates distances himself from this conception of eros through the characterization of 
his "non-lover", who is in fact a passionate lover pretending to be an indifferent non- 
lover. He does this through his disguise/deception but also through the excuse that he is 
26 On this account the three speeches represent negative or positive erastes and eros, Lysias' and Socrates' 
first speech representing the negative and Socrates' second speech exemplifying the positive. "Thus it is 
not only in his first speech that Socrates faults the sort of lover who allows his sexual hunger to dictate his 
behavior, so that in retrospect he reconciles the two speeches as containing, respectively, appropriate 
condemnation of an inferior type of love-madness and appropriate praise for a superior, `divine' type 
(265e-266a)" (Ferrari, "Platonic Love", p. 263), which resembles Pausanias' earthly and heavenly 
Aphrodite, a categorization by which to discriminate between lovers. As "Diotima discriminated among us 
according to the inferior and superior brands of eternal good for which each of our souls yearns; Socrates in 
the Phaedrus divides the soul itself into three parts, and assesses the superiority and inferiority of the 
individual lover according to the outcome of the power struggle among the yearnings represented by each 
part" (Ferrari, "Platonic Love, " pp. 263-4). 
27 Socrates "makes clear by word and deed that he does not agree with the thesis he is defending, repeatedly 
blaming Phaedrus for forcing him to make the speech (236e, 238d, 242d)" (Hackforth, p. 37). "That 
Socrates delivers his version of the non-lover's speech only under duress will prove important. It will help 
us to locate the voice of Socrates' non-lover in the moral development expressed through the three love- 
sreeches taken taken as a series. " (Ferrari, Cicadas, p. 95) 
Z "He also points out that giving a polished speech of this sort is not characteristic of his engagement with 
logos, blaming his `unusual fluency' (238c) on his being possessed by the Nymphs of the place (238d, 
241 e). " (Hackforth, p. 37) 
29 "To Phaedrus Socrates' words here doubtless express apprehension that he will disgrace himself by an 
inferior performance [to Lysias], but the shame that Socrates really feels is, as transpires later (243B), due 
to having been forced to adopt an unworthy conception of Eros" (Hackforth, p. 35). Socrates, knowing how 
Phaedrus is interpreting his actions, allows Phaedrus to continue to misinterpret him and therefore 
manipulates and misleads Phaedrus into thinking that Socrates views himself as inferior to Lysias. Though 
ironic in that Socrates as philosopher/lover of wisdom knows that he knows nothing, while Lysias as a 
sophist claiming to be wise does not realize that he knows nothing, Socrates does this to create a build up to 
Socrates' second speech by creating an object against which he can recant. Thus Socrates deceives 
Phaedrus making his repugnance appear to be modesty. 
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in fact an erastes governed by mania according to the traditional conception of the 
relationship 30 
Given that in Socrates' first speech the lover disguises himself as a non-lover, 
regardless of whether the two conceptions of eros from Lysias' and Socrates' first speech 
are the same, the speakers themselves are radically different. In contrast to the cold- 
hearted non-lover of Lysias' speech, the "non-lover" of Socrates' first speech expresses a 
"real concern for the boy's welfare... . [particularly the] moral welfare of the 
boy, a 
concern which would have been unconvincing to attribute to a genuine cold-blooded 
sensualist" (Hackforth, p. 40). This implicit selflessness is shown through his concern for 
the "educating of the soul" (241c5) and study of "divine" philosophy (239B4-6) 31 
As the "non-lover" is actually a "lover" of the youth, he grasps the potential 
danger concerning the boy's welfare at the hands of lovers. 2 For this reason he attempts 
to protect the youth from the harmful lover and from the lover within himself which he 
hides from the youth and represses within himself. 
This concern further comes across in that he cares how the eromenos sees him, 
and what he feels towards him, as he desires to please the eromenos and be loved in 
return. 33 Because of this empathy and anxiety, he suppresses his passion, turning it "in 
against itself. Gripped by powerful feelings that he is uncertain of satisfying, Socrates' 
30 As "the supposed speaker, in his discourse, is to be not a cold-blooded sensualist making a disgraceful 
`business proposition, ' but a `lover' astute enough to cloak his passion under an appearance of indifference 
[, t]his gives Socrates a double advantage over Lysias. He safeguards his own character by abstaining from 
even a playful defence of a morally disgraceful thesis, and he leaves himself free, if he pleases, to urge 
subsequently that the apparent reasonability of the speech is only the simulated rationality of a madman, 
since the client into whose mouth it is put is really inspired all the time by `romantic' unreason" (A. E. 
Taylor, p. 303). 
3'"His arguments like those of his predecessors, professedly appeal to self-interest, but to self-interest more 
enlightened, comprehensive, and far-sighted". (Plato, Phaedrus, notes by Thompson (1868)) 
32 "The wily friend (237b) asserts that the lover keeps the beloved away from `divine philosophy'. He must 
know, for he himself is caught up in this kind of love, after all, as much as he conceals it... This specific 
mode of life is led to reveal itself in its true nature. " (Friedlander, pp. 225-6) 
33 "Precisely because he does not want to use the boy for sex, but is really in love, he is sufficently 
concerned for the feelings of the other to imagine how things seem from his standpoint, and in particular to 
appreciate vividly how his own weathered and alarmingly mature physique must look to one still fresh of 
limb [240c1-6, d6-e2]. These are the anxieties of passionate involvement; and the theme is notable for its 
total absence from Lysias' speech (indeed, Lysias' persona gives no sign of any empathetic appreciation of 
the boy's feelings). " (Ferrari, Cicadas, p. 98) 
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non-lover turns hostile against the very pleasure that he longs to taste" (Ferrari, Cicadas, 
p. 98) as well as against himself. 34 
This repression and self-hate indicates that the "non-lover" is concerned with 
ethics (a twisted ethics) for the reason that he seeks the good for his eromenos. 
Resembling, due to his "unsophisticated" ethical character, the "honour-loving" person, 35 
he brings to mind the lower mysteries in the Symposium (208c6-7), "to become famous, 
`to lay up glory immortal forever"'. Also this seems to allude to the white horse of 
Socrates' second speech; "that... on the more honourable side is upright... a lover of 
glory, but with temperance and modesty... and needs no whip being driven by the word 
of command alone" (253d3-el; trans. Hackforth36), a correlation made by Ferrari 
("Platonic Love" p. 264) in that the well-behaved white horse represents the love of 
honour and propriety (253d6; cf. the level of aspiration attained in the Lesser Mysteries). 
For this reason, like the white horse, Socrates' speaker exemplifies sophrosune which in 
this context is "the moderation approved by conventional morality" (Cornford, 
Sapientiae, pp. 71-2). The motivation of the white horse "is desire to do what the law 
enjoins; to remain within the bounds of social propriety" ("Platonic Love", p. 266). Yet 
the white horse who is "driven by the word of command alone" has not seen the forms 
and therefore was limited in his understanding but obeys ("Platonic Love" pp. 265-6). 
Likewise Socrates' "non-lover" obeys traditional morality without rationally 
understanding why, which according to Ferrari results in "self-hate"37 (Listening to the 
Cicadas, pp. 100-102) allied to hypocrisy. 
34 "The whole speech is therefore an exercise in suppressing his deepest feelings. It is no exaggeration, 
indeed, to see it as a speech of self-hate. " (Ferrari, Cicadas, p. 98) His awareness of the inappropriateness 
of the relationship leads towards self-hate as his desires point towards the detriment of someone he loves 
which undermine his self-image/value as, seeing from the point of view of the victim, he sees himself as 
the abuser/tyrant. 
35 Through representing "the ordinary person" (Hackforth, p. 48; also Ferrari, Cicadas, p. 101) in part, "the 
Socratic persona's high-minded allusions to the `training of the soul' and to `divine philosophy' seem to 
put him on a rather more exalted level than the average, although still lacking in philosophic sophistication. 
We might compare the portrait of the honour-loving 'timocratic' man of the Republic (VIII 548b sq. ), who 
is second only to the philosopher in ethical character. The honour-loving person prizes what is best - above 
the mere satisfaction of his appetite for pleasure; but because he lacks a true philosophic education, he has 
not reasoned himself into this course but is following tradition: obeying the voice of the father. " (Ferrari, 
Cicadas, p. 101) 
36 Hackforth translation unless specified. 
37 Ferrari sees this repressive nature in the renunciation of desire as making the speaker of Socrates' first 
speech "gothic and gloomy, and at times almost maudlin (esp. 240a6; 241c2-6)" (Cicadas, p. 99). This 
results from the fact that he is "not really understanding why he should keep his appetite for pleasure in 
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Despite his lack of understanding, Socrates' "non-lover" is far more ethical than 
that of Lysias, which makes his argument more convincing, lifting the argument to a 
higher moral level. Therefore, though sharing a common understanding of eros with 38 
Lysias' speech, the speaker of Socrates' first speech demonstrates a substantial moral 
progression (Ferrari, Cicadas, p. 95). 
However this concern for the eromenos' well-being can also be seen as the 
surfacing of another type of love. Hackforth interprets this concern as the "lover peeping 
through the disguise-not indeed the oicaios spacri7s but the true lover as conceived by 
s par excellence, Socrates Socrates and Plato; in fact we get a glimpse of the EpaoT7 10 
himself' (Hackforth, p. 40). As we have previously noted, eros in this speech as in the 
speech of Lysias, is hubris or irrational passionate desire/wantonness directed towards 
physical beauty (Hackforth, p. 41), a type of eros which in neither of his speeches does 
Socrates condone (Hackforth, p. 48; also see Ferrari, "Platonic Love", p. 263) as it 
nourishes the lower appetitive part of the soul promoting disharmony and making a 
check, he simply represses it; with the result we might expect. The repressed appetite, as Plato imagines it, 
is disavowed in public but burns bright within the secret recesses of his soul" (Cicadas, p. 101). This 
position results in "the hypocritical refusal to acknowledge the passion he longs to indulge; the repression 
of pleasure without proper understanding of why it should be repressed, or of what its proper place might 
be; and a consequent hostility and harshness towards it in his public stance" (Cicadas, p. 102). This 
harshness resembles puritanism. "We have heard in Socrates' lover's voice the voice of puritanism: by 
which I mean an automatic hostility towards pleasure as such, and an inability to integrate pleasure in an 
honest fashion with the pursuit of the good. And in the popular and encyclopedic conception of the history 
of Western philosophy, this is of course often thought of as Plato's own voice. That this is a mishearing is 
quite clear even from so classic a work as the Republic, in which we read, for example at IX 586d4-587a2, 
that all parts of the soul and classes in the state have their appropriate pleasures, and that one of the results 
of pursuing the good is that each element can enjoy its pleasure without infringing on the pleasure of the 
others. But the Phaedrus does represent perhaps his most concerted reaction against puritanism. Of course, 
Plato too never fails to oppose the goal of pleasure to the goal of what is best. But he is not hostile to 
pleasure as such; rather, he holds that the true philosopher, precisely because he does not pursue the 
philosophic life primarily for the pleasure that it brings, will get to enjoy not only the pleasure appropriate 
to the philosophic life as such but also, and in due proportion, the pleasures of the more commonplace 
practices. Pleasure, then, would be like a mislaid key: you only find it when you stop looking for it. So in 
the mythic hymn we will see Socrates transcend the simple opposition of pleasure and the good, and find a 
place for love, and its attendant delights, in the pursuit of what is best. " (Cicadas, p. 100) 
38 Rather than Lysias' focus on means with a desired goal of securing his desired ends at all cost, 
"Socrates' character, in contrast, begins by discussing not means but ends, and stresses that ends can come 
into conflict" (Ferrari, Cicadas, p. 95). "Plato means Socrates' non-lover to come across as having the 
higher moral tone. His explicit distinction between pleasure and what is best, his talk of ethical rather than 
merely prudential conflict between these goals, his higher valuation of `educating the soul' (241c5) and of 
what he calls `divine philosophy' (he theia philosophia, 239b4) - whatever his intentions, he boasts a 
distinctively moral superiority to the type of lover whom he would supplant" (Ferrari, Cicadas, p. 99), 
which gives "him further the opening for lifting the whole argument to a worthier moral level by insisting 
on the supreme importance of the moral goods which are jeopardized by compliance" (A. E. Taylor, p. 
304). 
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philosophical ascent impossible (Cornford, Sapientiae, p. 71). However, this lover 
impersonating a non-lover in his effort to dissuade the boy from giving himself to his 
lovers (men like himself), is exhibiting not self-interest which characterized Lysias' 
speaker but selfless love in his desire to promote the boy's ethical well-being. Though 
possessed by the negative carnal form of eros defined in Socrates' first speech and 
exemplified in Lysias' speech, in his self-revelation Socrates' "non-lover" redefines or 
more precisely suggests the presence of another, alternative, understanding of eros. This 
is perceivable through his seeking not his own carnal satisfaction but, inseparable from 
his own pursuit of ethical perfection, consciously pursuing the good and ethical 
perfection of the beloved, which undercuts Vlastos' critique of the love of the individual 
in Plato. 39 This is a moment when the negative category of the lover is transcended, 
acting as a point of transition between the lover as bad and the lover as good. At this 
moment the lover though describing love as negative demonstrates love to be positive 
through his concern for the beloved. He is himself the site, point of convergence and 
battleground for these two opposing forms of love; a paradox pointing to a more adequate 
understanding of eros which is based on an examination of the inner psychology and 
healing of this "non-lover" through divinely inspired eros, the source of this self-less 
love, which is the subject of Socrates' second speech. 
39 This is to affirm with Nussbaum that the Phaedrus seriously presents a notion of the love of the 
individual, but, unlike Nussbaum, to maintain that this theory did not occur in Socrates' second speech 
alone following the recantation, but was actually present prior to the recantation in Socrates' first speech in 
the concern the "non-lover" has for the youth, lending support to the view of an ironic unveiling as opposed 
to a radical reversal of past views as described by Nussbaum. Friedlander can be seen to argue that this was 
already present in the subject matter of Lysias' speech which determined why Plato chose it. "In the 
definitions and organization of Socrates' first speech, something else seems to come through which 
transcends the- field of rhetorical technique. The subject to be discussed, love, is something that leads 
beyond the oratory into the depths of human existence. If Plato had not seen these possibilities, he would 
not have chosen Lysias' lecture as the point of departure for his dialogue" (Friedlander, p. 224). In keeping 
with Nussbaum's view that the Phaedrus puts in question Vlastos critique of the love of the individual in 
Plato's dialogues, Ferrari writes "Genuine love has a different goal: neither friendship as such, nor (still 
less) sexual gratification, but ... the common good of the 
lovers. But both friendship and, if not 
gratification, at least the passion that attends sexual arousal, belong to the loving relationship, and never so 
truly to any other. " (Ferrari, Cicadas, p. 94) 
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C. THE INTERRELATIONSHIP OF IRONY, EROS AND ETHICS 
Turning to technique for a moment, given Kierkegaard's perception that for Plato 
the ironist is equated with the seducer, this ironic unveiling is an act of seduction. This is 
lent support by Hackforth in his analogy of the relation of teacher and student with 
erastes and eromenos, likening education to an act of seduction which Plato envisages as 
a luring of the student to philosophy, 40 shown most explicitly in Socrates' attempted 
seduction of Phaedrus to philosophy. Socrates exploits the tradition of rhetoric to make 
his point that Phaedrus must give himself to a true lover, that is, on the Phaedrus' 
account, a philosopher. Socrates uses Lysias' content to attract and gain Phaedrus' 
respect through improving upon his rhetoric in terms of style, showing himself to be a 
better rhetorician as the first step in his persuasion of Phaedrus41 to abandon sophistry for 
philosophy. As education depends upon language, in order to communicate at all Socrates 
must come down to Phaedrus' level using the language most comprehensible to 
Phaedrus, the system of names and values given to things, products of Phaedrus' personal 
history, in order to reach any sort of common understanding or unity which will allow for 
conversation 42 Thus through "following the grain" (Hobbs, Personal Communication), 
taking on Lysias' conception of eros, a sense of familiarity is established and a 
commonness of language which forms an initial bridge or form of unity, by which 
differences can be negotiated. This negotiation of difference occurs through subtly 
shifting points of reference. Socrates' superiority results in destablizing Phaedrus' 
confidence in Lysias. Furthermore, the shifting of the figure of the non-erastes in his first 
speech to a pretend "non-erastes" who experiences not only eros but also concern for the 
eromenos' welfare, indicating a form of heavenly eros which in this context appears 
ao Taking the analogy literally, Sayre (pp. 126-7) strongly opposes what he sees as the physical seduction of 
the eromenoslstudent in that it prevents the student from advancing along the path of philosophy by 
blocking them from an ascent to the forms. 
41 Socrates' seduction works on three levels. On the first, Socrates uses Lysias' content to attract and gain 
Phaedrus' respect through improving upon his rhetoric in terms of style, showing himself to be a better 
rhetorician; then in Socrates' second speech, Socrates leads Phaedrus through using Phaedrus' preferred 
rhetorical language into a love dialectic, an erotic relation which is nonetheless abstinent, and thereby seeks 
to help Phaedrus to ascend towards the third level, contemplation of the forms which lie beyond human 
love relations, at which time the teacher and student will regain their wings. 
42 See Christopher Norris, Truth and the Ethics of Criticism, Ch. 2; also Angela Hobbs: Plato is "both 
revolutionary and conservative in that he uses traditional language, stereotypes and associated implications 
to persuade" (Personal Communication). 
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closer to a mixture of selfless love and moral concern, so that the "masked lover's" 
selfless love undermines the established conception of uncontrolled eros in Socrates' first 
speech, thereby alters the points of reference and suggests the need to redefine new limits 
for eros. 
Having gained Phaedrus' respect by reorganizing and improving Lysias' speech 
rhetorically, thereby showing himself to be the better rhetorician, Socrates turns to the 
content of Lysias' speech in his second speech and proceeds to correct it. Phaedrus is 
represented as a lover of rhetoric. In the Symposium, his speech "is full of references to 
myths and the poet. It is Phaedrus who brings up the story of Boreas and Oreithyia earlier 
in this dialogue; and Socrates later describes him as philomousos, `the lover of the 
Muses' (259b), ". 43 Thus the means by which he is most easily touched is through rhetoric. 
Socrates responds to his need by composing a rhetorical speech. Hence Socrates' second 
speech is "poetical; it is introduced with a host of poetic allusions as the speech of 
Stesichorus of Himera44 and at the end Socrates describes it as poetically worded `of 
necessity, for Phaedrus' benefit'-a hint that the poetic style is in part ad hominem, to 
suit Phaedrus' taste, or indeed his very soul. The Palinode thus exemplifies the rhetorical 
and persuasive skills which Socrates requires of a true orator in the second half of the 
dialogue" (Rutherford, pp. 256-7), 45 in order to seduce and persuade him of a position 
which is the antithesis of what Phaedrus held previously to be true. Yet once again this is 
not Socrates' usual form of presentation as "giving a polished speech of this sort is not 
characteristic of his engagement with logos" (Hackforth, p. 37). 
However, to convince or even communicate with Phaedrus, Socrates employs 
what Griswold ("Irony", p. 92) terms the fourth type of Socratic irony. Here Socrates is 
advocating a thesis which he "criticizes severely" in another part of the dialogue in order 
to bring Phaedrus to the point of "accepting on his own terms the position of Socrates". 
Socrates starts where Phaedrus is, assuming Lysias' position since Phaedrus as an 
43 Rutherford, p. 257, note 28; See Nussbaum, Fragility, p. 226. 
44 The second speech is the "speech of a poet, Stesichorus... and in so saying Socrates assumes a disguise 
and tells a lie-things that could not have happened in the heroic literature of the Ideal City" (Nussbaum, 
Fragility, p. 225) presumably of the Republic. Perhaps she is being sarcastic here because, as clearly 
evident from the myth of metals in the Republic, dishonesty and irony were inevitably a part of the 
Republic, suggesting the ideal to be not such an ideal as Nussbaum implies. 
43 Socrates' recommendation in the Phaedrus (271c12-272b2) is here put into practice. "Socrates knows his 
interlocutors and skilfully adapts his approach". (Guthrie, "Plato the Man and his Dialogues", p. 416) 
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historical being is always dependent upon his previously learnt language and basic 
knowledge. However, this Socratic use of irony, the assuming of Lysias' position, seems 
an act of imitation and deception on Socrates' part. This appears to be problematic in 
that, though revering wisdom and truth, Socrates seems to violate his allegiance to the 
pursuit of wisdom in attempting to persuade Phaedrus to pursue wisdom, a 
method/tendency not restricted to the Phaedrus alone. 6 As we shall note later in this 
chapter, Plato also has Socrates in another manner undermine this second speech, further 
indicating that this is not an act of deception simply but a tool of irony employed to serve 
the overall purpose of the dialogue. In this way Plato employs Socratic irony to serve the 
end of Platonic irony, implying that the means, though implementing a form of deception 
initially, is justified by the end of the development of reflective thought. 
The acknowledgement of Socrates' irony is dramatized through the covering and 
uncovering of his head. The most straightforward understanding of the covering of the 
head and its uncovering is as a tool of irony to illustrate the veiling and unveiling of the 
objective or universal truth. For Socrates Lysias exemplifies a state of intellectual 
blindness. In order to illustrate this Socrates veils his head (237a4) when presenting the 
thesis of Lysias in his first speech, then unveils himself (243b6) while recanting, 
dramatizing the revealing of truth, which he presents in his second speech (Hackforth). 47 
This is heightened by Socrates' citing of Stesichorus who, blinded for condemning and 
shaming Helen, through his recantation recovers his sight. The veiled Socrates in the 
speech resembling Lysias shows visually that, though Lysias thinks himself sophos, he is 
in fact blind, whereas Socrates through unveiling himself and then formulating a lyrical 
description of the soul shows himself to be the possessor and revealer of truth; this is 
done in a mythical form, seemingly inspired by the gods, combining the third and the 
fourth form of madness (Phaedrus, 249e), the madness of the Muses and that of love 
46 This problem concerning deception is not restricted to the Phaedrus but arises with regard to "various 
`myths' in other dialogues, and in any number of poetically `sweetened' or rhetorically elaborate passages" 
(Barker, 2002), such as the myth of the metals in the Republic. Also see Charmides 155b-157d in which 
Critias and Socrates plan to fool Charmides into believing Socrates can cure him of a headache in order to 
lure him into a conversation, hence dialectics: "Why not [Socrates] said, if only he will come" (Charmides 
155b6). 
47 This dialogue not only represents a subtle distortion of Sophocles' Oedipus the King in which an 
intellectually blind Oedipus physically blinds himself at the time he gains intellectual vision, but 
furthermore it is theatrical, a constant shifting of disguises and even roles as in a drama. 
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which in the Phaedrus are both classified as exemplifying the highest position of the 
soul, parallelling the ascents to the good and the beautiful, which are not clearly 
distinguished. Here the two appear together with little explanation (Phaedrus 248d). The 
ethical interpretation of Socrates' covering of his head relates to shame and intentional 
deception. Socrates covers his head so that he "can rush through [his] speech at top speed 
without looking at [Phaedrus] and breaking down for shame" (Phaedrus 237a). His wish 
to speak quickly and his inability to establish eye contact with Phaedrus reveals his 
dishonesty and duplicity. Though seeking Phaedrus' good ultimately, his conversion to 
philosophy, Socrates is trying to manipulate and seduce Phaedrus out of his support of 
Lysias into a love for himself. 
D. INTRODUCTION TO SOCRATES' SECOND SPEECH: SOCRATES' 
IDENTITY 
A moment of totalization48 contributes to and is perhaps indispensable for this act 
of persuasion. Socrates in uncovering himself does claim to be himself the possessor of 
knowledge of love (as in Symposium 177d-e, 198d), and the true source of understanding 
of love, i. e. a sophos rather than a philosopher, which enables him to claim the role of 
educator in love, in contrast to Sayre's analysis concerning the Symposium. This is a 
highly suggestive act on the part of Socrates, bringing together universal and particular, 
the one and the many for one instant under the name of Socrates. Such moments can 
result in the fixation exemplified by Alcibiades who sees Socrates as, in Kierkegaard's 
words, "holding the Idea as personal property" (Concept of Irony, pp. 48-9). Socrates in 
the Phaedrus enacts this moment of totalization by magnetically drawing Phaedrus 
towards himself not only as a reflection of the form of the beautiful and good, but also 
subjectively as an individual with whom he can engage in a love relation as exemplified 
by the lovers of Socrates' second speech. Yet as the love relation acts as an element in the 
pursuit of truth, this truth claim though deceptive acts as a means of drawing the beloved 
48 The totalization is, of course, that involved in purporting to unify universal and particular in a single 
totality. 
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into a dialectical erotic relation in which truth will be most effectively pursued 49 
This moment of totalization, the coming together of the universal and particular 
can be seen as characteristic of a daimon, the role of intermediary between the finite and 
infinite, linking this discussion back to our previous discussion of eros with regard to the 
Symposium. Significantly, directly following his recantation Socrates states that mania is 
not evil but "the greatest blessings come by way of madness, indeed of madness that is 
heaven sent" (244a7-bl). Socrates then distinguishes four types of madness: inspired 
prophecy (244b1-d4), healing and purification (244d5-e7), possession by the Muses 
(245a1-9), and eros sent by heaven "a gift of the gods, fraught with the highest bliss" 
(245c1-2). The Socrates of the Phaedrus is represented as prophet, healer, poet and lover. 
Socrates states before beginning his palinode that he "is a prophet, though not an entirely 
serious one... but good enough for my purposes. " (242c4-5; trans. Rowe). 50 Ferrari 
suggests that Socrates also takes upon himself the role of the healer, recanting like 
Stesichorus who "atoned for his blasphemy against Helen by public recantation, and 
cured himself, in the process, of blindness which the blasphemy had incurred. So too, 
Socrates will abjure his earlier blasphemy against the god of Love, adopting what he calls 
this `ancient spell of purification' (katharmos arkhaios, 243a4)" (Cicadas, p. 115). 51 
Furthermore, Socrates competes with Lysias through reorganizing and correcting his 
speech, showing himself the better rhetorician and ultimately poet, as exemplified by the 
poetic use of language employed in Socrates' second speech to entrance Phaedrus (for 
Socrates as artist, see Ferrari, Cicadas, pp. 16-21). 52 And lastly, as we have seen, 
Socrates is the exemplary lover who tries to woo Phaedrus to philosophy. Thus Plato 
represents Socrates as embodying four types of divinely inspired mania; prophetic, 
49See the Introduction to Nozik, Philosophical Explanations, for discussion as to whether ordinary 
philosophical argument is hubristic. 
so Ferrari thinks "Socrates hedges over his prophetic power just as he cannot espouse myth 
wholeheartedly, but only as a necessary resource from which he must maintain a careful distance". 
(Cicadas, p. 116) 
51 "Dionysiac or initiatory madness (µavia tcXcottxtj 265b) introduces many terms associated with 
cathartic procedures both in medicine and in the mysteries. " (Comford, Sapientiae, p. 75) 
52 Also see Comford, Sapientiae, pp. 67,70,76-7. For the connection of the Muses and prophecy, "poetry 
being the language of prophecy" (Sapientiae, p. 79) see Plato's Ion, 535B, 534C-Ion's "soul, rapt out of 
himself by inspiration, was present at the events he described in Ithaca or Troy". Poets work not by art but 
by "divine possession". "The god deprives them of their sober senses and uses them as instruments, like 
singers of oracles and inspired seers, in order that we who hear them may know that it is not they who 
speak things of such high worth, but the god himself who speaks to us through them. " (Sapientiae, p. 79) 
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healing, poetic and erotic (Ferrari, Cicadas, p. 118), 53 demonstrating Socrates to be 
prophet, healer, poet and lover. 54 As the exemplification of inspired eros in the 
Symposium he is considered to be a daimon, yet unlike Plato of the Symposium's 
characterization of Socrates as the personification of eros, in the Phaedrus Socrates not 
only exemplifies eros but also the other three forms of divine mania. As the 
exemplification of a daimon, who mediates between the universal and particular, the 
mortal and immortal, 55 the content of his second speech must be taken seriously. 
Having established his "identity", Socrates begins his second speech displaying 
the art of healing through the unveiling of truth. After analyzing the immortality of the 
sou1,56 he describes mythologically the soul's subsequent-fall and ascent 57 The pivotal 
53 "He reproduces with singular completeness every form of Plato's divine madness, every corresponding 
aspect of his god Apollo and his prototype Orpheus, and sums up in his own person all the characters which 
he describes as typifying the final, highest incarnation before the return to divine bliss; seer, minstrel, 
physician and leader of men. " (Cornford, Sapienliae, pp. 121-6) 
° Cornford (Sapientiae, p. 87) notes that "the three types which [Plato brings] together-prophet, poet, and 
sage-had originally been united in a single figure. " "The Union of prophet, poet and wise man in the same 
person is no novel invention of Plato or of Pythagoras. " "Orpheus, as Hermias remarks [in Phaed. 244A 
(p. 88.25 Couvreur, Kern, Orph. Fr. P. 51)], combined all the forms of divine madness, as founder of the 
mysteries, prophet, poet and son of the Muse Calliope, and instructor of Musaeus" (Comford, Sapientiae, p. 
89; also see p. 90). 
55 Like Nussbaum, Friedlander (pp. 226-7) thinks that the content of the first two speeches is the same, both 
conflicting with the representation of Eros as god (242e2). For this reason Friedlander refers to the 
Symposium, where Diotima describes/shows Eros to be a daimon, " an intermediary power, who mediates 
between gods and men and thus transmits the art of prophecy and other priestly powers from gods to men 
and from men to gods. It is these powers or types of ecstasy that will be formed into an ordered system in 
the second speech of Socrates here in the Phaedrus. " 
56This dry proof is analyzed by R. Bett in "Immortality and the Nature of the Soul", pp. 1-26 and by 
Robinson in "The Argument for Immortality in Plato's Phaedrus", pp. 345-53 as noted by Cobb (p. 150). 
Cobb finds this proof "oddly out of place. Just as Socrates begins a great mythological and poetic 
discourse, we find a dry highly abstract argument on an issue that seems intangible at best. The claim that 
the soul is immortal is not required for what is said about the nature and importance of love, except as an 
element in mythical stories he tells. Moreover, a demonstration of the literal truth of the claim is not needed 
to include it as an element in the myth; there are many fantastic elements in the stories for which no proof 
is offered or accepted" (Cobb, p. 150). However, by logically proving the soul to be immortal, it acts as a 
point (of truth) or hinge between the dialogue and the myth, the point of stability from which the 
speculative imagination takes off, similar to the point of realism from which abstraction departs. The use 
of allegory following creates images to represent a likeness of "things" which logos can not express, 
indicating that eros as madness goes beyond logos, supporting Hackforth's position though opposed by 
Cobb (p. 156). 
s' "For the mythical details of the soul's fall, peregrinations and recovery, Plato has relied largely on 
Pythagorean and Orphic lore, in part by way of Empedocles (vol. II, 251-3). The prologue of Parmenides 
may also be related; see Skemp, TMPLD 5 n. 5. " (Guthrie, "Plato the Man and his Dialogues", p. 402; also 
see Comford, Sapientiae, p. 46; also see pp. 45,54-8,91-112). From this reading it appears that the 
Plotinian strand of Neo-Platonist philosophy finds its sources in Pythagoras as distinct from Socrates' 
influence upon Plato. 
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point between the fall and ascent is the moment of falling in love. 58 By means of his 
analysis of the soul through the image of the charioteer and his horses engaged in the 
seduction of the beloved, Socrates shows the linking of eros and philosophy in the 
healing and purification of the soul in poetic language, as an act of eros directed at 
Phaedrus. 59 
E. SOCRATES' SECOND SPEECH 
Through using an imagistic and symbolic language associated with myth, 60 thus 
becoming more rhetorical than the rhetorician, Socrates attempts to sooth and "flatter" 
Phaedrus into "self-abandonment to the mania of eros"61 in order to contemplate the 
forms, thereby attempting to wean "Phaedrus from dependence upon written forms and 
58 See Cornford, Sapientiae, p. 80; A. E. Taylor (p. 305) calls it "the true psychology of love". Thus contra 
Nussbaum, "Socrates, then, is not much more concerned in the Phaedrus than he was in the Symposium to 
answer the questions about the life of the philosophic couple as it develops. For in the Symposium, the 
development we witness was of the philosophic lover alone; while in the Phaedrus, the focus is rather on 
the beginnings of love between philosophers than on its development" (Ferrari, "Platonic Love, " p. 268; 
see Cicadas, pp. 182-4, Fragility, pp. 182-4). 
59 Friedlander believes that 243E demonstrates that Socrates second speech is "unmistakeably addressed to 
Phaedrus himself' (P. Friedlander, Die Platonischen Schriften, p. 485; cited by Hackforth, p. 53). 
Hackforth agrees with him though he does "not think that Socrates' veiled suggestion that Phaedrus himself 
is the boy, and Phaedrus' acceptance of it, are anything more than playful" (Hackforth, p. 53). "A final 
light-hearted touch is the playful way Socrates implies that his speech is really directed at (seducing) 
Phaedrus and Phaedrus accepts the role (243e)" (Cobb, p. 147). In this instance I am more inclined to side 
with Friedlander and Nussbaum who view this as a moment of interpenetration between what is being 
'oken and what is being lived, philosophy and life (Nussbaum, Fragility, pp. 211-212). 
Further emphasizing Socrates' role as daimon and the importance of the speech, Socrates' second speech 
is written as a hymn. According to Rutherford, this speech is "referred to by its author as a `mythical hymn' 
(265c1), and provides a means of describing the truly real world to which the human soul naturally belongs 
and to which it always longs to return. This is not dialectically demonstrable vision, and so it is appropriate 
that it should be couched in mythical form, and that the idea of poetic inspiration should be used-poetry, 
elsewhere treated as the enemy of philosophy, is here employed in its service. It is admitted, not only in the 
later passage which plays down the significance of speech, but within the speech itself, that this is an 
approximation, an imperfect account, not a statement of absolute truths: `To say what kind of thing the soul 
is would require a long exposition, and one calling for utterly superhuman powers; but to say what it is like 
requires a shorter one, and within human capacity. So let us speak in the latter way' (246a). `And as for the 
realm above the heavens, there is no poet who has ever yet hymned it a it deserves, nor will there ever be. 
But it is like this... ' (247c). Plato surely does not intend his readers to press the imagery and the detailed 
doctrine too hard " (Rutherford, pp. 258-9, who refers Phaedo 114d, and Republic 414a, 533a. Also see the 
"Seventh letter". ) 
61 Warner ("Appropriating the Phaedrus", p. 12) interprets Phaedrus as initially not able to make his own 
this self-abandonment to the mania of eros because he is too attracted to cleverness and the skills of 
technical control to yet neighbour mania. Socrates uses this failure as an "integral part of a more indirect 
wooing of Phaedrus, to philosophy as the complement to rhetoric". His view, in some ways influenced by 
Nussbaum (Fragility, p. 211), is not only correct as an interpretation of Plato, but important when 
considering the necessity of surrender in any act of learning. 
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the authority of others to a recognition of the superior value of writing in the soul" 
(Warner, "Appropriating the Phaedrus", p. 8)62 where conviction is attained through 
questioning and response with a "fitting soul". He does this by describing from a 
psychological view the seduction of the beloved by the lover demonstrating the richness 
of this relation, rendering it appealing and unforgettable. 
In his second speech, Socrates is moving one step further than before. While "in 
Socrates' first speech, love is an "innate desire for pleasure leading to hubris" as opposed 
to sophrosune, in Socrates' second speech eros is one out of four types of divine 
possession which is a positive type of madness, an "inspired `frenzy' which is productive 
of good. " (A. E. Taylor, p. 305)63 Through an analysis of the lover's feelings, TM Socrates 
shows how this can lead to the philosophic life through the pursuit of virtue for the 
beloved and therefore the lover himself, while taking account of the struggle between 
different components within the soul of the lover. 65 
In the seduction of the beloved by the lover rehearsed in Socrates' second speech, 
62According to Cornford concerning Symposium (209d-e), "the educator begets children of a fairer and 
more lasting kind, by planting his thoughts in living minds, where they will live again to beget yet another 
generation of spiritual children" ("The Doctrine of Eros", p. 125). This is accomplished through 
conversation, the dialectical structure of question and answer. 
63 This divine possession stands in opposition to madness as a "human ailment". (Guthrie, "Plato the Man 
and his Dialogues", pp. 429-430) 
64 Ferrari, "Platonic Love, " p. 263. 
65 "The tripartite analysis of the soul in the Phaedrus also permits a more exact appreciation than in the 
Symposium of how it feels to fall in love, and why this feeling should awaken aspiration to the philosophic 
life. As in the Symposium, lovers are approved of who are not simply attracted to the beauty of their 
beloved's body but seek also to mould his character (Phaedrus 250e-251a, 252c-253c); unlike in the 
Symposium, Socrates takes us behind the scenes of such a lover's modest and respectful behavior towards 
the boy (254e8-255a1), and the spectacle he reveals to us within the lover's soul is a struggle of the utmost 
violence (253d-254c). " (Ferrari, "Platonic Love", p. 265) 
Nussbaum writes that the speaker, the poet from Himera, describes passionate love by taking "the 
same experience described by the earlier speeches in detached and clinical terms and enters into it, 
capturing through imagery and emotive language the feeling of being in a state of mania" (Fragility. p. 215 
also see A. Lebeck's "The Central Myth of Plato's Phaedrus", pp. 267-90). Ferrari, stating that the first two 
speeches describe love madness from the outside while Socrates' second speech describes the mania of 
love from the inside, "[finding] the good in love-madness (244a6-8)... seeing the world now through the 
eyes of the lover" (p. 263), also suggests the illusion that this is the same kind of love. The first two 
speeches describe a negative experience in which the lover is uncontrolled and selfish whereas Socrates' 
second speech describes the lover controlling his passions in order to develop and to help his beloved 
intellectually. Thus one is a selfish/bad and the other a selfless/good type of love. To state that one is 
outside and the other inside therefore misses the point as they are two distinct types of love, earthly and 
heavenly. The three speeches represent "a new version of a genuinely Platonic tension-the contrast 
between noble and ignoble love" (Friedlander, p. 227), which are made to form a progression. (One might 
indeed read the outside as body/flesh and the inside as soul indicating a progression from the emphasis on 
the body to the soul which would prove coherent with these notions of eros and further explain the 
significance of Socrates' prayer. ) 
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the interaction between the parts of the lover's soul when encountering the beloved 
demonstrates the lover's extreme sensitivity towards beauty. 
"Now when the driver beholds the person of the beloved, and causes a sensation of warmth to suffuse the 
whole soul, he begins to experience a tickling or pricking of desire, and the obedient steed, constrained now 
as always by modesty, refrains from leaping upon the beloved. But this fellow, heeding no more the 
driver's goad or whip, leaps and dashes on, sorely troubling his companion and his driver and forcing them 
to approach the loved one and remind him of the delights of love's commerce. For a while they struggle, 
indignant that he should force them to a monstrous and forbidden act. "66 (Phaedrus, 253e6-b2) 
66In the Laws 636c3-6, "this pleasure is held to have been granted by nature to male and female when 
conjoined for the work of procreation; the crime of male with male, or female with female, is an outrage on 
nature and a capital surrender to lust of pleasure". The Cretans are accused of the creation of the tale of 
Ganymede as a justification for homosexual pleasure (Laws 636d1-5). Dover (Greek Homosexuality, p. 
165) interprets this as indicating that "The Athenian speaker declares that the pleasure of heterosexual 
intercourse is `granted in accordance with nature', whereas homosexual pleasure is `contrary to nature and 
a crime caused by failure to control the desire for pleasure. "' Plato writes that "male does not touch male in 
this way because the action is unnatural" (Laws 836c4-5). Vlastos ("The Individual as an Object of Love", 
pp. 25-26) likewise interprets "against nature" as opposed to homosexual not heterosexual intercourse. 
Vlastos states that at moments Plato appears to view the activity of homosexual union as a sin, though not 
heterosexual union as demonstrated in Symposium where love is the "begetting upon the beautiful in body 
and soul". Furthermore, it is condemnable for "its deliberate murder of the race and its wasting of seed of 
life on a stony rocky soil, where it will never take root and bear its natural fruit" (839a1-3). 
Homosexual activity seems to be prohibited for two reasons, sensual stimulation for the sake of 
pleasure alone and the demasculinization of the passive male. These two reasons are articulated in Laws 
836e. Through homosexual copulation the passive male is an example of "unmanliness" as "the 
impersonator of the female-with his likeness to his model" (Laws 836e3-5), while Dover interprets this as 
the seducer being "open to blame as failing to withstand the temptations of pleasure; the [seduced] as 
`mimicking the female'". 
In this first position with regard to the eromenos we see the pursuit of pleasure for pleasure's sake. 
"Plato's main concern is to reduce to an unavoidable minimum all activity of which the end is physical 
enjoyment, in order that the irrational and appetitive element of the soul may not be encouraged and 
strengthened by indulgence". (Dover, Greek Homosexuality, p. 167) Therefore he writes, to eliminate 
homosexuality, affairs and incest will result in "untold good. It is dictated, to begin with by nature's own 
voice, leads to the suppression of the mad frenzy of sex, as well as marriage breach of all kinds, and all 
manner of excess in meats and drinks, and wins men to affection of their bedded wives. There are also 
numerous other blessings which will follow" (Laws 839a7-b2). "While prohibiting homosexual relations 
because they go beyond what nature shows to be adequate in sexual pleasure, he does not express an 
opinion on the naturalness or unnaturalness of the desire to perform the prohibited acts; it is to be 
presumed, in accordance with the sentiment of his time, that he would regard the desire as an indication 
that the appetitive element of the soul is insufficiently disciplined" (Dover, Greek Homosexuality, p. 168). 
(Dover seems to betray his partiality to homosexuality, for "going beyond nature" in terms of pleasure is 
not what Plato stated, while also showing a seemingly negative position towards heterosexuality as shown 
when he (Greek Homosexuality p. 164) states that in comparison to spiritual procreation, "the literal 
begetting of progeny by heterosexual intercourse is the gross and material counterpart (206c)". ) Nussbaum 
picks up this point concerning the fear of extreme pleasures in that she believes that Socrates speaks against 
intercourse as extreme sensual stimulation and as "incompatible with the preservation of reverence and awe 
for the other as a separate person" (Fragility, p. 217; also 219). 
In the case of the eromenos, the second reason for prohibition lies in the feminization resulting from his 
passive role. As we noted in the discussion of the speech of Lysias, this role renders the boy unworthy of 
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The sight of the beautiful person attracts the soul 67 Rowe (p. 75) translates 253e5-7 as 
the lover "catches sight of the light of his love, warming the whole soul through the 
medium of perception", thus through the eyes68 the whole soul is warmed and awakened. 
According to de Vries (pp. 173-5)69 "it is the erotic power of the eye which is visualized 
here . 
00 Though affecting the whole soul, 7' the vision of the beautiful causes the 
appetitive element to react 72 
being a citizen and deprives him of his the rights of citizenship. In this way it is unlawful. For this reason, 
Plato's Socrates describes sexual intercourse as disgusting, "terrible, unlawful" (Phaedrus 254a) as it is 
"potentially selfish and/or violent" (though there is some debate as to whether this concerns homosexual or 
heterosexual intercourse or both). This selfishness and violence is due to the inherent imposition of a 
hierarchy through sexual intercourse that is incompatible with Socrates' `democratic' concept of friendship 
(philia). This hierarchy or 'asymmetricality' for Lewis (Four Loves, pp. 95-6) emerges from sexual 
difference or the difference of 'active' versus `passive' in sexual intercourse, creating an inequality in 
philia which must be inherently `democratic' (Lewis, pp. 66-7). Thus homosexuality not only is a violation 
of a citizen's rights (Dover, Greek Homosexuality, p. 109) reducing them to a non-citizen, but furthermore 
the relation of the erastes and eromenos can be seen as that of a master and slave (see Lysias' speech; see 
also Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, B. IV. A). Functioning like sin it builds walls between individuals 
blocking communication and destroys dialectical relations. Thus not only is abstinence from homosexuality 
due to the fear of excessive stimulation causing mania, but is also an effort to preserve a sense of respect, 
equality and separateness. 
67 Beauty, evoking initially the strongest reaction and the greatest sensitivity, functions as the initial phase 
in leading the soul towards the good (Symposium 21 Oa, 211 c). "For sight is the keenest mode of perception 
vouchsafed us through the body; wisdom, indeed, we cannot see thereby-how passionate our desire for 
her, if she had granted us so clear an image of herself to gaze upon-nor yet any other of those beloved 
objects, save only beauty; for beauty alone this has been ordained, to be most manifest to sense and most 
lovely of them all" (Phaedrus 250d). As beauty is the most keenly perceived, the soul experiences beauty 
initially more strongly than wisdom or any other of the forms. Unlike beauty which by its nature is most 
manifest and lovely, and therefore "stirs our emotions and appetites, motivating us to undertake its 
pursuit,... [earthly justice and wisdom] do not engage the guiding appetites and emotions, are harder to 
discern; they can be grasped only after an initial education in beauty has quickened the intellect" 
(Nussbaum, Fragility, p. 214). "Beauty is that aspect of the divine which is manifest, though dimly, within 
or through the world of sense. The perception of beauty which comes through the bodily eyes and causes 
the distraction of love is also the first occasion for the awakening of Anamnesis-that mysterious memory 
of truth once seen by every human soul before it became incarnate. And the awakening ofAnamnesis is the 
beginning of philosophy. " (Cornford, Sapientiae, pp. 80-83) 
68 Hackforth (p. 103) interprets the "light of his love" as "the person of the beloved", his face. 69 Rowe, p. 187. 
70 The manner in which de Vries describes this eye contact makes the lover seem like the negative seducer 
of Socrates' first speech, whereas Hackforth rightly views this lover as "deeply sincere" (p. 109), though 
experiencing some complications in negotiating his desires. Ficino (p. 108), though in other ways original, 
attaches the same importance to the eyes, and seems more accurate. Ficino describe the beloved's falling in 
love as the beauty of the lover being transmitted through the eyes which in turn causes the beloved to fall in 
love with the lover. "A man's appearance, which is often very beautiful to see, on account of an interior 
goodness fortunately given him by God, can send a ray of splendor through those who see him and into 
their souls. Drawn by this spark as if by a kind of hook, the soul hastens toward the drawer. " (Ficino, p. 
108) He defines the hook as being the inner goodness which sparkles in the eye of the beloved, which 
constitutes the true beauty of appearance. As the beauty of a body or face does not sparkle but only the eye, 
Ficino seems to capture Plato's meaning more fully by implying that the beautiful transmitted through the 
inner beauty of the soul makes itself visible and apparent in the shining of the eyes, the window of the soul, 
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This vision of physical beauty causes the dark horse to act in such a way as to 
73 promote carnal satisfaction, though this is resisted by the soul as a whole, so that 
(perhaps like the "non-lover" of Socrates' first speech) "the struggle going on within the 
soul is glimpsed" (Friedlander, p. 225). This is a "desperate battle" (Guthrie, Plato the 
and thereby draw the beloved forth, making him a lover. Phaidros, one notes again, can be translated 
"sparkling". 
" This receptivity of the eyes in receiving the vision of beauty affects not simply the appetite or the 
intellect but the entire soul composed of the complex unity of the intellect, the spirited and the appetitive. 
Unlike the progressive detachment of the intellect from the other parts of the personality in the Symposium 
(and Phaedo), which for Cornford is a "preparation for death" and in which for Nussbaum also "the 
intellect is pure and active like the forms, and therefore never passive and receptive", "the developing soul 
of the Phaedrus is in a very different state. Complex and impure, throbbing with `ferment in every part', 
fevered and in constant motion, it depends for its growth on just these impure aspects of its condition. In 
order to be moved towards beauty, this soul must, first of all, be open and receptive. The stream of beauty 
that enters in at the eyes must be admitted by the whole soul (251B, C). And the crucial moment in its 
development is a moment not only of reception but of passivity: the roots of the soul's wings are melted by 
the warmth of the entering stream... All parts of the soul accept and are affected; and they interact with 
one another in such a way that it becomes impossible to separate them clearly. The growing wings belong 
to the soul as a whole (232C; cf. 253C, 254C). The deep sensual response to a particular person's splendor, 
the emotions of love and awe, the intellectual aspirations that this love awakens-all of these flow together, 
so that the person feels no gap between thought and passion, but instead, a melting unity of the entire 
personality. This is no ordinary sexual response to a beautiful body. " (Nussbaum, Fragility, p. 216) 
Through the receptivity of the eyes, all aspects of the soul receive or allow themselves to be affected by the 
image of the beautiful which neither produces a purely sexual response nor an intellectual reaction but a 
full integrated response of the whole soul to the beautiful. Reminiscent of Diotima's description of love as 
a "bringing forth upon the beautiful in body and soul" in which beauty produces a desire to procreate, one 
notes again in the Phaedrus, that beauty causes a state of harmony and receptivity in the lover which results 
ultimately in an overflowing of his love into the beloved. 
72 The dark horse or appetitive part of the soul is the most sensitive part of the soul to beauty, making it 
reasonable that beauty is first experienced through the appetitive. As the soul is in the prison house of the 
body, "fast bound therein as an oyster in its shell" (Phaedrus 250c), the soul experiences things through the 
body, so that its experience is coloured by the bodily sensibility. Thus as the dark horse or the appetitive is 
the most sensitive part of the soul to physical beauty, and the soul more sensitive to beauty than to other 
forms, therefore the soul is first attracted and directed towards the beautiful by physical beauty. 
The dark horse or the appetitive element is the first part of the soul to pursue the beautiful for the 
interconnected reasons of sensitivity, motivation, cognition and education. Nussbaum identifies three 
means which the appetitive part of the soul initiates in the pursuit of beauty. As the vision of the beautiful 
person stirs the appetites and emotions, it is motivational as they move the soul towards the good and 
beautiful. Furthermore, they are cognitive as they "give the whole person information as to where goodness 
and beauty are" located, which the intellect alone could not have accomplished. And thirdly they act as a 
preliminary education to prepare the soul for and render it sensitive to the apprehension of beauty 
(Fragility, p. 215). Furthermore, these three are interconnected as cognition precedes motivation and 
sensitivity proceeds cognition, showing that as the dark horse is sensitive to beauty it recognizes it and 
through this cognition it is motivated by it. Therefore, through the interconnection of sensitivity, cognition 
and motivation, the appetitive part of the soul represented by the dark horse initiates and sustains the soul's 
p'ursuit of the beautiful. 
Cf. the ego's resistance to the id's desires in Freud, (Freud, Lay Analysis, p. 23) yet not in order to 
achieve the fullness of sexual satisfaction, or cultural or scientific achievement (Freud, "Debasement in the 
Sphere of Love", p. 190) at a later time, but for a spiritual satisfaction, which Plato envisions as a 
nonphysical fullness. 
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Man and his Dialogues, p. 405)74, a "conflict within the soul ... with one part revering 
the beauty of which it sees the image in its beloved, while another part is filled with a 
craving for physically crude satisfaction" (Rutherford, p. 257). 
The appetitive desires are only put in check once the charioteer, through being 
attracted by the individual's unique beauty, 75 sees in the beloved the vision of the 
beautiful. The charioteer and steeds 
"behold the spectacle of the beloved flashing before them. At that sight the driver's memory goes back to 
that form of beauty, 76 and he sees her once again enthroned by the side of temperance upon her holy seat; 
then in awe and reverence he falls upon his back, and therewith is compelled to pull the reins so violently 
that he brings both steeds down on their haunches, the good one willing and unresistant, but the wanton 
sore against his will... humbled in the end, he obeys the counsel of his driver, and when he sees the fair 
beloved is like to die of fear. Wherefore at long last the soul of the lover follows after the beloved with 
reverence and awe. " (Phaedrus 54b4-e10) 
74 Likewise, Ferrari ("Platonic Love", p. 265) states that "Behind the scene of such a lover's modest and 
respectful behavior toward his boy (254e8-255a1) ... the spectacle 
he reveals to us within the lover's soul 
is a struggle of the utmost violence (253d-254e). " 
75 As we noted in the section on Nussbaum, the vision of the beautiful itself can be conceived of as the 
beauty of a particular irreplaceable individual which provokes or links into the greater vision, thereby 
directing the lover towards it, causing his soul to grow wings (Fragility, p. 215). Contrary to Nussbaum, 
Diotima's description of ascending from the love of particular beauty in the individual following the 
recognition that the "beauty of every body is the same" (Symposium 210B), does not indicate that the 
individual is dispensable in that this ascent ends in the begetting of true virtue in others. Also, as we saw, 
Socrates as the example of philosophical eros sought the well-being of the souls of those around him. Here 
likewise the particular element of the beautiful present in the beloved is indispensable as love is not 
transferable. 
76Ferrari points to the fact that through anamnesis the lover "derives the soul-shaking quality of the lover's 
experience from its origins in the vision that crowned Diotima's Greater Mysteries, the vision of the 
Beautiful itself-considered here not as a state of enlightenment attained only after long struggle, but as a 
memory of enlightenment stirred by the boy's beauty (254b), a memory that acts as a potential stimulant to 
that longer quest (256a7-b7)" (Ferrari, "Platonic Love", p. 263). However, Ferrari does not equate the 
vision of the beautiful in the Phaedrus with that of the Symposium. Unlike in the Symposium where the 
initiate sees "Beauty, independent of what we find beautiful [, the] experience of the inspired lover in the 
Phaedrus, by contrast, is to shuttle in memory between the bodily beauty of the boy and the Beautiful itself. 
It is to be awoken by an exemplar of Beauty to the conviction that there is such a thing as Beauty. (The 
boy, too, comes to have this experience seeing the lover's face transformed by love, made beautiful by the 
sight of beauty; 255b7-d3)" (Ferrari, "Platonic Love", p. 268). This calls into question the relationship of 
the Symposium and the Phaedrus, which Ferrari responds to by stating, "We should refrain from the 
attempt to situate the inspired lover of the Phaedrus at some precise point on the ascent undertaken by 
Diotima's initiate. Diotima deals with honour lovers and wisdom lovers separately, in the Lesser and 
Greater Mysteries; Socrates in the Phaedrus melds them into the figure of the inspired lover. This is further 
evidence that Plato is not concerned to propound a comprehensive unified theory of love" ("Platonic 
Love, " p. 268), a position which Nussbaum also affirms. 
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As in 248a1-5 only the charioteer saw the forms, only he recognizes the form of beauty 
shining through the beauty of the beloved. 7 This causes him to change his focus from the 
harmony and order of the team to his memory of Beauty and violently jerk the steeds. 8 
At this point his motivation is distinguished from the white horse in that he is no longer 
concerned with uniquely "the law" and social propriety but with the "sacred", the forms 
of Beauty and Moderation from which the law is derived/ comes, 79 making this act not 
only unlawful but "a violation of all that matters" (Ferrari, "Platonic Love, " p. 266). 80 
Experiencing fear and reverence before the forms, 81 the charioteer violently holds the 
77 Ferrari, "Platonic Love, " pp. 265-6. 
78 Ferrari, "Platonic Love, " p. 266. 
79 "The motivation of charioteer and white horse when together is the desire to do what the law enjoins; to 
remain within the bounds of social propriety. Even when the charioteer parts company with the noble 
horse, the sense of staying within bounds does not vanish from his thoughts, for he has a vision not of 
Beauty alone but Beauty together with Moderation (254b6-7). But it is a different sense. He sees Beauty 
`on its holy seat' (254b7). The bounds that feature in this vision, then, are the bounds not of law but of the 
sacred. " (Ferrari, "Platonic Love, " p. 266) 
80 "And the act of attacking the boy is avoided not as something socially forbidden but as something simply 
unbearable, a violation of all that really matters. Nothing in the soul can resist the charioteer at that moment 
of realization... Although the immediate effect of the charioteer's seizure is to prevent an outrage of 
convention and law, the behaviour to which it will lead-as we know from the earlier description of the 
lover's antics in the social world-will be anything but conventional. The lover, we read, will for his 
beloved's sake `disdain the conventions and niceties of which he previously made a show' (252a4-5); he 
will give up family, friends, and wealth in order to be with his love. And his behavior makes good sense 
when seen as the outcome of the charioteer's shift of focus away from his team. In non-allegorical terms, 
this would represent someone inclining to act in an otherworldly fashion, as if not tied to a social and 
timebound existence; ready to throw all else to the winds for the sake of his love. But this is an inclination 
common to the true lover and the true philosopher-notoriously so. Socrates here puts two cliches into a 
bottle-the temporary insanity of the infatuated lover, the hopeless impracticality of philosophers... Simply 
put, his point is that love makes philosophers of us all. " (Ferrari, "Platonic Love, " pp. 266-7) 
81 "The effect of the experience in awakening `recollection' is therefore exceptionally startling" (A. E. 
Taylor, p. 308). Ficino describes how "lovers fear and worship in some way the sight of the beloved. " 
(Though Sears and Jayne refer to Symposium 192b, this passage clearly describes Phaedrus 254a-e) 
"Certainly it is not anything human that frightens them... but that splendour of divinity, shining in the 
beautiful like the statue of god, compels lovers to marvel, to be afraid, and to worship. " (Ficino, 2: 6; also 
see Santayana, The Realm of Essence, p. 116) 
Ficino shrewdly comments upon the reverence and fear of the eromenos/student subtly suggesting 
likewise a shift in value and tension. He states, "Even brave and wise men... have been accustomed to 
suffer in the presence of the beloved. Certainly it is not anything human which frightens them, which 
breaks them, which seizes them. For a human power is always stronger in brave and wiser men. But that 
splendor of divinity, shining in the beautiful like a statue of god, compels lovers to marvel, to be afraid, and 
to worship. " (Ficino, 2: 6) In recounting the phenomenon of the erastes passionately attracted to but 
revering the form of beauty shining through the eromenos (Ficino employs the terminology of Neo- 
Platonism; see Plotinus, Enneads, 1,6,9), Ficino comments that the lover suffers "in the presence of the 
beloved, however inferior". (The lover seeks the youthful beloved because of his physical beauty (though 
not uniquely as the beloved is chosen according to the lover's type. Phaedrus, 252e) regardless of the fact 
that the lover possesses a deeper beauty. Plato appears to be linking youth with beauty in this section. This 
longing for youthful beauty is a longing for immortality, yet it is one in which the individual has not yet 
fully realized that beauty of the soul is superior to a beautiful body (Symposium. 210b). This clinging to and 
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dark horse in check, 82 hence we begin to recognize a correlation between Socrates' 
second speech and the charioteer. 83 
pursuit of physical youth, the "fountain of youth", marks a resistance in the erastes to his personal bodily 
finitude. ) This acknowledgement that the eromenos/student is inferior and the erastes/teacher is superior in 
wisdom and bravery shows paradoxically that what is more beautiful seeks what is less beautiful 
essentially, regardless of the fact that beauty shines through the beloved physically. 
Within Platonic dialogues, the notions of bravery and wisdom are inter-linked. According to Hobbs 
(Plato and the Hero), bravery which in Greek is andreia means manliness (strength in battle). Furthermore, 
courage is used by Plato to promote philosophy; a love of wisdom. It is manly to do philosophy and 
philosophy makes you manly, thus using the traditional paradigm of manliness to promote philosophy, 
conventional means to achieve a revolutionary end. Within the ascent by dialectic serving didactic ends, 
wisdom and bravery are inseparably intertwined, each producing the other. 
Thus the claim that the lover is more brave and wise signifies that he is more philosophical, 
forcefully overcoming obstacles while advancing towards the good, while the eromenos/student is less 
courageous and philosophical, and therefore less advanced and in need of help to advance towards the 
good. Although the erastes/teacher reveres the beauty of the eromenos/student, the student, in recognizing 
his inferiority in courage and wisdom, though he recognizes this ignorance, experiences an equal or greater 
sense of respect for the teacher which is essential to the process of education. This indicates a reversal of 
roles as experienced by Alcibiades (Symposium 222a6-b3) situating the teacher as eromenos, possessing in 
some form more knowledge, goodness, or spiritual beauty which is desired by the studentlerastes, 
reminiscent of the ontological ascent described in the Symposium's (210b-c) which shifts from a focus on 
the beauty of the body to the beauty of the soul which directly points to the fact that Socrates, the ultimate 
eromenos for Plato, is not physically beautiful (215b). 
The divine aspect is enhanced through the evocation or reference to the Eleusian mysteries in 251 a 
noted by Hackforth (p. 95). Cornford writes that similarly the language of the Symposium "borrowed from 
Eleusian mysteries the language of the Sacred Marriage and of the final revelation, when the ancient 
symbols of the divinity were disclosed to the purified initiate in a sudden blaze of light. The soul is united 
with divine Beauty, and itself becomes immortal and divine. The offspring of the marriage are not 
phantoms of goodness like those images of virtue which first inspired love for the beautiful person. The 
child of Love and Beauty is true virtue, dwelling in the soul that has become immortal, as the lover and 
beloved of God. " (Cornford, Sapientiae, pp. 86-7) 
82 This vision immediately curbs the lover's sensuous desires, prioritizing the intellectual, but 
simultaneously making him look up to and fear the beloved, as the eromenos through his physical beauty is 
the reflection of the beautiful which the erastes seeks to "possess". This vision causes the intellect to apply 
its force and tame the appetitive. 
83In this way we come to realize that Socrates' second speech represents the charioteer in the image of the 
soul as charioteer and his horses, and that the three speeches of the Phaedrus represent the three parts of the 
soul. "Socrates will fashion the soul in the properly complex account that he gives of it in his mythic hymn, 
Lysias' non-lover speaks with the voice of the lustful black horse, for whom there can be no ethical conflict 
but at most a prudential deferral of the immediate satisfaction of pleasure for the sake of its future 
maximization; Socrates' man adds to this drama the voice of the white horse, who seeks honour with the 
same unreflective determination that the black yoke-mate applies to the pursuit of pleasure, and so can do 
nothing but bluntly resist the other's aims when they come into conflict with its own; and although both 
characters claim to speak with the voice of reason, what we have yet to hear is reason's true voice: that of 
the charioteer, who cannot achieve his own ends without learning from and harmonizing all the voices in 
the soul. " (Ferrari, Cicadas, p. 102) "When the charioteer is in charge... the entire soul is at its best, and the 
person lives the good life, the philosophic or `wisdom-loving' life (256b2-7). (Compare Republic IX 586d: 
The other parts will attain their `truest' satisfactions when they follow the wisdom-loving part. This I take 
to be what Socrates means by describing the feathers of the entire soul as nourished by truth. )" (Ferrari, 
"Platonic Love, " p. 264) However the relation of the charioteer to the intellect as represented by Socrates' 
second speech proves likewise problematic as Socrates' second speech is poetic and mythic which in turn 
undermines its analogy with the "voice of reason" though in actuality it may be the only means by which to 
truly harmonize its parts. 
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In taming the appetitive, the reverence for the forms is eroticized84 in the sense 
that all desire is channelled towards the forms, though without abandoning the love of the 
individual. Therefore "though love starts in worship and reverence, it presses on to a 
union closer than these can give" (Hackforth, p. 98), 85 as the lover wishes to become one 
with the vision of the beautiful which he sees through the beloved. This allows the "self- 
abandonment to the mania of eros" resulting in the transformation of the sensibility of the 
lover (Warner, "Appropriating the Phaedrus", p. 13), through his relation with the 
beloved. What the lover experiences is a mixture of awe86 and respect coupled with an 
intense desire for the beautiful which causes the lover simultaneously to desire the 
beloved and aspire to transcend this desire to a higher level of unity with beauty. Thus in 
contrast to the position of Ficino who concentrates on the love of the universal forms and 
Nussbaum who focuses on the particular individual, the Phaedrus seems to suggest a 
third view giving voice to both. The Phaedrus seems to describe an oscillation between 
sa Hackforth (p. 98) notes that "the shuddering awe which the holiness of beauty inspires, though erotic, 
contains elements of religious feeling. This goes so far as to almost [identify] the erotic with the religious 
impulse, not passionless self-suppression but a passionate self-surrender which is a profound satisfying of 
the self'. 
"The accent which Hackforth gives Plato here, suggests that at moments he reads him through or at least is 
influenced by Plotinus. 
86 "Awe" means "great wonder" indicating that love precedes understanding. "Whenever they see some 
likeness of the things in that other world, they are struck with amazement and lose their self-possession, 
though they know not what this condition means, because the perception is not sufficiently clear. " 
Phaedrus 249B (Comford, Sapientiae, p. 82) The beloved experiences love before understanding, shown 
through the fact that the beloved does not know what he loves: "So he loves, yet knows not what he loves; 
he does not understand, he cannot tell what has come upon him" (Phaedrus 255b-e; also 253a5). This 
incomprehension and sense of mystery is explained by Ficino in Plato on Love when he says the lover 
"does not desire the body but... he is amazed by the splendour of the celestial majesty shining through the 
bodies. For this reason lovers do not know what they desire or seek, for they do not know God Himself 
whose secret flavor infuses a certain very sweet perfume of Himself into His works" (Ficino, 2: 6). Though 
in his commentary he clearly conflates Plato's form of the beautiful with the Judaeo-Christian God (see 
Watson, pp. 24-5), Ficino addressing Phaedrus 255b-e understands that for the lover, which is the beloved 
in the Phaedrus (Ficino reverses the reaction of lover and beloved, substituting the erastes for the 
eromenos), knowledge of the beautiful is limited, he does not know what he loves, due to the limitation of 
his memory (Phaedrus 255; Republic. 621a-b), and the physical limitation deriving from the contamination 
of the intellect by the desires of the body. (Symposium 254b, 256c; these passages refer to homosexual love 
and express the inferiority of a full sexual relation as opposed to one built on self-control and the 
channeling of powerful desires to intellectual ends, which Freud defines as the source of all cultural 
achievement. See Freud, "Debasement in the Sphere of Love, " p. 190; also Civilization and our Discontent) 
He cannot fully know or recognize the form (Republic 517b). Hence with his vision obscured, through 
anamnesis initiated by the shock of the vision of beauty he becomes aware of the beautiful itself, after 
which he gains understanding. 
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universal and particular beauty (showing eros as a daimon), 87 in which the particularity of 
the beloved is essential and necessary though remaining of less importance than universal 
beauty from which he is imbued with its beauty. 
The liberation of the intellect from the spirited and appetitive elements is shown 
more directly through the mutual exchange and interaction between the erastes and 
eromenos. After the charioteer has tamed the dark horse so that he shares his awe towards 
the eromenos, the charioteer tries to maintain a state of sophrosune. This reverence 
pushes him to serve the eromenos, as the erastes "is no pretender but loves in all 
sincerity" (Phaedrus 255a2), so that with time the eromenos is "filled with amazement, 
for he perceives that all his other friends and kinsmen have nothing to offer in 
comparison with this friend in whom dwells a god" (Phaedrus 255b6-8). This marks a 
shift or moment of reversal. Having received so much good from the erastes, the 
eromenos recognizes that the erastes is a source of good beyond others, that in him 
dwells a god meaning that the form of beauty shines through him, though this beauty 
reached the erastes through the eromenos, as we shall now see. This recognition causes 
the eromenos to begin to favour the erastes, thus initiating a shift, as noted by Alcibiades 
(Symposium 222b), the eromenos becomes erastes. and the erastes, eromenos. 
This shift is tracked through the flow of passion following a dialectical pattern. 
"That flowing stream 88 which Zeus, as the lover of Gänymede, called the `flood of passion', 89 pours in 
87 The conception of eros as daimon or god remains debatable in the Phaedrus. "I see no need to excuse 
Socrates for calling Eros a god here and a daimon in Symposium" (Hackforth, pp. 54f. ). "There it suited his 
purpose to make Love an intermediate and intermediary, and he adapted popular mythology accordingly; 
here he can accept it unaltered. Such playing with the myths was a common literary device, freely 
employed by the speakers in Symposium" (Guthrie, p. 401). However, regardless of Socrates' declaration 
that Eros is a god, the actual configuration of eros suggests that he is a daimon, indicating an aspect of 
cohesion with the Symposium. 
Plato's new vision of seduction is explained to us as not only involving a pursuit of the form of the 
beautiful but likewise the constant interaction of individuals on multiple levels. "They grasp the good and 
the true not by transcending erotic madness, but inside a passionate life" (Nussbaum, Fragility, p. 220). 
Only in a relation of passionate love can individuals regrow their wings which carry them through 
understanding to the form of the beautiful, or in the terms of the Republic, the form of the good, the source 
of the intellectual world, (Republic 517b-c). 
88 The Ganymede story has two variants. In the Homeric version which has "no explicitly erotic overtones" 
(Barker, 2003), Ganymede was carried off by Zeus to be his wine pourer because of his beauty. With 
regard to the myth of the soul as charioteer with two horses, Ganymede's father Tros was recompensed by 
Zeus with the gift of "marvellous horses" Iliad 20.232-5,5.265-7. (See Rowe) This can be interpreted 
symbolically as Zeus taking the intellect of Ganymede, the charioteer, leaving behind the two horses, the 
appetitive and spirited parts of the soul. However, the two horses left behind were "marvelous". As, 
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upon the lover. And part of it is absorbed within him, but when he can contain no more the rest flows away 
outside him, and as a breath of wind or an echo, rebounding from a smooth hard surface, goes back to its 
place of origin, even so the stream of beauty turns back and reenters the eyes of the fair beloved. And so by 
the natural channel it reaches his soul and gives it fresh vigour, watering the roots of the wings and 
quickening their growth, whereby the soul of the beloved, in its turn, is filled with love. " (Phaedrus 255c- 
d) 
That the flood of passion streams down upon and into the lover90 suggests that this is 
inspired love, referring back to the description of the fourth type of madness identified 
according to the myth, humans have one good and one bad horse and divine beings have two good horses 
(Phaedrus 247), this implies that Ganymede is no longer human, fulfilling the myth. However, as we 
mentioned in note 64, the Laws 636d recount how the Ganymede tale was used as a justification for 
homosexual pleasure. The earliest surviving appearance of this variant is found in "Euripides' Orestes 
1392, but according to a scholiast on Apollonius of Rhodes Argonautica III. 114 (where it appears again), it 
goes back to the sixth-century lyric poet Ibycus. He was famous especially for his meltingly gorgeous love- 
poetry, and it seems... probable that it was Ibycus who made Zeus call the stream of love `himeros', and 
that he did so in the poem alluded to by the scholiast. Given the general character of Ibycus' best-known 
work (Cicero, Tusc. 4: 71 says that Ibycus, most of all poets, was 'aflame with love', flagrasse amore), 
Plato would clearly be intensifying the erotic tone of this passage by alluding to an Ibycan motif ... That 
[Plato] knew some of his love-poetry is confirmed by the reference at Parmenides 137a to the poem printed 
in Campbell's Greek Lyric vol. 3 as no. 287... Himeros is a very plausibly Ibycan word.... Campbell's no. 
286... itself uses erotic imagery not unlike Plato's (rushing wind, lightening flashes, madness)" (Barker, 
2003). Through his allusion to both variants together, Plato may be ultimately suggesting that Socrates' 
attraction to Phaedrus while physically based is spiritual, showing how the erotic nature if properly 
channelled to the intellect acts as the means by which the individual ascends towards the forms and the 
divine. 
89Rowe translates this as "desire" the Greek word being himeros, recalling the name of the town from 
whence the poet who is telling this story comes (244a; see also Nussbaum, Fragility, p. 211). 
90 Nussbaum interprets the effect of falling in love, the effect of the vision of the beloved on the lover, as 
the melting of all hardness into liquid. This not only causes unity in the lover and the vision of the beautiful 
entering him from the beloved but it allows a kind of contact with the beloved which inspires the lover, 
imitating the sexual language of Phaedrus 255d, she writes, "Instead of being like a dry beam of light 
looking upon dry light, he receives a mysterious substance that begins by being light, but transforms itself 
into liquid... Receiving the other person's soul, allowing to melt the hard impassive parts of him, he feels 
the sudden release of pent up liquid within him, which makes him another flowing liquid light. In the 
'flowing' of his desire he resembles a person with `streaming' eyes (255D). So transformed, he begins to 
have access to insights that are not available within the dry life of the non-lover (cf. 239C8). He would not 
have had them if he had remained `very similar' to the form. " (Fragility, pp. 216-7) Although passionate 
and insightful in her reading of the Phaedrus, I find Nussbaum's reading of the middle dialogues to be 
slanted in order to support her argument about the Phaedrus. Nussbaum incorrectly equates the dry life of 
the non-lover with the initiate seeking the form of the beautiful in the Symposium. Clearly this initiate does 
to some extent have a dry life but his life is none the less that of a lover. Although this non-physical but 
sensual liquid unity achieved between the lover and beloved is not present in this way in the middle 
dialogues, the initiate desires the beautiful above all else and the beautiful exerts a passionate drawing 
power upon the lover through instances of beauty, as noted by Watson (p. 24), which dilutes Nussbaum's 
extreme view of the opposition between the middle and late dialogues by which she virtually formulates 
another dualism. Although Nussbaum's reading has a great deal of appeal, I am not convinced that it is 
supported by the texts. 
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earlier in Socrates' second speech. 91 As in this context, passionate love comes from the 
gods and indicates possession by the god Eros, this explains how the lover is 
distinguished from others as "in him dwells a god" (Symposium 255b). This mania 
however is governed by the intellect, indicating its inconnection with sophrosune (in 
contrast to the conception of eros in Lysias' and Socrates' first speech and here 
Nussbaum's reading of Bros as irrational mania), 92 shown through the keeping in check 
of the dark horse. 93 In the case of the followers of Zeus, Zeus who is the god of the 
philosophers (252e1-2) as he is the god of order, 94 this flood is channelled in such a way 
91 "When he that loves beauty is touched by such madness he is called a lover. Such a one as soon as he 
beholds the beauty of this world, is reminded of true beauty, and his wings begin to grow. " (Phaedrus 
249d-e) 
92 Hackforth (p. 98) distinguishes two levels of madness. At the first level, love induces both pleasure and 
pain. Healing of spiritual pain and sickness demonstrates that "general principle that any satisfaction 
involves previous dissatisfaction. " Thus "before full satisfaction is attained there is a stage of acute distress 
mixed with joy, and by reason of this tension the lover is maddened and distraught" (Phaedrus 251D). 
"Those who have been trapped by love alternatively sigh and rejoice. They sigh because they are losing 
themselves, because they are destroying themselves, because they are ruining themselves. They rejoice 
because they are transforming themselves into something better" (Ficino, 2: 6). Similar to the myth of the 
birth of eros in the Symposium (203b), the first level of erotic madness is mixed, poverty and abundance, 
yet like Plotinus' view of eros as an emotion, Ficino describes the love of the Phaedrus as a psychological 
state of the lover experiencing joy and longing yet through this process being transformed by love into 
something better, which Hackforth picks up with regard to Socrates' self-consciousness concerning his own 
state of possession. (Phaedrus 241e, Hackforth, p. 47) 
The second level of madness is transcendental. "We must, however, not identify this transitional stage 
with the `divine madness' with which love in general has been unified; the madness of our present passage 
leaves the lover when full spiritual union with the beloved is achieved" (Hackforth, p. 98). According to 
Hackforth, eros transcends or goes beyond reason and therefore the power of logos to reach an ineffable 
truth. (Cobb (p. 149) points out that Hackforth's statement assumes that the second speech is based on the 
same definition of eros as his first speech. ) Rowe (p. 169) maintains that the only common denominator in 
the four types of madness is that they are of divine origin, but Cobb comments that such a position would 
be "compatible with claiming that it is not madness in the sense of a condition that violates or transcends 
the limits of rationality" (p. 149). For Hackforth beauty is beyond being, a thesis we considered with regard 
to the Symposium. This is further suggested in that the satisfaction of the first madness marks the beginning 
of the true madness, recalling Markus' analysis of the changes in love from needing to giving in the 
Symposium (Markus, "The Dialectic of Eros", p. 138). Unlike Hackforth who is working "vertically", 
Rowe's position is far more "horizontal" as he suggests that Plato is comparing love to the other forms of 
madness (Rowe, p. 185). Developing a different perspective, Griswold believes that "erotic madness is not 
so much sent from the gods external to the individual as sparked from a source within him, as is suggested 
by its association with anamnesis [recollection]" (Self-Knowledge, 75), and therefore remains within the 
framework of rationality. Here as in the Symposium, the question of whether this is so seems unanswerable. 93According to A. E. Taylor (p. 309), though much less clearly in Plato's own text, this struggle is 
intensified when the beloved returns the love of the lover. "The time of really fierce temptation comes 
when the passion which was one-sided is reciprocated on the other. " 
94 Rowe states that "controlling the dark horse is necessary for the wings to grow", which explains why 
Plato believes philosophers necessarily are only those who have this control, the followers of Zeus, as 
possessing sophrosune enables them to grow wings and therefore experience this superior type of love, a 
transcending of the more earth-bound erotic relation. 
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as to become a philosophical love which Socrates considers to be the highest type 
95 
This flood of passion which Socrates now calls a "stream of beauty", thus 
equating love with beauty coming from the image of beauty impressed upon the 
beloved's form, returns to the beloved entering in to him by his eyes, the eyes being the 
most sensitive and receptive part96 of the body. 
97 Passionate desire softens "the roots of 
the wings"98 and "quickens [the wings] to growth" so that the beloved filling with love 
and beauty is likewise able to ascend, the wings referring simultaneously to the emotional 
lightness which love produces and the ascent to truth, which is the process of 
understanding. 
Now possessed, the erastes brimming with inspired love seeks to pour it back into 
the beloved through moulding him into the likeness of the god they share. 
99 Plato uses the 
95Unlike Nussbaum (Fragility, p. 212), Hackforth is of the opinion "that a man may be a true lover.. . 
without being a philosopher" (Hackforth, p. 101). However, followers of Zeus, as 
distinct from followers of 
Ares, Hera or Apollo, are superior as, according to Rowe, Zeus represents order and therefore 
his followers 
are orderly, "able to control their responses to the burden of `the feathery one, ' Eros, and passionate 
love 
(Rowe, p. 186). Hackforth's correlation of the love, philosophy and 
inspired mania is taken up by 
Rutherford who writes that "Love, poetic madness and philosophy are united-indeed, they are almost 
assimilated to one another" (Rutherford, The Art of Plato, p. 260) as is the philosopher and the 
lover. As 
Nussbaum beautifully states, "If these characters can bear to experience passion as they 
do, it is in part 
because they dare to think and argue as they do... If on the other hand, they speak philosophically as they 
do, it is, too, because they are here lying beside one another as they are, on this grass beside the river, 
willing to go mad; and this madness leads them to a new view of the philosophical truth... Their entire 
lives become ways of searching for wisdom; and part of their argument for the new view of madness comes 
from within their lives. " (Fragility, pp. 211-12) 
96Aristotle via Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Q. 78, art. 1-2, The "eyes being the most 
intellectual of 
the senses. " 
97 Cf. Symposium (206c-d) where love is to bring forth in beauty as beauty enables procreation which leads 
to immortality and contemplation of the good. This inner beauty according to the Symposium is the beauty 
of the soul which is virtue (Symposium 209a) leading to understanding, which again shows the participation 
of desire in understanding. 
"The image of the wings expresses this love relation. Feathers are referred to in multiple ways concerning 
love. Rowe says, followers of Zeus are "able to control their responses to the burden of `the feathery one' 
(literally, `the one who takes his name from his feathers/wings')" (Rowe, p. 186). Referring to Cupid, this 
juxtaposes the lightness of his wings to his burden, the lightness and heaviness of love. Cupid "lends to 
Psyche the wings that will carry her" to Mount Olympus (Cornford, "The Doctrine of Eros", p. 123). The 
nature of wings "consists in their power to raise heavy things aloft to the region where the gods dwell; there 
is no bodily part more closely akin to the divine; and the divine is beauty, wisdom, goodness' (246D) 
(Cornford, Sapientiae, p. 80). Note also the "tickling" at the growing of the wings of the lover and beloved 
(Phaedrus 251D-E), and the phrase "setting aflutter" to describe the lover's reaction to the beloved (Rowe 
p. 188). This reminds us of Aristophanes being tickled with a feather to stop his hiccups so that he could 
begin his speech in the Symposium (189A), as the tickling of a feather, symbol of eros, heals (reminding us 
that Aristophanes' speech followed that of Eryximachus, discussing how love heals the body, Symposium 
186D), eliciting a speech on love (Symposium 21OA). 
9 "The lover's task of moulding the beloved into the likeness of their common god requires the discovery 
by the lover within himself of traces of that god's nature; for although these traces are within him ex 
hypothesi (because his soul has followed the god discarnate) yet he might be blind to them, were it not that 
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term "Bacchant" to describe the lover. According to Rowe (p. 186), "when Bacchants are 
possessed they draw milk and honey from rivers", thus the lover/Bacchant, in his 
passionate possession draws forth the nectar of the gods from Zeus making him godlike, 
while pouring into or bathing the beloved in his love which symbolically represents his 
spiritual richness, his love and inner beauty symbolized by milk and honey, thereby 
infecting the beloved with madness. 1°° Thus "the divine grace bestowed upon the lover is 
poured by him in turn into the soul of the beloved so the latter too becomes assimilated to 
their common deity" (Hackforth, p. 102). This very act of the lover's seduction of the 
beloved represents the education of the beloved, the moulding of the beloved into the 
god's as well as the lover's image. '°' 
Without realizing, the lover acts as a mirror for the beloved. 
"He cannot account for it, not realizing that his lover is as it were a mirror in which he beholds himself. 
And when the other is beside him, he shares his respite from anguish; when he is absent, he likewise shares 
his longing and being longed for, since he possesses that counter-love which is the image of love. " 
(Phaedrus, 255d4-el; my emphasis). 
Hackforth opposes eros with the term anteros as possessing counter-love which is the 
eidolon or reflection of love. 102 As the beauty of the beloved inspires love, the reflection 
of beauty is love, so beauty seems to be transformed into love at the entrance of beauty 
he is constrained by the very fact of 'possession' to keep his gaze fixed upon the god (253A2)" (Hackforth, 
p. 101). This process involves two types of "possession", which seem to occur simultaneously; possession 
by the lover and by the god. 
ioo "They are both mutually active and mutually receptive: from the one the other, like a Bacchant, draws in 
the transforming liquid; and pours liquid back, in his turn, into the beloved soul (253A). Plato describes 
their passionate longing and emotion for one another in a way that stirs us (and Phaedrus) with its beauty 
and strongly indicates that he find their madness beautiful and good... In this speech eros is not just a 
daimon, but a god; a thing of intrinsic value and beauty, not just a way-station towards the good. The best 
human life involves ongoing devotion to another individual. " (Nussbaum, Fragility, p. 219) '°'In imitating their god, Plato uses the phrase, "`reaching out after him in memory' (253A2)... Plato 
seems here to come very near to identifying remembrance of the Forms with remembrance of the gods who 
led the procession of souls; and it would seem that the two memories correspond respectively to the 
metaphysical and religious aspects of philosophy, though not strictly identical, the two are inseparable, and 
the words of 249c imply that the memory of the forms is the more ultimate of the two" (Hackforth, p. 102). 
102 According to Rowe, the "stream of beauty which, as we have been told earlier (251C-D), enters into the 
soul of the lover and initiates the process of regrowing its wings, is not all used up in this way; some of it is 
drawn back 'like a wind or an echo' into the eyes, and through the eyes into the soul of the beloved and 
does the same for him; thus a counter-love is born, whose nature is not apparent to the possessor, because 
he does not realize that his lover has become a mirror in which his own beauty is reflected. " (Hackforth, 
p. 108) 
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into the lover's soul. The lover's love results in a counter-love which causes a mirroring 
of the beloved's love, '03 a counter-love which is repeated indicating a continuing cycle of 
reflection and transferral of passion, the love and counter-love of the other, each acting as 
the complement/symbolon of the other, 104 further justifying the uses of the terms "flood" 
and "flow" which imply liquid, a continued movement. 
As the lover acts as a mirror for the beloved, which in turn allows the lover to 
learn through a counter reflection, '°5 their relation promotes mutual growth towards 
beauty and wisdom. 106 As each acts as the student and teacher, this interchange results in 
the dialectical structure through producing a deepening of eros and understanding. This 
suggests that the apparently revealed truth of Socrates' second speech107 is a dialectical 
ascent in which the paths of eromenos and erastes are interwoven in their love, resulting 
103 Commentators dispute as to whether the beloved reciprocates because he sees his own image, his own 
beauty in the other's eyes or because he partakes in the lover's eros. Hackforth states that the "account of 
`counter-love' is based on the principle that the sublimated love of the [beloved], no less than that of the 
[lover], must originate in the sight of physical beauty, and on the complementary fact that the physical 
beauty resides wholly in the person of the beloved" (Hackforth, p. 108). For Rowe, "on Socrates' new 
account, the boy's feelings are similar to the lover's (though weaker, E3: the desire has further to travel? ) 
and are directed towards the same object, i. e. his own beauty; he too, then, can be aid to be in love" (Rowe, 
p. 188). This question is unresolved. Plato seems to leave a certain amount of vagueness in this area. 
Loving one's own reflection of physical beauty would indicate the loving of a physical instantiation of true 
beauty, which can lead to philosophical reflection of true beauty. Likewise, loving the inner beauty 
revealed through the love of the lover would indicate a preference for virtue which would also lead towards 
philosophical contemplation of the beautiful and the good. 
104 According to Markus' (p. 135) analysis of the speech of Aristophanes, "Love is identified with this 
desire for completion; its object, which may be otherwise unknown, is defined by being the `complement' 
(symbolon is the word Plato puts in Aristophane's mouth, 191D) of the lover's need. " Thus love and 
counter-love act as complements, each a symbolon to the other. 
105 Though the lover desires the beloved, giving the impression that the latter is superior (Symposium 200e), 
the lover though not possessing physical beauty is initially higher than the beloved. The lover, through 
absorbing the beloved's beauty and reflecting it back upon the beloved in the form of virtue, acts as a 
mirror in order that the beloved might likewise see through his love and beauty the form of the beautiful 
shining within. Also, the lover acts as a transformer in that he takes in exterior beauty and internalizes it, 
giving forth virtue which is the beauty of soul, a higher form of beauty. The lover actually expresses and 
makes active the inner beauty and goodness whereas in these terms the beloved is purely potential and 
beautiful in an external way. It is only in the beloved's loving back, thereby reversing his role, that he 
becomes truly and deeply beautiful, whereas the lover, though inspired by physical beauty, is more 
beautiful as he has made what is outside inner and in his abundance has poured this inner beauty to another. 
106 Nussbaum interprets this as applying directly to the relationship of Phaedrus and Socrates. Though it can 
be argued that Phaedrus may not have developed in the line that she wishes to suggest, her interpretation is 
illuminating in illustrating precisely the erastes/eromenos relation which Plato is formulating. See 
Fragility, p. 223. 
107 Both the Symposium and the Phaedrus describe revelations which involve an evocation of or reference 
to the Eleusian mysteries. Cf. Symposium 210-211 and Cornford, Sapientiae, 86-7 with Phaedrus 250d, 
251a and Sapientiae p. 95. 
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in and motivated by the pursuit of the truth, 108 showing interpersonal eros to be 
indispensable to yet governed by the pursuit of the truth. '°9 
Therefore, in contrast to Nussbaum's understanding of a radical recantation of 
past views, the Phaedrus is actually a gradual progression towards the revelation of the 
"truth. " This process begins with a utilitarian relationship exemplified in Lysias' speech 
in which the eromenos is advised to give himself to the non-erastes almost as an act of 
prostitution, an example of sheer appetitive desire which epitomizes earthly eros. In 
Socrates' first speech though eros is still conceived of as appetitive and the lover 
dangerous, the speaker, a lover disguised as a "non-lover", expresses concern for the 
beloved therefore showing selfless love, in that he seeks his beloved's good. The speaker 
thereby embodies the inner strife between earthly and heavenly eros acting as a mid-point 
in this progression. Following the recantation, the truth or kernel of this progression 
emerges: eros is redefined as man's greatest good and shown to be the element which 
following man's fall to earth initiates his ascent and return to the realm of the gods 
enabling him once more to contemplate the forms of the spiritual realm. Thus this 
sequence of speeches describes the gradual unfolding and opening of the soul emerging 
or turning from matter/the material world through the love of an individual towards virtue 
and the forms which ultimately govern that relationship with the individual. In this way 
the sequence of the speeches can be seen as an ironic unveiling of the true nature of eros, 
a turning from the most callous and inhuman notion of eros to a virtuous, generous, 
deeply human and inspired love. This voyage of the soul may well indicate what Plato 
actually thought. "" Yet a substantial problem is present within the dialogue which 
disrupts this sequential unveiling: the recantation formulating an aporia which not only is 
a "lack of way" or "poverty" of meaning but causes the evacuation of meaning. 
108 "The inspiration of love opens a potential path but does not ensure that it will be followed; still less does 
it do the travelling... We learn that like other kinds of inspired lovers, they will be encouraged in their own 
development by their concern to educate the beloved and bring out the character that they sense he shares 
with them (252e-243c)... The philosophic couple, who never consummate their sexual desire, live a life 
`together in mind' (homonoetikon, 256b1), but a mind set on their remaining always in control of 
themselves and on regaining their wings for the sake of the good that awaits in the afterlife (the vision of 
the Forms) rather than for the sake of love (256b). " (Ferrari, "Platonic Love", p. 267) 
'09 Rutherford, p. 257. 
110 Comford, Sapientiae, p. 126. 
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F. IMPOSITION OF APORIAI 
In order to understand this problem, we must turn back to our initial analysis of 
the recantation. In Socrates' first speech, as sophrosune is good and mania is evil 
Socrates claims that love is evil. Having covered his head for his first speech, he then 
recants stating that love as mania is the highest good, uncovering his head to unveil the 
truth. By recanting and unveiling his head Socrates implies that this first position is a lie, 
thus pointing to and reinforcing the integration of sophrosune and mania in love because 
in order for love to be good it must be self-controlled. The implication therein is that 
Socrates' second speech represents the truth. 
Hackforth's reading of Socrates' second speech as the unveiling of truth is 
reinforced by its economic centrality and his use of myth and "poetic" language. First, by 
means of the economy and layout of the dialogue, through "size and grandeur", Plato 
"attaches an importance to the second speech of Socrates and ... [uses] the other two 
speeches by way of foils or contrasts thereto. . . [within] the total economy of the 
dialogue" (Hackforth, p. 136), h 11 suggesting Socrates' second speech as being the 
"central mystery"112 of the dialogue, perhaps suggesting that Socrates' second speech is 
actually Plato's position. The use of myth and "poetic" language here as elsewhere seems 
to be "designed to convey truth or something close to it however indirectly or to nudge 
readers in a truth-oriented direction" (Barker, 2002). According to Rutherford (pp. 258- 
9), this speech is 
referred to by its author as a "mythical hymn" (265c1); it provides a means of describing the truly real 
world to which the human soul naturally belongs and to which it always longs to return. This is not 
dialectically demonstrable vision, and so it is appropriate that it should be couched in mythical form, and 
that the idea of poetic inspiration should be used-poetry, elsewhere treated as the enemy of philosophy, is 
here employed in its service. It is admitted, not only in the later passage which plays down the significance 
of speech, but within the speech itself, that this is an approximation, an imperfect account, not a statement 
of absolute truths: "To say what kind of thing the soul is would require a long exposition, and one calling 
"Not only does this discount Arieti's position in Interpreting Plato: The Dialogues as Dramas in his 
chapter on the Phaedrus, as interpreted by Cobb (p. 140), that this dialogue is a discussion of rhetoric in 
which eros has no positive significance, but it also demonstrates the importance of the second speech of 
Socrates' praising love, to which the first two act as a foil or highlight by contrast. 112 Ficino, On Love, VII, 13-15. 
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for utterly superhuman powers; but to say what it is like requires a shorter one, and within human capacity. 
So let us speak in the latter way" (246a). "And as for the realm above the heavens, there is no poet who has 
ever yet hymned it as it deserves, not will there ever be. But it is like this" (247c). 
This seems to support Ficino's understanding that Socrates' second speech represents this 
central mystery as being beyond language, a position held both by Hackforth and A. E. 
Taylor. Then "just as imagery, playfulness, poetic allusions etc. are useful in enticing a 
person for the first time into argumentative philosophical thought, 113 so these myths 
work, at a higher level, to draw us towards modes of thought which give access to 
absolute truth-but which (perhaps) cannot be recreated for us in someone else's words, 
certainly not written words" (Barker 2002). 
Further emphasis is placed on Socrates' second speech as the bearer of truth by 
the fact that Socrates is presented through his discussion of madness as the 
exemplification of a daimon, the intermediary between mortals and immortals, attributing 
a positive truth value to Socrates' second speech, as previously discussed. Though 
Socrates puts his speech in the mouth of the poet from Himera which appears to distance 
him from its contents, as he puts it in the mouth of a poet who according to Ion (535b, 
534c) being divinely inspired reveals the truth (Cornford Sapientiae, p. 79), this further 
increases the credibility of Socrates' second speech as expressing in some way Plato's 
position. 
However as we discussed in Chapter V, "Recantation", Socrates' recantation must 
be read in the light of Stesichorus' recantation which he cites. As Stesichorus recanted 
that which may well have been true, or partly true, that Helen went to Troy, for a tale that 
she did not "sail in well-decked ships", this suggests that Socrates in recanting his first 
speech may also be recanting what is true in favor of his second speech which given this 
reversal is by implication not true. Thus given the progression of the dialogue without 
taking into account Stesichorus, Socrates first speech is false while his second speech is 
113 Friedlander (p. 226) expresses uncertainty as to whether to take Socrates' recantation seriously 
specifically due to his playfulness and irony. "Socrates is very ironic and playful in his approach to his 
second speech... His flattery of Phaedrus at 242b seems a bit hyperbolic. He claims that he is a prophet at 242c, which, even if the claim is ironic, contrasts with his attitude of humility before the prophetess 
Diotima in Symposium (206b). Moreover, such irony seems a bit cavalier on the part of one who is already in serious trouble with an important god, if we are to believe that his claims about needing to expiate his sin 
are serious" (Cobb, p. 147). Socrates' playfulness and irony act as the means by which Socrates lures others into philosophical discussions. 
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true. However in the light of the complexities involves in Stesichorus' recantation, 
Socrates recanting through citing Stesichorus suggests the possibility that Socrates' first 
speech may be true while Socrates' second speech may be untrue. This, as we discussed, 
is a recantation within a recantation which forms an aporetic structure. 
As a consequence of its placement between Socrates' first and second speeches 
the aporetic structure of the recantation undermines the speeches and therefore exposes 
weaknesses in both Nussbaum's and Hackforth's readings of the Phaedrus. Through 
undermining the value of Socrates' second speech, the aporia brings into question 
Hackforth's view of the ironic unveiling of Socrates' second speech as the "central 
mystery" of the dialogue. Likewise the aporia also further undermines Nussbaum's 
reading of the recantation as a sincere repenting of Plato's views in the middle dialogues 
due to his philosophical reevaluation of the role of the individual, mainly due to his 
relationship with Dion. In Nussbaum, the "truth" content of Socrates' second speech is 
put in question, which draws into question Plato's position and consequently whether 
Plato changed. Though Hackforth's reading is closer to the Phaedrus than Nussbaum's 
interpretation, he does not seem to acknowledge the aporia as is shown by his low 
valuation or trivialization of the recantation seen only as a dramatic tool. '14 Though this 
is a possible and initially coherent view, nonetheless it seems to be undermined through 
the presence of this aporia. Though generally much farther away from the text than 
Hackforth, Nussbaum puts strong emphasis on the recantation, however she does not go 
far enough. Though she sees the recantation as an aporia and turns "This story isn't true" 
against Socrates' second speech and the dialogue, she seems to employ the aporetic 
nature of the recantation as a means of avoiding drawing any conclusions. Though 
moving in the right direction initially, she does not recognize the full implications of the 
aporia as the potential recantation of a recantation. For this reason the aporia ultimately 
undermines her reading as she does not seek to explain, given Plato's new view of eros, 
why the recantation is designed in such a way as to be aporetic. Thus both Hackforth and 
Nussbaum's reading of the value of Socrates' second speech and the recantation, though 
"' Hackforth (p. 111) thinks "there was no real change of attitude on Socrates' part" after his recantation of 
the conception of love presented in his first speech. Hackforth believes that the purpose of the "recantation 
is to encourage Phaedrus to recant. " 
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raising essential and valid points of their interpretations of the Phaedrus which are at 
least partially present in the text, are undermined by this aporia. 
Thus this potential recantation of a recantation obscures the meaning of eros and 
the dialogue as a whole. This creates a certain tension between the affirmation of 
Socrates' second speech as representing eros accurately and the simultaneous suggestion 
of the possibility that none of the readings of eros are to be taken as the "truth", "5 thus 
leaving behind the question; Where does the truth lie? 
G. EDUCATION THROUGH APORIAI 
To respond to this question, we may ask: Given the centrality of the recantation, 
what is its purpose? This process of underlining and undermining the speeches, 
suggesting the various pros and cons of the two positions on eros expressed in Socrates' 
first and second speeches can continue perhaps indefinitely. Given this potentially infinite 
movement, why does Plato lead his readers back and forth whether through technical 
device, dramatic exchange, symbolism, metaphor, morality? The answer to this question 
lies in the dialogue's role in education. 116 This oscillation which is clearly intentional on 
Plato's part, and a form of play, is a method of sublimation. Through undermining his 
own position, Plato prevents the student from becoming fixated upon the teacher's views 
and thus from becoming stuck, according to the perfectionist method"? to force his 
students to think for themselves. Through undercutting the speeches with the aporia, 
Plato forces his students and readers to think for themselves, putting their pre- 
conceptions into question and through this themselves and their conceptual 
115 Furthermore, bearing in mind the proof in the Symposium that eros is a daimon not a god (Symposium 
203b7-d10) and is therefore between good and evil (202b2-6), and that the recantation returns to a 
declaration that Eros is a god (as in the Symposium, Phaedrus' speech 178a1-2; Agathon's speech 195a8- 
10, b5-cl), we note a gap in the notions of eros allowing for slippage between Socrates' second speech and 
Socrates' first speech read in the light of the Symposium. "If we assume that the view Socrates attributes to 
Diotima in the Symposium represents Plato's own best effort at an analysis of eros, this `slip' by Socrates 
could be seen as further support for the claim that Plato does not intend for the reader to accept any of the 
views of eros that Socrates offers in this dialogue, although it must be noted at the same time that the 
Greeks generally (and Socrates in particular in this dialogue) deal with stories about the divine realm in a 
flexible manner. " (Cobb, p. 147) 
116 The form of this dialogue, also suggested in that it is open-ended, suggests that it may have been devised 
as apaignion or "plaything" (see Rutherford, p. 243) for Plato's students, intended primarily for circulation 
inside the Academy. 
117 See Cavell, Ch. 1; Warner, "Appropriating the Phaedrus", p. 10. 
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limitations/boundaries, 118 and in this way actually convert them into philosophers. 
Therefore, the role of the aporia is not destructive in Plato, i. e. negative, to reduce others 
to nothing, but as a means to stimulate thought, philosophical reflection, to sublimation in 
the sense of purification or elevation. 
This process of education incorporating an aporia, the potential recantation of the 
recantation, works simultaneously within the Phaedrus with the erastes' seduction of the 
eromenos to philosophy and in turn the author's seduction of the appropriate reader. 
119 
Though Socrates is not wooing Phaedrus in the romantic sense (Kierkegaard, Concept, p. 
189) except playfully, 120 Socrates is wooing Phaedrus to philosophy. 
121 On a second level 
"a This is a device currently used by postmodernism; cf. David Robey, Writers and Society in 
Contemporary Italy, p. 77. 
19The notion of the fitting reader is discussed in Lyotard's analysis, in Just Gaming, p. 9. The classical 
(modem) addressee puts great importance on the appropriate. In contrast to the "casting a bottle in the 
waves" of postmodernity, affirming the desirability of an unknowable reception of a work by a unknown 
addressee, in modernism (which he calls here "classicism"), the sender and addressee have a common 
system of values. The sender can substitute himself for the reader and thereby can judge his 
accomplishment. Plato, one might say, searches for and writes for the modem addressee. 
120 The philosophical relationship of Socrates and Phaedrus is characterized by play, explicable in that play 
is intrinsically a part of eros for the individual (Lewis, The Four Loves, p. 92-3). At the beginning of the 
Phaedrus, "the relationship takes on a playfully erotic tone at several points" (Phaedrus. 229B, Cobb, p. 
142). Socrates teases Phaedrus for trying to trick Socrates into believing that he does not posses the 
manuscript. Hackforth (p. 26) attributes Phaedrus' "hiding of the manuscripts to the custom of rhetorical 
teachers to encourage students to make such summaries and Phaedrus youthfully wishes to be 
complimented by Socrates after disclaiming his ability". Phaedrus is playing hard to get with regard to 
admitting that he possesses the speech, in order to "try his powers" to lure Socrates (228E) exemplifying 
rhetoric as the art of persuasion. This hiding of the manuscript also brings to the foreground that Phaedrus 
is not always entirely honest (being what he seems) showing play to occur through irony, the intentional 
confusing of essence and existence. Further, Phaedrus taunts, provokes and teases Socrates, playfully 
mimicking him, with the same words Socrates used on him saying "don't I know my Socrates? If not, I've 
forgotten my own identity. He wanted to speak, but made difficulties about it" (236C), likewise playing 
with identity, seductively confusing essence and existence, unity and difference. Furthermore, the transition 
between Lysias' and Socrates' first speeches employs words implying "play" in abundance. See 229c, 
265c, 276c-d, 278b. emphasizing the relation of play and language in seduction. Thus Cobb (p. 145) 
plausibly suggests that "being playful may be part of being serious" within the dialogues. 
121 Socrates and Phaedrus seem to know each other well enough to predict each other's actions and 
responses and can thereby because of this familiarity tease each other (28a, b, c9), bringing to mind 
Nussbaum's comment that truth in the Phaedrus involves "subjective knowledge of the individual beloved, 
their responses, habits and limit. " Phaedrus is an appropriate soul as he is always "eager for a dialogue on 
love" being here "the author of our discussion" (177D) (Hackforth, p. 26), and in the Symposium initiating 
speeches on love. He seeks an appropriate soul as is shown when Phaedrus says, this is "appropriate for 
you to hear" (227c3), Socrates having claimed in the Symposium, to be an expert only in matters 
concerning eros (177d) (Rowe, p. 136). Thus this is "the association of two kindred souls". 
However, which soul is fitting is not always obvious and can only be discerned through interaction 
with the potential beloved and the choice the beloved makes faced with philosophical discourse. Thus the 
beloved's appropriateness is discovered only in response to the lover's efforts to attract and seduce him. 
Appropriateness is determined in this case in retrospect, depending upon the level of success of the 
relationship (whereas the seduction is only the beginning of a relationship). 
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however, Plato through Platonic irony (Griswold, "Irony", p. 100) simultaneously is 
wooing the reader of the Phaedrus, and hence ourselves, to philosophy, seeking in effect 
to guide the reader "into leading reflective and possibly philosophical lives". 
With regard to Griswold's conception of Platonic irony, Platonic anonymity is 
essential in order that each element in the dialogue serves to convey Plato's overall 
message which in the Phaedrus as in others is the purpose of leading the reader to 
philosophical reflection. Taking this into account, to assume with Warner that Plato is 
seeking an "appropriate reader" ("Appropriating the Phaedrus" p. 11) through the text 
seems to conflict with Socrates' critique of writing. Socrates criticizes writing in that 
although it appears to be alive if you ask it something "[it points] to... the same thing 
each time... and it does not know how to address those it should address and not those it 
should not" (275e1-4; trans. Rowe). Thus in Phaedrus' words, unlike "the living and 
animate speech of the man who knows,... written speech would rightly be called a kind 
of phantom" (276a8-10; trans. Rowe). Thus writing is seen as a phantom/dead as opposed 
to living speech. For Warner although readers often take Plato's critique of writing 
literally, Plato's critique of writing appears a gesture of irony, 122 in that through the 
Phaedrus, Plato is actually sifting readers in order to find the appropriate reader to whom 
it can fully disclose its message. Readers who are drawn in and seduced into abandoning 
rhetoric for philosophy represent the "fitting readers" 123 whereas those who reject the 
The end of the Phaedrus following Socrates' prayer is left open and indeterminate. Plato does 
imply at the end following Socrates' prayer that Phaedrus has been won over to Socrates, but as Cobb (p. 
156) comments, a good question at the end of the Phaedrus is how much has Phaedrus actually changed? 
Has he switched his preference to Socrates because Socrates used rhetorical language and techniques which 
appealed to him in which case he has not changed at all because he is still obsessed with rhetoric rather 
than philosophy, semblance over truth? Or has Socrates managed to write something on his soul which has 
made him begin an ascent through his dialectical relationship with Socrates towards the truth? We do not 
know if Socrates was successful in seducing Phaedrus nor perhaps can we be sure whether Plato has 
seduced the reader. The end is left open resembling postmodern texts in their indeterminacy. 
122 , It is indeed, a little strange that the dialogue's deflationary account of writing has so often been taken 
as representing the literal truth it undoubtedly designates without regard for the possibility of seeing the 
literal description as ironic commentary on its misleading nature as an account of a work such as that 
within which it is embedded. " ("Appropriating the Phaedrus" p. 11) 
123 "The critique of writing invites the retort that if a work is able to discriminate between readers, and 
those who are fitting find in the text upon interrogation responses to their questions, so that it does not, 
when `you ask it about any of the things it says out of a desire to learn' only superficially point `to just one 
thing, the same each time' (275d-e), then it is not simply the illegitimate brother to speech-and may 
indeed play that role in the reader's self-development that it would appear that the Phaedrus itself has 
indeed itself frequently achieved. " ("Appropriating the Phaedrus" p. 11) 
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conversion to philosophy show themselves, not writing, to be illegitimate brothers. 124 
Supporting this reading, if Plato did not believe that the written words convey life he 
would, it seems plausible to suppose, hardly have written his numerous dialogues, which 
are clearly not just an "elixir of memory" (274e5-6; trans. Rowe) for "[laying] up a store 
of reminders... for himself, when he reaches a forgetful old age" (276d2-4; trans. 
Rowe). 125 On this reading, the function of the Phaedrus, as we have seen through the 
Socrates of the Phaedrus' use of the aporia, would be to form a dialectical relation with 
the readers, echoing the dialectical structure within the dialogue, to teach the reader to 
become philosophical. 126 
Griswold seems closer to the text in that he simultaneously affirms both writing 
and Socrates' critique of writing in view of philosophical reflection. 
By written dialogues which present themselves as spoken exchanges and which do not explicitly call 
attention to their status as written texts, Plato appears to be affirming without qualification the Socratic 
praise of the spoken dialogue. This appearance is a dissemblance, for Plato did write, and his putatively 
spoken dialogues could exist only as written..,. Plato might then appear, given his deed of writing, to be 
endorsing without qualification the genre of the written dialogue. This endorsement is revealed as a 
'24There is initially a correlation between the philosopher and speech as the true son, and the rhetorician 
and writing, the illegitimate son, yet Plato here manipulates this opposition showing writing not to be 
classed with rhetoric, but a possible means to the end of philosophy, reminding us of Pausanias' statement 
in the Symposium that "any... action itself, as such, is neither good nor bad [but].. . 
depends upon how it is 
performed" (181a). Also see Derrida's "Plato's Pharmacy". 
25 Writing is not just an "elixir of memory" "for anyone who is following the same track" (276d2-4), but is 
also used to sift the readers and lead the appropriate reader onto the right path. 
126 As Lyotard (Just Gaming, p. 6) writes, "A reader is an addressee of written messages. A reader who 
starts to talk is something else: someone who takes the position of a sender of new message. Even if the 
message is a question; even if the message awaits an answer. In this way, there is in our present game a 
certain reversal of roles, since I am the one who tries to listen to your questions and to speak in turn from 
them. Insofar as what I wrote raised questions for you, you ask questions that in turn will raise questions for 
me: there is a permutation, an exchange of roles in the very production of a book. " The reader of the 
Phaedrus is Plato's addressee. The reader who answers back to the Phaedrus in voice or writing (as in the 
case of this thesis) becomes the sender. Through examining the text again Plato responds to the reader's 
question. Thus in questioning the text, the reader becomes the writer who in turn becomes the reader again 
reproducing the internal dialectical structure of a dialogue. This change from reader to writer is a role 
reversal which, when repeated, shows a necessary and continuous exchange of thought which defines 
neither as the writer or reader but each as both reader and writer, student and teacher, and lover and 
beloved, in which each pulls forth the wisdom from the other suggestive of the dialectical structure of 
anamnesis echoing the internal dialectic within the dialogue. Thus Plato's interaction with the reader 
produces a new dialogue/text between author and reader. Through this method, Plato by means of his 
philosophical dialogue not only sifts his readers but teaches them to become philosophers. Therefore, in the 
Phaedrus Plato, through the guise of Socrates, is trying to attract and seduce the reader, us, through 
establishing a reading dialectic with us through which he employs the aporia of the recantation to convert 
the reader to philosophy. 
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dissemblance when we realize that the texts are not meant as substitutes for spoken dialogue but as 
invitations to it. (Griswold, "Irony", pp. 94-5) 
In this way by writing dialogues Plato endorses spoken dialectics. Because of the 
dialogues' "logographic necessity" (Griswold, "Irony", p. 84) he endorses writing. Yet 
given this logographic necessity in which each element is directed towards the 
encouragement of philosophical reflection which is through dialectic, he uses the 
dialogues as an invitation to or initial introduction to the end of philosophical reflection. 
Strengthening and clarifying this argument Griswold elsewhere points out that in the 
myth concerning the critique of writing by Theuth, "the sort of `memory' which Thamus 
[Theuth] wishes to safeguard is precisely the anamnesis of Socrates' palinode" (Self- 
Knowledge, pp. 206-7). In this way, while emphasizing and affirming the anamnesis 
element in Socrates' second speech, Plato through categorizing writing as dead seemingly 
undermines the entire dialogue, 127 puts all the speeches into question, and encourages the 
reader (in the context of anamnesis) to weigh the conceptions of Bros, philosophy, 
rhetoric and writing for himself, inviting him to think for himself. 128 
H. IRONY AS POROS 
Given that Hackforth's conception of the Phaedrus, which proved to be more 
accurate textually than Nussbaum's, proposes an ironic unveiling of the "truth" presented 
in Socrates' second speech, which in turn opposes the irony of the aporia reducing all 
knowledge to nothing, we note a conflict in different types of irony, similar to that 
discussed in Chapter IV, "Eros and Irony". In the first, reminiscent of the traditional form 
of irony, exemplified by Alcibiades' understanding of irony, as the opposition of essence 
and existence, existence is slowly unveiled to reveal the essence. Thus through the 
sequence of speeches, the truth of Socrates' second speech is ultimately unveiled. In the 
second form of irony, Socratic irony of the first type according to Griswold, as Socrates 
127Plato's critique may also allude to the fact that Lysias can not personally respond to Socrates' attack as his written speech is discussed while he is not present. 128 In this way Plato remains "faithful to Socrates' method in refusing to `teach' his readers and leaving 
them to think out the matter for themselves". (Cornford, Sapientiae, p. 137-9; also see Kuhn, Fin du Phddre de Platon, p. 10) 
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while claiming to know nothing deflates the truth claims of the sophists and reduces the 
youths to "nothing", so here in the Phaedrus the aporia of the recantation functions to put 
in doubt all truth claims. While Hackforth's view emphasizes certain truth claims 
concerning the dialogue's ironic progression and the value of Socrates' second speech, 
the second type of irony undermines the first, producing an underlying aporia, resulting 
in a destablization of any preconceived reading (with the exception of that which is 
derived through anamnesis), thereby stimulating philosophical reflection as discussed by 
Kierkegaard (Concept, p. 211). 
In this context, as in other dialogues, Plato's "speculative" thought in that it 
"presupposes a fullness, "129 regardless of the work of the Socratic aporia of knowledge 
upon it, ultimately is not undermined. This resilience to the Socratic aporia of knowledge 
perhaps results from the fact that Plato's "speculative thought", like his understanding of 
divine inspiration, presupposes a heteronomous system accessible through anamnesis. 
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Speculative thought integrates the "nothing" of Socratic aporia within itself as a tool by 
which it enhances its further speculation, thereby making itself even more heterogeneous, 
using irony as an element directed towards creating rather than destruction, focused on 
beingt"fullness" rather than nothingness. Because of speculative faith in fullness through 
anamnesis, though the aporia is still present, it is controlled, and therefore is unable to 
infect all thought with nothingness. 
This purpose of philosophical reflection in the Phaedrus, as in many of the 
129 This fullness while indicating a belief in true virtue also points to the fullness of reason, that everything 
is explicable through reason exemplified by Plato's confidence in mathematics/geometry and its connection 
with anamnesis. Fullness is a belief that humans can know, a "unity of thought and being" (Kierkegaard, 
Concept, p. 37). 
130 "The resolution of the aporia of knowledge is anamnesis" (Cornford, Sapientiae, p. 49-51,52). This 
opens the problem of being and beyond being which is ambiguous in the dialogues. Divine inspiration or 
mania, at least for the lover in the Phaedrus (254b6-7) and in terms of mathematics in the Meno (82a1-2 
ff), appears to be through anamnesis. Though this has been viewed as extending beyond reason, this pursuit 
of wisdom is strictly, at least in terms of mathematics, through reason indicating that to which it points is 
within the boundaries of reason, though the human mind is generally blind to it. 
For Aristotle "Platonism was, in fact, [more] Pythagoreanism modified by Socrates' influence than 
Socraticism modified by Pythagoreans' influence. " (Cornford, Sapientiae, p. 46; also see p. 62; 
Empedocles vol. II, pp. 251-3; Guthrie, "Plato the Man and his Dialogues", p. 402) According to Cornford 
(p. 62), the Platonic dialogues are enveloped in the religious beliefs of Pythagoreans, "kinship of all life, 
divine, human, and animal - provides a scale of being along which the migrating soul may rise or sink 
according to its merits". 
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dialogues, is inseparable from anamnesis131 in that it is through remembering that which 
is forgotten that reflection is possible (see Theaetetus 150). Griswold suggests that 
Plato's strategy of letting the individual think for himself as opposed to imposing a 
doctrine upon him seems 
obviously connected with the notion that philosophical learning is a form of `recollection', a kind of 
knowledge to be brought out by the learner `from within'. Irony in its various guises, on both Socratic and 
Platonic levels, seems fairly obviously to be one way to compel the reader to rediscover on his or her 
own... [The Platonic dialogues have] an understanding of what it would mean to be a perfected, complete 
human being 
.... an ethical point to make to the effect that the unexamined 
life is not worth living.... [We 
should understand] `the point' of irony as connected to Plato's wish to invite the reader into a life of self- 
examination. (Griswold, "Irony", p. 100) 
This interconnection between irony and anamnesis is likewise affirmed in the critique of 
writing by Theuth in which anamnesis seems to be the only means by which true wisdom 
can be acquired, achieved through dialectics with another, which causes the bringing 
forth of true virtue in oneself and/or the other, which brings us back to Symposium 212, 
though there anamnesis is not referred to overtly. 
Given therefore that the aporia of the potential recantation of the recantation in 
the Phaedrus results in the undermining of other views with the exception of that which 
is derived though anamnesis, thereby stimulating reflective thought, the use of the 
aporetic structure of the recantation extends beyond Socratic irony. It can be seen as an 
example par excellence of Platonic irony in that its function transcends the conversation 
131 The Plato of the Meno is far more direct in his undermining of Socratic irony. In the Meno, just 
following Meno's statement that Socrates is "a perplexed man... and reduce[s] others to perplexity" (80a1- 
2), to "nothing, " through his Socratic irony, then comparing Socrates to the numbing effect of a sting ray 
(80a6-7), Meno brings up the question of the aporia of knowledge which is at the heart of Socratic irony, 
that which reduces others to perplexity. To this Socrates responds "You realize that what you are bringing 
up is a trick argument? " (80b1-2) an argument of the Sophists, which several lines later Socrates condemns 
as not a good argument. The aporia fails, according to Socrates, faced with what he has "heard from men 
and woman who understand the truths of religion" (81a4), "priests and priestesses" (81a8) also spoken of 
by "poets who are divinely inspired" (81b2), the immortality of the soul which he proves through 
anamnesis (82a1-2). Curiously, Socrates condemns the heart of the technique by which the actual Socrates 
reduced people to "nothing" and "silence, " as "a trick argument" (80e2), implying that Socrates employed 
the tricks of the sophists to some extent, thereby radically reducing the image of the original Socrates. He 
stretches beyond the "trickery, " sophistry, "false" knowledge with the notion of the immortality of the 
soul, proved through anamnesis exemplified by mathematical proofs, showing Plato's "Socrates" to be 
influenced by Pythagorean teachings (Cornford, Sapientiae, pp. 111-112). Here it seems Plato, student of 
the Pythagoreans and a mathematician himself, goes beyond the Socratic irony. 
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taking place within the dialogue and, as an example of logographic necessity within the 
dialogue, works with the other elements in order to communicate Plato's central message 
to the reader. This entails leading the reader to reflect philosophically to enable him to 
lead a "reflective, possibly philosophical [life]" (Griswold, "Irony", p. 100), thereby 
seeking the well-being of his soul through procreating true virtue. This in itself shows 
that Plato presupposed "fullness", that true virtue and understanding exist and that their 
attainment is possible, which is the foundation of and that towards which Platonic eros is 
directed. Furthermore this fullness is the end that Platonic and consequently Socratic 
irony strive to achieve; Platonic irony, subsuming Socratic irony, being the means by 
which Plato introduces and leads the reader along the path to true virtue. Platonic irony, 
pursuing the well-being of the reader's soul, demonstrates the poros-dominant tendency 
in eros emphasizing that part of eros focused not upon lack but on a pathway through 
lack, which is Plato's overall project. This is articulated in the Phaedrus through the 
sequential progression of different forms of irony. The unveiling irony of Hackforth is 
undermined by Socrates' aporia of the recantation, a further use of irony. This use of 
Socratic irony is undermined in turn by Platonic irony which provokes philosophical 
reflection, hence the well-being of the reader's soul through anamnesis. Thus we see 
three distinct types or phases of irony, each moving beyond the next, creating a "path" of 
irony, showing in the Phaedrus as in other dialogues the inseparability of eros and irony, 
irony being a means by which love is demonstrated. 
I. CONCLUSION 
Thus far in this thesis, having noted that in Platonic thought Eros is the child of 
Penia and Poros, we have identified two strands and potentialities of Bros which can be 
seen as giving rise to a penia-dominant form of eros and a poros-dominant form. 
Socrates, the embodiment of Platonic eros, affirmed that he knows nothing. His reduction 
of others to an aporia, which is the essence and starting point of Socratic inquiry seeking 
virtue and wisdom, demonstrates this penia-dominant tendency in eros which focuses 
upon lack. While penia and poros are integral parts of eros, this penia-dominant form of 
eros serves and is subsumed under the greater ends of the poros-dominant form of eros, 
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the general Platonic notion of eros. This functions as a method or technique and phase in 
the process of understanding in a similar way to the manner in which Socratic irony 
serves the overall telos of Platonic irony. The poros-dominant tendency in eros focuses 
not upon lack but on the passage through the aporia of the lack of knowledge, virtue etc. 
This is accomplished, or at least striven for, through Socratic and Platonic irony by which 
Plato seeks to beget true arete in others, and hence the reader, through causing them to 
reflect for themselves. Here we see that though in Diotima's myth of the birth of Eros the 
meaning of poros is intellectual resourcefulness and cunning, the overall understanding 
of poros in the Platonic trajectory is "pathway" indicating the passage through the aporia 
or penia of knowledge, the facilitation of which Plato seems to consider a great act of 
selfless love as it aids the other and oneself to advance towards true understanding, virtue 
and perhaps immortality. 
As noted in Chapter I of this Thesis, while Plotinus' understanding of Penia was 
relatively consistent with Plato's myth, his understanding of Poros represents a 
significant shift in understanding. From Plotinus onward in the Platonic tradition -Poros 
may be read as "wealth, resource or possession", as for him it represents the Reason- 
Principle from the Intellect and ultimately from the One overflowing in reason principles 
and goodness, resulting in the "contemplation of immutable essences". Given this 
understanding of Poros as the abundance of goodness, beauty and truth pouring down 
from the One, through turning upward in contemplation of the One we receive a wealth 
of goodness, virtue and truth. This understanding of poros is connected to poros as 
pathway in that the contemplation of this wealth of reason principles and tracing them 
back to their source functions as a pathway through which individuals are liberated from 
the aporia of the world, causing the liberation and/or salvation of their souls depending 
upon the interpretative tradition. This third understanding of Poros, implicit in Plato at 
best, following Plotinus is accepted by many Neo-Platonic Christian thinkers, such as 
Augustine, Ambrose and Ficino. In this context, Poros is seen to be of divine origin, a 
fullness suggesting the wealth of God and his creative goodness and love pouring down 
into creation, clearly therefore having a non-acquisitive selfless aspect and which in 
conjunction with penia/lack lead men back to God. In this way therefore we see Plotinus' 
understanding of poros to be digestible by and providing a linguistic resource for 
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Christianity which, though extremely different, integrates into its tradition, as we shall 
shortly see with regard to Dante. Before exploring this, however, we shall turn to 
examine two possible means by which Platonism may have reached Dante. 
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PART 2 
FROM PLATO TO DANTE: 
TWO POSSIBLE CHAINS OF INFLUENCE 
159 
VIII. INFLUENCE THROUGH THE PHILOSOPHICAL TRADITION 
Having examined Plato and before turning to Dante, in order to situate the choice of 
Dante in relation to Plato in our discussion of eros, we shall now examine two 
complementary ways by means of which the Platonic influence may have reached Dante; 
the philosophical and the literary. On the first account, Dante was influenced by the 
philosophical/theological tradition of scholars within the monastic community; one 
seemingly plausible chain of influence is Plato to Plotinus to Augustine and, as 
Augustinian teachings infiltrated most of the schools (including those holding to the 
Aristotelian model), eventually leading to Dante. The second account suggests that 
Platonism influenced Dante through the poetic tradition, perhaps through Ovid but 
certainly through the Neo-Platonic influence upon the Troubadours. 
Dante had no direct access to Plato's dialogues on love, neither the Symposium nor 
the Phaedrus. ' Conservatively Moore ("Dante and Plato" in Dante Studies, First Series, 
p. 156) states that "Dante's knowledge of the actual works of Plato was doubtless 
limited.. . to the Timaeus, though from passages 
in Aristotle, Cicero and perhaps 
Augustine, he was aware of some of the doctrines beyond the limits of that work". 
Mazzeo (Structure and Thought, p. 2), Gilson, and Nardi ("Dante and Medieval Culture", 
p. 41) extend this position, maintaining that Platonism was diffused through the culture2 
through philosophy, theology and literature. 
With regard specifically to Dante's education, relatively little is known. As Florence 
had no university, "university learning was represented chiefly in the Dominican and 
Franciscan convents whose schools Dante tells us he attended. Among their friars were 
I Symonds, "Dantesque and Platonic ideals of Love", p. 30; Mazzeo, Structure and Thought, p. 167. 
2 "It is as certain as these things can be that Dante had no direct knowledge of the Phaedrus. On the other 
hand, if sources are insisted upon, he had no need of the Phaedrus. To paraphrase Etienne Gilson, if, in the 
Middle Ages in Western Europe, Plato was virtually nowhere, Platonism was everywhere, in the fathers, in 
Cicero, in the Arab philosophers, and, indeed, in Aristotle. " (Mazzeo, Structure and Thought, p. 2) "To the 
objection that the Florentine poet had no knowledge of those two works of the Athenian philosopher, we 
may reply that Platonic thought spread in countless rivulets and by then was inspiring a vast literature 
which, at least in part, was already well known to Dante. " (Nardi, "Dante and Medieval Culture", p. 41) 
"The scattered elements of platonic doctrines of love were everywhere present awaiting a synthesis. The 
vocabulary awaited a man who had had a platonic experience and had the need and ability to express it. 
Dante, I think, was just such a man. " (Mazzeo, Structure and Thought, p. 2) 
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men who had been to universities and who were capable of introducing him to classical 
and scholastic philosophy. " (Holmes, p. 18; see Convivio II, XII, 2-7) In Inferno XV 
Dante himself acknowledges his considerable debt to Brunetto Latini. Furthermore, after 
the death of Beatrice (Convivio II, XII, 2-7), echoing Augustine after the death of his 
friend (Confessions IV), Dante consoled himself with the pursuit of philosophy reading 
Cicero's On Friendship and the Neo-Platonist text Boethius' Consolation of Philosophy3; 
thereafter he became so engrossed in philosophical studies that he calls Philosophy 
(Convivio, II, XII, 2-7) 4 the "noble lady"5 with whom he has now fallen in love, a 
personification reminiscent of Boethius' "Lady Philosophy" and likewise Cicero's 
"exhortation of Philosophy. ,6 
1. SIMILARITIES BETWEEN PLATO AND DANTE 
To explore the proposed Neo-Platonic chain of influence by which Dante may 
have been influenced by Plato, we will point to items in the Symposium, Phaedrus, and 
Republic which play a role in Neo-Platonism and show how they recur, somewhat 
modified, in the Dantean texts. With regard to the similarities between the thought of 
Plato and Dante, the general resemblance may be broken down into three areas; cultural, ' 
3 "The `consolation' which he advocates is an awareness of God, as identified with goodness and the source 
of beatitude, and of the negativity of evil... It may also have been as a result of reading Boethius that Dante 
adopted a vision of the universe governed by the principles of emanation from a divine centre of pure light 
and goodness, which now first appears in his writings. " ( Holmes, p, 19-20) 
° "Some of these philosophical poems [of the Convivio] are addressed to a lady. Dante explains that she is 
not, as she might appear to be, a courtly love lady but an allegorical figure, standing for Philosophy... 
Dante also feels bound to explain how the allegorical lady came to take the place of Beatrice in his poetry. " 
(Holmes, p. 17) 
5 Dante was "a poet before he became a philosopher and a poet of the courtly love tradition of the period. If 
philosophy was a lovely thing, it had to be imagined as a woman. " (Foster, "The Mind in Love", p. 45) 
6 Similarly, Augustine writes in Confessions 3: 4 of reading Cicero's Hortensius "[containing] an 
exhortation to philosophy". 
With regard to cultural similarities, for both Plato and Dante love is considered an "ennobling passion. " 
(Mazzeo, Structure and Thought, p. 111) This passion is of military origin (Symonds, "The Dantesque and 
Platonic Ideals of Love", p. 77,79; also see Phaedrus' speech in Symposium), which has been refined by 
the intellect or through philosophy. "In both instances, an enthusiasm which had its root in human passion, 
after passing through a martial phase of evolution and becoming a social factor of importance in the raising 
of the race to higher spiritual power, assumes the aspect of philosophy, and connects itself with the effort of 
the intellect to reach the Beatific Vision. " (Symonds "The Dantesque and Platonic Ideals of Love", p. 80) 
Also they are conceived in primarily extramarital forms (ibid., p. 75 and p. 78); the relationship in Plato is 
between men (Symposium 209B6-8), while in Dante it is strictly heterosexual (Capellanus, The Art of 
Courtly Love, Book I, Ch. 1; Foster, "Dante's Idea of Love", p. 80). 
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philosophical concerning the nature of love, 8 and regarding transformation, involving the 
ascent from the physical to the intellectual. 9 Given that Plato was an ancient Greek pagan 
They share similar attitudes towards sexual love in that desire must be channelled towards 
intellectual ends (Symposium 210B and Brandeis, p. 107). Though sexual attraction is encouraged, both 
forbid sexual intercourse. (Phaedrus 254B2 "monstrous and forbidden act"; also 255A5 "shameful to have 
commerce with a lover"; 256A6; also see Dover Greek Homosexuality. In Dante "abstractly considered, 
sexuality is thoroughly good; in the concrete, in its practical effects, it is often evil--damnably so. " Foster, 
"Dante's Idea of Love", p. 81. For the role of sexual attraction see Symposium 210A9 and Foster, "Dante's 
Idea of Love", p. 83 and p. 90. ) Yet given these types of love's close relation to physical passion, both 
forms of love in both Plato and Dante, the latter influenced by courtly love, are tied closely to a potential 
evil. This evil for Plato is homosexual pederastic intercourse, while for Dante it is adultery. (Symonds "The 
Dantesque and Platonic Ideals of Love" p. 78 and Mazzeo, Structure and Thought, p. 112) Further, both 
codes instantiating these concepts have "an `alien' quality". (Mazzeo, Structure and Thought, p. 112) 
8 With respect to philosophical similarities, we note even more striking likenesses concerning the theories 
of love. In both conceptions, Eros or Amor is neither bad nor good in itself but is defined by the object at 
which it is directed. (Symposium 180E6-181A1 and 181B4-5; Purgatorio, XVII, 103-5; Barolini, "Dante 
and the Lyric Past", p. 31-2 also cites Purgatorio 18: 14-15) Both theories of love acknowledge a dispute 
as to whether Love is a sentiment, a daemon or a god. (Mazzeo, Structure and Thought, p. 126-7; 
Symposium 202D11-203A8; Phaedrus 243D3-7; also see Nardi "Dante and Medieval Culture, p. 40) Love 
is at times linked with tyranny (Republic 573a2; Inferno V; Nardi, "Filosofia dell'Amore", p. 88; Cambon, 
p. 57) and also with the philosopher who being a lover of wisdom knows that he does not know. 
(Symposium 203-4; Convivio 3, i, 3. and 3,1,7. Cf. Nic. Ethics, ii 63b 30, cited by Foster, "The Mind in 
Love", p. 46-7) Furthermore in both love is understood to be a desire for immortality and eternity. 
(Mazzeo, Structure and Thought, pp. 140 and 193; Symposium 207A1-3; Paradiso XXIV) 
9 Concerning transformation that involves the ascent from the physical to the intellectual, many more 
similarities may be noted. Both Plato and Dante show and express the importance of possessing a 
sensitivity to physical beauty (Phaedrus 250B2-c7 and 254A3-B 1; Mazzeo, Structure and Thought, p. 
138). In this context, love begins with and is passed through the eyes. (Phaedrus 255C2-7, Paradiso 
XV. 34-36, Pelikan p. 72 cites Paradiso XXVIII. 3; Phaedrus 250D cited by Mazzeo, Structure and 
Thought, p. 18 and 19; Paradiso XIV; Mazzeo, Medieval Cultural Tradition, p. 129) This vision of 
physical beauty as reminiscent of an ideal beauty causes a state of stupor in the lover, (Mazzeo, Structure 
and Thought, p. 126; Convivio, 4,25,5; Aristotle, Metaphysics 982, b, 10; Vita Nuova; Charles Williams, 
The Figure of Beatrice, p. 7 and Ch. 1; Foster, "The Mind in Love", p. 50) For both, this beauty functions 
as a lure (Phaedrus 254B6-8; Mazzeo, Structure and Thought, p. 22-23), the universal shining through the 
particular, which leads or causes the lover to ascend towards an ideal Beauty. (Phaedrus 254B6-7; cf, 
Purgatorio XXXI and Purgatorio I, 46-54; Mazzeo, Structure and Thought, p. 128-9; Symposium 210a6- 
211a4; Paradiso III. 124-130; Paradiso XXI, 10-12; ParadisoVIII. 14-15; Pelikan, p. 72; with regard to the 
metaphysics of light see Republic 507A-509D, Mazzeo, Medieval Cultural Tradition, Ch. III and Structure 
and Thought, p. 10- 17) This marks a movement from the physical to the intellectual, profane to sacred. 
(Symposium 210a8-10 and 210e5; Vita Nuova, Foster, "Dante's Idea of Love", p. 80; Foster, "Dante's Idea 
of Love, p. 81 cites Purgatorio, XXX, 127-41; XXXII, 103-05; XXXIII, 52-54; Shaw, p. 126-7 cites 
Purgatorio XXX, 48; Brandeis, p. 106). This process in both entails the enlargement of love (Symposium 
210a10; Shapero, Woman, Earthly and Divine, p. 126) from the desire for one physical object to the love of 
the universal (Mazzeo, Structure and Thought, p. 113-120, p. 127-8, p. 140). Furthermore this ascent which 
is an ascent on the ladder of beauty is also related to the ascent of the ladder of truth and goodness. 
(Symposium 210; Paradiso, III, 1-3; Brandeis p. 121; Vita Nuova; Mazzeo, Structure and Thought, p. 7, 
131-2; Purgatorio XXXI, 34-36; Paradiso XXX, 7 ff; Purgatorio XXVI, 59) 
Though in Plato, unlike Dante, the ascents do not fully converge as the forms remain to some 
extent distinct, in both Plato and Dante, the pinnacle of the ascent is described imagistically as a sun so that 
the ascent can be described through the metaphor of light and illumination (Republic 517B7-C4; Mazzeo, 
Structure and Thought, p. 9-10). When considering specifically Plato's Phaedrus in relation to Dante, both 
maintain the importance of the love of the individual (Mazzeo, Structure and Thought, p. 132,137; Phaedrus 256A7-B7) in the pursuit of self-knowledge and transcendence (Phaedrus 255D2-3,256B4; 
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and Dante subscribed fully to medieval Christianity, in discussing the similarities 
between the thought of Plato and Dante I am not claiming that there is a direct identity 
between many aspects of Platonism and Dantean thought, but only that there is a 
resemblance which seems to indicate an influence of Platonism, though indirect, on 
Dantean thought. However, in the light of the points of similarity between Plato's 
dialogues and Dante's poetry (detailed within the notes), we may posit the hypothesis that 
Plato influenced Dante, and hence seek to identify the manner by which these Platonic 
conceptions may have been indirectly transmitted to Dante. 
2. THE NEO-PLATONIC CHAIN: PLATO, PLOTINUS, AUGUSTINE AND 
DANTE 
Having noted Dante's exposure to Neo-Platonism through the Dominicans, 
Franciscans, Latini, and through reading Cicero and Boethius (and of course Aristotle), 
and having sketched the notable similarities between Plato and Dante with respect to their 
conceptions of love, we shall now attempt to trace the threads of the Neo-Platonic 
Brandeis, p. 122). In both contexts, the lovers understand through otherness (Phaedrus 255C1-D6; 
Brandeis p. 124), through the mediation of the beloved. Though both use erotic language to describe 
intellectual/spiritual love (Phaedrus 255C1-D2 and 251B1-D1; Paradiso XXX. 70-74 and 88-89 cited by 
Pertile, p. 167), each prescribes a moral direction to passion (Mazzeo, Structure and Thought, p. 112). 
While each discusses free will (with regard to Plato "legitimate satisfaction" in Cornford "The Doctrine of 
Eros"; see Dante's Monarchia I; Republic 518D3-7; Symposium 208e2-209a5; Foster, "Dante's Idea of 
Love", p. 82; Purgatorio XVI-XVIII: 55; Mazzeo, Structure and Thought, p. 63), love is directed at moral 
perfection (Symposium 209B6-c2; Phaedrus 253B9-C2; Foster, "Dante's Idea of Love", p. 81-2; Holmes, 
16; Nardi, "Filosofia deli 'Amore", p. 92) so both views can be understood as being examples of 
perfectionism (Symposium 201C11-13; Symposium 213C5-6; Pelikan, p. 77; Theaetetus 150B5-D9; 
Pelikan, p. 73; Shapero, Woman, Earthly and Divine, p. 135), and both maintain a sense of mission 
(Republic (517C7-9,519D1-520C9,519B8-C4; Purgatorio XXXII. 149,155; Paradiso XXVII. 31-36; 
Pelikan, p. 76). In Plato and Dante the images of wings are employed to express a flight to truth (Phaedrus 
251B1-Cl, 255C7-D1,247D6-7; Paradiso XXXIV, Paradiso XXV. 49-50; Mazzeo, Medieval Cultural 
Tradition, p. 125). In this flight the lovers experience a sense of joyful mania in the presence of the beloved 
(Mazzeo, Structure and Thought, p. 14,112; Symonds, "The Poetry of Chivalrous Love" in Introduction to 
the Study of Dante p. 258-60; Symonds "The Dantesque and Platonic Ideals of Love" p. 76-7) as well as a 
sense of poetic inspiration described as a type of mania (Phaedrus 244c-245A, 248D21,249D4-E6, 
Mazzeo, Structure and Thought, p. 7-8,121,128-13 1; Foster, "The Mind in Love", p. 48-50). Both seek to 
resolve the tension between the philosopher and the poet (Phaedrus 241D-243E; Mazzeo, Structure and 
Thought, p. 120-1,131). "Lover, poet and pilgrim in Dante reconstituted the Phaedrus doctrine of 
`salvation, ' love, and poetic inspiration in extraordinary detail. " (Mazzeo, Structure and Thought, p. 2) 
Furthermore, both seek to synthesize several traditions. (Mazzeo, Structure and Thought, pp. 113 and 140) 
Finally it is worth noting Nardi's observation that "even the last thesis of the Phaedrus-that true eloquence 
is the sincere expression of the feelings of the soul-finds a perfect echo in the verses of the poet: I' mi son 
un, the quando amor mi spira, noto, ed a quel modo ch'e' ditta dentro vo significando [I am one who takes 
note when love inspires me and signify it after the manner in which it is said within me]". (Nardi, "Dante 
and Medieval Culture", p. 41) 
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influence upon Dante. The most plausible chain of influence is from Plato to Plotinus to 
Augustine, and thereby through medieval culture/monastic schools to Dante. Though the 
Phaedrus was formative for the neo-Platonic tradition, 10 most of the items linking the 
texts under discussion in their treatments of love can be found in the Symposium though, 
as we shall see later, the culture of courtly love seems to have transmitted the notion of 
the love of the individual found in the Phaedrus. We shall therefore proceed by sketching 
certain topics addressed in the Symposium (and the Phaedrus), demonstrating their 
appearance in Plotinus, Augustine and Dante to show the putative line of influence. It 
would be possible to follow the overall line of argumentation of the Symposium in order 
to present the case, covering major issues such as whether love is daemon, god or stated, 
the pursuit of Eudaimonia/Happiness12, the pursuit of eternal possession of the Good 13, 
10 Supporting this view Foster ("The Mind in Love", note 33, p. 174) maintains "The Phaedrus was the 
keystone of the neoplatonic system, and the neoplatonists systemized its central doctrines in their theory of 
salvation through love's extasis. They gave us a rationale for finding God progressively as a result of 
spectative activity. The extasis, however, comes only to those who are prepared to receive it. " 
" Plato, Plotinus, Augustine and Dante all questioned the nature of love. In Symposium 202D4, Socrates 
states "If Love has no part in either goodness or beauty how can he be a God" after which Socrates has 
Diotima launch into the myth of the birth of Eros (203B1-204C5) to illustrate the point. By contrast in the 
Phaedrus, as we have discussed, Love is a god. Centuries later Plotinus enquires "What is Love? A God, a 
Celestial spirit, a state of mind? " after which he analyzes Plato's myth of the birth of Eros from the 
Symposium, in which he reinterprets the poros of 111.5.7-9 as the Intellectual Principle from the One. 
Augustine resolves this problem by stating that as we have "the imprint of God our creator who loves us we 
desire to return to him, so that we are lovers of God who is Love and the beloved of Love. " (see 
Confessions Book X, xxvii) In Dante, love is understood in all three ways mentioned by Plotinus: First 
everyone, including all in Paradiso, are in a state of desire and are therefore lovers. Secondly, Beatrice is 
love, a mediating spirit between the mortal and Heavenly in the Commedia, and as shown also in the Vita 
Nuova when we see a change from love as amor to caritas represented as Beatrice. Amor, in the Vita 
Nuova is thereafter understood as a quality as opposed to the substance of Love, which is God as 
demonstrated at the end of Paradiso. 
12 Through the Platonic (as well as Aristotelian) tradition the idea that every person seeks happiness is a 
recurring theme. Socrates in Plato's Symposium (205A1-3) states that a longing for happiness is common to 
all men. Diotima thinks this is so self-evident that "there is no need for us to ask why men should want to 
be happy". This idea is discussed by Plotinus in the Enneads 1.4 when he writes "If, then, the perfect life is 
within human reach the man attaining it attains happiness". Later Augustine writes "All men desire 
blessedness" (Confessions XX, 20; also "Is not a happy life the thing which all desire and there is no man at 
all that desires it not? ", Confessions XX, 20; and "When I seek Thee, my God, I seek the blessed life" 
Confessions X, xx, 29; also see Cicero's Hortensius, "Certainly we all want to be happy". For discussion 
see Nygren, p. 476-7). However, as Augustine states also in de Trinitate 13, iv, 7, true happiness cannot be 
attained in this life but only in the presence of God. "The Happy life [is] to rejoice concerning thee unto 
thee for thy sake" (Confessions X, 22). Dante influenced by Augustine recognizes in the Convivio (like the 
Symposium, "Convivio means `The Banquet. '" Holmes, p. 16) that perfect happiness can not be found in 
this life. Foster ("The Mind in Love", p. 47) writes, "Dante will tell us that the speculative felicity of pure 
knowing is not perfectly to be found on this side of eternity". In Virgil's speech in Purgatorio XVIII, he 
discusses man's inborn "craving for happiness" which can only be satisfied fully by God. "The norm of 
morality... is first and foremost the living human soul itself in its inborn and essential craving for 
happiness; and this because that craving can only in fact be fulfilled by God. " (Foster, "Dante's Idea of 
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Love as the source of all motivation14, the pursuit of immortality15, the division of love 
Love", p. 74) This craving therefore is only fulfilled by God in Paradise and is indescribable, being a state 
simultaneously of continued desire and satisfaction. "It is constantly replenished and renewed.. . the 
desire 
of the blessed is eternally alive and yet eternally fulfilled. " (Pertile, p. 166; also p. 154-5) "In Dante's 
paradise the blessed themselves feel constant desire..., it is in itself perfect, it is the tangible form of perfect 
love; this desire, hunger and thirst are constantly alive and constantly replenished. In Heaven the soul is not 
fed and satisfied once and for all, its desire extinguished for ever and ever; but as it reaches God, desire and 
fulfillment, perfectly balanced and simultaneous, become a timeless mode of being that is forever present. " 
(Pertile, p. 154-5) However, "it is precisely because Dante imagines and structures it in terms of a tension 
between desire and fulfilment that his Paradise becomes representable and Paradiso works as poetry". 
(Pertile, p. 155) 
13 This line of influence further shows the repeated longing to make the good one's own forever. In the 
Symposium 205A6, Diotima maintains "we all long to make the good our own, " and in Symposium 206E9- 
10, "the lover longs for the good to be his own forever. " Plotinus (Enneads 6.9.8) who considers the good 
to be the One and the Supreme, states "we reach towards the Supreme, " and in Enneads V. I. 6., "the 
offspring must seek and love the begetter". (Also see Enneads III, 5,1; Love is.. .. 
longing for the Good. ") 
In turn Augustine speaks of this first tendency in terms of good effects being inseparable from the blessed 
or happy life: "If [human nature] is not capable of [immortality] it is not capable of blessedness. For that a 
man may live blessedly, he must needs live. And if life quits him by dying, how can a blessed life remain 
with him? " (de Trinitate 13.8) He further speaks of this in relation to God the ultimate Good: "Thou hast 
made us for thyself, 0 Lord, and our hearts are restless until they rest in thee". (Confessions, 1,1) Dante, 
having the same conception of God uses terms similar to Augustine to discuss this same theme. "It is 
impossible for him ever to consent that he should turn from it...; for the good which is the object of the will 
is all gathered in it, and apart from it that is defective which there is perfect. " Paradiso XXXIII, 100-105) 
"The supreme aim, hope and (reaching out of the text and across to its reader) promise implicit in the 
pilgrim's ascent is precisely to restore the unity and identity, beyond desire, of knowing and possessing, 
which indeed-the poet tells us-is what happens in the final vision, even if only for one momentary flash" 
(Pertile, p. 164), for the good to be his forever. (Also see Pertile, p. 146,163. ) 
la Plato, Plotinus, Augustine and Dante believe that Love motivates all things. In Plato's Symposium 
(205D1-7) Diotima says every activity is done through desire, so every activity is motivated by love. 
Plotinus in the Enneads (5.1.6. ) states that the One overflows giving off hypostases as "fire gives out its 
heat; snow is cold not merely to itself; fragrances" giving off their scent. In turn the "offspring must seek 
and love the begetter. " Augustine discusses this in terms of good and evil in Confessions II, 4 and X, 27 
and de Trinitate 13. Dante has Virgil declare, `Neither Creator, my son, nor creature ... was ever without love, whether natural or rational" (Purg. XVII, 91-93). Dante's work can be seen as "a variant on the Neo- 
Platonist tradition that all things go in a cyclic movement from and to the divine One or Good. " (Foster, 
"Dante's Idea of Love", p. 90; also see p. 86-7) Paradiso ends with Dante writing, "L'amor the move il 
sole e l'altre stelle. " There are "two parallel impulsions from God, the one driving the sun and the stars, the 
other impelling a man's desire and will... the God-swayed motion of the stars is an objective fact to which a 
newly achieved state of one human soul is now being likened. " (Foster, "Dante's Idea of Love", p. 66) u Likewise these thinkers and poets believe that all men seek immortality. In Plato's Symposium 207A2 
Diotima states, "Love is a longing for immortality". Plotinus (Enneads III. 51) borrowing much from the 
Symposium writes, "There are those that feel also a desire of such immortality as lies within mortal reach. " 
Augustine, influenced both by Christianity and also by Platonism, writes in the Confessions XXX, "all men 
long for immortality, " and in the de Trinitate 13.8, he writes "No one wrongly wills immortality, if human 
nature is by God's gift capable of it. " This introduces the notion of grace associated with Christian agapic 
love. Dante takes over both aspects of Augustinian belief fully. For Dante throughout Purgatorio and 
Paradiso, all desire is a desire for immortality. Even in the Inferno, concern for the living world can be 
seen as a concern for self-perpetuation, as demonstrated in part by Cavalcanti's concern for his son Guido 
(Inferno X, 67-80). Also Cavalcanti's condemnation resulted from his seeking "immortality" in the wrong 
way through Epicurianism. (Inferno X, 13-14; see Lucretius' notion of "immortality" in On The Nature of 
Things. ) 
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into two forms, earthly and heavenlylb, the ladder of Beauty17, the Good or God likened 
16 Plato, Plotinus, Augustine and Dante consider love to take two forms; earthly and heavenly. In the 
Symposium, love can either be "procreancy... of the body ... 
[or] procreancy... of the spirit rather than the 
flesh. " (208E2-209 2) In the Enneads 111.5.1, "This aspiration takes two forms, that of the good whose 
devotion is for beauty itself, and that other which seeks its consummation in some vile act. " As Platonic 
eros is distinguished by the object to which it is directed likewise "the difference between Caritas and 
Cupiditas is not one of kind, but of object" (Nygren, p. 494), which in turn defines the kind. "Man has to 
choose between Caritas and Cupiditas, between directing his love up to the eternal [love of God] or down 
to the temporal ... 
Cupiditas [being] love of the world. " (Nygren, p. 483). "St. Augustine says, in effect, that 
concupiscentia is the opposite of caritas, but that both have a single source in amor. ['Love is 
convetousness (concupiscentia) when the creature is loved for its own sake; and then it serves not to aid our 
use but to corrupt our enjoyment. ' But `a love of the creature, if referred to the Creator, becomes charity 
(caritas) and not covetousness'. De Trinitate, IX, sec. 12. trans. Burnaby] His reference here is to 
concupiscence in its wider sense, as all possessive creature-love; and he opposes it to that totally selfless 
love of God in which all particular loves are transmuted. " (Brandeis, p. 190-191) "Augustine in On 
Christian Doctrine continues, `I mean by charity that affection of the mind which aims at the enjoyment of 
God for His own sake, and the enjoyment of one's self and one's neighbor in subordination to God; by lust I 
mean that affection of the mind which aims at enjoying one's self and one's neighbor and other corporeal 
things without reference to God. '" (Foster, "Dante's Idea of Love"). In this way Caritas as "gratis" is the 
opposite of cupiditas. Augustine expresses this in the tension between carnal and spiritual longing: "Late 
have I loved you beauty so old and so new: late have I loved you. And see, you were within and I was in 
the external world and sought you there, and in my unlovely state I plunged into those created things which 
you made" (Confessions 10: 38). These two sorts of love and their tension in Dante's Commedia (Foster, 
"Dante's Idea of Love", p. 96) will be explored in this thesis through Francesca seen as earthly eroslamor 
and Beatrice, understood to embody caritas, the medieval fusion of heavenly eros and agape. 
17 Plato describes the Ladder of ascent to the beautiful in Symposium 210a6-211a4 and also 211c2-8. 
Recollection of the beautiful is more thoroughly marked out in the Phaedrus 254b. Plotinus in Enneads II, 
9,16 discusses this phenomenon with regard to painting when he writes, "Now if the sight of Beauty 
excellently reproduced upon a face hurries the mind to that other Sphere, surely no one seeing the 
loveliness lavish in the world of sense.. . could 
be so dull-witted, so immovable, as not to be carried by all 
this to recollection. " For Mazzeo, "For both Plotinus and St. Augustine... beauty is a function of that 
principle which constitutes things in their being and their intelligibility. In this they agree. But St. 
Augustine gave to beauty a purpose in the order of things absent in Plotinus. Its primary function is to make 
known the Creator. " (Mazzeo, Structure and Thought, p. 69; also see Rom. 1: 20. ) Augustine in 
Confessions X. 10-11 traces the ladder of Beauty; also see Confessions X, 9 when he describes his search 
for God in creation: "And I replied unto these, which stand so round about these doors of my flesh: Answer 
me concerning my God since you are not he, answer me something of him. And they cried out with a loud 
voice: He made us. My questioning with them was my thought; and their answer was their beauty. " Mazzeo 
notes, "Although the Phaedrus and Symposium were unknown in the West, the elements of the doctrines 
contained in these works were widely diffused. The ladder of love and beauty to God were cornerstones of 
much medieval theological speculation. To reconstitute the Phaedrus doctrine, it was simply required to 
synthesize love of beauty in a person with the amorous ascent to God. "(Mazzeo, Structure and Thought, p. 
167) Dante thinks, according to Mazzeo (Medieval Cultural Tradition, p. 122), that "All human beauty, 
natural or portrayed, is bait, serving to capture and fix the eyes so as to possess the mind". "If I flame on 
thee in the warmth of love, beyond the measure witnessed upon earth, and so vanquish the power of thine 
eyes, marvel not; for this proceedeth from perfect vision. " (Paradiso. V, 1-5) "The lure of beauty for the 
eyes and the eyes themselves as the most beautiful of bodily parts run as a unifying thread through Dante's 
works from the first visions of the Vita nuova to the final visions of the Paradiso. " (Medieval Cultural 
Tradition, p. 127) Mazzeo traces the ladder of beauty showing a like pattern of influence. Given that "the 
light and Beauty of God shine through creation" (Brandeis, The Ladder of Vision, p. 198; Mazzeo, 
Medieval Cultural Tradition, p. 115-6, Structure and Thought, p. 155), the increase in beauty which is 
represented as light lures Dante to ascend to God. Simultaneously as the beauty and light increase so does his desire/love, his wisdom and existence/being. Thus in this way "the ladders of light, being, love, knowledge, and beauty are all actually fused; this fusion permits Dante to ascend to God as poet, lover, 
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to the sun18, the vision of the Good or Beauty as an inexpressible experience 19, though it 
would remain important to respect significant differences in conception. 20 Nevertheless, 
philosopher, and mystic seer all at once" (Mazzeo, Medieval Cultural Tradition, p. 117; also see Brandeis, 
p. 127), resembling the musicos in the Phaedrus. Mazzeo (Structure and Thought, p. 68) concludes that "all 
medieval speculation on the nature of love and beauty was ultimately Platonic and Neo-Platonic, and the 
transmission of this classical stock of ideas was in great part the work of the church fathers". (Mazzeo, 
Structure and Thought, p. 67-75; For the continuation of the argument concerning beauty in Plotinus and 
Dante see Mazzeo, Structure and Thought, p. 78-83. ) However though consistent with Neo-Platonism this 
fusion of the ladders is not Platonic as the dialogues do not suggest one ladder but several reaching towards 
differing forms which though related are not identical. The way these ladders join shows the neo-Platonic 
influence on Dante. The ladders form part of the cyclical passage by which the lover having been sent out 
is drawn back to God through his love of beauty and truth "The circle is thus closed: the ladders of love and 
beauty are conceptually unified in the all-inclusive idea of universal love ordering to each other the forms 
of love and the manifestations of beauty. This all-embracing principle of love is the same Love in whose 
presence Dante assumes the circular movement of eternity, the Love which moves the sun and other stars. " 
(Mazzeo, Structure and Thought, p. 83; also see note 42, p. 193) 
18 All four thinkers use the image of the sun to describe the pinnacle of the ascent. Plato describes the form 
of the Good as a sun in Republic 517B8-C4, further suggested by the revelation of the form of the beautiful 
as a flash which "bursts upon him" in Symposium 211e4-5. Plotinus describes the One's 
"circumradiation-produced from the Supreme but from the Supreme unaltering-and may be compared to 
the brilliant light encircling the sun". (Enneads, 5.1.6; also see 5.1.7) Mazzeo (Structure and Thought, p. 
142-3) points out that, "St. Augustine adopted the famous platonic metaphor of the Good as the sun of the 
intelligible world, a metaphor widely used by both pagan neoplatonists and Christian fathers. It is largely 
through his influence that the platonic interpretations of the sun symbol became widely diffused among 
medieval thinkers". Dante calls God in Paradiso XXIX: 136 "Prima Luce. " Mazzeo writes that for Dante, - 
-"God is the Eternal Light (etterno lume, 43) as lume or radiated light. He is Supreme Light (somma luce, 
67) and Eternal - Light (luce etterna, 83 and 124) as luce or the source of light. The love and knowledge 
relating the Persons of the Trinity are a kind of circling of reflected light (127-128)". Furthermore 
resembling Plotinus, "the relation of multiplicity to this unitary Primal Light (prima luce, XXIX, 136) is 
one of creation and of "emanation"... The relation between the various orders of being including the angels 
is one of an "outflowing" or "downpouring"; Dante frequently describes it as a "raying" (raggiare, VII, 
75). God pours out, without stint, His goodness, beauty, love, and light-irradiating all things and 
conforming them to Himself in their degree (cf. XIII, 52 ff. )" (Mazzeo, Medieval Cultural Tradition, p. 
110-111). 
19 For these thinkers, an encounter with the divine comes as an inexpressible experience. Plato in the 
Phaedrus 247C3-4 writes of "that place beyond the heavens none of our earthly poets has yet sung, and 
none shall sing worthily" Plotinus describes how "In knowing, soul and mind abandon its unity; it cannot 
remain a simplex: knowing is taking account of things; that accounting is multiple; the mind thus plunging 
into number and multiplicity departs from unity" (Enneads 6.9.4) yet in grasping the One, the soul is 
"caught away" (6,9,11) beyond rational thought. "It is not a vision compassed but a unity apprehended. 
The man formed by this mingling with the Supreme must.. . carry 
its image impressed upon him. " 
(Enneads, 6.9.11) Augustine in Confessions 1.4 writes of the "incomprehensibility" of God; also see the 
close of the Ostia vision. Furthermore the underlying emphasis of the "inexpressibility of God runs through 
and underlies de Trinitate 1-2. And finally Dante emphasizes the inexpressibility and incomprehensibility 
of God. (Par. XXXII. 142-145)" (Pertile, p. 145-146,170-172) "I saw things that he who from that height 
descends, forgets or can not speak; for nearing its desired end, our intellect sinks into an abyss so deep that 
memory fails to follow it. " (Paradiso, 1.5-9, echoing 2 Corinthians 12: 2-4; Penile, p. 145- 146) This is 
introduced and emphasised by the fact that Beatrice's beauty as she approaches God becomes indescribably 
beautiful. (Pelikan, p. 58-9 refers to Paradiso XVIII, 10-12, XXX. 14-18) 
20 These similarities and threads of influence do not, of course, indicate that these texts are concerned with 
the same God or experience. Similar terminology is used to describe very different things. Plato describes 
forms or principles. In Symposium 211b he writes of the form of the Beautiful while in Republic 517B8-c4 
he writes of the form of the Good; "the idea of the good.. . the cause for all things of all that is right and 
167 
given the limits of space we shall here concentrate upon only one parallel, eros, as this is 
the primary concern for the thesis. 
With regard to eros, "Dante's general theory of love falls easily into place as a variant 
on the Platonic tradition" (Foster, "Dante's Idea of Love", p. 75). The Plato of 
Symposium 210 and Republic 518C7-10 maintains that though eros can be directed at 
either carnal or intellectual/spiritual ends, properly trained, it "[becomes] a love of ideal 
goodness and beauty, " the forms of the Good and Beautiful (see note 16). 
This conception of eros is rethought in Plotinus' Enneads in that eros emanating 
from the One involves a return to the One creating a cyclical path of eros. This seems to 
result from Plotinus' conflation of the ascent to the Form of the Good in the Republic 
with that to the Beautiful in the Symposium. The aspects of the Symposium appropriated 
beautiful, giving birth in the visible world to light, and the author of light and itself in the intelligible world 
being the authentic source of truth and reason. " Plotinus describes an impersonal source or unity beyond 
being: "Generative of all, The Unity is none of all; neither thing not quantity nor quality nor intellect nor 
soul; not in motion, not at rest, not in place, not in time: it is the self-defined, unique in form or, better, 
formless, existing before Form was, of Movement or Rest, all of which are attachments of Being and make 
Being the manifold it is" (Enneads 6,9,3). Describing the Judaeo-Christian God "I am that I am" 
Augustine, given the limits of human expression, uses similar terminology: "Most high, utterly good, 
utterly powerful, most omnipotent, most merciful and most just, deeply hidden yet most intimately present, 
perfection of both beauty and strength, stable and incomprehensible, immutable and yet changing all 
things" (Confessions 1.4). In de Trinitate, Augustine writes of God as the Trinity, stressing the importance 
of the incarnation and crucifixion as we will discuss later. We have, that is, accounts of entirely different 
things, one a principle, another an abstract source, and the third the omnipotent and personal God. 
Nonetheless, Watson (Greek Philosophy, p. 24-25) appropriately states that "the vision of beauty [in the 
Symposium] is described in terms which St. Augustine could have easily adopted for his vision of God in 
the Confessions. " Following Augustine Dante takes on the Christian understanding of God as the Trinity 
(Paradiso XXXIII, 127-13 1), and the ultimate source and good, uniting goodness, beauty and truth. 
Here the terminology employed is stretched almost beyond recognition. Language which was 
initially used to articulate one experience has been extended to cover or is employed as a tool to express 
something with very different meanings. Though the Christian God and the Platonic forms and the 
Plotinian One are entirely different, through using similar terminology/language the careless reader may 
misunderstand what they signify, assuming that they are similar or the same. 
This brings us to the most evident difference in Plato's and Dante's conceptions of God. Plato was 
part of a culture adhering to Greek paganism which was "plastic, objective, anthropomorphic. The Greeks 
thought of their deities as persons, whose portraits could be carved in statues. " (Symonds, "The Dantesque 
and Platonic Ideals of Love", p. 83) though Republic III shows Plato's critique of this view in that gods 
must be good and beautiful, nonetheless he considers the gods as inferior to the forms, which "nourished" 
them (Phaedrus 247) and were their "source" (Republic 517b-c). In contrast Dante held to the Christian 
notion of God as Trinity in all its incomprehensibility and unrepresentability. "Medieval religion was 
spiritual, separating the divinity man worshipped from corporeal form, so far as this was compatible with 
the dogma of the incarnation. Greek philosophy, in spite of its occasional excursions into mysticism, 
remained positive. Medieval philosophy eagerly embraced allegory and `anagogical interpretations. '" 
(Symonds, "The Dantesque and Platonic Ideals of Love", p. 83) For Dante God loves mankind and out of 
this love created man with a desire for his creator in order that God may enter into a love relationship with 
us; such conceptions are alien to Plato, whether with respect to gods or forms. 
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are the eros driven ascent of the ladder to the form of Beauty (Symposium 210E2- 
211A4), and the fact that Beauty seems to possess a drawing power (See Watson, Greek 
Philosophy and the Christian Notion of God, p. 24-25)21 Combined with this drawing 
power, in the myth of the Cave, the "idea of the good... [is] the cause for all things of all 
that is right and beautiful... the authentic source of truth and reason" (Republic VII, 
517B8-C4). Thus for Plotinus the good seems to bring together all the ladders which in 
Plato though related seem distinct, as the forms of beauty, goodness, truth (and 
temperance) are distinct. Furthermore as the sun (Republic VII, 517B 1-3), the light of the 
good, emanates beyond itself, according to its nature, so the good, being the ultimate 
cause of being, the source of goodness, beauty and truth, overflows in the act of creation 
(Plotinus reads creation as emanation and overflowing of eros22) after which it returns to 
the good. Thus here the Plotinian cycle of eros seems to find its origin. 23 
21 "Plato represents [the Forms] as exercising an attraction and taking on a quasi-personal appeal. " 
(Watson, Greek Philosophy and the Christian Notion of God, p. 24-25) 
22 "One element that is quite foreign to genuine Platonism .... 
[is] the descending movement in the cosmos, 
or the idea of emanation. " (Nygren, p. 188-9) "In the account he gives of the upward way, Plotinus is in the 
main dependent on Plato; but in working out his theory of the downward way he had to depend chiefly on 
himself. " (Nygren, p. 195) This changes the origin of Eros which as articulating an ascent was the "longing 
of man for divine life. " (Nygren, p. 195) Nygren notes that as "agape... is the way of descent.. . 
if we ignore 
the difference it makes that the downward way of Christian Agape leads from God to sinful man, while the 
Plotinian way of descent leads from the Divine to matter", given their similar structure they might be 
confused particularly as Plotinus states "the higher cares for the lower and adorns it" (IV, 8,8). 
Nygren, in maintaining that Platonism can only involve an upward movement (Nygren, p. 196) 
seems not to accept that the idea of emanation comes from the image of the sun. However he is entirely 
correct that Plotinian eros is distinct from Christian agape. Plotinus is thinking of "a cosmic process" as 
opposed to salvation and for Plotinus god does not descend into the world as that would indicate guilt and 
sin produced by "involuntary" weakness, but instead remains purely transcendent, "inert, exercizing its 
influence only by `passive rule' (IV. 8.2)" like the sun (Nygren, p. 196-7) ("self-sufficient and never issues 
forth from its sublime repose" VI, 7,41, and V, 1,6). "Fellowship with God is not brought about by God's 
coming down to man, but by man's climbing up in Eros to God. " (Nygren, p. 196) "In spite of all he says 
of the downward way, there is in Plotinus no real descent of the Divine. " (Nygren, p. 196) Christianity 
"tells of a descent of the Godhead into the lowest depths of human weakness; the latter calls for an 
elevation of man to superhuman Divinity" (Zeller, p. 444) 
Barker (2002) here notes a connection with "the 'cyclic' structure of the progression of 
understanding in the simile of the Divided Line. The route by which understanding is reached goes first 
from the bottom up, and then returns, from the top down. The fact that true understanding is only attained 
in the final stage, `top-down', reflects the ontological order, other realities are as they are because the Good 
is as it is. " 
23 "The later Platonists, especially Plotinus, developed their master's teaching by combining his notion of 
the absolute divine Good with his ideas about human eros. [See Armstrong, "Platonic Eros and Christian 
Agape", p. 105-21. ] Thus Plotinus conceived of the Deity, the One or Good, not only as the universal 
source of goodness but also-and this point is crucial--as the source of eros itself, of an aspiration in all 
things toward the absolute Goodness: He gives "a dynamic being which turns back towards its source, 
which looks, tends, strives towards Him: and in us this movement back to our source is eros, a love given by and conforming us to the Good we love. " [ibid., p. 113] "The soul, " says Plotinus, "loves Him (God), 
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Furthermore, Plotinus states that God is Eros. "He is worthy to be loved, and is 
Himself love, namely, love of Himself, as He is beautiful only from Himself and in 
Himself" (Enneads, VI. 8.15) This is distinct from the Christian "God is agape". Eros 
indicates a lack or longing which leads to the pursuit of the Divine and cannot be applied 
to the Divine as the Divine is completely full and lacks nothing (Symposium 202). 
Plotinus is not abandoning the Platonic use but is saying that God is Eros to himself. 
As the ultimate goal of all Eros, He cannot be Himself caught up in the movement of Eros. This fact, that 
there is nothing outside God which could be the aim of his strivings and Eros, Plotinus expresses by saying 
that God is certainly Eros but Eros to Himself. In this way he succeeds in applying the Eros-scheme to 
God, without infringement either of His position as ultimate end, or of His absolute eudaimonia, self- 
sufficiency and autarchy. God is at once the ultimate source and the ultimate goal of all things. (Nygren, p. 
199) 
At this point one notes the distinction between erns and agape clearly. If eros is applied 
to God, he becomes an "acquisitive and egocentric character,.. -.. entirely taken up with 
itself and the enjoyment of its own perfection. " "God is eros has no meaning unless Eros 
is... self-love; but to speak of God's Agape as self-love, as an agape directed to itself, 
would be sheer nonsense" (Nygren, p. 199). 
Considering the difference between eros and agape more generally, 
Frao, eros in the New Testament is sexual love, but also spiritualized.... of upward striving and quest of the 
human soul towards the suprasensual and divine... called forth by the inherent worth of its object, and the 
desire to possess and enjoy its object. It is essentially egocentric, seeking its object for the sake of its own 
satisfaction and self-fulfillment and self enhancement ... Agapazo, agapao 
[having] neither the warmth of 
phileo nor the intensity of erao... refers to the will rather than to the emotion, and often conveys the idea of 
showing love by action. The substantive agape is almost entirely absent from pre-Biblical Greek. It is 
[translated from aheb because it is] free from erotic associations and conveyed the idea of a love that 
moved by Him to love from the beginning. "[Enneads, VI, 7,31; 9,9] Moreover God, as the active source 
of eros, may be called not only erasmion (lovable) but eras (love itself): "He is at once lovable, and love, 
and love of Himself. " [ibid., VI, 8.15; Also see Rist, Eros and Psyche, pp. 78-112] Thus... the upward 
path from the many to the One, from creatures to God, implies a prior downward path. Eros moves in a 
circle; things return through it to God because they came through it from God. " (Foster, "Dante's Idea of 
Love", p. 76) 
Adding to Plotinus' reading of Plato, Foster notes the influence of Proclus' belief that each movement 
of going out results in a counter movement, a return, so that "the whole cosmos follows this triadic pattern, 
whose unifying principle is erns. " (Foster, "Dante's Idea of Love", p. 77) 
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showed itself by helping its object rather than by desiring to possess and enjoy it. (Richardson, A 
Theological Word Book of the Bible, p. 133-4) 
Soble (p. 12) simply distinguishes man's love for God as Bros from agape, God's love for 
man. Concerning love within the agape tradition, . 
the attractive and unattractive properties of the object, the object's value, are irrelevant. The irrelevance of 
merit is clear in agape as God's (or Jesus') love for humans: God does not love that which is already in 
itself worthy of love, but on the contrary, that which in itself has no worth acquires worth just by becoming 
the object of God's love. Agape has nothing to do with the kind of love that depends on the recognition of 
valuable quality in its object; Agape does not recognise value, but creates it. Why, then, does God love 
humans? 'The `reason' why God loves men is that God is God, and that is reason enough. ' [see Morgan, 
Love: Plato, the Bible, and Freud, p. 741 As Nygren says, "There is only one right answer... Because it is 
His nature to Love ... The only ground 
for it is to be found in God himself. (Soble, p. 12; also see 
Richardson, p. 132) 
Though clearly distinct from eros, Singer (Vol. 1, p. 71) using deceptively Neo-Platonic 
language writes, "Agape is.. . spontaneous. It simply radiates, 
like the glorious sun or the 
universe at large, giving forth energy for no apparent reason. " The distinction of eros 
from agape for Richardson is demonstrated in the Old Testament in which love of man 
for God is "not something independent, not the mystical quest of the religious eros, the 
upwards striving of the human spirit towards the divine, such as is prominent in Plato 
[and] Plotinus.... but rather something dependent on God's prior love, the response of 
man to God's love, his gratitude. " (Richardson, p. 133) This indicates in contrast to 
Nygren that agapic love is not restricted to God but that man too can have agapic love 
whether directed towards God or his fellow man. However such agapic love on the part 
of man is dependent upon and in response to God's love for him whereby in agapic love 
man is always loving God first. Augustine as we will see considers this reciprocation to 
indicate a blending of eros and agape which he calls caritas, a term which given his lack 
of Greek he also applies to God, Caritas. However as man's concern for himself is 
inescapable due to his embodiment, his feelings and motivations are generally impure 
and mixed, making the above distinctions inevitably ambiguous. 
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Returning to Plato, Nygren's reading of Platonic eros as self-love proves not only 
pessimistic concerning human goodness, 24 but also problematic in that it is an 
oversimplification (Oukta, p. 62). 25 Vlastos (p. 6) opposes Nygren saying that his 
"treatment of the `Greek' idea of love fails to reckon with the elementary fact that philia 
is a near-synonym of agape, and that, regardless of what their philosophers said, Greeks, 
being human, were as capable of genuine, non-egoistic, affection as are we". Osborne 
comments upon Vlastos' critique saying that while "Vlastos disagrees with Nygren's 
one-sided and inadequate understanding of what the Greeks could regard as love, he does 
not actually break loose of the dichotomy that he inherits from Nygren" (Osborne, p. 
222). She likewise vehemently opposes Nygren's view that Eros is purely selfish and 
agape is selfless, that man can only have eros/need-love for Godnever agape/gift-love. 
Nygren assumes the "total discontinuity" of Christian agape from all prior conceptions of 
love thereby identifying a "pure and original Christian motif, unadulterated by influence 
from either Classical Greek thought or Hellenistic Judaism" (Osborne, p. 3). For 
Osborne, the central problem with Nygren's understanding the relation of eros and agape 
is that though "Nygren recognizes the close connection between love by God and love 
from God in the New Testament (Agape and Eros, 129 and 140) and the use of agape to 
make this connection,... he underestimates the extent to which love for God is also 
implied. That love from God might be love for God is something that Nygren's 
dichotomy of agape and eros misses" (Osborne, p. 29), though this is a point which 
seems to be assimilated into Augustine's notion of caritas as understood by Nygren. 
However the main problem with Nygren's account of eros is that Nygren only 
focuses upon one part of eros. Rist notes this when he writes, 
24 "The implications of analyzing mankind's love for God as a case of needy desire in accordance with such 
a reading of Diotima's speech are to make humanity's motives self-interested and grasping. It does not 
leave humanity morally the better for its devotion to God. " (Osborne, p. 55) 
25 In discussing Nygren, Outka writes, "Nygren claims to identify an entire 'Eras-religion' and 'Eros- 
ethics' governed by such self-seeking" (Outka, p. 57), which he considers unsatisfactory, seeming to 
propound "a version of what moral philosophers commonly call psychological egoism" (Outka p. 59). 
Outka citicizes Nygren for being "oversimplified" in that he sees eros-ethics as pure self-interest and 
agape-ethics as "utter self-giving". Outka suggests Nygren's view to be weak given the idea of `civic 
righteousness' which produces fellow-feeling resulting in "transcendence of one's own interests" as well as 
the fact that there may be fluctuation within a person and group. Secondly "agape [is] an actual alternative 
to acquisitiveness through divine grace, as something available to men in their present confusions" (Outka 
p. 62). Men can choose to "[reject] psychological egoism as an exhaustive account" (Outka p. 63). 
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This violent sense of need is what Plato primarily means by love, and to the casual reader his analysis of 
the nature of Epazs gives little trace of any non-appetitive ideal. However, when we come to consider the 
actions of the Gods and of those perfect mortals who have been able to follow the path of Epau to its end, 
we find a considerably less egoistic, and as the future was to show, more fruitful notion, that of creation as 
a result of `Love perfected' (Rist, Eros and Psyche, p. 26). 
Rist "finds in the Platonic texts both the acquisitive love that Nygren found and an other- 
regarding creative love" (Osborne, p. 54), as is evident in the conception in the 
Symposium of "begetting upon the beautiful in body and soul" (206 b-e) and later 
"procreating true virtue" (212). Osborne (p. 55) acknowledges this when she writes 
"Even within Diotima's speech, and certainly within Plato and the Platonist tradition, 
there is an alternative model of eros at work. "26 She goes on to state that Nygren's 
dichotomy is problematic in that a loving relationship is "more than a one-sided 
transaction" in that it involves both giving and taking. "Within the Greek tradition of eros 
it is necessary to account for the other-regarding devotion to a beloved whose benefit is 
sought for her own sake; and within the Christian account of love and charity it is plain 
that the generosity shown to the beloved can, or should, also be a joy to the giver.. . Both 
eros and agape can be found to incorporate both kinds of love in parallel ways. " 
(Osborne, p. 69) 
In view of the above considerations, but even more explicitly from the discussion of 
Eros in the myth of the birth of Eros, Nygren's reading of eros is problematic in that it 
presupposes that Bros is all lack while, as we have seen in Symposium 203, eros combines 
penia and poros. In possessing the two strands, eros can accentuate either the poros- 
dominant stand or the penia-dominant strand as demonstrated in the first half of the 
thesis. The poros-dominant strand of eros, though distinct from agape, in Plato does 
involve an aspect of resource, the ability to reason and faith in virtue and understanding, 
which allows for a passage through aporiai to increasing knowledge. Furthermore, later 
in the Platonic tradition poros is reinterpreted (or misinterpreted) by Plotinus as a pouring 
out of resource from the One, evident in Plotinus' reading of the birth of Eros (Enneads 
26 Osborne further notes that we are prevented "from reading into the Symposium an acquisitve theory of 
love such as Nygren found there since Plato himself shows that that is unsatisfactory in the Lysis" which 
"effectively undermines the notion of love that Nygren and many others have found in Diotima's speech". 
(Osborne, p. 57) 
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III, 5,7-9). Whether involving Socrates' desire to beget virtue in others or later Plotinus' 
notion of poros as resource in the emanation of reason principles from the One, Nygren's 
view of eros as self-love only takes into account one strand of eros and misses the other 
half, which arguably is the truer form of love (and which on the later interpretation in its 
outpouring shows some resemblance to agape). 
Nonetheless, as we noted in Chapter VI, Greek virtue-based ethics involve a quest for 
ethical self-perfection which functions as the "ethical ideal" (Barker, 2003). In this 
pursuit of ethical perfection, the poros strand which involves the aiding of others is 
indispensable, as being virtuous oneself involves the begetting of virtue in others which 
by contributing to their pursuit of self-perfection is, on the terms provided by the 
Symposium, a great gesture of love. Nonetheless in this context, as Barker (2003) writes, 
"it becomes difficult, if not unintelligible, to conceive `selfless' love as an ethical ideal". 
In Neo-Platonism, the One as Eros loves itself, while the pursuit of the One is likewise 
grounded upon the pursuit of self-perfection through union with the One. This seems to 
indicate that the Platonic and Neo-Platonic conceptions of eros, though necessarily 
involving strong other-regarding and "selfless" components, are concerned with the 
desire for self-perfection, hence on some level self-love, in contrast to Christian agape 
from God to man which is purely selfless. In thus distinguishing eros from agape, this 
provides some support for the gist of Nygren's rather insensitive reading. 
Distinct from Plato's view of Eros as daimon or god, from Plotinus' god as Eros, and 
from primitive Christianity's God as Agape, Augustine in calling God Caritas brings 
together Eros and Agape. "The meeting of Eros and the Agape motifs in Augustine's 
doctrine of Caritas ... concerns the very heart of his conception of Christianity. " (Nygren, 
p. 457)27 Though Augustine distinguishes between erosic and agapic love, amor ex 
r Never ceasing to be a Platonist, Augustine "has done more than any other, by combining things Neo- 
Platonic and Christian, to import the Eros motif into Christianity and to procure ecclesiastical sanction for 
it... Judged by the primitive Christian idea of Agape.... the Christian idea of love has suffered seriously 
through being combined with the Neo-Platonic Eros motif" (Nygren, p. 459). Nygren explains this when he 
writes, "If Christian love is thought of as a form of 'acquisitive love' and interpreted to mean that we seek 
our own 'bonum' in God, then the theocentric character of the Christian Commandment of Love is 
undoubtedly lost. Even though God is described as the highest good, this does not alter the fact that He is 
degraded to the level of a means for the satisfaction of human desire. 'Love to God', as interpreted by 
Augustine, loses a good deal of its original Christian meaning" (Nygren, p. 500). Opposing Nygren's view 
that Augustine's notion of caritas which combines agape and Platonic erns damages true Christian agape, 
Foster ("Dante's Idea of Love", p. 77) thinks eros can "reappear ... in ways that were more or less 
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miseria and amor ex misericorde, 
28 he however "wanted to maintain both Eros and 
Agape at once". 29 He settles the problem by recognizing that though eros could bring him 
to the recognition of God, it could not bridge the rift between himself and God due to his 
sin (Confessions 7; Nygren 471)30 hence the need for God's agape, his humilitas, shown 
through the incarnation, crucifixion, and grace which are elements quite foreign and 
controversial for Platonism? ' Part of this grace is the desirelcaritas in our hearts to seek 
God. 2 Thus "When God gives Himself to us in Christ, He gives us at once the object we 
are to love and the Caritas with which to love it. The object we are to love is Himself, but 
Caritas also is Himself, who by the Holy Spirit takes up His abode in our hearts" 
(Nygren, p. 525). So the gift of God's Spirit in our hearts (an expression of God's agape) 
creates a longing and resource (understanding, truth and power) which enables man to 
return to God thereby merging eros and agape and producing a circle of love. So for 
Augustine caritas is an upwards love directed to God, as shown in Confessions 1: 1: 
"Ibou hast made us for thyself, 0 Lord, and our hearts are restless until they rest in 
thee. "33 
Dante adopts the notion of caritas from Augustine in terms of desire to return to God 
and uses it in the figure of Beatrice. Dante in the Convivio IV, xii, 14 writes "the chief 
desire in everything, and the first given it by nature, is to return to Him". This desire of 
authentically Christian... The essential features of his love-doctrine are historically explained by Neo- 
Platonist influences, but in themselves they do not imply any weakening of Christian dogma. " 
2' Augustine "distinguishes between two sorts of love, a love that is due to the dryness of need and longing 
(indigentiae siccitate) ... and a love that springs out of the 
fulness of goodness and benevolence 
(beneficentiae ubertate), or.... amor ex miseries and amor ex misericordia. What is the difference between 
these two, if not that between Eros and Agape? Augustine seems to be well aware that God's love to us 
must be distinguished from Eros-love. God's love is a love of mercy and of the fulness of goodwill. Eros- 
love ascends and seeks the satisfaction of its needs; Agape-love descends in order to help and to give. " 
(Nygren, p. 469) 
29 Though Nygren writes, "He was unaware that they are diametrically opposed to each other and that the 
relation between them must be an Either-Or" (Nygren p. 470), the poros aspect of Eros is actually closer 
to agape, while only the penia is opposite. 
30 Though he distinguishes between erosic and agapic love, "Augustine never doubts that Christian love to 
God is the same as Platonic Eros and that the Way of Eros leads ultimately to the same God as Christianity 
proclaims" (Nygren, p. 466). Eros for Augustine always remains an essential part of the process of 
returning to God. 
31 Nygren, p. 469-70; see also for philosophical reaction to Christianity, Watson, "Celsus and the 
Philosophical opposition to Christianity", p. 165-176. 
32 "Caritas is on the one hand that gift which man receives by grace, on the other hand it is `the fulfilling of 
the law' and so the sum of all virtues. " (Nygren, p. 514) "He does not possess any Caritas in himself, and 
if he is to gain it, it must be given to him by a special Divine act of grace, it must be infused into his heart 
from without. " (Nygren, p. 522) 
33 See Enneads VI, 9,8 and Republic VII 532E3. 
175 
"everything", attributed to "nature", suggests a Neo-Platonic influence perhaps showing 
traces of the Symposium and Republic. However in the Commedia Beatrice embodies 
caritas, the merging of heavenly eras and agape, which came from God (from 
beato/beata meaning "blessed" or "blissful"), who brings Dante back to his creator 
through their love. She therefore represents God's grace, an expression of his agape. 34 
While having been Dante's beloved on earth, the object of his desire and source of his 
inspiration, she as caritas brings together Platonic and Christian traditions. Indeed, she 
seems to connect the Phaedrus' notion of the love of the individual, probably transmitted 
through the tradition of the Troubadours and courtly love, with the philosophical tradition 
of the Symposium (Republic and Phaedrus) transmitted through Plotinus and Augustine 
to Dante. The figure of Beatrice brings together these three traditions (Christian, 
Platonist, and courtly love) leading Dante back to God. Thus Dante's "desire and will, 
like a wheel that spins with even motion, were revolved by the Love that moves the sun 
and the other stars" (Paradiso XXXIII, 143-5), which in itself articulates a cycle of love. 
However, for Dante, like Augustine, this is only made truly possible through God's 
grace, his caritas, which is distinct from eros, as it presupposes and involves the 
intervention of God as agape. 35 
Given this analysis we may agree with Foster ("Dante's Idea of Love", p. 77) that "a 
fairly direct line leads from this Neo-Platonism to Dante, even though it lies through 
Christianity. " However in contrast to Foster, while eros does follow a similar "basic 
34 In contrast to Nygren's agape, which is fully "sovereign in the sense of being not evoked or motivated by 
anything about an object" (Poellner, Personal Communication, 2002), Dante writes in a letter to Can 
Grande that the Commedia addresses through allegory how "man, through the exercise of free choice, 
becomes liable to rewarding or punishing justice". Underpinning Nygren's understanding of agape is I 
John 4: 19 "We love because he first loved us" and also 1 John 4: 10: "This is love: not that we loved God, 
but that he loved us and sent his Son as an atoning sacrifice for our sins. " In both of these scriptures and 
according to Nygren agapic love is a gift from God given to man. Inherent in that gift is the ability to 
choose to love or not to love, which is a necessary condition for love. To force someone to love is not love 
as love must be voluntary. In this context where God loves first, Dante has the choice to love or not to love 
in response. Each of these possibilities results in specific consequences as is indicated in Galatians 5. Given 
this Biblical basis, Nygren's framework, as modified above, provides an illuminating perspective for the 
reading of Dante. The tension here noted represents one of the central disputes in Christian thought 
throughout Church history from the first century to the present, the law versus grace, or salvation by works 
versus grace, though this subject extends beyond the scope of this thesis. 
33 Eros involves a lack, while agape is absolute fullness. Eros therefore concerns a need to fill the self as 
opposed to agape which is absolutely selfless. Augustine used the term caritas to express God's agape, this 
selfless love, which is without the warmth of phileo or the intensity of egos, in an effort to describe through 
a term the selfless, feeling and loving nature of God. 
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triadic pattern of procession and return through love"-to that of Christian caritas, 36 which 
seems to make "the tradition of eros congenial to Christian theology" (Foster, "Dante's 
Idea of Love", p. 77), eros does differ significantly from the Augustinian conception of 
caritas, given that the latter brings together eros and Christian agape (see Nygren, p. 
457), a conception later passed on to Dante. This addition of agape shows therefore 
caritas to be the telos of the eros tradition, but a significantly different and higher form of 
love from eros given its contact with and subsequent transformation through agape. 
3. CONCLUSION 
The development of this principal parallel, reinforced by the nine other parallels 
mentioned, provides a strong case for the transmission of Platonic ideas via Plotinus 
through Augustine into the monastic schools where Dante studied. I have not been 
concerned to explore which Dominican and Benedictine schools could have transmitted 
the Augustinian conceptions to Dante as this is the subject for another thesis. What can be 
relied upon is that Augustinian thought, including these Neo-Platonic ideas, had strongly 
infiltrated the cultural milieu via the monastic community; it seems, indeed, to have 
reached Dante directly through, at least, the Confessions and de Trinitate. 37 Augustine's 
presence with St. Bernard in the Celestial Rose (Paradiso XXXII) is a fitting emblem of 
this. 
36 "The points of difference concerned, not the reality of such a cyclic movement, but how it took effect. 
For Christians the proodos from God entailed creation in the strict sense, a non-necessary causing of being 
ex nihilo an idea alien to the Greek mind. The epistrophe to God entailed Christ, the incarnate Redeemer, a 
'folly to the Greeks. ' Nevertheless, love was for Christianity also-indeed, more emphatically-the 
principle of both proodos and epistrophe. " (Foster, "Dante's Idea of Love", p. 77) 
7 Moore (Studies in Dante, First Series, p. 291-293) states that the Convivio and the Commedia seem to 
suggest knowledge of Augustine's Confessions in language and subject matter, and seem to paraphrase 
Confessions 1.7. Furthermore Purgatorio XXV. 83: memories, intelligen a, e volontade, seems to suggest 
St. Augustine de Trinitate X. 17,18" among other examples. Moore father refers to Scartazzini who links 
Confessions IV, 16 with Purgatorio XXII, 67-69. As these two texts, the Confessions and de Trinitate, are 
primarily the texts which have been relied upon to argue for Dante's exposure to Augustinian thought, this 
suggests that he may have had direct exposure to Augustinian texts though this cannot be relied upon nor is 
this direct exposure essential to prove my case. Direct exposure to other Augustinian texts, such as De 
Quantitate animae, can in fact be established (see Mazzeo, Structure and Thought, p. 184). 
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IX. INFLUENCE THROUGH COURTLY LOVE AND THE 
TROUBADOURS 
The second plausible means by which the Platonic understanding of eros may 
have been transmitted to Dante can be found in the literary tradition, coming down 
through Ovid into the culture of courtly love and through Troubadour poetry, then 
making its way through Italian lyric poetry into the work of the poets of the Dolce Stil 
Nuovo of which Dante was one. 
1. THE AMBIGUITY OF LOVE 
The point of origin in this chain of literary influence relates to the ambiguity of 
love and the desire of the beloved to form a unified whole with the beloved. ' As we noted 
above with regard to the Symposium (180E6-181A1; 202D4-203A8) and the Phaedrus 
(243D3-7), questions arose as to the nature of love, whether a god or daimon, good or 
evil, etc. This produced in both dialogues a series of speeches seeking to come to terms 
with the meaning and significance of love. In Aristophanes' speech (Symposium 192D 10- 
E4) the lover desires to be united with the beloved forever, a position which is affirmed 
but redirected in a non-carnal orientation by Diotima2, pointing beyond virtue to the form 
1 It seems likely that certain aspects of Ovid's thought have a Platonic source. The four key points which 
Plato and Ovid seem have in common are 1. The ambiguity of love (a position supported by Nardi in 
"Filosofia dell'Amore"); 2. Eros/Amor as a god (likewise affirmed by Nardi); 3. The desire of the lover to 
be united with the lover forever, and 4. Consideration of the value of love of the individual. The first two 
are evident. The irony in Ovid's Ars Amatoria points up love's ambiguity which we saw in the Symposium 
(180E6-181A1; 202D4-203A8) and the Phaedrus (243D3-7). Furthermore, "Ovid creates a mock-religion 
in Ars Amatoria through the worship of the God Amor" (Lewis, Allegory, p. 21). The argument concerning 
the lover's desire to be united eternally with the beloved is explicit (see Barkan, p. 57; Metamorphoses IV. 
371-8 and 111.415-32). With regard to love of the individual compare Ars Amatoria II. 721-722 with 
Phaedrus 251A-C. "For the notion that the spark which kindles passion strikes the admirer in the eye and 
from there penetrates deeper, see the graphic description in Plato's Phaedrus 251A-C" (Fraenkel, Ovid, a 
poet between two worlds, p. 216, note 48). (For further similarities see Tissol, The Face of Nature: 
concerning rhetoric, p. 51-2, and writing p. 46-8. ) An exploration as to how these features were indirectly 
transmitted from Plato to Ovid extends beyond the scope of this thesis. 
2 In Socrates' speech (Symposium 201B2-4) love desires the beauty (and goodness) which it lacks, and as 
Diotima declares that (206A9) "Love is wanting to possess the good forever". 
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of beauty, thus demonstrating the existence of two forms of love (208E3-209A4), 
indicating Love's ambiguity. 
This Platonic tendency3 reemerges in Latin literature in Ovid's Metamorphoses 
VI, 371-8. Due to Salmacis' love for Hermaphodites, 4 she prays, "May no day ever come 
that shall separate him from me or me from him... . [following which] their two 
bodies, 
joined together as they were merged into one, " forming the Aristophanic unity "with one 
face and form for both" (Metaphorphoses, IV, 377-8)5 Evident in this notion of love is a 
desire for wholeness with the beloved, yet when this conception of love is explored by 
Ovid in the Metamorphoses concerning Hermaphroditus he is being ironic and cutting, as 
he is also in the case of Narcissus, indicating that he has made a distinction between good 
and bad love, the irony being evidence of Love's ambiguity. 
This irony is particularly apparent in Ovid's Ars Amatoria. In this "manual for 
seducers", Ovid is joking and being fully ironic concerning romantic love through 
encouraging that it be taken seriously, which in turn like Aristophanes' speech stresses 
the ridiculousness of man's carnal appetites. 
6 The irony lies in that while mocking 
inappropriate prioritization of carnal love simultaneously it negatively affirms the 
underlying truth of a deep need in man for wholeness, visible when man in his need turns 
for fulfillment to love relationships, ' though these can not fully satisfy. Herein lies the 
3 Barkan (p. 57) affirms this is a Platonic tendency when he writes, "above all, the act of love itself, as 
Platonists from Plato to Spenser have understood, blurs distinctions by transforming the lovers into a 
hermaphrodite", after which he cites Metamorphoses IV, 371-72, as his prime example, indicating that this 
tendency is demonstrated in Ovid. 
° This desire for fullness emphasizes a lack in the lover, pointing to Socrates' speech of Symposium 200E9- 
201AI. Fraenkel (p. 218 note 59) contrasts the "novelty" of Plato maintaining love as lack as in the 
Symposium with Ovid where the object of love issues forth love; cf. Symposium 199 and Metamorph. 3, 
372-4 (the beloved "burning for a nearer flame"). However Ovid's position in this context is more in 
keeping with Phaedrus 255 whereby beauty radiates from the beloved entering the eyes of the lover which 
is then communicated back to the beloved forming a cycle of love, a position which Fraenkel discusses on 
p. 216 with regard to Phaedrus 251. However in Ovid, though beauty may issue forth as a form of love 
producing love in the spectator, it likewise indicates a lack of wholeness which the lover desires to fill; for 
example Salmacis "longed to possess what she saw" (Metamorphoses IV, 316), which therefore in Ovid 
remains an essential aspect of love. 
5 This ironization of the Aristophanic unity is also found in the Narcissus myth of Metamorphoses in, 415- 
17,425-432. Barkan (p. 57) notes this when he writes, "Ovid plays on Narcissus' hopeless inseparability 
from his beloved; here he creates of two people a single image". 
6 Ovid's Ars Amatoria "presupposes an audience to whom love is one of the minor peccadilloes of life, and 
the joke consists in treating it seriously-in writing a treatise, with rules and examples en regle for the nice 
conduct of illicit love" (Lewis, Allegory, p. 6). It is both a "comic confession of the depths to which this 
ridiculous appetite may bring a man" (Lewis, Allegory, p. 7) as well as a lesson in the art of seduction. That 
he did not take it seriously is shown in that he wrote "Remedium Amoris to set against the Ars amatoris" 
(Lewis, Allegory, p. 43). 
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inherent ambiguity of love, a point which Socrates, when discussing the tendency to 
elevate carnal love over virtuous love, had effectively addressed and critiqued through 
Diotima's correction of Aristophanes' speech through the ladder to the Form of the 
Beautiful. This, likewise, indicated that though love can be good and evil (its value 
determined by the object towards which it is directed, whether a carnal object or a 
spiritual virtuous object), true fulfillment is found only in the virtuous non-physical 
object. 
Ovid was misunderstood in the Middle Ages within the tradition of courtly love? 
in which his work is taken so seriously8 that a "sensual experience" associated with 
romantic love "took on... a salutary aspect" .9 Though Lewis 
in part convincingly argues 
that Ovid is not the source of courtly love, 10 it nonetheless reinforced a certain reading of 
7 Though Ovid has been misread what is of consequence is that he can be misread, underlining the inherent 
ambiguity of love with its potential for an ironic conflict of values, a point of which Ovid seems well 
aware. 
8 "The very same conduct which Ovid ironically recommends could be recommended seriously in the 
courtly tradition" (Lewis, Allegory, p. 7) and embraced within the courts (though not in the Church). 
9 "What was problematic was its reception in the Christian-courtly circles of medieval France and 
Provence; for love, though still a sensual experience, took on now, in keeping with its new circumstances, a 
salutary aspect. " (Took, Lyric Poet, p. 1) 
10 Scholars have tried to determine the origin of this type of poetic sentiment. Took (Lyric Poet, p. 1) 
believes the origin of the ambiguity of the conception of love prevalent in the tradition of courtly love finds 
its origins in Ovid. Symonds thinks that through contact with Arabian civilization, "the consequence of this 
collision was the addition of a certain Oriental quality to the sterner ideal of knighthood, rooted already in 
Teutonic Christianity. The extravagant warmth of feeling which we find in Troubadour poetry has a 
perfume of the East. The worship of women, which was something almost religious in the North, loses 
much of its mystery, and acquires a new voluptuousness in Southern Europe ... 
[exemplified in] the 
Provencal lyrics" (Symonds, An Introduction to Dante, p. 264). Expanding on the notion of an Arabic 
influence through which there is a Neo-Platonic influence, Shaw writes, "it appeared first in Provencal 
poetry because the south of France was accessible to notions belonging to Arabic Neo-Platonism, which 
were prevalent among the Moors, particularly the notion of the peculiarly elevating value of sexual desire 
as long as it remains unappeased. This idea that a passion for a woman is refined and ennobling in as far as 
it can be separated from the satisfaction of sensual appetite appealed to all those who were already 
conscious of a kind of love superior to that of the common crowd. It made no difference that the social 
position of women among the Arabs was even lower than her position in the ancient and early mediaeval 
world, for she occupied a comparatively exalted station in the homogenous feudal society of southern 
France, and it was natural to transfer to the lover the well-recognized virtues of chivalry, especially that of 
devoted loyalty to the lord or lady" (Shaw, 104-5). 
In contrast to Took, Symonds and Shaw, Lewis believes that "the efforts of scholars have so far 
failed to find an origin for the content of Provencal love poetry. Celtic, Byzantine and even Arab influences 
have been suspected; but it has not been made clear that these, if granted, could account for the results we 
see. A more promising theory attempts to trace the whole thing to Ovid; but this view-apart from the 
inadequacy which I have suggested above-finds itself faced with the fatal difficulty that the evidence 
points to a much stronger Ovidian influence in the north of France than in the south... The crusading armies 
thought the Provencals milksops, but this will seem relevant only to a very hardened enemy of 
Frauendienst. We know that this period in the south of France had witnessed what seemed to 
contemporaries a signal degeneracy from the simplicity of the ancient manners and an alarming increase in 
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Ovid and his conception of love" with significant resemblance to a Platonic conception 
of love which, as we noted in the first section of Part 2, was already of great concern in 
the monastic culture of the time. 
Courtly love12 shares similar concerns with Platonism in that it, while maintaining 
Love's ambiguity, affirms the desire for unity with the beloved. Courtly love involves the 
opposition of two types of love, both of which desire wholeness through the possession 
luxury [Jeanroy, tom. I, p. 83]. But what age and what land, by testimony, has not? Much more important is 
the fact that landless knighthood-knighthood without a place in the territorial hierarchy of feudalism- 
seems to have been possible in Provence [Faurel, tom. I, p. 515]. The unattached knight, as we meet him in 
the romances, respectable only by his valour, amiable only by his own courtesy, predestined lover of other 
men's wives, was therefore a reality; but this does not explain why he loved in such a new way. If courtly 
love necessitated adultery, adultery hardly necessitated courtly love. We come much nearer to the secret if 
we accept the picture of a typical Provencal court ... a castle which 
is a little island of comparative leisure 
and luxury, and therefore at least possible refinement, in a barbarous country-side". With many men but 
"few women-the lady and her damsels... Whatever `courtesy' is in the place flows from her: all female 
charm from her and her damsels. There is no question of marriage for most of the court. All these 
circumstances together come very near to being a 'cause'; but they do not explain why very similar 
conditions elsewhere had to wait for Provencal example before they produced like results. Some part of the 
mystery remains inviolate" (Lewis, Allegory, p. 12). 
11 Given that Ovid is "certainly most influential [of the ancient writers] in the Middle Ages" (Lewis, 
Allegory, p. 5), though perhaps not its immediate source, he acts as a reinforcement. Lewis' objection 
(Allegory, p. 7) to "Ovid misunderstood" as the source of courtly love is that "the Middle Ages 
misunderstand him so consistently. " As Lewis (Allegory, p. 43) writes, "I have endeavoured to point out 
above that 'Ovid misunderstood' explains nothing until we have accounted for a consistent 
misunderstanding in a particular direction". Though not accounting for the origin perhaps, the culture 
associated with the medieval feudal setting seems to have encouraged and reinforced this specific reading 
of Ovid and its resulting view of love. 
12 Courtly love came to fruition in the Troubadour poetry of Provence in Languedoc in the eleventh 
century, and was centred upon unfulfilled desire. "Courtly poetry ... makes 
desire itself the essential motif, 
and so creates a conception of love with a negative ground-note. " (Huizinga, p. 104; also see Brand and 
Pertile, Cambridge History, p. 9) The "characteristics [of which] may be enumerated as Humility, 
Courtesy, Adultery, and the Religion of Love. The lover is always abject. Obedience to his lady's lightest 
wish, however whimsical, and silent acquiescence in her rebukes, however unjust, are the only virtues he 
dares to claim. There is a service of love closely modelled on the service which a feudal vassal owes to his 
lord. The lover is the lady's `man'. He addresses her as midons, which etymologically represents not `my 
lady' but `my lord'. [Jeanroy, La poesie lyrique des Troubadours, tom. I, p. 91 n. ] The whole attitude has 
been rightly described as `a feudalisation of love. ' [Wechssler, Das Kulturproblem des Minnesangs, 1909, 
Bnd. I, p. 177]... It is possible only to those who are, in the old sense of the word, polite... [distinguishing] 
the gentle from the vilein: only the courteous can love, but it is love that makes them courteous. Yet this 
love, though neither playful nor licentious in its expression, is always what the nineteenth century called 
`dishonourable' love. The poet addresses another man's wife, and the situation is so carelessly accepted 
that he seldom concerns himself much with her husband; his real enemy is the rival. " (Lewis, Allegory, p. 
2-3) 
The poettlover uses, as in the case of Dante, the vernacular so that she can understand. As Dante 
writes in the Vita Nuova; "The reason why certain of a very mean sort obtained at the first some fame as 
poets is, that before them no man had written verses in the language of Si; and of these the first was moved 
to the writing of such verses by the wish to make himself understood by a certain lady, unto whom Latin 
poetry was difficult. This thing is against such as rhyme concerning other matters than love; that mode of 
speech having been first used for the expression of love alone". (Cited in Symonds, An Introduction to 
Dante, p. 278) 
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of their object; fino amor and fol amor. Fino amor directed towards virtue necessitates 
the absence of physical union. However, "based on the notion of the lover's feudal 
service to `midons' (Italian `madonna'), his lady, [the lover]... expects a `guerdon' 
(Italian `guiderdone'), or reward" (Barolini, "Dante and the Lyric Past", p. 14) indicating 
that love though supposedly "morally improving" (Took, Lyric Poet, p. 1)13 and intended 
as non-physical in its ideal form, remaining a state of unsatisfied desire, often 
degenerates into adultery, thereby becoming a "social evil" (Symonds, "The Dantesque 
and Platonic Ideals of Love", p. 66). This explains the split into two loves; fino amor 
which is morally improving14 non-physical love of an ideal which seems closer to 
heavenly eros though involving the idealization and adoration of a mortal woman15 (see 
Boyde, p. 280 and Brand and Pertile, Cambridge History, p. 9)16 degenerates to fol amor, 
carnal lust directed at physical pleasure, similar to earthly eros. However this 
degeneration is inevitable precisely as courtly love overemphasizes the love of the 
individual as an end in itself which blocks transcendence towards what is truly virtuous 
and the Lady is elevated above God. Nonetheless, given this concern of the lover to be 
13 "Without giving up all connection with sensual love, the new poetic ideal was capable of embracing all 
kinds of ethical aspirations. Love now became the field where all moral and cultural perfection flowered. 
Because of his love the courtly lover is pure and virtuous. The spiritual element dominates more and more, 
till towards the end of the thirteenth century, the dolce stil nuovo of Dante and his friends ends by 
attributing to love the gift of bringing about a state of piety and holy intuition. " (Huizinga, p. 104) 
14 According to Capellanus (I. iv; ed. Walsh, p. 39), "The effect of love is that no greed can cheapen the true 
lover. Love makes the hirsute barbarian as handsome as can be: it can even enrich the lowest born with 
nobility of manners: usually it even endows with humility the arrogant. A person in love grows to the 
practice of performing numerous services becomingly to all. What a remarkable thing is love, for it invests 
a man with such shining virtues, and there is noone whom it does not instruct to have these great and good 
habits in plenty! " 
1s Shaw thinks the reverence or idolization of women as a "potentiality of such an emotion belongs to 
human nature. It is not because of anything he has read or has been taught". (Shaw, p. 103) Symonds ("The 
Dantesque and Platonic Ideals of Love" p. 61) sees this as abnormal ("Greek love and chivalrous love form 
two extraordinary and exceptional phases of psychological experience"), while Lewis (Allegory, p. 3) sees 
it as "a special state of affairs, which will probably have an end, and which certainly had a beginning in 
eleventh-century Provence ... (that love should 
be regarded as a noble and ennobling passion)". "The 
reverent yearning for the idealized feminine persists as long as it is not overwhelmed by the growth of 
sensual appetite. A striking example is Dante who never forgot the `fiamma di caritade' which used to 
invade him whenever he was hoping for the greeting of Beatrice. [NJ XI] It seems to me that this natural 
potentiality is too little considered by scholars in their search for the causes of the ideal quality of love in 
the poetry of the troubadours. " (Shaw, p. 104) Shaw seems the more convincing as without this potential 
both Troubadours and the Platonic ascent to the form of the Good would have been impossible. "Idealized 
love for woman has become the chief subject of all literature not only because the Provencals first made it 
conspicuous in literature, but also because it has always been latent in the hearts of men. " (Shaw, p. 104; 
also see Freud, "Debasement in the Sphere of Love". ) 
16 "The goal of such lovers was not a brief shudder of the loins in bodily union, but a permanent state of 
bliss resulting from an `unimento spirituale', a `marriage of true minds. '" (Boyde, p. 280) 
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unified with the beloved, in which love is determined by its object resulting in the 
opposition of two loves, one virtue based and the other carnal, indicating the ambiguity of 
Love and concern for the individual as an object of love, we note a resemblance to 
Platonism. 
This brings us to the question of the influence of Platonism on courtly love. While 
Symonds argues that courtly love owes nothing to Platonism, 17 he goes into great detail 
demonstrating the similarities between the Platonic notion of love and the conception of 
courtly love as transmitted to Dante. 18 Singer on the other hand has fewer doubts: "When 
the northern tradition of courtly love supplemented the NeoPlatonism of the troubadours 
with Ovidian ideas about adultery and sexual freedom, the danger to ecclesiastical 
doctrine was obvious". (Singer, p. 364) Singer suggests that Neo-Platonism, as discussed 
in the previous section, was part of the culture of the Troubadours, but that a conflict 
arose with regard to the influx of the immoral ideas from Ovid which tainted the moral 
Neo-Platonic culture of the Troubadours. It is noticable that the Ovidian tendency 
(whether or not misunderstood) brings with it concerns as to Love's ambiguity and the 
lover's desire for wholeness with the beloved which is in keeping with Plato of the 
Symposium. Furthermore, Troubadour poetry places emphasis on love of the individual 
and the divinity of Eros, itself suggestive of certain strains of Platonism deriving from the 
Phaedrus. 19 Whether the Platonic influence upon the Troubadours came through the Neo- 
Platonists or was transmitted through Ovid makes little difference, indeed the influence 
may well have come from both. What is of consequence is that the Troubadours were 
17 "We have no reason to suppose that feudal chivalry owed anything to Platonic influences, even in this its 
latest manifestation. " (Symonds. "The Dantesque and Platonic Ideals of Love", p. 30) 
1$ See Symonds' Introduction to the Study of Dante and "The Dantesque and Platonic Ideals of Love". In 
these Symonds pushes their similarities to the point that he defines the two as being "psychologically rare 
to the point of calling them abnormalities, " "two brief moments, once at Athens and once at Florence, when 
amorous enthusiasms of an abnormal type presented themselves to natures of the noblest stamp as 
indispensable conditions of the progress of the soul upon the pathway toward perfection". (Symonds, "The 
Dantesque and Platonic Ideals of Love", p. 31) Mazzeo (Structure and Thought, p. 139) comments that "as 
good a critic as John Addington Symonds ... was unable to accept the Platonic and Dantesque ideals of love 
as anything other than abnormal attitudes". He criticizes the view of Symonds expressed in "The Dantesque 
and Platonic Ideals of Love", (p. 55-86) by stating "Symonds is not clear concerning the speculative and 
moral attitude both Dante and Plato assumed in regard to their respective love traditions. Neither Dante nor 
Plato ignored the social context in which Eros and "amore" were imbedded, but both emphasized the 
metaphysical and personal aspects of love". (Mazzeo, Structure and Thought, p. 203-204) 
'9 Mazzeo, Structure and Thought, p. 167. 
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strongly influenced by Platonic ideas and this emerged in their poetry, particularly in 
their concern for the nature of love. 
2. AMOR AND CARITAS 
This concern is expressed through the struggle of the Troubadours with 
Christianity. Not surprisingly a conflict arose as the Medieval Christian culture 
worshipped the Christian God of love (God as caritas) while the Troubadours and poets 
of courtly love, though following the pagan god Amor of courtly love, considered 
themselves to be Christian (see Lewis, Allegory, p. 23). For this reason, "at the heart of 
troubadour poetry is an unresolved tension between the poet-lover's allegiance to the lady 
and his allegiance to God" (Barolini, "Dante and the Lyric Past", p. 14-5)20 While the 
poet knew God, as creator and caritas, deserved undivided and the highest reverence, he 
chose to love the domina as master "without reference [or subordination] to God. s21 For 
this reason though directed upward and focused upon virtue, the worship of the Lady 
became a form of idolatry leading the poet astray. 22 
20 "Some antagonism naturally existed between the chivalry of religion and the chivalry of Love .... The 
Crusades, by developing a deeply religious spirit, and setting martyrdom in the Holy Land before the souls 
of knights and warriors as an object to be devoutly desired, put a sword between the Love of God and the 
Love of the Lady. " (Symonds, An Introduction to Dante, p. 257) 
21 This conflict was inevitable because "in his `philosophy' the troubadour found no place for Christian 
love as such.. . within Troubadour 
ideology there is no place for an object of love higher than the lady; 
whereas in the Christian, not only can there be no object of love higher than God but all other loves must 
show subordination to love of Him. The trouble was precisely that the troubadour could always forget to 
acknowledge that subordination for his love of domina was without reference to God" (Singleton, "From 
Love to Caritas ", p. 63-4) as she was master and allowed none higher. When considered with respect to the 
god Amor, "It was also to the greater glory of the God of Love that domina should be extolled; for this, the 
God would no doubt cause reward to be made to his faithful servant. The result could not have been other 
than it was: this love of woman which the poets sang was necessarily without subordination to God" 
(Singleton, "From Love to Caritas", p. 63-4). Thus in a greater sense than in the Symposium, though like 
the Phaedrus, love of the individual is highly valued. "As early as Plato's Phaedrus, one finds descriptions 
of lovers prepared to fall down and worship the beloved as if in the presence of a god" (Singer, Vol. H. p. 
152). Yet in contrast with both dialogues in relation to the forms, love of the individual seems to be placed 
above the love of God. 
22 The Christian poets' adherence to courtly love indicates sin, idolatry, a "straying from the path which 
could lead to the peace of Heaven" (Singleton, "From Love to Caritas", p. 64-65). As in heavenly eros the 
poet looked upward "towards heaven", so the domino is above him (a tendency which "seems, as the 
tradition grows older, increasingly higher and higher above, until finally she begins to resemble an angel"), 
inspiring virtue by her very name. "Being always higher, she ought always to lead to higher things ... and as domina she must be the last and only object of desire in her poet-lover's upward gaze. How might he dare 
look beyond her? The little closed world of this kind of love did not allow for such irreverence. Yet, as 
every troubadour knew, beyond and further up was God". (Singleton, "From Love to Caritas" p. 68) 
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Thus the notion of fino amor, of courtly love, while containing the values of 
chivalry, many of which were derived from Christianity (see Boyde, p. 280 and 
Symonds, "Dantesque and Platonic Ideals of Love", p. 73)23 through making its own 
culture, an "alternative culture" (Boyde, p. 280), worked against Christian values24 and to 
some extent parodied Christianity. 25 This resulted in the production of poetry tainted with 
23 "Chivalry had absorbed and organized not only a large portion of the Christian but also a large portion of 
the old Teutonic spirit. The unselfishness, humility, forgiveness of injuries, indifference to worldly wealth, 
the chastity and purity of love which formed ingredients of the chivalrous ideal were Christian. The 
adoration of women, love of battles and of feats of arms for their own sake, the scrupulous sense of honour, 
the obedience to laws, the truthfulness and loyalty to persons, the respect for knighthood as a form of 
consecration, -all these no less essential elements of chivalry, were 
Teutonic. " (Symonds, An Introduction 
to Dante, p. 261-2) 
24 Through providing an alternative culture, though sounding `high minded' and derived from Christianity, 
courtly love worked against Christian values. (Symonds, "Dantesque and Platonic Ideals of Love", p. 78) 
First, regardless of spiritual aspirations, "the goal of the chivalric lover is usually to win his lady fully. His 
love is not `platonic' or exclusively a wishful dream; he expects to realize it physically. But he recognizes, 
as such, its great power that can move him to good and evil. Often he perceives it as a danger as well as 
delight, and even in the romances where that love is idealized, the destructive element is always present" 
(Shapero, Women Earthly and Divine, p. 98). Secondly, in order to understand this, we must realize that in 
this period, as "marriage had nothing to do with love" but basically economics, "any idealization of sexual 
love, in a society where marriage is purely utilitarian, must begin by being an idealization of adultery" 
(Lewis, Allegory, p. 13). "Where marriage does not depend upon the free will of the married, any theory 
which takes love for a noble form of experience must be a theory of adultery. " (Lewis, Allegory, p. 37) This 
is further intensified by the fact that passionate love/eros was considered evil/sinful by the medieval church 
fathers whether outside or inside marriage. "Andreas repeatedly recognizes this. `Amorem exhibere est 
graviter offendere deum. ' Marriage offers no compromise. It is a mistake to suppose that the vehemens 
amator can escape sine crimine by the impropriety (from the courtly point of view) of loving his own wife. 
Such a man is in propia uxore adulter. His sin is heavier than that of the unmarried lover, for he has abused 
the sacrament of marriage. And that is precisely why the whole world of courtesy exists only by leaving the 
religious side of the question out for a moment. Once bring that in, as the lover argues in the same passage, 
and you must give up, not only loving par amours, but the whole world as well...... 'No man through any 
good deeds can please God so long as he serves in the service of Love'[Quum igitur omnia sequantur ex 
amore nefanda]". (Lewis, Allegory, p. 41) Given this view of the rift in the medieval mind caused by the 
economic view of marriage, and further the prohibition of passion which is in marriage viewed as a greater 
sin in that it "abuses the sacrament of marriage", it is not surprising that adultery and subversive love were 
idealized. Consequently, for Francesca who imbibed the doctrines of courtly love wholeheartedly, it is not 
surprising that she justified herself by Amor and saw her passionate love for Paolo as a lesser sin, and 
furthermore did not fully recognize her sin as her whole value system conflicted with medieval Christian 
values. 
2 When the Love religion of the god Amor opposes the Christian religion, it can operate through parody. 
"This erotic religion arises as a rival or a parody of the real religion and emphasizes the antagonism of the 
two ideals. " (Lewis, Allegory, p. 18) As "the worship of the god Amor has been a mock-religion in Ovid's 
Art of Love, ... the 
Ovidian tradition, operated upon by the medieval taste for humorous 
blasphemy.. 
. 
[producing] a love religion, and even in a sense a Christianized love religion", parodies 
medieval Christianity. "As against any theory which would derive medieval Frauendienst from Christianity 
and the worship of the Blessed Virgin, we must insist that the love religion often begins as a parody of the 
real religion. This does not mean that it may not soon become something more serious than a parody, nor 
even that it may not, as in Dante, find a modus vivendi with Christianity and produce a noble fusion of 
sexual and religious experience. But it does mean that we must be prepared for a certain ambiguity in all 
those poems where the attitude of the lover to his lady or to Love looks at first sight most like the attitude 
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lust reflecting a rebellion against Christian doctrines26 which, as Dante demonstrates in 
Purgatorio XXVI, was capable of leading people astray. 
3. THE POETICS OF RECANTATION 
Rather than seeing God as the ultimate end and good of the soul, the poet of 
courtly love knowingly violated Christian ethics and his conscience (Singleton, "From 
Love to Caritas", p. 68), worshipping a temporal woman. Having recognized themselves 
to have violated their consciences some of the poets were struck with remorse, which 
eventually resulted in a pattern whereby "recantation even became a part of the tradition" 
(Singleton, "From Love to Caritas", p. 65). 27 This poetics of recantation has affinities 
of the worshipper to the Blessed Virgin or to God... Where it is not a parody of the Church it may be, in a 
sense, her rival-a temporary escape, a truancy from the ardours of a religion that was believed in to the 
delights of a religion that was merely imagined. To describe it as the revenge of Paganism on her 
conquerors would be to exaggerate; but to think of it as a direct colouring of human passions by religious 
emotion would be a far graver error. It is as if some lover's metaphor when he said `Here is my heaven' in 
a moment of passionate abandonment were taken up and expanded into a system. Even while he speaks he 
knows that `here' is not his real heaven; and yet it is a delightful audacity to develop the idea further. If you 
go on to add to that lover's `heaven' its natural accessories, a god and saints and a list of commandments, 
and if you picture the lover praying, sinning, repenting, and finally admitted to bliss, you will find yourself 
in the precarious dream-world of medieval love poetry. " (Lewis, Allegory, p. 21-22) 
26 This conflict between the values of courtly love and Christianity resulted in subversive love poetry, 
poetry tainted with lust. "The general impression left on the medieval mind by its official teachers was that 
all love-at least all such passionate and exalted devotion as a courtly poet thought worthy of the man- 
was more or less wicked. And this impression, combining with the nature of feudal marriage as I have 
already described it, produced in the poets a certain willfulness, a readiness to emphasize rather than to 
conceal the antagonism between their amatory and their religious ideals. Thus if the Church tells them that 
the ardent lover even of his own wife is in mortal sin, they presently reply with the rule that true love is 
impossible in marriage. If the Church says that the sexual act can be `excused' only by the desire for 
offspring, then it becomes the mark of a true lover, like Chauntecleer, that he served Venus `More for delyt 
than world to multiplye. ' [Cant. Tales, B 4535] This cleavage between Church and court ... 
is the most 
striking feature of medieval sentiment. " (Lewis, Allegory, p. 17-18) For this reason, regardless of its 
notions of higher love, fino amor, Troubadour poetry and the Dolce Stil Nuovo are, due to their subject 
matter, "tainted with `lussuria, '" (Boyde, p. 290) 
27 "There is no better example of this inevitable final turning from love of woman to love of God than what 
a famous `theologian' of courtly love wrote toward the end of his Art of Love. In the first two books of his 
work, Andreas Capellanus gives a most detailed course of instruction in that art to a young friend named 
Walter (and what an amazing course it is! ). But then comes the time, at the beginning of the third book, 
when he feels that he must admonish his pupil as follows: `You should know that we did not do this 
because we consider it advisable for you or any other man to fall in love, but for fear lest you might think 
us stupid; we believe though that any man who devotes his efforts to love loses all his usefulness. Read this 
little book, then, not as one seeking to take up the life of a lover, but that, invigorated by the theory and 
trained to excite the minds of women to love, you may, by refraining from so doing, win an eternal 
recompense and thereby deserve a greater reward from God. For God is more pleased with a man who is 
able to sin and does not than with a man who has no opportunity to sin... ' At least one third of the 
troubadours in the south of France are reported to have turned to the cloister and to God in their last years- 
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with Plato's Phaedrus when Socrates at the beginning of his second speech confesses that 
he has sinned against the god of love. Analogously, though with the striking difference 
that Socrates' sin was to speak against Love rather than advocate a false love, the 
Troubadour poets acknowledge that in following Amor, the false god of love or the false 
god of inferior love, they sinned against the true God of Love, the Christian God who is 
caritas. Here recantation becomes Biblical repentance, the repentance of amor for 
caritas, a bad view of love for a good one, a recantation which is central to our discussion 
of Dante as with Plato. 
The development of Italian lyric poetry in Italy culminating in Dante sharpens the 
parallel with the Phaedrus. This culture of courtly love infused with the Platonic 
questioning of the nature of love, the divinity of Eros/Amor and the high value of the love 
of the individual, all of which are attributes of the Phaedrus, was expressed through the 
poetry of the Troubadours. This in turn was transplanted in the thirteenth century into 
Italy forming the Italian lyrical tradition28 where it likewise created a context in the 
Sicilian and Tuscan schools for the inquiry into the nature of love. 29 The poetry of its 
leader, Lentini Notaro is characterized by "a constant questioning about the nature of 
Love, rather than a concern for the erotic vicissitudes of the poet or his beloved, who 
often seem mere pretexts for philosophical soul-searching. " (Brand and Pertile, 
and it does not much matter if this be only legend; the substantial pattern of the matter is still there, even in 
the rumor. (We find it in Chaucer and in Gower and in Juan Ruiz in Spain. )... In one form or another 
repentance did come to be a part of the tradition of courtly love. " (Singleton, "From Love to Caritas", p. 
65-6) 
28 "Italian lyric tradition... had its roots in the Provencal poetry nourished by the rivalling courts of twelfth- 
century southern France. The conventions of troubadour love poetry ... were successfully transplanted to the 
court of Frederick H of Palermo" (Barolini, "Dante and the Lyric Past", p. 14), the Magna curia (Great 
court) of Frederick Hohenstaufen, "as only one amongst many competing forms of expression" (Brand and 
Pertile, Cambridge History, p. 9). The Magna curia "became the capital of the first group of Italian 
vernacular lyric poets, the so-called Sicilian School". (Barolini, "Dante and the Lyric Past", p. 14) Scholars 
consider this tradition of lyric poetry to have improved in Italy through having passed into the hands of a 
"nobler race of poets" who introduced "a grave and metaphysical turn of thought". (Symonds, An 
Introduction to Dante, pp. 265-278; "A nation of scholars and of doctors-Dante calls the poets of his 
school dottori-men who were not knights or squires. " Symonds, "Dantesque and Platonic Ideals of Love", 
p. 79) 
29 In "Filosofia del' Amore" Nardi discusses how Mostacci believed love was either a cruel or benevolent 
god, Lord or Tyrant yet cannot be personalized as he is a god. Piero della Vigne responds that love is in a 
visible form but is an invisible force. Cappellano thinks love is a passion, excessive imagination, and 
emphasizes the manners of the lover who becomes chaste. He emphasizes an inner beauty over birth. Le 
Notero responds to Mostacci saying love is a passion of the heart which he relates to Aristotelianism. The 
lover experiences pleasure and delectation through the face of the beloved. (Nardi, "Filosofia dell'Amore", 
pp. 1-19) 
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Cambridge History, p. 12)30 In opposition to the Sicilian poetry of "sorrowing [and] 
sighing", the Tuscan school took a moral stance, Guittone therein offering an example of 
the reemergence of a poetry of recantation following the pattern of the Troubadours. 31 He 
focused upon ethics, morality and moderation hence resembling Socrates' first speech, 
articulated through Ferrari's reading of the white horse in Socrates' second speech of the 
Phaedrus. 32 These poets of Sicilian and Tuscan schools in turn were stylisically reacted 
against by the poets of the Dolce Stil Nuovo who were the great influences upon Dante, 
Cavalcanti and Guinizzelli in particular. As Nardi ("Filosofia dell' Amore", p. 19) writes, 
30 "The `leader' (or `caposcula') of the Sicilian School was Giacomo da Lentini [the Notary, Purg. 24]" 
(Barolini, "Dante and the Lyric Past", p. 14; also Brand and Pertile, Cambridge History, p. 12). His poetry 
exemplified the Silicilian tradition focusing upon the erotic "not in the contingencies of love, in its time, 
place, and circumstances, but in its condition, in the experience of seeing, sorrowing, sighing, and 
rejoicing" (Took, Lyric Poet, p. 2). 
31 "The Tuscans, by contrast, mainland successors to the Sicilians, took a moral line [as compared to what 
Took calls the Sicilian "hedonism"]... Love is a good thing, liable in the right-thinking citizen to inculcate 
the virtues of patience, perserverence and self-discipline" (Took, Lyric Poet, p. 3) as exemplified by 
Guittone and Bonagiunta. The poetry of Guittone is criticized as being "mere artifice [see Barolini, "Dante 
and the Lyric Past", pp. 15-18]... a blind acceptance of the instructions as adequate, [showing] quite clearly 
how little [he was]... concerned with any genuine emotion. " In Purgatorio, Guittone is grouped with Le 
Notero and Bonagiunta as representatives of the old style against which advocates of the new style, the 
members of the Dolce Stil Nuovo, react. Bonagiunta admits that they could not like Dante transcribe love 
directly when he states "Now I see... the knot which held back the Notary, Guittone and he from reaching 
the sweet new style which I hear" (Purgatorio, XXIV, 55-57). 
"Guittone continued to elaborate his peculiarly ingenious and obscure love poetry until his 
religious conversion, after which he refused to have anything more to do with sexual love. " (Shaw, p. 106) 
Guittone underwent a religious conversion, and "in about 1265 abandoned a wife and three children to 
enter the lay Franciscan order of the Milites Beatae Virginis Mariae (Knights of the Blessed Virgin Mary), 
popularly nicknamed the `Frati gaudenti' (Jovial Friars)" (Brand and Pertile, Cambridge History of Italian 
Literature, p. 15). The conversion marks the transition "from love poetry to moral and ethical poetry, and 
even to the religious lauds to honour St. Francis and St. Dominic" (Barolini, "Dante and the Lyric Past", p. 
15-8). Therefore, "Guittone's literary output.... tends to be classified according to this watershed in his life, 
with one half conventionally lyrical (Guittone), and the other moralistic and spiritual (Fra Guittone)" 
(Brand and Pertile, Cambridge History, p. 15). Following his conversion, particularly due to the medieval 
doctrinal view of sex and passion, Guittone's poems at times envision love as mania and negative-"Now 
that I completely flee love and do not want it, and more than anything else find it hateful.. .. 
for in all parts 
where Love seizes madness is king, in place of wisdom.. .. 
[Instead] make God... [my] star.. . 
for neither 
great honour nor great good have been acquired by following carnal desire", partially reminiscent of 
Socrates' first speech in the Phaedrus. "Guittone is thus the first Italian poet to trace in his career a 
trajectory like that of Dante's (albeit without the epic dimension), and to embrace in his lyrics issues as 
diverse as the nature of love, in both its secular and divine manifestations, the moral code, with its virtues 
and vices, and the vicissitudes of Aretine and Florentine politics. " (Barolini, "Dante and the Lyric Past", p. 
15-8) 
32 "Thematically, a bourgeois ethic comes to play, as the poet, following his rejection of the troubadour 
equation between Love and true worth, exhorts us to pursue civic morality and virtuous moderation: 
although he tells us on the one hand to reject carnal desire...., he does not tell us on the other to embrace 
monastic contemplation. The Guittonian ideal is... an honoured position in the community and a wisdom 
conceived in terms less metaphysical than practical and ethical" (Barolini, "Dante and the Lyric Past", p. 
18), hence like the white horse in Plato's Phaedrus. 
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"Considering love as a passion as defined by Capellanus and Notaro these poets could 
only develop the doctrine of love in two ways: 1) by accentuating its violent and 
irrational character, 2) or by accentuating the imaginary element with artistic and moral 
catharsis of love as with Guido Guinizzelli. " For Cavalcanti "love [is] irrational, indeed 
destructive" (Took, Lyric Poet, p. 4)33 In contrast, Guinizzelli34 represents a positive ideal 
form of love, a pure contemplation of beauty35 which is ennobling. 36 In Guinizzelli, the 
struggle between courtly love and Christianity comes into the foreground seeking 
resolution, though this is only accomplished in Dante. 7 He, however, does bring 
33 His poetry therefore expresses a "tragic... pervasive sense of conflict. On the one hand stands the 
possibility of understanding, abstraction, imagination and contemplation issuing in a state of pure 
consciousness.. . on the other hand stands love, 
invasive, ineluctable, and inducing in the lover a deep sense 
of helplessness as he witnesses his own spiritual disintegration" (Took, Lyric Poet, p. 5), suggesting the 
opposition of reason versus passion/the irrational, which we will discuss in terms of Francesca. Shaw (pp. 
119-123) argues that Cavalcanti is a realist facing the temporality of love; Cavalcanti's lover pursues his 
ideal which reveals itself momentarily in different women, yet the recognition of the temporality of his 
ideal and therefore the finitude of love causes the lover to be heartbroken, thereby causing death. 
34 Guinizzelli of Bologna, admirer and imitator of Guittone differed from him in that he "really felt the love 
that most of the others merely wrote about" (Shaw, p. 106). 35 "The flower and fruit of the desire which the poet would like to pick are nothing else than a glance full of 
pity and of benevolence of the beloved women of whom he asks nothing else than to pay his service with a 
smile. " (Nardi, "Filosofia dell'Amore", p. 19) 36 His "repeated assertions that only the noble are capable of love, that nobility is a product of virtue and 
not of heredity, that the influence of the lady is ennobling, are taken seriously. " (Shaw, p. 106) 37 "All this vindication of pure, that is, unsensual love and of the elevating influence of the lady, is directed 
against the prejudiced opinion of philosophers, churchmen, and worldly scoffers, for whom sexual love can 
only be carnal. That apparent incompatibility between ideal love for a woman and philosophical and 
religious doctrine on love, which had bothered previous poets so little, was a serious problem for 
Guinizzelli. In the last stanza of the canzone he imagines himself before the judgement seat of God who is 
accusing him of comparing `vano amor', love for a woman, to love for Him and the Virgin. All he can say 
in his defense is: `This woman was no ordinary woman: she seemed like an angel of Thy kingdom: it was 
no fault of mine if I set my heart on her. ' He had loved her with the good love that is peculiar to the gentle 
heart, a love similar to that which is properly directed to God and the Virgin, a religious love. He has no 
solution to the problem, no defense, only an excuse, but he is sure that his love is good, and his deep 
sincerity distinguishes him from the many poets who had used the same excuse lightly. " (Shaw, p. 107; my 
emphasis) However concerning the concluding sentence, "She had the appearance of an angel who came 
from Your kingdom. No sin is imputable to me if I loved her", Singleton ("From Love to Caritas", pp. 69- 
70) rightly writes, "But can we accept this as a sufficient reply to God? Is this any solution? In short, is the 
poet right or is God right? Should we not rather observe that Guinizzelli has deliberately ended his poem 
with an ambiguity? He has refused at the end to take sides. The very point, the conceit of his poem is to 
present the conflict without solution". Furthermore while Nardi believes that Guinizzelli succeeds in 
resolving the conflict between courtly love and Christianity as shown when he writes "hence the lover feels 
no guilt as a Christian of such feeling" ("Filosofia dell'Amore", p. 19), Singleton ("From Love to Caritas", 
p. 68-71) is correct in saying that "the so-called donna angelicata, the lady-made-angel, of the lyric poetry 
being written before and in Dante's time in Italy did not bring in herself the solution to the conflict between 
troubadour love and Christian love, as some historians of literature would seem to suggest, [giving] the 
credit for the solution... to [Guinizzelli's]... famous song, `Love and the Gentle Heart. '" This conflict is 
only brought to a kind of resolution in Dante. 
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theology and poetry together in the worship and desire of the beautiful, thus yoking 
philosophy and theology to eros, which is the subject of Bonagiunta's criticism of him. 
38 
4. RESOLVING THE AMBIGUITY 
In Dante we see the fruitfulness of "the yoking of philosophy-indeed 
Theology to Eros ... a conjoining that would effectively 
dissolve the impasse that drove 
troubadour poetry and give rise to a theologized courtly love, epitomized by the figure of 
Dante's Beatrice, the lady who does not separate from God but leads him to God. " 
(Barolini, "Dante and the Lyric Past", p. 19) Like the divine nature of Eros in Socrates' 
second speech of the Phaedrus and its role as daimon in the Symposium, Beatrice acts as 
the divinely sent love, caritas, which acts as a guide to aide Dante in his return to God 
marking the "rediscovery of the divine origin of Eros" (Nardi, "Filosofia dell'Amore", p. 
41) 39 The figure of Beatrice overcomes in the context of the courtly tradition the struggle 
between human and divine love and is crucial to Dante's development as a poet4° which 
38 In his verse Guinizzelli mixes theology and poetry. Objecting to Guinizzelli's philosophical terminology 
(see Brand and Pertile, Cambridge History, p. 18), Bonagiunta "[accuses] Guido Guinizzelli, the Bolognese 
poet whom Dante hails as the father of the new style in Purgatorio 26, of having altered love poetry for the 
worse, of having `changed the manner of elegant verses of love' ('Voi, ch'avete mutata la manieral de Ii 
plagenti ditti de 1'amore') .... He 
does not understand what the `wisdom of Bologna' (a reference to that 
city's university, noted as a center of philosophical study) has to do with love poetry, and he accuses 
Guinizzelli of writing pretentious, obscure verse whose philosophical subtleties make it impossible to 
decode 
.... Bonagiunta was right to point to the yoking of philosophy-indeed 
Theology-to Eros. " 
(Barolini, "Dante and the Lyric Past", p. 19); however, this linking Dante held to Guinizzelli's credit. 
39 With Beatrice "love that the eyes of the beloved young girl had lit up in his heart during his adolescence 
is not extinguished; but on the contrary, purified of all cloud of mortality, has become light of his life, in 
the ascent from the lowest lacuna of the universe to the glory of God, `love that moves the sun and the 
other stars"' (Nardi, "Filosofia dell'Amore", p. 92). 
40 Dante having sinned against Beatrice after her death through turning aside to other loves, most probably 
the cold Lady Philosophy who showed herself "proud and despising" (Nardi, "Filosofia dell'Amore", p. 
63), interrupted and abandoned the Convivio in its fourth treatise. As in the Phaedrus' recantation of an 
incorrect view of love, Dante recants his incorrect object of love placing his love back on Beatrice who 
after her death in the Vita Nuova took the place of love (Singleton, "From Love to Caritas", p. 57; Love's 
last words are "And whoever should consider subtly would call that Beatrice Love because of the great 
resemblance which she has to me" after which the god of love disappears as Beatrice has become love, 
caritas). According to Nardi, Dante then rewrites the end of the Vita Nuova (pp. 72-3) and the role of 
Beatrice in the Comedy, so that the notion of love of the individual is reintroduced, not left on the first rung 
of the ladder of ascent as in Vlastos' reading of the Symposium, which is much more in keeping with the 
notion of love of the individual we discussed with regard both to the Symposium and, more particularly, the 
Phaedrus. Thereafter the beloved forms a dialectical relation with the lover to help him return to God 
acting as a gift, a "beatrice" from God to the lover, Dante. As a result he synthesizes passionate desire for 
Beatrice with pursuit of the virtue/good which she embodies in the pursuit of the Christian God who is 
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progressively leads to the vision of love as being of divine origin. 1 As with the 
Symposium and the Phaedrus, the Vita Nuova and Commedia address the opposition 
between two forms of love, irrational desire and idealizing contemplation of the beautiful 
which leads to virtue. This dichotomy between love as irrational and destructive in 
Cavalcanti versus Guinizzelli's ideal ennobling love emerges between Francesca and 
Beatrice, Francesca exemplifying the former and Beatrice the latter. However, as in the 
Phaedrus where we see the opposition resolved by divine Eros, similarly Beatrice acts as 
a transition between amor and caritas and thereby Dante's answer to the problem of love. 
This pattern may be read as showing Dante's synthesis of the love of the individual 
present in the Phaedrus, understood through the irony of Ovid (perhaps under the 
Platonic influence of Aristophanes' speech in the Symposium), with a post-recantation 
notion of God as AgapelCaritas42 as distinct from Amor. 
In Part II we have examined two means by which Platonism may have infiltrated 
the medieval society and thereby reached Dante. The first, the Neo-Platonic philosophical 
chain--through Plotinus to Augustine into the monastic communities through which it 
touched Dante-seems solid enough. The literary chain, while more delicate in that it 
passes through Ovid, is also plausible. However the more direct Neo-Platonic influence 
upon the Troubadours may seem stronger. Though the question of the sources of Platonic 
caritas, the love of which Beatrice is an expression. According to Nardi, Dante rewrites the end of the Vita 
Nuova enthroning her in heaven thereby causing it to become an introduction to the Commedia. 
41 Nardi writes, "In the discussions concerning the nature of love which were kindled among the Italian 
poets of the thirteenth century, there seems to have been a dialectical development comparable to the 
discussion of Plato's Phaedrus; so that from the rhetorical exercises which call to mind the discourse of 
Lysias we arrive with Dante at the rediscovery of the divine origin of Eros. It is in the poetic representation 
of the ascent of the soul beyond the heavens, celebrated in the second discourse of Socrates, and in the 
vision of Er at the end of the Republic, rather than in the humble visions of the Middle Ages, that the fertile 
seed of the philosophy and poetry of the Commedia can really be found. " (Nardi, "Dante and Medieval 
Culture", p. 41) 
Thus Mazzeo (Structure and Thought, p. 204) writes, "Nardi pointed out how the Vita Nuova and 
Comedy stand in a relationship to Provencal and stil nuovo speculations and representations of love similar 
to that of the Phaedrus and Symposium to Greek traditions. The history of the Italian lyric up to Dante 
seems to recapitulate the stages of development which culminated in the conception of Eros presented by 
Socrates in those two dialogues. Nardi traces a development of love from Andreas through Cavalcanti and 
Guinizzelli who conclude that the beauty of the beloved comes from heaven and is destined to return there 
and that this beauty arouses in the gentle heart every noble virtue by means of love. Such was the doctrine 
as Dante received it. He added a new theme, that of the death of the beloved. In dying, she became a 
"spirital bellezza grande"(Vita nuova XXXIII, 8), and it is from this death that the platonism and mysticism 
of Dante arises. This is the doctrine of both the Vita nuova and the Comedy. " 
42 As Dante read the Bible in Latin (Vulgate) he would have been exposed to God as caritas as distinct 
from the Greek understanding of God as Agape. For this reason it is important to realize that he would draw 
no distinction between the two, having inherited a form of Christianity already infused with Platonism. 
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influence upon Dante remains debatable, it seems perfectly reasonable to accept that 
Platonic thought reached Dante both through the communities concerned with 
philosophy/theology and through the literary community, especially its poets. 
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PART 3 
DANTE'S DIALECTICAL STRUCTURE OF LOVE 
EXHIBITED IN THE DIVINE COMEDY 
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We now turn, more directly, to Dante, a poet emerging from the Christian 
tradition of the Middle Ages who, through the Commedia, reveals the conflict and 
reconciliation of the courtly tradition with Christianity while simultaneously and in so 
doing showing the indirect influence of Platonism. We have introduced our discussion of 
Dante by taking account of two ways through which a Platonic influence may have 
reached Dante. The first, the philosophical approach, traces a plausible progression from 
Plato through Plotinus and Augustine into medieval culture and the monastic schools of 
which Dante was a pupil. Secondly, through literary traditions Platonist discussion 
concerning the ambiguity of love and the lover's desire for wholeness with the beloved 
was passed down from the Platonic dialogues on love through Ovid; it may have partially 
formed and certainly informed the tradition of courtly love. We have highlighted the way 
Platonic influence seems to surface through courtly love's conflict with Christianity, 
expressed through the poetics of recantation. Debates concerning the ambiguity of love 
are expressed through the poetry of the Troubadours, particularly in their poetry of 
recantation, which influences the Sicilian and Tuscan schools and in turn the Dolce Stil 
Nuovo of which Dante was a part. Dante's poetry similarly shows a great concern for the 
positive and negative forms of love, which in his work is expressed through amor versus 
caritas, both echoing and providing a subtle deviation from the dichotomy of earthly and 
heavenly eros. 
Given this framework, we shall examine Francesca as Dante's most eloquent 
articulation of courtly love and the exemplification of amor. First we shall see how Dante 
likens her to Aphrodite in Chapter X, "The Venus of Rimini", showing her understanding 
of love to emerge from the pagan notion of earthly Bros associated with earthly 
Aphrodite. Through using the myth of Venus and Mars to articulate her very similar 
relationship to Paolo, Dante simultaneously ennobles her and debases/condemns her. This 
condemnation is further explored in Chapter XI, "Falling for Francesca", an analysis of 
Inferno V in which we see that while Dante identifies Francesca with Aphrodite he is 
simultaneously, as if on the opposite side of the coin, condemning her according to the 
Christian tradition as an Eve figure, constituting a trap into which both Paolo and Dante 
the pilgrim fall. By identifying her as a trap/snare (reminiscent of the net of Vulcan), she 
is demonstrated to be a penia figure who through her penia/lack of moral virtue which 
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she disguises with aesthetic and literary sensibility lures others away from the path to true 
virtue, causing them to fall into the aporia (lack of passage) and be caught forever in 
Hell. This in turn expresses Dante's condemnation of courtly love as aporetic, leading its 
followers astray resulting in their condemnation, thereby explaining the reason behind its 
conflict between Christianity, why it is to be condemned in Christian terms. 
We then turn in Chapter XII to Beatrice whose Rebuke in Purgatorio XXX and 
XXXI marks the moment of Dante's full recantation of the notion of courtly love in 
favour of Christianity, following the tradition of the Troubadours. In "Beatrice as 
Heavenly Venus" we will explore how Dante in Purgatorio XXX parallels Aeneid I in 
order to represent Beatrice as heavenly Venus. Through using Christian imagery, Dante 
seems to rewrite heavenly eros in Christian terms suggesting a similarity between the 
two. However at the point in Aeneid I when Venus directs Aeneas to the town where 
Dido is living a difference becomes apparent. Dante indicates that heavenly eros 
ultimately degenerates to earthly eros, concupiditas, demonstrating the central problem in 
courtly love. Dante corrects both courtly love and reexamines Virgil however in Chapter 
XIII, "Conversion to Caritas", in which Dante, through the latter part of Purgatorio XXX 
and XXXI shows Beatrice to be an expression of God's grace for Dante, acting as a 
bridge between heavenly eros and caritas. As the Word of God and a Christ-like figure, 
she forces Dante to confront his sins and his sinful view of love, and initiates and 
oversees his full Christian conversion according to the model of Acts 2: 36-41, after 
which she leads Dante to God. She thereby shows herself to be both a poros-figure 
(combining the understanding of poros as resource and pathway) and the reconciliation of 
courtly love and Christianity. 
In Chapter XIV we shall discuss how through analogy Beatrice functions as a 
Poros-figure, an expression of and pathway to God. Beatrice as the bearer of central 
analogies concerning the nature of eros and the object which eros desires, God, through 
body-involving imagery and light as a way of pointing to the unrepresentable, leads the 
pilgrim beyond the physical towards an understanding of love and God. 
In the concluding chapter of Part 3, we shall turn back to the myth of the birth of 
Eros, taking account of the way that poros and penia have been reevaluated; as Francesca 
tends to a penia dominated path exemplifying a penia-dominant form of eros, likewise 
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Beatrice tends to a poros dominated way indicative of a poros-dominant form of eros. 
Yet given that Christianity puts forth/posits a fullness which Platonism lacks, we shall 
end by examining their differences in order to distinguish better how the Platonic notion 
of eros has changed through its contact with Christianity. In the Commedia, Dante adds a 
new to twist to Platonism, extending it beyond itself to Christianity so that Christianity 
becomes the answer to Platonism, the poros (pathway) out of the aporia (lack of way) of 
Platonism. As with the aporia (lack of way) of courtly love, Dante borrows from and 
converts the aporia in Platonism, enabling it to be integrated into and contribute to the 
poros of Christianity. 
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X. THE VENUS OF RIMINI 
Through his use of Platonic imagery combined with his clever manipulation of 
myth, Dante likens Franscesca to earthly Venus, thereby showing the destructive nature 
of uncontrolled eros, earthly eros which is not governed by sophrosune. The account of 
Paolo and Francesca in Inferno V begins, "Poet, I would fain speak with these two that go 
together and seem so light upon the wind" (Poeta, volontieri parlerei a quei due the 
insieme vanno, e paion si al vento esser leggieri; lines 73-75). Dante is intrigued by them 
and desires to speak to them because they are together and because they are "light on the 
wind. " The first distinguishing quality about the two spirits' is their "togetherness. " 
1. HISTORICAL ACCOUNTS OF FRANCESCA AND PAOLO 
Dante desires to speak with them to find out who they are. The female shade, not 
identified until line 116, is Francesca, wife of the ruler of Rimini, of whom relatively 
little is known. She, the daughter of Guido Minore da Polenta of Ravenna, married 
1 In the Inferno all the personalities Dante sees and comes into contact with are shades, disembodied spirits 
as shown by Dante greeting the woman as `anime' (80) contrasted with her calling him `animal' (88). Their 
existence is of a spiritual/non-physical nature (see Boyde, Perception and Passion in Dante, pp. 141-2). 
Chiampi observes this slightly differently: "the pilgrim's first word to Francesca is `anime' and hers to him 
'animal'-words that express, in turn, the difference between her carnal vision and his eventual spiritual 
vision. `Animal', as virtually all the commentators are aware, means animate being: it nevertheless does not 
cease to mean beast. Indeed, it is the play of these meanings that provides a basso ostinato more perceptible 
on the printed page than in the dramatic action of the canto. As we shall see, Francesca's words themselves 
evidence the unlikeness that has infested her being. In sum, she has identified the core of her being with the 
lower, sensitive part of the soul that she shares with the beasts. " (Chiampi, pp. 58-59) 
2 Given there is no document or chronicle before Dante of Francesca's love for Paolo and their murder 
(Singleton, Commentary, p. 84; also see Durling Canto V, note 116 and Musa, Commentary, p. 77; "There 
is not even a historical record in Ravenna confirming that the lovers died on the same day"), "although the 
event must have been well known"(Grandgent, p. 47), it is difficult to date the event. Parodi estimates that 
the date falls "between 1283-1286. "(E. G. Parodi p. 63 in Singleton, Commentary, p. 84), while Grandgent 
(p. 47) and Sayers (Commentary, p. 102) believe it to be about 1285. "When Dante was eighteen, in 1282- 
1283, Paolo was for five months in Florence as Capitano del Popolo; he is not mentioned among 
Malatesta's sons in 1287; and in 1288 there is evidence of a child born to Giovanni by a second wife. In 
1285 Paolo was some 35 years old, had been married sixteen years, and had two children; Francesca had 
one child. Paolo's daughter married a son of Aghinolfo of Romena. " (Grandgent, p. 47) However though 
"it is easy to suppose that he had knowledge which is lacking to us on which to base his portraiture of 
Francesca" (Sinclair, p. 84), for De Sanctis (p. 36) dates and the historical character are of little importance. 
"It little matters how Dante was led to the conception of this Francesca; and it matters still less to know 
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whether through ruse3 or mutual consent the physically deformed Giovanni di Malatesta 
da Verrucchio or Gianciotto, master of Rimini, for political reasons, and fell in love with 
his handsome younger brother Paolo who had been Capitano del Popolo. Gianciotto may 
have surprised them together (see Boccaccio), Inferno V suggesting that he has killed 
them both4 which explains why they remain united having died together. In line 106 they 
are brought to "una morte" implying that they died at the same time. Furthermore, the 
whether, or to what extent, he may have altered or modified historical tradition. What matters is this: 
Francesca, as Dante conceived her, is more alive and real than she could ever be as presented by history" 
(also see Boyde, p. 292). However, that Francesca is named only at line 116 and that Paolo is never named, 
Singleton (Commentary, p. 92) interprets as "true indications that the poet is presenting a cause celebre" 
(Also see Musa, Commentary, p. 77). 
3 Boccaccio, asked by the city of Florence to give the first weekly public lectures on Dante one year after 
his death and who having interviewed the family claimed to be an authority, tells the story as follows. "A 
long, harsh war had raged between [Guido Minore da Polenta] and the Malatesta, lords of Rimini, when 
through certain intermediaries, peace was treated and concluded. To make it all the more firm, both sides 
were pleased to cement it with marriage. " However, Guido Minore da Polenta was warned by a friend that 
given Gianciotto being deformed and as Francesca was extremely "high-spirited", she would never go 
through with the marriage. The friend advised the father to fool Francesca by having one of Gianciotto's 
brothers, Paolo, marry her in his name. Prior to the marriage contract, Francesca saw Paolo, "handsome, 
pleasing, very courteous" and fell in love with him and thereafter accepted the marriage and went to 
Rimini. It was not until the morning after the wedding day that she realized she had been fooled and was 
furious and continued to love Paolo. It is not clear how their renewed relationship began, Boccaccio 
claiming that Dante probably constructed his own story based on probability. "And thus happened what 
[Gianciotto] would not have wanted: before reaching Paolo, the blade passed through Francesca's bosom. 
Gianciotto, completely beside himself because of this accident-for he loved the woman more than 
himself-withdrew the blade, struck Paolo again, and killed him. Leaving them both dead, he left, and 
returned to his duties. The next morning, amidst much weeping, the lovers were buried in the same tomb. " 
(See Singleton, Commentary, p. 87-9 for translation of Italian. ) 
If Boccaccio's reading is accepted, then Francesca has a case for at least `partial' innocence. She 
has been deceived and treated treacherously; fooled into a marriage she would never have agreed to. Also 
there is a case for the righting of injustice, the actualizing of her marriage vows to him to whom she vowed. 
She believed that she was marrying Paolo so in her heart she pledged herself in matrimony to Paolo, and 
only to Paolo did she make her vow of fidelity, not to an empty name but to an individual present before 
her eyes. Therefore on some level Paolo was her husband, though following the ceremony she was tricked. 
This implies that her infidelity to Gianciotto can be seen on some level as the righting of a wrong, not in 
terms of revenge though there may have been some element of this present, but more precisely a return to 
her `real' husband, the man she actually married. In Genesis 2: 23---"A man will leave his father and mother 
and be united to his wife and they will become one flesh. " Her vows were a pledging of the fulfillment of 
this scripture, though its fulfillment was reached/actualized with another, Gianciotto. Leaving aside 
discussions of the power of the name and the distinction between a man and his name, Francesca the lover 
of "beautiful words" (Shapero, Woman, Earthly and Divine, p. 107), ultimately becomes the victim of 
words and their impious manipulation, as these words imprison her by binding her to the flesh of a man to 
whom she had not pledged herself in matrimony. Thus, ironically, to return to the man she had pledged 
herself to in matrimony ceased to be fidelity and the fulfillment of the vow of matrimony but became 
adultery and incest. Dante's references to Genesis 2: 23 with regard to the togetherness of Paolo and 
Francesca is ironic undercutting of Francesca's surface piety, if Boccaccio is accepted. 
Though Boccaccio tends to embellish history and make it more politically correct, De Sanctis 
accepts his version (p. 34) though Croce (p. 28) does not. "Others pretend... [that] the anecdote (the late 
anecdote) of how she was taken from Paolo and given to Gianciotto by stratagem" is true. 
4 See Sayers, Commentary, p. 102. 
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next sentence reads "Caina attende chi vita ci spende" ("Caina waits for him who 
quenched our life"; line 107). As Caina, the ninth circle of Hell, was reserved for the 
punishment of those treacherous to kindred (Inferno XXXII) and as Cain murdered his 
brother Abel, this suggests that the man who killed them was definitely kindred, more 
specifically Paolo's full brother Gianciotto, a point reinforced by Dante's use of myth as 
we shall see. Though Francesca is not explicit and seems somewhat evasive (Boyde, p. 
296), she implies that Gianciotto discovered them together, though whether the scene 
resembled that which Boccaccio describes is unanswerable. In any case it is clear from 
Inferno V line 106 that he killed them together, perhaps simultaneously in that it was a 
"single death" (Sayers, Commentary, p. 160) which occurred in a particularly offensive 
manner ("e '1 modo ancor m'offende"; line 102; as for the violent nature see line 107). 
This unity in death suggests the physical unity in life "the two [having become] 
one flesh" (Genesis 2: 23), which seems to suggest that they died as one "flesh" caught in 
the act of adultery. Dante's image seems to evoke John 8: 1-11 which describes the scene 
in which a woman is brought to Jesus by the Pharisees who was "caught in the act of 
adultery" (John 8: 4). The two shades as anima "[going] together" (lines 74-5) not only 
are suggestive of a union of the spirit (which though they go together is not really 
achieved; see lines 139-140) but also a union of flesh implying a union of two in one and 
which will never be parted ("che mai da me non fia diviso; line 135) This is revealed 
when one reads beyond Canto V to Canto XIII, where Piero della Vigna explains that 
after the final judgement all damned souls will receive their bodies back (Inferno XIII: 
104-6; `Come 1'altre verrem per nostre spoglie, ma non perö ch'alcuna sen rivesta; the 
none giusto aver cio ch'om si toglie'). The direct implication of this passage when 
applied to Canto V (which the reader realizes only in retrospect) is that when Francesca 
and Paolo receive their bodies back, their bodies like their souls will go together, united 
forever in the state in which they died, suggesting the horrific nature of their punishment 
as intensified following the final judgment. 5 
s "The protagonist had asked whether `these torments will increase after the Last Judgment, or whether they 
will be less, or equally roasting? ' And he was invited `to think back to your new science, which requires 
that the more perfect a thing is, the more it feels both good and suffering. So, although this cursed race will 
never achieve true perfection, they must expect to be closer to that state, rather than further from it' (and 
hence their suffering will increase when their former bodies are restored). " (Boyde, p. 168) 
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This state of unity in the rapture of an eternal physical embrace immediately 
brings to mind Aristophanes' myth of the circular people in the Symposium (192e9- 
193d6), a dialogue which Dante had never read6 though he was familiar with Ovid who 
alludes to it as noted in the last chapter. The circular people divided in two by Zeus, 
desire more than anything else "to be merged, that is into utter oneness with the 
beloved... following after the primeval state,... and [thereby to be established]... in joy 
and blessedness. " Aristophanes further jokes 
"Suppose two lovers are lying together and Hephaestus stands over them with his mending tools, asking, 
`What is it you human beings really want from each other? ' And suppose they're perplexed, and he asks 
them again: `Is this your heart's desire, then-for the two of you to become parts of the same whole, as 
near can be, and never to separate, day and night? Because if that's your desire, I'd like to weld you 
together and join you into something that is naturally whole, so that the two of you are made into one. Then 
the two of you would be one being, and by the same token, when you died, you would be one and not two 
in Hades, having died a single death. '" (Symposium, 192D3-192E4) 
Invoking the image of Hephaestus capturing Aphrodite and Ares in his net, the relevance 
of which we consider below, this physical state of eternal unity is presented as sought 
after as the ultimate end and absolute good of the soul. Chiampi (p. 72) notes the 
resemblance of the speech of Aristophanes with the unity of Francesca and Paolo, 
comparing them with the circular people. "Francesca's love... degenerated rapidly into 
self-reference as she and Paolo melded into this undifferentiated Platonic amalgam", 
unified even in Hell where two due to a common death form one. However, within the 
Symposium, Aristophanes' understanding of love is ultimately rejected for the pursuit of 
to kalon, the form of the beautiful, which Neo-Platonic writers reinterpreted as referring 
to the One and which Christian Neo-Platonists then understood as alluding to God, a 
pattern eventually followed by Dante. In Aristophanes' speech this state is taken both 
seriously and in a tongue-in-cheek, way. Aristophanes, a writer of Comedy, tells a 
provoking, funny and absurd tale, which while making fun of humanity's obsession with 
fulfilment in erotic love, points to a deep truth concerning mankind's need for love and 
wholeness, a subject which Ovid, following the Platonic tradition expressed in 
6 Moore, "Dante and Plato", Studies in Dante, First Series, p. 156. 
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Aristophanes' speech (Barkan, p. 57), ironically refers to in Metamorphosis IV, 371-8. 
Ovid also, in The Art of Love, mocks erotic love as the telos of human activity, through 
portraying it as a serious concern in need of rules, a book which was misunderstood 
through being taken seriously, 7 influencing the tradition of courtly love in the Middle 
Ages. 8 It should be noted that references to this type of image in antiquity typically 
alluded to the Myth of Mars and Venus. Dante, a diligent scholar of Ovid and antique 
Latin literature, was well aware of this. 
2. THE MYTH OF MARS AND VENUS 
Dante's conception of an eternal physical embrace appears to relate on several 
levels to the Mars and Venus myth. In order to appreciate this we must take account of 
the story as Dante would have known it. Although Dante would have known the myth 
through Ovid's Metamorphoses, his writing shows evidence of an awareness of many 
elements of the myth as recounted in the Odyssey, the text upon which Ovid's description 
is based. Though Dante would not have read the Odyssey himself, 
9 fragments of the 
Odyssey found their way into the texts of many Latin authors, such as Lucian and 
Fulgentius, who had been read by Dante. Thus as we explore the relation of the myth of 
Mars and Venus to the account of Paolo and Francesca, we shall locate the relevant 
sources for various aspects of the myth in both the Odyssey and the Latin texts, and in the 
case of Paolo show how the modifications made through the Latin texts altered Dante's 
representation of him. But before exploring the action of the myth itself, it will be useful 
to look at the correspondences between the list of actors and their relationships. 
The structure of the myth of Mars and Venus is not only suggested by the story of 
Paolo and Francesca but duplicates it almost exactly. As Vulcan and Mars were brothers, 
both sons of the same parents, Hera and Zeus, Juno and Jupiter (henceforth I will 
generally use the Latin names to prevent confusion), likewise Paolo and Gianciotto were 
7 Lewis, Allegory, p. 6. 
8 Lewis, Allegory, pp. 7-8. 
9 Though Dante may have read Greek, "it is clear that if [Dante] knew anything of Homer, it was not from 
the original, but from some secondary source, such as his quotation by other authors, e. g. by Aristotle or 
Horace. " (Moore, "Dante and Plato", Studies in Dante, First Series, p. 164-5) 
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brothers of the same parents. 1° As Mars was the younger brother of Vulcan, " so Paolo 
was the younger brother of Gianciotto. Vulcan (Hephaestus) was the 
god of fire (the volcano takes its name from him), and the blacksmith who forged the weapons of many 
gods and heroes... educator of primitive man, and taught him the proper use of fire... He was crippled from 
birth, or as a result of being thrown down to earth from Olympus by Jupiter in a fit of anger. He is 
seen.. . with a crutch under one arm or 
in an awkward posture because of his deformity... protector of the 
craftsmen... In allegories of the four elements Vulcan personifies fire. (Hall, p. 338) 
Giovanni the "second son of Malatesta da Verrucchio, lord of Rimini (called `il mastin 
vecchio' in Inf. XXVII, 46)" resembles Vulcan in that he was "ugly and deformed". 12 He 
was called Gianciotto meaning Gian ciotto = `crippled John. ' Due to Vulcan's skill and 
"ingenuity" 13 in making lightning bolts for Jupiter, Jupiter gave him Venus as his bride. 
This cleverness may be suggested in that Gianciotto the second son was made Lord of 
Rimini. 14 Vulcan was the god of fire and this fire can be understood in several ways. 
Firstly, fire is literally the power held in a burning flame. Also fire can be interpreted as 
anger which he is able to use properly (Hall, p. 358). This is exemplified by Vulcan's 
rage regarding Venus' infidelity which caused him to have "a heart full of evil thoughts" 
which he channels into the construction of the net (Odyssey Book VIII, 273). In the 
Aeneid (369-390) Vucan's fire is lustful desire, motivated by his wife which he uses to 
constructive ends, the creation of Aeneas' shield. 15 In Gianciotto, both aspects of fire are 
10 Grandgent, p. 47; Boccaccio, trans. Singleton, Commentary, p. 87; Sayers, Commentary, p. 102. 
11 Lucian, "Jealousy of the comeliest gods at Vulcan's success in marriage, " XV, trans. Took, p. 88. 
'2 Boccaccio, Singleton, Commentary trans. p. 87. 
13 In Odyssey VIII. 297, we see a concrete example of his ingenuity. 
14 Gianciotto was viewed as the most capable and promising of the Malatesta da Verrocchio's sons. 
Boccaccio writes that because he was a "very capable man, and everyone expected that he would become 
ruler when his father died. For this reason, though he was ugly and deformed, Messer Guido wanted him 
rather than one of his brothers as a son-in-law" (Singleton translation, p. 87, line 97). 
Is Strangely in the Aeneid there seems to be no reference to the myth of Mars and Venus. The only 
discussion of their relationship is positive, basically harmonious and motivational. In order to win Vulcan 
over to help Aeneas she "turned to Vulcan.. in her bridal chamber all of gold, putting divine desire in every 
word .... The goddess spoke and wrapped 
her snowy arms this way and that around him in her swansdown 
embrace. And instantly he felt the flame of love invading him as ever, into his marrow ran the fire he knew, 
and through his bones, as when sometimes, ripped by a thunder peal, a fiery flash goes jagged through the 
clouds. His wife, contented with her blandishment, sure of her loveliness, perceived it all. Lord Vulcan, 
captive to immortal passion answered her, " and made a shield to protect Aeneas. (Aeneid 369-390, 
translation Fitzgerald, p. 242-243). Interestingly, Virgil's understanding of Vulcan's relation to fire, his 
attribute, here is the fire of lust. This fiery lust is identified with lightning bolts. Jupiter gave Vulcan Venus 
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present; anger towards Paolo and Francesca and lust related to revenge concerning the 
infidelity of his wife (Inferno V, line 106-7). The aspect of Vulcan which is absent from 
Gianciotto is Vulcan's self-control, his ability to channel fire to its proper and creative 
uses. Gianciotto dominated by fire becomes purely destructive, fire out of control, and 
therefore a poor copy of the god himself. 
While Gianciotto resembles Vulcan, Paolo embodies many of the qualities of 
Mars. Mars (Ares) is the 
god of war... [with a] brutal and aggressive nature ... 
[He has] a warlike spirit who is tamed by 
love,.... young and vigorous.. . 
[with] armour... helmet and shield ... 
[which] are laid aside when he is 
conquered by love. 16 (Hall, pp. 200-201) 
Lucian in explaining why Vulcan overlooks their affair writes "To engage with a lusty 
young rival, who is moreover a soldier, it would not be advisable"17 In Fowler this is 
translated as "a martial young fellow". This shows not only that Mars is envisaged as a 
soldier but also that he is younger and stronger than Vulcan. Likewise, Paolo is younger 
and stronger than Gianciotto (Sayers, Commentary, p. 102). Like Mars, Paolo was a 
soldier, the Capitano del Popolo in Florence from 1282-1283 when Dante was 18. Given 
this military role, Paolo was probably on some level manly and virile. While Mars was 
considered "good-looking and sound of limb" (Odyssey, VIII, 37-8), Paolo in turn was 
handsome enough that in Inferno 104 Francesca admits to having been strongly seized by 
"his charm", 18 i. e., his person or his amor, reminiscent of Phaedrus 255. As "Mars, 
plagued with frenzied love of Venus, from a terrible captain became a lover, " (Ovid, The 
for a wife as a reward for fashioning the thunderbolt for Jupiter (Bulfinch, p. 22) When Venus is unfaithful, 
Vulcan demands that Jupiter return what he made for him, the thunderbolts, in exchange for the release of 
Mars and Venus, though at the prompting of Neptune, Vulcan eventually lets them free. As Mars and 
Venus are not a focus in Virgil, perhaps Dante in making them so central is trying to improve upon Virgil 
in the same way as Francesca can be read as Dante's competition with Virgil concerning his representation 
of Dido. 
16 "In early Renaissance painting he may be accompanied by a wolf, the animal sacred to him in Roman 
times and having, like him, an aggressive nature..... Mars was the father of Romulus and Remus who were 
reared by a she-wolf. " (Hall, pp. 200-1) This is of interest with regard to the Inferno given Dante's initial 
encounter with the she-wolf in Canto I: 49-51. (The she-wolf for Sinclair (p. 31) represents covetousness). 
17 Lucian, "Jealousy of the comeliest gods at Vulcan's success in marriage", XV, trans. Tooke, p. 88. 
18 Sayers, Commentary, p. 102, Boccaccio, p. 87; "Paolo was a handsome, pleasing and very courteous 
man". 
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Art of Love, II, 561-2)19 so likewise Paolo "all trembling" became the lover of Francesca 
(Inferno V, 136; also 130-132). 
Francesca resembles Venus. Venus (Aphrodite) is the goddess of "love and 
fertility... Among her attributes are: a pair of doves or swans, either may draw her 
chariot. " (Hall, p. 318) In Inferno V when Francesca and Paolo approach Dante, they are 
compared to doves which are symbols simultaneously of peace and lust 20 "As doves, 
19 "To pass through companies of guards and bands of sentinels is ever the task both of soldier and 
wretched lover. Mars is doubtful, and Venus, too, not sure; the vanquished rise again, and they fall [whom] 
you would say could never be brought low. " (Ovid, Heriodes and Amores, I. ix, lines 27-30) "It is Venus 
alone who can without fear stand in the path of Mars' chariot and bring it to a halt (262-5), for the power of 
Love is greater than that of Strife. " [For the history of this idea, cf. Wind, Pagan Mysteries in the 
Renaissance, 84ff. ] (David Vessey, Statius and the Thebaid, p. 86) 
20 Durling refers to Aeneid 6: 92, when the "doves of Venus guide Aeneas to the golden bough, the key to 
entering Hades. " (Durling, p. 96) Also "Diodorus Siculus (60 B. C. )... retells the legend of [Semiramis'] 
semi-divine origin.. . her being rescued from 
death as a child by the care of doves, connecting both her 
name itself and her final metamorphosis into a dove at her death with this episode" (Jacoff, "Transgression 
and Transcendence", p. 54) 
This reference of the doves clearly echoes "Qualis spelunca subito commota columba, cui domus 
et dulces latebroso in pumice nidi, fertur in arva volans plausumque exterrita pinnis dat tecto ingentem, 
mox aere lapsa quieto radit iter liquidem celeris neque commovet alas. " [Even as, if startled suddenly from 
her cave, a dove whose home and sweet nestlings are in the rocky coverts, wings her flight to the fields and, 
frightened from her home, flaps loudly with her wings; soon, gliding in the peaceful air, she skims her 
liquid way and stirs not her swift pinions. ] (Aeneid V, 213-217) "Dante, however, while keeping a part of 
the general picture and a few of the expressions ('sweet nest' and `motionless wings'), alters the situation, 
making the dove fly to her nest instead of away from it; furthermore, he infuses an entirely new spirit into 
the figure by his conception of love as the sole power that sustains the mother bird in her flight. " 
(Grandgent, p. 52, also Singleton, Commentary, p. 82-3) "This image of two doves returning to their nests, 
with all its connotations of peacefulness and divine love (the Holy Spirit is traditionally represented as a 
dove), is far more Heavenly than infernal. Particularly interesting are the words `desire' and `will', which 
appear in syntactically similar constructions (`dal disio chiamate', `dal voler portate'). In Scripture, desire 
and will in consort work against spirituality, and their apparently positive relationship here may be ironic, 
especially since the dove image has such a long tradition as a beneficent, even salvific sign in biblical 
writings (cf. Gen, 8.8-12, and Song of Songs). The dove was known to the ancients (Pliny, for example) as 
a monogamous bird that shunned the bestial, in obvious contrast to these adulterous lovers of the circle of 
the lustful. " (Musa, Commentary, p. 74) "The image of the two doves is both elegant and gentle, not unlike 
the lovers whom it serves to introduce. " (Musa, Commentary, p. 68) "As a scene of natural innocence and 
bliss, this also speaks of the garden and hence of the paradisal state. " (Masciandaro, p. 75) "The doves are 
the birds of love, and here they introduce a ray of Paradise, but only as a foil to the lovers' distress; there is 
no `sweet nest' for the latter! " (Cambon, p. 64) Francesca craves peace and the dove is the symbol of 
peace. 
In contrast to this view, "Starlings and doves were associated in the medieval bestiaries with lust" 
(citation by Durling, p. 95), "proverbial in Dante's day for their luxuria. " (Boyde, p. 293) "A dove, the 
instant before alighting, will raise its wings vertically. The wording of this simile captures the moment just 
preceding the one where the bird's sexual desire is satisfied in the nest. That moment-the one just before 
satisfaction-becomes an important theme in the rest of the canto. See 98-99,124,118-120,130-2. " (Musa, 
Commentary, p. 74-5) 
Balancing these two views Masciandro (p. 75) writes, "this scene is animated by a pair of doves, 
birds traditionally identified with love and peace, although they are at times also associated with lechery. 
The season, we can surmise, is not, as before, that of the `freddo tempo' ('cold season') of late fall, but its 
opposite, spring, the season of love. As reference to the nest clearly suggests, this love is a positive, 
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summoned by desire, come with wings poised and motionless to the sweet nest, borne by 
their will through the air, 21 so these left their troop where Dido22 is, coming to us through 
the malignant air. " (V, 82-86) Francesca and Paolo flying towards Dante like doves, as it 
were draw behind them the personification of Venus, `embodied' in Francesca. Like 
Venus who is a "lovely creature... [and] a marvel to behold" (Odyssey VIII, 320 and 366) 
Francesca had a "bella persona" (101). The self-conscious language she uses suggests 
that she was truly remarkable to see as she still is to hear-though the body is gone, the 
language remains. "Her words most clearly reveal.. . good 
breeding... hers is an 
aristocratic nature, now fired with ardent memories, now tempered by sweet feminine 
grace, " (Musa, Advent, p. 20), "her refinement of speechs23 expressing "gentleness and 
modest reticence" (Grandgent, p. 47). 24 To some, it seems "the attractiveness of her 
personality is great enough to atone for her sin. " (Musa, Advent, p. 19) Also like Venus 
who is "a slave to her passions" (Odyssey VIII, 320), 25 Francesca claims 
"Love... exempts no one beloved from loving" (Inferno V, 103), blaming Love's 
irresistible power for her adulterous relationship with Paolo (100-106), a subject that will 
be discussed in the next chapter. That she is motivated uniquely by love is brought to the 
creative force. Significantly, the doves are not seen as being only drawn to one another, or as lovers carried 
by unbridled passion (a `tempest'), but as drawn by desire which is activated by its object, the 'sweet nest', 
which obviously represents the fruitfulness of love. " Dante saw Paolo and Francesca as "a pair of doves 
gliding towards their nest, unable to dissociate an infernal from a paradisal scene. " (Masciandaro, p. 82) 
The ambiguity emerges in that with every negative there is the possibility that it could have been its 
opposite. Francesca could have been godly and represented by a dove of peace, but instead she chose to be 
her own love goddess and become an image of pagan Aphrodite so the doves take the negative meaning. 
21 "The language of desire includes `piego', a word previously used in v. 79, where the wind `bends' 
Francesca and Paolo towards Dante: emblematic of the way they come-'Quali colombe, dal disio 
chiamate' (V. 81). The desire is dual: theirs and Dante's (or Venus's, in the image, if they are her doves). " 
(Tambling, Dante and Difference, p. 14; also see Brandeis, p. 26) 22 This mention of Dido intensifies the image of Venus because when Aeneas sees Dido in the underworld 
it is described as "a myrtle woodland" (Aeneid, VI, 448). Like "the red rose (stained with her blood)... the 
myrtle (evergreen like love) are sacred to her [Venus]. " (Hall, pp. 318-319) When in line 90 Francesca 
states that she and Paolo have "stained the world with blood" according to Durling (p. 97) "Francesca is 
alluding to Ovid's tale of Pyramus and Thisbe, residents of Semiramis' Babylon. (see Meta. 4: 55-169): 
Pyramus' blood stains the mulberry first red, then, when it dries, black. " 
23 Shapero, Woman, Earthly and Divine, p. 101 and p. 107. 
24 "There is the delicacy, one might even say the femininity, of her words indirectly alluding to the hideous 
fact of their murder. `noi the tignemmo il mondo di sanguigno. ' Not the basic word sangue but its 
derivative sanguigno-and the blood which she mentions is a 'tint'. " (Musa, Advent, p. 21) 25 Singleton, Commentary, p. 89; Cambon, p. 57) Also see Lucian, "Why Cupid leaves some goddesses 
unexcited, " Dialogues, XIX, trans. Tooke, p. 96-7) 
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fore by Virgil's suggestion to "entreat [Francesca and Paolo]... by the love that leads 
them, and they will come" (78-79), so that they are "summoned by desire" (82)26 
Now returning to the myth of Mars and Venus itself as represented in the 
Metamorphoses, Ovid writes, the Sun 
was first, 'tis said, to see the shame of Mars and Venus; this god sees all first. Shocked at the sight, he 
revealed her sin to the goddess' husband, Vulcan, Juno's son, and where it was committed. Then Vulcan's 
mind reeled and the work upon which he was engaged fell from his hands. Straight away he fashioned a net 
of fine links of bronze, so thin that they would escape detection of the eye. Not the finest threads of wool 
would surpass that work; no not the web which the spider lets down from the ceiling beam. He made the 
web in such a way that it would yield to the slightest touch, the least movement, and then he spread it deftly 
over the couch. Now when the goddess and her paramour had come thither, by the husband's art and by the 
net so cunningly prepared they were both caught and held fast in each other's arms. Straightway Vulcan, 
the Lemnian, opened wide the ivory doors and let in the other gods. There lay the two in chains, 
disgracefully, and some one of the merry gods prayed that he might be so disgraced. The gods laughed, and 
for a long time this story was the talk of Heaven. (Ovid, Metamorphoses, Book IV, lines 171-192) 
Like Vulcan and Venus, the aristocratic Francesca married Gianciotto, the lame brother 
of Paolo and heir to his father, the Lord of Rimini. Though from Inferno V we do not 
know the context of the marriage, 27 both were arranged marriages: Vulcan had made gifts 
for Zeus while Gianciotto married for political reasons, meaning that in neither case were 
they choices made for love (a concept foreign to thirteenth century Italy), but marriages 
imposed on the brides by their fathers. 8 Both Venus and Francesca fell in love with their 
husbands' more attractive younger brothers who were both men of war and both Venus 
and Francesca were adulterous in the houses of their respective husbands. 29 In both cases 
26 E. G. Parodi cited by Sinclair, p. 83. 
27 If Boccaccio is accepted (see note 3) further parallels lie in the correspondence between relations in the 
family of the gods and the active strife which divided the families of Paolo and Francesca and the way that 
in both cases the marriages in question were arranged by fathers for their most resourceful sons for reasons 
concerned with power politics. 
28 Depending upon the account, Jupiter is not always Venus' father. While in Hesiod Theogony 188-200, 
Aphrodite is "born of the sea-from the foam produced by the genitals of the castrated Uranos... when they 
were cast upon the waters" (Hall, p. 320), in the myth of the Odyssey VIII, 306, however, Zeus is the father 
of Aphrodite and chief of the gods. If one wishes to consolidate the versions, as head of the gods after the 
deposition of Uranos and Cronos, Zeus had power over Aphrodite as that of a father. 
29 Odyssey 270-1; Lucian "The net of Vulcan", XVII, trans. Tooke, p. 92; Singleton, Commentary, p. 88. 
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the lovers were found out, in the myth by the Sun, Helios30 though in Inferno V how is 
not mentioned. 31 In reaction while Vulcan channelled all of his anger and ingenuity into 
the construction of a net, a male relative of Paolo and Francesca, presumably Gianciotto, 
"quenched [their] life" (line 107) in an extremely offensive way (line 101). In the first the 
lovers were caught and trapped, while in the latter they were murdered. 32 
This is the point where Dante's genius makes itself felt. For Dante it seems 
Francesca and Paolo were killed while physically together. For Boyde (note 36, p. 292), 
"With Francesca ... 
it was presumably the manner of [her] death (murder in , 
flagrante 
delicto... ) that captured [Dante's] imagination. 03 Though Boccaccio explains that Paolo 
was clothed, given that Aphrodite and Mars were "caught in the act", 34 this suggests that 
Paolo and Francesca likewise were "discovered in an amorous embrace" (Musa, 
Commentary, p, 73) 35 Francesca states "his charm that, as thou seest, does not leave me 
yet" (V, 105; mi prese del costui piacer s? forte, che, come vedi, ancor non m'abbandon), 
indicating that from the beginning of their relation to the present Paolo's charm has not 
left her, his charm representing his amor for her (his physical attraction for her) or the 
attraction being Paolo himself. 36 "He... never shall be parted from me" (V, 135; questi, 
30 Lucian, "The Net of Vulcan, " XVII, trans. Tooke, p. 92-3; Ovid, The Art of Love, II. 564. 31 Boccaccio suggests the report was made by "a certain servant of Gianciotto" (Singleton, Commentary, p. 
88). He indicates the parallel is even closer in that the betrayed husbands pretend to go on trips (Odyssey 
VIII 281-2 and Lucian "The Net of Vulcan, " XVII, trans. Tooke, p. 92), Gianciotto "went to some nearby 
city as podesta. " (Singleton, Commentary, p. 88) 
32 Given this tight fitting of the myth of Mars and Venus to the story of Paolo and Francesca as represented 
in Inferno V and how it is supported by the account of Boccaccio, it would seem that Boccaccio (putting 
aside his political politeness) is not altogether unreliable. The other option is that Boccaccio intentionally 
wrote his account of the historical Francesca with the myth of Mars and Venus in mind. 
33 Amor condusse not ad una morte (106), "the third verse of the anaphora fatefully seals the doom of the 
lovers, as if Love himself had pronounced the decree; "una morte" seems to unite these lovers in that 
moment of death and forever thereafter. " (Singleton, Commentary, p. 91) "Use of the singular, 'a death', 
plays on the conceit of dying in orgasm but also on the irony that in committing this sin they literally died 
as one, experiencing a joint death by violence. " (Musa, Commentary, p. 79) 
34 In Lucian's "The Net of Vulcan" (XVII, trans. Tooke, p. 92) Mercury tells Apollo "Venus and her Mars 
are caught in the act. " They were "caught in the snare the two lie naked. He summons the gods; the 
captured pair afford a spectacle; scarce did Venus, they say, restrain her tears. They cannot cover their 
faces, nor even veil their lewd parts with their hands. " (Ovid, Ars Amatoria, H, 565-66) Since Ovid writes 
in Ars Amatoria, "caught in the snare the two lie naked" the implication is that Francesca and Paolo are 
likewise naked. "Scarce did Venus, they say, restrain her tears" makes us remember that Paolo is crying. 
Though Francesca and Paolo are at present spirits, soon, after judgment, like Mars and Venus in Ars 
Amatoria, "they [will not be able to] cover their faces, nor even veil their lewd parts with their hands". 
35 For Sayers (Commentary, p. 103), line 102 `the way of it leaves me still distressed' may refer to "the way 
of the murder, because the lovers were killed in the very act of sin and so had no time for repentance". 36 "The phrase 'e '1 modo ancor m'ofende' may be linked to the preceding relative clause, '[la bella 
persona] the mifu tolta, ' but not because Francesca is offended by the manner of her death-not having 
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the mai da me non fia diviso) likewise invokes a sense of lust in that it procedes the 
clause "la bocca mi bacio tutto tremante" (line 136) suggesting the physical 
consummation not of an idealized love, as in the clause preceding and with regard to the 
"disatio riso" (line 133), but of physical lust which will be a continued/eternal state, the 
physicality emphasized by the word "bocca" (136). 37 This implies a lustful 
consummation that was fixed and endured beyond the moment of death into the present 
and which will endure eternally. As earlier mentioned, after all the bodies of the dead are 
returned to the respective souls, tragically and even horrifically Francesca and Paolo will 
have their bodies returned to them in the state in which they were taken away, implying 
that they will forever be in each others arms embracing at the moment of their murder. 
Returning to the myth of Mars and Venus, the lovers were caught in a net fixed in each 
other's embrace where Vulcan (Hephaestus) intends to leave them for eternity as he says 
in the Odyssey or until Zeus (Jupiter) returns his gift of thunderbolts, 38 which as an 
attribute of Jupiter are irretrievable, though he relents at the request of Neptune 
(Poseidon). 39 In contrast, Gianciotto kills them without mercy and implicitly God 
condemns them without compassion, contrasting with the pilgrim's compassion. Through 
killing Paolo and Francesca in each other's arms, Gianciotto intends to punish them for 
eternity by destroying them in body and soul, thus allowing no hope of the repentance 
allowed the adulterous women in John 8: 11 ("Neither do I condemn you... Go now and 
time to repent and she and Paolo being exposed in their intimacy. It is more likely that Francesca is still 
suffering primarily because she and Paolo were not only exposed together but were also killed together. 
Note that the 'ancor' of line 102 is paralleled by the `ancor' three lines later, which, in turn, points to the 
`mai' of line 135. Thus, Francesca's two references to her and Paolo's fated inseparability (105 and 135- 
136) are stylistically linked with the reference to the manner of their death ('e 7 modo..., ' 102). The 
'manner' of their death `still' torments her, for she is `still' linked with Paolo who will `never' leave 
her... [Concerning ancor non m abandon, ] most commentators (see, for example, Sapegno, Bosco and 
Reggio, Porena) take the subject of this phrase to be `amor', although 'Paolo" also works well from a 
grammatical point of view. " (Musa, Commentary, p. 78) 
37 Singleton, Commentary, p. 94; Boyde, p. 300. Durling notes that Dante continues to use the passive form. 
"For another reference to this scene, see Paradiso 16: 14-15 (the 'first recorded fault of Guinevere')" 
(Durling, p. 99) 
38 In the Odyssey VIII, originally Vulcan's intention is "to keep them prisoners forever" (276) but then 
decides "to keep them just where they are, till her father hands me back every one of the gifts I made him to 
win" her (317-8). 
39 Odyssey VIII, 344-346; Ovid The Art of Love II, 596; Lucian, "The Net of Vulcan, " XVII, trans. Tooke, 
p. 92-3. 
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leave your life of sin"). Sealing their own fates, Francesca and Paolo die unrepentant, 
40 
imperfect finite copies of the pagan original and, compounding the sin, worshipping a 
false divinity, as we shall see. 
3. "TOGETHERNESS": A BLESSING OR A CURSE? 
Many commentators have considered the fact that Paolo and Francesca are 
together in Hell as a sign of God's compassion on them41 or as a statement of the power 
and consistency of love, 42 thus rendering their situation in more positive terms. Though I 
wish these positive readings were the intention of Dante, it seems clear that Dante has 
something else which is far more terrible and even horrific in mind. We should be put on 
our guard by the fact that in the brief introductory lines we are told they "seem so light 
upon the wind" (V, 75). This lightness, in comparison to the train of lovers, indicates if 
40 "But the souls in Purgatory had felt genuine remorse for the wrong they knew they had done of their own 
free will. Even in the moment of violent death they had shed a 'little tear' which was enough to rescue them 
from the devil. " (Boyde, p. 297) "Time itself would be no object, for we know that the repentance of 
Buonconte da Montefeltro (Purg. V) took place at the ultima ora and consisted in dying with the name of 
Mary on his lips (Purgatorio V. 101). " (Shapero, Woman, Earthly and Divine, p. 102) This suggests that 
Francesca even at the moment of death was wholeheartedly committed to her adultery. 
41 "Greater than their sin was the mercy of God, who out of consideration for so great a love softened their 
punishment by permitting them to continue it even in Hell. " (De Sanctis, p. 34) 
42 Grandgent (p. 47) says "Amid the tortures of Hell, where all is hatred, her love does not forsake her, and 
she glories in the thought that she and Paolo shall never be parted. " Carroll (pp. 92-3) calls togetherness 
"the comfort, bitter sweet, of not being separated. " If they "seem upon the wind to be so light, " "it is rather 
that their being together makes it easier for them to float on the winds of passion, -it seems their native 
element. Hence the comparison with doves that follows.... There was to him something soft, gentle, dove- 
like in the love which had brought them to the 'woeful pass, '" something which "rewards" their 
"faithfulness" (Carroll, p. 99; also see Carroll, p. 95 concerning the "nobility" of this love and Shapero, 
Woman, Earthly and Divine, p. 101 with regard to Francesca's consistency). From a different point of view 
De Sanctis (p. 47) writes, "Those two who go together, love through all eternity not because they are not 
damned, but precisely because they are damned. In Paradise the earthly is raised to the divine, whereas in 
Hell the earthly remains eternal and unaltered. In Dante's Hell the sinners retain all their passions and are 
therefore impenitent and damned ... The mark of the 
damned soul is that he brings to Hell all his qualities 
and passions, good and bad; wherefore Francesca loved, loves, shall love, and can never cease to love. That 
is why the unhappy woman cannot tear this Paolo from her heart and has him always before her eyes-a 
sentiment the Poet represents concretely by placing Paolo eternally at her side. " "What is all this? Is it joy? 
Is it sorrow? It is joy and sorrow, it is love and sin, earth and Hell, the bitterness of that love whose wage is 
Hell, the thrill of that Hell where love still abides. It is a complex emotion that defies expression. It is a 
living contradiction, the heart in all its mysteries, life in its contrasts it is Heaven and Hell, angel and 
demon; it is man. " (De Sanctis, p. 50) "Their love is as changeless as the storm. A consolation lingers with 
them through the infinite 'forever. ' So in the Poem; and could the soft delaying indulgence of the soul so 
delay perpetually, the imagination and the will might be almost content to lose Heaven for that. " (Williams, 
The Figure of Beatrice, p. 119) 
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not a greater severity of punishment, at least a greater amount of passion which tortures 
them. 
In order to understand the lightness of the wind as indicative of the level of 
torture, we must first examine what the wind represents. Lussuria is depicted as a 
turbulent black wind, violently beating the lovers, which according to contrapasso is 
indicative of the inner turmoil they experience due to the subjugation of reason by 
passion, their self-indulgence. 43 Accordingly with regard to punishment, Singleton 
(Commentary, p. 82) interprets "e paion si al vento esser leggier" as "these two spirits 
are more violently tossed by the wind than the others are. " According to contrapasso, a 
more violent wind indicates more passion 44 as well as greater suffering. 45 So in contrast 
to De Sanctis' reading (p. 34), rather than a mitigation of punishment, it seems to indicate 
an intensification. 
Returning now to the myth, we need to take into account the precise punishment 
of Mars and Aphrodite in. order to appreciate what Dante is doing with Francesca and 
Paolo. Mars and Venus were caught in the act of adultery and fastened together; they 
became a "comic and cruel thing, " a spectacle for all the gods' amusement. 6 Likewise, 
once Francesca and Paolo's bodies are returned to them, they will be held together as a 
43 "The 'punishment' for sin is simply the sin itself, experienced without illusion. " (Sayers, Commentary, p. 
101-2) "Metaphorically speaking, to renounce reason is to be blind or to live in the dark and hence to lose 
one's way. To follow instinct is to be driven by a storm of ever-changing force and direction ... 
[The air] is 
convulsed by a roaring and turbulent typhoon which is said to `beat', `toss', `molest' and 'castigate' them. " 
(Boyde, p. 293; also see Brandeis, p. 26; Musa, Commentary, p. 67; Chiampi, p. 69) 
44 "According to the principle of just punishment, the heightened violence of the wind signifies that the 
love, which led them in life and leads them now, was, and is, most passionate. " Agreeing with Singleton's 
reading (Commentary, p. 82), Masciandaro (p. 72) adds that this lightness is illusory, "This reading is 
correct only within the field of vision of the allegorist. As it correlates the power of the wind with the 
exceptional violence of Paolo's and Francesca's passion, it fails to capture an important facet of that 
passion, namely the illusory sense of lightness-the lightness offlight. This is an essential component of 
their inordinate love, one that Dante the Dramatist does not want us to ignore as he develops a scene in 
which the wayfarer's response helps reveal the ambiguities of a love that destroys. If the wayfarer (and the 
reader) saw only the wind as passion-as the allegorist in us and among us is inclined to see-he would 
have the clear, detached view of the moralist and judge, which is only one facet of Dante's representation. 
And if he did not feel the lightness of flight inherent in lust, if he were not seduced by it, he would never 
experience the illusions and ambiguities brought about by the adulteration of love. He would never truly 
know this love. " 
4s "But the positioning of these two spirits together is part of their punishment... and their appearance as 
`leggieri' implies that they are blown about by the wind more than the others and are therefore probably 
suffering more. " (Musa, Commentary, p. 73) "They did not resist the impulse of passion, and so they are 
unable to resist that of the wind. " 
46 Odyssey VIII, 306; also see Lucian, "The Net of Vulcan, " XVII, trans. Tooke, XVII, p. 93; Ovid, The 
Art of Love, II, 580. 
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spectacle for eternity. What greater punishment could be given to an aristocratic woman 
like Francesca who is consumed with appearances and the aesthetic, and so eager to 
please and impress. 7 Given that Dante as pilgrim is not aware of the corporeal aspect of 
her punishment, "for a brief moment, with the pilgrim, she could perform, she could 
pretend, she could be the gracious lady she had been in the beautiful life on earth" (Musa, 
Advent. p. 33). 
A significant insight into this punishment is gained through examining Vulcan's 
analysis of the punishment and sin. 8 "Yet I have an idea that they won't be eager to 
prolong that embrace, no, not for a moment, not for all their love. Theirs is a sleep that 
both will soon be tired of' (Odyssey, VIII, 305-7). In Homeric times this seems to have 
indicated simply that they will soon be tired of being imprisoned in this net. From the 
later Latin view point however Vulcan's analysis of the situation is that their love which 
is purely physical is carnal and temporal 49 Though not mentioned in Ovid, this point 
appears in Latin literature through Fulgentius' reading of the myth (7). Blumenfield- 
Kosinski (p. 74) writes that Fulgentius "saw in the Venus love affair with Mars `valor 
corrupted by lust, ' stating that Vulcan's chains represent the fetters of habit. "50 Due to the 
finite and carnal nature of their attraction, their desire will fade when continuity and 
regularity is imposed upon them. Of greater consequence however is the point that their 
Vulcan calls Venus a relation has been made public and humiliating, a source of shames' 
" Musa, Advent, p. 24-7. 
48 I suspect that Dante had some other access to this myth which is closer to the version of the Odyssey than 
Ovid's Metamorphoses. Fragments of the original had been translated into Latin or appropriated/integrated 
by Latin writers. The only element in the original myth of the Odyssey that remains outstanding, meaning 
that I have not found the fragment in Latin prose, is Vulcan's statement: "I wish I had never been born". 
49 Though there are more positive readings of the relationship of Mars and Venus as demonstrated in 
Statius (see Vessey, Statius and the Thebaia p. 86), these do not come into play in the Inferno. so According to Fulgentius' The Mythologies (7, in Fulgentius the Mythographer, trans. L. Whitebread, pp. 
72-73; referred also to by Blumenfield-Kosinski, p. 74) after the Sun "reveals the adultery of Venus ... she, in her grief, inflamed with love the five daughters of the Sun-that is, Pasiphae, Medea, Phaedra, Circe, 
and Dirce. Let us look into what the prating poets may allude to by this. Certainly for our present age there 
remains full evidence of this fable, for valor corrupted by lust becomes clear at the witness of the sun, 
whereby Ovid in the fifth book of his Metamorphoses says: `This god was the first to see. ' And this valor 
corrupted by lust is shamefully held in the fetter-like grip of its ardor. She thus inflamed with love the five 
daughters of the Sun, that is, the five human senses devoted to light and truth and as if made dark by this 
corrupting of the Sun's brood. " In this reading of Venus' reaction Fulgentius agrees with the reading of 
Hyginus Fabulae 148, "To Sol's progeny, however, Venus, because of his disclosure, was always hostile" 
implying that desire always works against the pursuit of truth (pp. 72-73). 
51 Lucian, "The Net of Vulcan", XVII, trans. Tooke, p. 92-3. 
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"brazen hussy" and a "slave to her passion, "52 indicating the base level of her love 
regardless of her desire to make it seem otherwise. The utter humiliation of being 
physically exposed in her sin for everyone to see and mock for all eternity is the greatest 
single punishment both Venus and Francesca could experience. For Venus this means the 
lowering of herself from a Heavenly Aphrodite/love to a worldly and common 
Aphrodite. 53 As she is lowered from a Heavenly to an earthly/common Venus in pagan 
terms, and as pagan terms in Dante are backed with Christian images and meanings 
which magnify their significance, we can see Francesca in this way as being lowered 
from Virgin to temptress or Eve figure, a point which was suggested by Bernard 
Silvestrus' reading of the pagan myth, 54 which with regard to Francesca we shall discuss 
in the next chapter. But taking this one step further, as aristocratic Francesca is mortal 
and was killed in the act of love and will be "common" forever in that she is maintained 
52 Odyssey VIII, 318-320; Ovid, The Art of Love, II, 576. 53 Though full discussions only come in the Renaissance, with the rise of Platonism and the works of Ficino 
such as his Commentary on the Symposium, this double image of love permeates the Judeo-Christian world 
through the Middle Ages, particularly with the rise of the adoration of the Virgin Mary versus Eve. As Hall 
(p. 319) writes with regard to Sacred and Profane Love, "The idea of twin Venuses who represent two 
kinds of love was expressed by the Florentine humanists of the 15th century ... The Celestial Venus 
symbolized love that was aroused by contemplation of the eternal and divine, the Earthly or Common 
Venus represented the beauty found in the material world, the procreative principle. To the humanists both 
were virtuous, Venus Vulgaris being regarded as a stage on the way upward to Venus Celestis. " 
Against the claim that the notions of Heavenly and Earthly Aphrodite were not in circulation until 
the Renaissance's rediscovery of Platonism, I would point to Augustine who through Plotinus along with 
many other Neo-Platonists, not only made Platonic thought an integral part of the culture but also 
integrated it to a large extent with church teaching. Its presence is exemplified when Augustine writes (City 
of God Against the Pagans, Vol. II, Book IV. x, p. 42-3), "Or are there two Venuses, one virgin, the other 
not? Or rather three: one who is also Vesta, a goddess of virgins; another of married women; another of 
harlots? To the last the Phoenicians used to make a gift of money gained from the prostitution of their 
daughters before marrying them to husbands. Which of these is the wife of Vulcan? Certainly not the 
virgin, since she has a husband. Perish the thought, moreover, that it should be the harlot, lest we seem to 
wrong the son of Juno and fellow-patron with Minerva of the crafts. Therefore it is clear that she is the one 
concerned with married women, but we don't want them to imitate her in what she did with Mars. `Once 
more, ' they said, `you are going back to the fables. " With this final gesture he appears to be reacting to the 
thought that all women are Vesta or harlots, Heavenly or earthly/common Aphrodites, as given the story 
the third category is tainted with the second. Sadly this polar and immoderate view of women and love has 
deeply affected Western culture. (See M. Shapero, Woman, Earthly and Divine, passim. ) 
54 Bernardus Silvestrus (in Mythographi Vatican I and II, ch. 144, Kulcsar, ed., p. 206); his moral 
interpretation is present in Wetherbee, Platonism and Poetry in the Twelfth Century (p. 117); "Mars is... a 
good man corrupted by Venus, and the capture of the pair is made to show `how the fire of concupiscence 
fetters virtue with the unbreakable bond of habit. "' Silvestrus' understanding of the relation of eros and 
habit within the myth of Mars and Venus is significantly different from that of Fulgentius. 
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eternally in state of humiliation, this degrades the image of the goddess of love further, 
making her truly a distortion of the original representation, and a true subject for pity. 
55 
Because of their deep humiliation Mars and Venus on the moment of their 
liberation flee from each other's presence. "The two of them, freed from the shackles that 
had proved so strong leapt up and fled, Ares to Thrace, and laughter-loving Aphrodite to 
Paphos in Cyprus" (Odyssey VIII, 359-366; also Ovid, The Art of Love, II, 561-592). This 
further suggests that Francesca and Paolo if given the chance would instantly flee in 
opposite directions, from each other's presence. As Venus flees from Mars or War to a 
place of peace, "Paphos in Cyprus, where she has her sacred precinct and altar fragrant 
with incense. There the Graces bathed her and anointed her with imperishable oil that the 
immortals use" (Odyssey VIII, 364-366), so likewise Francesca longs for "pace", 56 to be 
released from the strife of Hell, but as a damned soul she will never be free. 
4. "TOGETHERNESS" AS TORTURE 
Few commentators have noticed this implicit desire of Paolo and Francesca to be 
away from each other, or more precisely that the greatest aspect of their punishment is to 
be chained together, which perhaps is why they are so light upon the wind. "Many critics, 
taken in like the Pilgrim by Francesca's smooth talking, have asserted that she and Paolo 
in their love have `conquered' Hell because they are still together [see Grandgent, p. 47]. 
However, their togetherness is certainly a part of their punishment. " (Musa, Commentary, 
p. 72) Musa (Commentary, p. 32) argues against Grandgent (p. 47) systematically and 
most convincingly by first pointing out "this would contradict the principles of divine 
punitive justice as these are reflected throughout the Inferno. " Why would he make the 
first sinners the exception? Next he argues that "Eternal togetherness in itself is not 
necessarily a cause for exaltation, "57 but may be the deepest source of unhappiness as it is 
55 Dante can be understood as doing Francesca honour in a sense as he compares her to the Goddess of 
Love, but in this sense he is envisioning her as worshipping Eros, and hence not a true Venus; the images 
do not exactly mesh. 
56 Grandgent, p. 53. "Her repetition of pace (97) recalls simultaneously the external wind that surrounds her 
now, the internal storm that she carries within her, and the earthly turmoil that was an indirect cause of her 
downfall. " (Shapero, Woman, Earthly and Divine, p. 101) 
57 "Can an eternity of floating on the wind in each other's arms be a punishment for lovers? That is just 
what their passion, if left to speak for itself, would have chosen. It is what passion stops at and would 
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the imposition/forced presence'58 "the naked body of her dead lover [serving as 
a]... constant reminder of passion spent, of the sin that condemned them, of shameful 
. Thirdly she, dominating the scene, shows no pleasure in Paolo's exposure and death "59 
presence as demonstrated by the manner in which she impersonally refers to him without 
addressing him directly, 60 hence speaking as if she wishes that he were not there. 
5. WHERE DOES THE TRUE RESPONSIBILITY LIE? 
The only reference to Gianciotto in Inferno V is "Caina waits for him who 
quenched our life" (line 107). Although not a popular reading in general, 61 it has been 
suggested by Poggioli, Donadoni, Roncaglia and partially Bergin that this especially 
aggressive line was spoken by Paolo. Given my reading emphasizing Paolo's relation to 
Mars and the character of a soldier/warrior, this seems possible though Musa is probably 
correct in disagreeing with this position 62 
gladly prolong for ever. Divine judgement has only taken it at its word.. . Abandon yourself, Dante would 
say to us, - abandon yourself altogether to a love that is nothing but love, and you are in Hell already. " (G. 
Santayana quoted in Sinclair, pp. 82-3) 
58 Like Fulgentius' comment concerning Venus and Mars with regard to the end of love through its 
imposition of habit, Brandeis (p. 31-32) writes, "That amor of which Francesca says `even now it leaves 
me not', has become through their living embrace utterly barren. " 
59 Musa, Advent. p. 32; also p. 76; also see Barbi, Dante, p. 172; Musa, Commentary, p. 72. 60 "Nor during the scene where Francesca holds the center of the stage does she give the slightest indication 
of enjoying the presence of her lover. We have already seen how Paolo is immediately eclipsed as soon as 
she begins to speak. " (Musa, Advent. p. 32) "The ever-silent, weeping Paolo is surely not happy with their 
state, and Francesca coolly alludes to him with the impersonal `that one' (costuii) or 'this one' (quests) as 
she speaks; she never mentions him by name. " (Musa, Commentary, p. 72) 
Cambon (p. 49) gives an alternative reading: "Paolo is her man, not this legal husband who 
married her almost by proxy and for political reasons; and Paolo arose first in her speech, in connection 
with love. Even him she refrains from naming directly; he is referred to as `costui'. Modesty again, 
intensified by love; but note how qualitatively different that gestural pronoun is from the frozen 
impersonality of 'chi'" 
61 Bergin ("The Women of the Comedy" in An Approach to Dante, p. 84) finds "the suggestion, originally 
made by E. Roncaglia and picked up by Donadoni ['Le tre donne della Commedia' in Studi danteschi e 
manzoniani, Florence, 1963, p. 801, that it may more correctly be assigned to Paolo, very appealing. But the 
notion has not met with general favor. " 
62 Musa does not hold this position. "According to Roncaglia (1876), this verse is spoken not by Francesca 
but by Paolo. His support for this reading is the plural pronoun ! or in the following verse ('Queste parole 
da for ci fuor porte) and the fact that the vindictive tone of the words befits Paolo more than the gentle 
Francesca. However, in lines 115-116, the Pilgrim turns to 'them' before addressing Francesca in the 
singular; and as to Francesca's `gentle' nature, the ambiguities in her character have already been noted. " 
(Musa, Commentary, p. 79) In his book Advent at the Gates (p. 138) with regard to Poggioli's view that 
Paolo speaks line 328-239, Musa responds "But even though the use of the plural pronoun must be 
`explained away' if Francesca has been the only speaker (compare also line 109: Quand'io intesi 
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Paolo's tears at the end of the canto correspond to Lucian's description of Mars' 
reaction to his entrapment in Vulcan's net, a reaction not mentioned in the Odyssey. 
According to Lucian 63, "the gallant for a while thought he could tear the net and save 
himself by flight; but, perceiving that to be impossible, had recourse to entreaties. " First 
he lashes out violently, employing physical strength to break the net. Failing he "had 
recourse to entreaties", pleaded and begged. At this point Mars was released, however 
Paolo was never released. Dante, therefore, seems to be showing the result of the process 
of a certain character type begun by Mars and mirrored by Paolo which ends with the 
degeneration of the image in Paolo and his "masculinity". After recognizing the ultimate 
futility of his state, and being without hope he begins to cry piteous tears. 
This gives insight into why Paolo is portrayed as a weakling crying and over- 
shadowed by Francesca. M Having depended upon his physical appearance and strength, 
he did not have maturity or strength of character. This image of Paolo also shows him to 
be the degeneration of the image of the warrior and a poor reflection of Mars, 
unmasculine and undivine. 
Returning to the line "Caina waits for him who quenched our life" (107), Musa 
reads this not as Francesca's awareness of the section of Hell Caina, but as a reference to 
Cain who killed Abel. 65 Nevertheless, whatever Francesca's awareness, from the point of 
view of the reader, Dante here presents Francesca as thrusting Gianciotto to the third 
lowest level of Hell, near the level of Judas. This is clearly appropriate as Cain killed his 
brother Abel, the first example of murder and fratricide in Genesis 4: 10; "Your brother's 
blood cries out to me from the ground. " Likewise Gianciotto murdered both his brother 
quell anime offense.. '), still, what has been proposed to justify the literal interpretation of da for is surely 
unacceptable: it would imply incredible carelessness on the part of the narrator (who would have failed to 
announce the change from one speaker to another); moreover, if the hitherto mute Paolo would suddenly 
chime in, this would offer a comically melodramatic conclusion to the deeply moving words of Francesca. " 
63 Lucian, "The Net of Vulcan", XVII, trans. Tooke, p. 93. 
64 Musa, Commentary, p. 83; Poggioli, p. 73-74. 
65 "I have accepted the variant `Cain, ' meaning the biblical figure Cain, as opposed to the standard reading 
of 'Caina', the region in the lowest part of Hell wherein are tormented those souls who betrayed their kin 
(see Petrocchi II, 90). The reason is simple: how would Francesca know about this section of Hell? She 
would know, however, the biblical story of Cain, who slew his brother Abel, and would make the 
connection with Paolo, murdered by his older brother, Gianciotto. " (Musa, Commentary, p. 79) Carroll (p. 
99) thinks he is referring to the Circle of Traitors and concludes "Probably the reason why Dante condemns 
him to the Circle of Traitors is that he knew of some element of treachery in his conduct towards them, 
although it is unknown to us. " (Carroll, p. 99) 
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and wife implying that the two like Abel are "innocent", 
66 which Francesca deceiving 
herself maintains to be true, though in fact she is more like Eve as we shall soon see. 
Therefore Francesca depicts Gianciotto as an unrepentant tyrant, remaining insensitive to 
the injustice he has done. The reader may well ponder whether this condemnation is 
wholly without warrant, for though having been gravely sinned against, he remains 
ethically responsible for the way he has responded to the sins of Paolo and Francesca, 
giving them no opportunity for repentance. For this reason is not Gianciotto on some 
level also responsible for the damnation of Francesca and Paolo? 
6. CONCLUSION 
According to the Aristophanes of the Symposium, eros seeks eternal union with the 
beloved, for two to become one. However Dante, through his clever manipulation and 
identification of Francesca and Paolo with Venus and Mars, shows how such a carnal 
union in which eros is sought as an end in itself and is not controlled (in the sense of 
moderated), or is focused upon a prohibited desired object, ultimately becomes 
profoundly undesirable. Not only does it result in sheer humiliation and the revelation of 
moral depravity in that all else is given up for its sake, but it leads to complete 
degeneration and destruction, not only for Francesca and Paolo but also for Gianciotto as 
it creates the condition for his own sin, resulting in their damnation, and, possibly, his 
own. Simply put, the telos of purely physical eros sought as an end in itself, i. e., pleasure, 
and as the absolute good of the soul, is Hell. Considering that Aristophanes' myth 
articulates a desire for wholeness present in every human being though not restricted to 
the physical, this is a sobering Christian warning and judgement of eros gone wrong for 
all, including the Platonist. 
66 "The words `afflicted souls' echo Francesca's `e `l modo ancor m'o fende' ('and the way of it afflicts me 
still'). By adopting her language and her perspective, and by imitating them, he creates a space which is 
shared not only by the wayfarer and Francesca, but also by the reader. At least momentarily, we are invited 
to see Paolo and Francesca as souls who have been wronged, and therefore as victims of a power that is 
external and ineluctable, much like, as we have already observed, the power of the Hellish hurricane that 
smites them without rest. " (Masciandaro, p. 85) 
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XI. FALLING FOR FRANCESCA 
Having seen how Dante used the pagan myth of Mars and Venus to articulate the 
death of Francesca and Paolo so that Francesca is made to epitomize earthly 
Venus/Aphrodite, we shall now look at the opposite side of the coin, Dante's Christian 
reading of the event into which the pagan analogy is funnelled. In the Christian reading, 
which for Dante is central, Francesca is an Eve-figure. 
In order to appreciate the subtlety and precision of Dante's representation of 
Francesca as temptress, an Eve figure, we shall turn to the Fall of Man in Genesis which 
Dante follows and uses in the pattern of Inferno V to enact the fall of Dante under 
Francesca's influence. In Genesis 2: 15, after placing Adam in Eden, God warns Adam 
not to "eat from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, for when you eat of it you 
will surely die" (Genesis 2: 17). Yet later the serpent tempts and deceives Eve, calling into 
question God's integrity and motivations (3: 4-5), after which she eats from the tree as 
does Adam (3: 5), an act for which they do not take responsibility (3: 12-13), ultimately 
resulting in their exile (3: 23-24) and death. Given this story, we shall now examine how 
Dante employs the pattern/sequence of events in Genesis to present Francesca as an Eve- 
figure tempting and causing Dante to fall. 
1. THE WARNING 
Echoing Genesis 2: 17 in which God warns Adam not to eat of the tree of 
knowledge, moments before the meeting with Francesca and Paolo, Minos warns Dante 
as he stands before him, "0 thou that comest to the abode of pain .... look how thou 
enterest and in whom thou trustest; let not the breadth of the entrance deceive thee". (V, 
16-20) However in contrast to the Judeao-Christian God, Minos the judge of Hell (V, 4- 
15), no longer holding his honourable role as the judge of the dead in the Odyssey XI, the 
Gorgias 524-526 and the Aeneid VI, 1 in the Commedia is "a hideous demon ,2 judging 
1 Grandgent, p. 46; Durling, p. 94; "Minos in legend and myth was a king of ancient Crete, son of Zeus and 
Europa, and brother of Rhadamanthus. In assigning to Minos the office of judge in Hell, Dante imitates 
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and damning the mal nata3 on their own confessions 4 Though the symbol of an "evil 
conscience", 5 Minos directly warns Dante to pay attention to how he enters and in whom 
he puts his trust. While Dante gains access to Hell through having it decreed by God (V, 
23-4) and is aided by the three Ladies (II, 53-114) (echoing Aeneid VI, 461-2 where 
Aeneas' journey to Avernus is also "a decree of the gods"), Minos' warning implies the 
possibility of being deceived into trusting that which should not be trusted, that which 
will endanger and damage Dante spiritually. 
This warning has been interpreted in two ways. Firstly, a fall may be caused by an 
over-dependency on reason (in the Commedia imaged by Virgil). 6 However as this 
possibility seems unlikely, he seems to be referring to the subversion of reason under the 
influence of one of "the sinners in this circle". It would seem, then, that Minos' warning 
Virgil (Aeneid, VI, 432-33): "`Quaesitor Minos urnam movet; We silentum/conciliumque vocat, vitasque et 
crimina discit. ' (Minos, presiding, shakes the urn; 'tis he calls a court of the silent, and learns men's lives 
and misdeeds. )" (Singleton, Commentary, p. 74). 
2 Grandgent, p. 46. Minos demonstrates a tendency in medieval Christianity to demonize some dignified 
classical figures and gods (Sayers, Commentary, p. 101; Sinclair, p. 81, also see Carroll, p. 85 and 1 
Corinth. X, 20). Others, like "the Muses and Apollo were to [Dante] simply allegorical figures, while Jove 
apparently represented the ancient poets' dim conception of the Supreme Being". (Grandgent, p. 46) 
O'Grady considers this "transformation of the dignified judge of the Tartarus of the Aeneid into a 
monstrous brute, which apart from symbolizing loss of intellect, represents the reversal of order, passing 
judgement, as he does, with his tail rather than his head. " (O'Grady, p. 75) 
3 Singleton notes that the damned are the "Mal nata" a name suggesting that "it would be better for them 
not to have been born" as in Matt. 26: 24. He also refers to Vita Nuova XIX. 8 for '0, malnati' and 
Paradiso V, 115 for `bene nato', those destined for Heaven. (Singleton, Commentary, p. 75) 
4 Sayers, Commentary, p. 101. 
s Though standing at the entrance to the circle of the lustful, Minos is not a symbol of sensuality but of the 
"evil conscience" (Carroll, p. 84), or "the guilty conscience" (Grandgent, p. 46) or "an accusing 
conscience" (Sayers, Commentary, p. 101). This is explainable in that Minos may well represent the 
"horrible and distorted conception of the justice of God" (Musa, Commentary, p. 66), which is one of the 
main punishments of the hardened "impenitent and despairing conscience. " (Carroll, p. 86; Sinclair, p. 81) 
For the "acoustic imitation of the growling sound", see Musa, Commentary, p. 65. 
6 Musa, Commentary, p. 66. Given Dante has entered the circle of the lustful and as lust is the subjection of 
reason to desire, it is unlikely that Minos is warning Dante not to trust reason, unless he is trying to trap 
Dante in Hell by convincing him abandon himself to desire. 
Musa, Commentary, p. 66. From this second interpretation immediately the question arises: Can the 
inhabitants of Hell deceive and lie? The soul "confesses all" before Minos (V, 8), and are "damned on their 
own confession... Hell being the place of self-knowledge in sin ... 
[means] there can be no more self- 
deception here, " (Sayers, Commentary, p. 101; though perhaps "confusion" see Musa in Advent). Although 
this question is left open for the moment, later we see the potency of Minos' warning and that it is directed 
at Francesca. In contrast to Foscolo's discussion of the "truthfulness [which] beautifies her confession of 
desire, " and Renato Poggioli who thinks Francesca "has given proof of intellectual and moral courage by 
facing the truth in all its nakedness, " (Musa, Advent. p. 339), for O'Grady (p. 76) "the true confession to 
Minos is followed by a false confession by Francesca, which is an attempt at self-justification. This could 
indicate that this circle is the home of lust thriving on flattery and falsehood. One thus comprehends the 
weight of Minos' warning to Dante". 
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to watch "in whom thou trust" refers to Francesca, indicative of trusting his passion over 
reason and hinting at Dante's susceptibility towards the coming temptation, a beautiful 
poetically articulate woman, and his subsequent fall. 8 
Resembling Adam listening to Eve in Genesis 3: 17, from the beginning Dante's 
weakness, like that of Francesca, is the subjugation of reason by desire, the definition of 
which is lussuria or cupiditas, the "first sin of incontinence", the circle of Hell into which 
he has just entered .9 The 
image of the lustful blown in the wind10 resembles the 
comparison of the wicked with chaff in Psalm 1: 4; "Not so the wicked! They are like 
chaff that the wind blows away. "" Though the sin of concupiscence might seem to 
suggest the prohibition of sexuality, the reason for the condemnation of the lustful is that 
they lacked self-control with regard to their passion12 and subjugate their "reason to 
desire. " (V, 39)13 
° As a concluding remark, Minos states "let not the breadth of the entrance deceive thee". (V, 20) This 
invokes both a Biblical and Classical reference. "Wide is the gate, and broad is the way that leads to 
destruction" Matt. VII, 13. In slightly different words, Virgil (Aeneid, VI, 126-7) writes "Facilis descensus 
Averno: noctes atque dies patet atri ianua Ditis" (Easy is the descent to Avernus: night and day the door of 
gloomy Dis stands open). Grandgent notes this connection which Singleton (p. 66) uses in his commentary. 
"Since the entrance to Hell proper is here where Minos stands as judge and there is in fact no portal at all, 
the `entrance' is indeed wide. " (Grandgent is concerned with the Aeneid while Singleton focuses on both 
the Bible and Aeneid. ) Though Dante does consider himself to be unrelated to the condition of the damned, 
a visitor or tourist as distinct from a resident in Hell, "familiarity with sin is easy... [as] `the amplitude of 
the entrance' is great, [and]... the very contemplation of evil may leave unsuspected stains upon the soul" 
(see Purg. I, 121). If Dante walks carelessly and allows himself to be influenced, he may very well slip and 
be trapped and consumed. 
9 Grandgent, p. 46. 
10 V, 28-3 8,82-4, Durling, p. 96. 11 For Durling, this image describes the sin of lust indicative of the principle of contrapasso which 
essentially means "whatsoever a man soweth, that also shall he reap. " (Matt. 5: 38,7: 2, Galatians 6: 7; 
Exodus 21: 23,24; Leviticus 24: 20, Deuteronomy 19: 21) Contrapasso or counter-suffering "translates the 
Latin contrapassum, a rendition of the Greek to antipeponthon in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics 
5.5.1132b, part of a discussion of retaliation as a form of justice. Aquinas uses the term for the biblical law 
of retribution (lex talionis): Summa Theologica, 2a 2ae, q. 61, a. 4. " (Durling, p. 448) 
12 For Sinclair (p. 81), "they have sown the wind and forever reap the whirlwind. " (For discussions of 
weakness of will see Sayers, Commentary, p. 101; concupiscence see Brandeis, p. 191; for the purging of 
lust in Purg. XXV, XXVI, see Carroll, p. 98; and in Paradiso IX. 118 "within the shadow of the earth ... 
[as] 
a darkness upon the joy of Heaven" see Carroll, p. 98. ) 
13 There is some debate as to whether Dante is condemning passion. For Masciandaro, (p. 67), given the 
"God-given passion ... 
[which] He endows on his creatures, " "it is not passion that is condemned in Hell's 
second circle but its adulteration, or the inordinate way in which the lustful have let it become an all- 
powerful, unbridled force that has blinded them to all other forces and other goods, by obfuscating the light 
of their intellect. " Sinclair (p. 81) finds that "there is nothing in Dante's treatment of these carnal sinners of 
the false and unchristian condemnation of sexual motive which has sometimes obtained in the Church's 
teaching. " Presumably he is thinking of clergymen like Gregory the Great, Hugo St. Victor, Peter Lombard 
and Albertus Magnus who views desire as evil (Lewis, Allegory, p. 15), so that as Lombard quotes, omnis 
ardentior amatorpropriae uxoris adulter est, passionate love of a man's own wife is adultery or as Lewis 
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This implies that moral reason in a specific area is frozen. 14 In Inferno V, as we 
shall soon see, a key point of surrender in which desire subjugates reason, the kiss, marks 
the moment when Paolo and Francesca's relationship transgressed the social and moral 
order leading to adultery (Exodus 20: 14) and to incest (Leviticus 18: 16), neither of 
which Francesca acknowledges to be a sin given that the relationship is her "moral blind 
spots15 which in turn blinded and corrupted the whole. 16 Thus the lives of Paolo and 
Francesca, "spoiled by love [demonstrate that]... love, pitted against reason, inevitably 
destroys" (Brandeis, p. 27), ironically validating Francesca's statement that love (at least 
her kind) leads to death, a problem set up in Inferno V to which Beatrice will respond. '7 
Given this similarity and susceptibility to fall, Dante the pilgrim has fallen even 
before he falls. 18 From among these spirits for whom Dante already felt compassion (V, 
(Allegory of Love, pp. 17-18) writes "the ardent lover even of his own wife is in mortal sin". However, 
while Nardi ("Filosofia dell'Amore", pp. 90-1) believes Dante does to some extent condemn passion, 
Shapero (Woman, Earthly and Divine, p. 79) says that "Dante does not directly condemn women or sex in 
general in the vehement manner of Church Fathers or troubadours, " but attempts to "resolve the resulting 
anguish. " (Shapero, Woman, Earthly and Divine, p. 85) 
However Paolo and Francesca's particular sin is not with regard to "natural sexual desire but 
because they `subject reason to desire, '" (Sinclair, p. 81), a position likewise held by Aquinas (Summa 
Theologiae, Prima Secundae, XXXIV, Art. 1; also see Summa Theologiae, I, 92. Art. I and Lewis, 
Allegory, pp. 16-17) and typical of Dante's period. Though Dante is extremely passionate spiritually 
(caritas), he maintains some reserve concerning physical desire, partially justifying Shapero's reading with 
regard to his uneasiness concerning passionate sexual relationships. This also supports his Thomist bent 
though differing from Aquinas in his image of women which is far more positive than Shapero (Woman, 
Earthly and Divine, p. 85) admits. 
14 For the medusa-like quality of the beloved, see Brandeis, p. 177-8; also Dante's poem "Cosi nel mio 
parlar voglio esser aspro" from Rimes II. 35-7, pp. 167-8: "Dante describes his love for the so-called 
Donna Petra [Medusa] as an experience of spiritual degradation that threatens to transform the lover into 
stone. " "Dante clearly implies the absolute corruption of the intellect or, since mens is the faculty of 
intellectual vision, the darkening of reason by the fleshly sight of the Medusa. " (Mazzotta, Dante, Poet of 
the Desert, p. 163) 
15 To say that they have "subjected reason to desire" does not mean that they are "deprived of reason" but 
that the subject of their desire represents a "moral blind spot" so that "the sense, the bearings, the 
connections of things escape them, so that they grasp eagerly for what hurts them. Thus it is in their minds 
that they are blind-. -limitedly but persistently-in the area of their own good. They may know the technical 
reason for their torment, but the real reason eludes them", as does the shape of the moral framework and 
how Hell is situated in it. (Brandeis, pp. 172-3) 
16 Ephesians 4: 18-9 discusses "being darkened in their understanding". Musa (Commentary, p. 68) 
describes how "lusts of the mind sink men to a deeper perdition than those of the flesh" though they may 
not be intentionally selfish (Carroll, p. 84; also see Sayers, Commentary, p. 101, Durling, p. 95 and 
Brandeis, p. 179). 
17 "This is almost the opposite of the view, implicit in so much romantic love poetry, that it is precisely 
passion which purifies.. [It is also] the scholastic picture of unfallen sexuality-a picture of physical 
pleasure to the maximum and emotional disturbance at the minimum. " (Lewis, Allegory, p. 17) 8 For Musa, when Virgil identifies the damned according to their transgressions of lust and incest which 
should provoke righteous indignation and terror, Dante deeply moved calls them those "whom love parted 
from our life" referring to them nostalgically as `donne antiche e' cavalieri. ' ("knights and ladies of old 
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72), he noticed Paolo and Francesca who "go together and seem so light upon the wind. " 
Virgil tells Dante the pilgrim to "entreat them then by the love that leads them, and they 
will come" (V, 77-8), to which Dante filled with pity19 calls, "0 wearied souls, come and 
speak to us, if One forbids it not" (V, 80-1)20 Though not summoning them in the name 
of Amor, "a force or an authority that lies outside and above the lovers" (Masciandaro, p. 
77) which "leads them" in their passion, Dante "speaks to them with passionate intensity" 
conveying compassion, feeling for their pain through putting himself in their place and 
thereby feeling their passion, which in this context produces pity, appealing indeed "to 
their self-pity" (Masciandaro, pp. 75-77). In this way he speaks the language of Amor2l 
and of courtly love22, their language, thereby following Virgil's advice though on a 
deeper level. 23 
To the compassion of Dante24, Francesca and Paolo respond passionately like 
"doves, summoned by desire", and immediately glide towards them as if returning to the 
comfort of their nests. Francesca lovingly responds "0 living creature gracious and 
friendly25.... thou hast pity on our evil plight" (88-93). In this way "by their tone, by their 
adjectives-'grazioso' and `benigno'-by their use of the intimate tu, they cradle the 
stranger's instant pity and they suggest in Francesca a rather quick compliancy" 
(Brandeis, p. 28), her susceptibility to passion which like Eve's transgressions led to her 
damnation. This Dante further responds to with pity identifying himself with her and 
times") so that "pity came upon [him] and [he] was as one bewildered" (V, 72). Then Dante unobjective 
and "emotionally distraught" refers to Virgil as "`poeta'... the sublime singer of the tragic love of Dido for 
Aeneas. " His pity is partially self-referential as he too is a love poet. (Musa, Commentary, p. 72) 19 Musa, Commentary, p. 75. 
20 By stating `0 amine affannate' and 's'altri nol niega ="Dante represents a reduction to pathos and pity 
of what is essentially a conflictual condition, one in which human passion and pity are set against the fear 
associated with God and His judgment" (Masciandaro, p. 76). We see this same awareness of God 
moments later in Francesca's utterance, "If God were our friend. " De Sanctis (pp. 42-43) interprets this as 
piety, the beginning of a prayer, while Musa as we shall later discuss interprets it as Francesca blaming 
God for her present state of damnation. 
21 Brandeis, p. 27. 
Boyde, p. 295, note 46. 
23 For Masciandaro, (p. 77) they speak the "language of pathos and pity. " In this context, in Hell, pity is the 
language of love and as De Sanctis (p. 50) writes Dante is the "muse [of] Pity. " 
24 Brandeis, p. 27. 
25 Musa, Commentary, p. 76. 
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loving her as a kindred soul mirroring himself 26 (Genesis 2: 23), which in turn we identify 
with as a reflection of our inner selves. 27 
2. AMOR, AMOR, AMOR 
In Genesis 3: 4-5, the serpent twisted God's instruction calling into question God's 
will, integrity and therefore his identity, thereby leading Eve and through her Adam away 
from God. Likewise Francesca in her first speech employs the conflict between courtly 
love and medieval Christianity, to which Dante has split allegiance, to lure Dante the 
pilgrim from the Christian God of love, "God as caritas", to the pagan god Amor of 
courtly love. 8 
In order to win over the pilgrim she begins by establishing her original home to be 
a type of Paradisal state, echoing Eden of Genesis 1: 31 and 2: 25. By saying "the city 
where I was born lies on the shore where the Po, with streams that join it, descends to 
rest" (V, 99), 29 Francesca portrays it as a lost paradise '30 
indicating that she once 
possessed what she falsely conceived to be a time of total peace. 31 The three tercets 
following, according to this logic, will describe her fall from paradise and thus the story 
of her demise. Through this story however she seduces not only Dante, as we shall see, 
26 Brandeis, p. 28. 
27 De Sanctis pp. 40-41. By Dante her creator, "Francesca is given Dante's tenderness, his literary 
sensibility and his capacity for sexual love". (Boyde, p. 292) 
2' Dante uses the conflict between the tradition of courtly love, which involves a devotion to Amor, and the 
medieval Christian tradition in order to enable Francesca to win the pilgrim Dante's further compassion. As 
we have seen in the "The Venus of Rimini", Dante has represented Francesca as the imitator and follower 
of the pagan goddess Venus, mother of Amor who is always in her company. This suggests that Francesca 
is a follower of both as Francesca while representing earthly Venus, embodies earthly eros, so that in 
leading Dante away from the Christian God, who "is caritas", she will lead him towards the pagan god 
Amor of courtly love. As Dante is a Christian thinker he is employing this pagan symbolism to serve very 
precise Christian ends which in the case of Francesca is the analysis of her tactics, an elucidation of her sin 
and explanation for the reason for her damnation, which in turn serves as a critique of contemporary 
society's tradition of courtly love. 
29 The use of pace articulates the tension between courtly love and Christianity. Singleton ("From Love to 
Caritas", p. 68) notes that the last word of the Vita Nuova is pace, so that he sees it as closing in "a prayer 
for peace". This pace is an impossibility for Francesca (Cambon, p. 65) given that the true end of peace lies 
not in the creation following the dictum of courtly love but in God alone (Paradiso III, 85; Augustine, 
Confessions XIII, 9,10; Masciandaro, p. 82-4). Furthermore pace conflicts with courtly love in that amor 
involves unsatisfied desire which if satisfied would destroy the virtue in love and cause his poetic 
inspiration to cease. (Singleton, "From Love to Caritas", p. 68) 
30 R. Dragonetti, "L'Episode", p. 101. 
31 Masciandaro, p. 83. 
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but also most who hear it into a false sense of security and peace, through the musicality 
and rhythm of the tercets which Boyde (p. 297) compares to waves whose repetition 
eventually "smashes through our emotional defenses. " Boyde's analogy, one notes, 
suggests Francesca as Siren. 
When Francesca states in line 100: Amor, ch'al cor gentil ratto s'apprende, 
particularly through the expression `cor gentil', she speaks the language of courtly love 
articulated by Guinizelli 32 While Boyde (p. 297) thinks line 100 "stops short of asserting 
the identity of love and the gentle heart", Poggioli (pp. 68-9) believes this repeats the 
central message of the Dolce Stil Novo affirming an identity of the cor gentil and fino 
Amore 33, suggesting a paradisal state. 
However in the second tercet we see a shift out of the doctrine of love of the 
Dolce Stil Nuovo. Amor which kindled Paolo's heart due to its gentleness "gentilezza", 
"seized this one for the beauty of my body, torn from me" (prese costui de la bella 
persona the mifu tolta (V, 100-102)". 34 Significantly, Amor seized him for Francesca's 
"bella persona" or beautiful body. "The reference `bella persona' implies physical rather 
than spiritual qualities" (O'Grady, p. 81-2). 35 Here we find a significant point of 
deviation from the Dolce Stil Nuovo36 which focuses, as in the case of Guinizelli, upon 
32 The Bolognese poet Guido Guinizelli, one of the founders of the Dolce Stil Novo whom Dante called the 
"sage" (Vita Nuova 20) and "my father" (Purgatorio 26: 97) wrote "'Al cor gentil rempaira sempre Amore/ 
come I'ausello in selva a la verdura' (`Love always repairs to the gentle heart, as the bird in the wood to 
the verdure')" (Durling, p. 97). Love, from birth in a "potential form" in the noble/virtuous heart, is 
awakened by the sight of the beautiful, reminiscent of Phaedrus 253-255. (Grandgent, p. 53; Boyde, p. 290, 
297) 
33 "Amor ch'al cor gentil ratio s'apprende" echoes and replicates Guinizelli's "Al cor gentil ripara sempre 
Amore" which according to Poggioli (p. 68-9) Dante paraphrases in "Amore e il cor gentil sono una cosa" 
[Love is one with the gentle heart] of Vita Nuova XX, 3-5. Francesca's speech is "a tissue of allusions to 
the fashionable poetry of love, including Dante's own early poems" (Durling, p. 97). 
34 Singleton, Commentary, p. 89. 
35 Musa (Commentary, p. 76) notes Francesca's physical "0 animal grazioso e benigno" as opposed to 
Beatrice's spiritual greeting "0 anima cortese mantovana" (Paradiso, II, 58). 
36 "The Dolce Stil Nuovo tradition expresses an intellectualization of love, a fusion of sacred and profane 
concepts, and presents woman, the object of love, as a spiritual creature. The woman, in this tradition, 
actualizes the potential of love in the lover. The intellect abstracts from the sensible forms conveyed to it 
and presents them to the will, which is free to accept or reject. The result is that the well-disposed 
individual, in possession of a cor gentile, falls in love, from which there follows the moral and intellectual 
improvement of the lover. The angelic qualities of the lady eventually lead him to God. This is the effect of 
Beatrice on Dante. Her situation bestows grace. It renders man more perfect. " (O'Grady, p. 81) 
Nardi ("Filosofia dell'Amore", p. 86) and Poggioli (p. 67), like O'Grady (p. 81) and Musa 
(Commentary, p. 78) believe that it is incorrect to think of Francesca as supporting the Dolce Stil Nuovo. 
This is particularly true for Poggioli (p. 67) given her highly constructed and conventional style as opposed 
to Dante (Purg. XXIV. 52-4) who writes io mi son un the quando Amore spira noto, ed a quel modo, the 
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the idealization of women, the donna angelica, 37 thereby leading man to virtuous as 
opposed to carnal love (Musa, Commentary, p. 78). By Paolo's preoccupation with her 
body, he shows his love to be the latter, concupiditas. Thus Francesca, though appearing 
linguistically to support the Dolce Stil Nuovo, distorts and reverses it philosophically 
(O'Grady, p. 74), 38 a distortion accentuated by a gender reversal. 39 
This reversal of fin Amor with fol Amor through Francesca's misuse and 
conflation of two mutually exclusive concepts of the Dolce Stil Nouvo brings into 
question whether her misreading is due to carelessness, confusion, deceit or self- 
deception40. Given that it is a repeated pattern 41 as we shall see, it suggests a certain 
"moral ambiguity" in Francesca. 42 
Paolo's love may be reciprocated in like kind. "Love, which exempts no loved 
one from loving in return, seized me for his charms" (V, 103) The term "placer" (V, 104) 
like "plater", the Provencial term for "attraction" and "charm" (Grandgent, p. 54)43 
suggests a physical attraction. However placer may also mean pleasure, the pleasure 
Paolo took from Francesca's bella persona, his love for her beauty. 44 "Neither meaning 
can be ruled out, since the poetic ambiguity can support one or the other" (Singleton, 
ditta dentro vo significando. [I am one who takes not when love inspires me and expresses it as it is written 
within me]. Poggioli further notes that her speech shares more common traits with Provencal poetry and the 
Troubadours. He suggests the influence "not from the tradition of the poetry of love (versi d'Amore), either 
in the lingua del si or the langue d'hoc, but from the tradition of love fiction (prose di romanzi) in the 
langue d'oil. After all, the name 'Francesca' means nothing else but `French'. " (Poggioli, p. 70) 
37 When comparing Francesca to the donna angelica we must first note that Francesca's Amor leads not to 
"a new quality of life" but to death in contrast with the Vita Nuova. "In the Dolce Stil Nuovo tradition the 
lady chooses the man, who is predisposed towards love and goodness. He, in turn, is attracted to the lady, 
because of the divine and intellectual light communicated through her eyes and her salutation. Francesca, 
on the contrary, implies that Paolo chose her. The reference `bella persona' implies physical rather than 
spiritual qualities. The poetic beautification of Francesca entails the substitution of poetic qualities for those 
spiritual qualities necessary for salvation. The power of the will is diminished with the elimination of the 
spiritual and the intellectual. Furthermore, the commentary on love is provided by Francesca, rather than by 
Paolo, as would have been the case in the medieval tradition. " (O'Grady, p. 74) In short Francesca distorts 
the idea of the donna angelica held by Guinizelli and the other poets of the Dolce Stil Nuova. 
38 Francesca use of gentilizza (nobility) of heart opposes the view held by Dante and Guinizelli in that she 
refers to gentility of blood as opposed to virtue. (Poggioli, p. 68-9) 
39 This reversal of roles involves the woman praising Amor (O'Grady, p. 74) and the good looks of her 
lover (Poggioli, p. 67). 
40 Musa, Advent. pp. 26-7. 
41 Musa, Commentary, p. 78. 
42 Musa, Commentary, p. 76. 
43 "`Placer' probably is intended to correspond to the `bella persona' of vs. 101. Thus Paolo falls in love 
with the beautiful Francesca, and Francesca falls in love with the handsome Paolo" (See Barbi, pp. 10-11 
quoted in Singleton, Commentary, p. 91). 
44 Brandeis, p. 29; Singleton, Commentary, p. 91. 
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Commentary, p. 91). From the latter reading Chiampi (p. 59-60) suggests that "Francesca 
loves herself and her body as an absolute and loves them through Paolo's eyes", 45 which 
is either a form of self-love, 46 or may mean that she honestly loves the fact she pleases 
him, that she loves to please 47 Whether carnal love, fol amor (see Chiampi, pp. 59-60), 
self-love, or desiring to please, all are focused on the surface48 and temporal as opposed 
to the eternal, and easily corrupted resulting in her demise. Thus though following 
Guinizzelli in the first tercet, Francesca's second tercet shows her misreading 
Guinizzelli's poetry (and Capellanus' philosophy), twisting Guinizelli's donna angelica 
to her own ends. 
A Religion unto Themselves 
"Love, which exempts no loved one from loving in return" (V, 103) indicates that 
Francesca had no choice and necessarily loved Paolo in return. Given this "imperious 
law" (Musa, Advent, p. 26) their mutual love was inevitable and unavoidable, as "the 
nature of the love that inspired them was beyond reproach" (Musa, Advent, pp. 26-27), 49 
a position which is later rebutted by Virgil. 50 
Seen thus, Francesca's view is that Amor is an all powerful and irresistible god 51 
This view finds its source in courtly love poetry, 52 a point which she emphasizes by 
beginning each tercet with Amor showing herself to be his votary, 53 and also which she 
"[asserts] with pride"54 ss regardless of where she finds herself because of this allegiance 
as She therefore experiences great sorrow in their loss. She is "obsessed with memories of her destroyed 
beauty" (Chiampi, p. 59), the loss of which signifies death (De Sanctis, p. 44). 
46 Her tendency to be self-focused is demonstrated in that "she interprets Dante's journey as a `visit' to 
herself and Paolo alone. " (Masciandaro, pp. 78-9) 
47 Musa, Commentary, p. 77. 
48 Brandeis, p. 29. 
49 The possibility of blaming Amor is already present in the Aeneid. "Virgil had run the risk of deceiving his 
less sophisticated readers by attributing the onset of Dido's fatal passion to the activity of Cupid. " (Boyde, 
282) 
Francesca acted by free choice and is therefore responsible. Cf. Inferno V: 103 with Purgatorio XVIII, 
62-6 and XXII: 10-12. See Durling, p. 97 and Brandeis, pp. 29-31. 
s' Boyde, pp. 280-281. This necessity in love is a position Dante never held. In contrast late in life he held a 
position similar to Phaedrus 252e-253b (See Boyde, p. 298). 
52 Singleton, Commentary, p. 89. 
53 Cambon, p. 57. 
54Boyde, pp. 280-281. 
55 E. G. Parodi, cited by Sinclair, p. 83. 
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Yet as we have seen courtly love both appropriates and opposes Christianity. 
Though in 1 John 4: 8 "God is caritas, " the pagan devotion to Amor, opposes and is 
antithetical to Christianity. With application directly to line 103, "Francesca's second law 
of love echoes a dictum which the cult of courtly love characteristically had taken over 
from Christian doctrine.... 1 John 4: 19 ... 'Let us therefore 
love, because God first loved 
us'... [upon which] Fra Giordano da Rivalto sermonizes (Prediche XLV, 1831 edn., vol. 
II, p. 78): `Non e nullo che, sentendosi the sia amato da alcuno, ch'egli non sia tratto ad 
amar lui incontanente. ' ('There is no one who, feeling himself loved, will not 
immediately feel drawn to love in return. ')" (Singleton, Commentary, p. 90-1) Singleton 
further notes that this is twisted through medieval culture into an ambiguous statement 
exemplified by Andreas Capellanus, the Chaplain in De Amore II, 8 (p. 311): `Amor nil 
posset Amori denegare. ' ('Love can deny nothing to love. ') which regardless of any 
religious pretence, 56 ultimately serves the end of courtly love and its cult of Amor as 
exemplified in Francesca's second tercet. 
As previously mentioned, the "Love religion" of the god Amor arises in 
opposition to the Christian religion, by parodying it 57 In this way courtly love formulates 
an opposing system imitating Christianity58 but with an opposing set of values in that the 
central object of love is the Lady as opposed to the Christian God, so that the ephemeral 
is placed above the infinite which is an absurdity. We noted in Chapter X Chiampi's 
analysis (p. 72) in relation to the image of the union of Francesca and Paolo likened to 
Aristophanes' circular people. Looking more deeply here we see Francesca following the 
"religion of courtly love" as a devotee of Amor (and unaware of the humour/absurdity 
behind the original conception). 
Before demonstrating how Francesca's devotion to Amor parodies medieval 
Christianity, we must first better understand in what this devotion consists. In devoting 
herself to Amor she claims that she and Paolo are possessed by love for each other which 
by its very nature cannot be refused, as it is willed by Amor (as exemplified by Dido in 
Aeneid IV: 93-98). In succumbing to this love they love each other before God, being 
56 "`Quum igitur omnia sequantur ex Amore nefanda' (No man through any good deeds can please God so 
long as he serves in the service of Love). " (Lewis, Allegory, p. 41). 
s' Lewis, Allegory, p. 18. 
58 Lewis, Allegory, pp. 21-22. 
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fully devoted to each other first and foremost. Paolo is unconditionally devoted to 
Francesca's "bella persona" while Francesca loves Paolo likewise for his charm or 
because of his delight in her "bella persona", that she pleases him. As Paolo and 
Francesca loved each other before God they "[mimicked] God's mode of existence59.... 
and [created their] own myth" (Chiampi, 59) and laws. 60 Admitting no room for the 
Christian God, "Francesca's eyes were paradise enough for Paolo" (Chiampi, p. 62); 61 in 
this way Paolo and Francesca make their love a mutual worship of Amor, a religion unto 
themselves, parodying Christianity and demonstrating the pride exemplified by Eve in 
turning away from God, which displays an extremely limited view of love 62 
Like the tyrant in the Republic embodying uncontrolled eros, Amor is a tyrant63 
violating both the law of God and social laws of man, causing death and destruction. 
Hence in the third tercet, Francesca describes the consequence of their adulterous 
relationship: Amor condusse not ad una morte (V, 106). The fate 64 of this type of Amor is 
morte 65 
59 Chiampi (pp. 50,59-60,64, note 13) notes Francesca's twisted resemblance to God which he compares 
with Augustine's (Confessions II, 7) statement, "All who desert you and set themselves up against you 
copy you in a perverse way; but by this very act of imitation they only show that you are the Creator of all 
nature and, consequently, that there is no place whatever where man may hide away from you". 
60 Francesca creates her own laws in keeping with her will as opposed to following God's laws and his will 
and thereby "she usurped a prerogative God alone enjoys. " (Chiampi, pp. 59-60,72) Through her adultery 
and incest (Inferno VI, 2) she exalts self-love over duty thereby showing a complete disregard for God's 
law or any other bar her own. (Chiampi, p. 61) This tendency in Francesca to make her own desire into a 
law explains why the first shade in the train before which Francesca entered was Semiramis, the Greek 
name of a queen of ancient Assyria in the forteenth or thirteenth century B. C. who legitimized lust and 
incest. (See Musa, Commentary, pp. 64,69 who cites Paulus Orosius, Hist. I, iv, 4,7-8). Later in the canto 
like Semiramis, Francesca attempts "to legalize, or `authorize', her own lust in terms of the reading act: 
'Galeottofu il libro e chi lo scrisse. "' (Jacoff, "Transgression and Transcendence", p. 56) 
61 For Chiampi as God loves himself in his creation so Francesca loves herself in Paolo which blocks out 
God. This makes them a corrupted imitation of "deificatory charity" and thereby "fallen angels". (Chiampi, 
p. 69) 
62 Her understanding of love expressed in Inferno V, 103-105 is that of a sensualist living for the present 
with little grasp of God as pure being, eternal and omniscient. "She cannot conceive of a love that could 
transcend her own and hence trivialize it. " (Chiampi, p. 57) 
63 This domination by the tyrant Amor (Cambon, pp. 57-8) which involves the surrender of one's own 
desires leads to death. Francesca finds him irresistible, overcoming reason, demonstrating the full extent of 
the tyranny in love's destructive potential by firmly maintaining her devotion to this destroying god and 
self-destructive love. (See also Singleton, Commentary, p. 89) 
64 Singleton, Commentary, p. 91. 
65 The end of this type of Amor is morte, emphasized by the common sound in "Amor" and "morte", one 
picking up where the other has ended, so that Cambon writes "The beginning of love is described as a fire 
quickly catching (`ratio s'apprende'), whereas at the end life itself is extinguished ('a vita ci spense'). 
Love's torch begets a consuming fire which leaves only ashes. " (Cambon, p. 58) This is an inversion of 
"Amor the move il sole e I'altre stelle" Paradiso XXXIII (Cambon, p. 59). 
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Francesca's linking of love and death confirms her misunderstanding or 
misreading of Cavalcanti's vision of love. Though Shapero's reading seems to equate 
Francesca's view of love with Cavalcanti's, 66 while Cavalcanti correlates love and death 
it is in a very different way from Francesca. Unlike Francesca, who experiences 
love/passion as leading to physical death, a process having religious and moral 
undertones, Cavalcanti's notion of death by love is not physical nor is his notion of love 
"consciously religious or moral" (Shaw, p. 123) 67 Although Cavalcanti discusses the 
association of love and death, it only superficially resembles Francesca's third tercet; 
opposing the goal of Francesca, Cavalcanti through stressing the beloved's inability to 
live up to his ideal, ultimately undermining the beloved, thereby expresses 
disillusionment at love's finitude. Once again, as in her twisting of Guinizelli's donna 
angelica to carnal ends in the second tercet, in the third Francesca distorts Cavalcanti's 
vision of the relation of love and death. 8 One might say that she has poorly read her 
texts, but more probably she has read into them what she wanted to see in order to suit 
her desires, a point in which she further resembles Eve, influenced by the serpent's 
deception in Genesis 3: 4-5. 
Like Eve in Genesis 3: 14 blaming the serpent, Francesca's attitude towards her 
own damnation is to blame everyone rather than taking personal responsibility. She 
blames God, Amor, Guinizelli, Cavalcanti, the Troubadours69 and the Dolce Stil Nuovo, 
Paolo, Giovanni, and suggestive literature70, a matter which we shall soon discuss with 
66 Shapero, Woman, Earthly and Divine, p. 102. 
67 "It is not recognized as an aspiration to the highest good, but it is a thoroughly human affection. Born of 
imaginative intellectuality, the nobility of the human soul ... 
it becomes a passion of body and soul for a real 
woman, in which the Supreme Good (`buon perfetto) is forgotten. " (Shaw, p. 123) "With all her 
gentleness, beauty, understanding, and complete charm, which seemed to correspond exactly to his 
imagined ideal, she is essentially without mercy, ready to be a thoughtful spectator of the death of his 
heart. " (Shaw, pp. 119-121) "The passion is destructive and often disastrous [bringing death; "The 
conviction of hopelessness leads at last to the gradual death of love"; Shaw, pp. 122-123], and the mind of 
the poet broods with tender melancholy over the impossibility, demonstrated again and again by 
experience, of holding permanently the temporary realization of his ideal. " (Shaw, p. 123) 
68 Through this misreading of Cavalcanti she describes a purely carnal negative view of love leading to 
death, which, as we shall see, contrasts with Dante's love for Beatrice, the example of "fino Amor" which 
leads to life. The opposition expressed in this last tercet encapsulates Dante's problem and the first marked 
effort to come to terms with the problem of the extraordinary ambiguity of love, which can lead to eternal 
life as in the love of Beatrice or lead to death and eternal damnation as in the case of Francesca. 69 Nardi ("Filosofia dell'Amore", pp. 87-8) and Croce (p. 110) both note that Francesca blames the 
Troubadours. 
70 Sayers, "The Meaning of Heaven and Hell" in Introductory Papers on Dante, p. 80. 
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regard to Lancelot, and elicits our compassion. 7' While blaming others, one cannot help 
noticing that she misreads everyone and everything that she blames, so that the texts are 
often twisted into their opposite, 72 a point that will be developed in this chapter, which 
results in an idealization of the carnal. Through her twisting of texts into their opposites, 
she serves her own ends (see 2 Timothy 4: 3-4). Connectedly with her courtly love parody 
of Christianity, she turned away from the Biblical laws against adultery and incest known 
to her through the medieval church and towards the poetry of the Troubadours and the 
Dolce Stil Nuovo. This poetry she further distorted to her own end to fulfill and support 
her desire for an incestuous adulterous relationship with her brother-in-law, similar to 
Semiramis. In the pursuit of self-justification, she sculpted a support in courtly love and 
the religion of Amor and the Dolce Stil Nuovo, which finds its completion in Lancelot du 
Lac (also known as Lancelot do Lac) through which she defines her own personal myth 
as we shall soon discover, thus clarifying the meaning behind Minos' warning. 73 
Francesca's indulgence of desires and her reaction to her damnation cast light on 
her beliefs and why she is the only Christian woman in Hell. She has prioritized her own 
physical or self-regarding desires and Paolo over spiritual love, thereby turning away 
from God in order to satisfy these desires. By doing this she makes her desires into her 
god, parodying and opposing God and medieval Christianity and ultimately leading to her 
death and damnation. Francesca's reaction to this tragic end is to blame everyone as an 
act of self-justification. 4 "As the only Christian woman condemned to eternal 
torment ... Dante had both theological and artistic reasons 
for placing Francesca in Hell. " 
(O'Grady, p. 79) As a devoted practitioner of courtly love, she is not a Christian but a 
follower of Amor, a pagan divinity. Like Eve wishing to be her own god (Genesis 3: 6), 
Francesca wishes to be "a light unto [herself]; regards [herself] as [her] own light" 
(Augustine, City of God, p. 573). This in turn is reinforced by Dante's analogy equating 
Francesca with Venus as discussed in "The Venus of Rimini. " As the "goddess of love" 
71 Masciandaro, p. 85. 
72 Poggioli, p. 70. 
73 We now begin to discern the meaning of Minos' warning. Francesca's "attempt to shift responsibility 
onto a literary personification met with no favour from Minos, the judge and `connoisseur of sin', who 
consigned her to this second circle of Hell" (Boyde, p. 298), having heard a confession of a very different 
sort when she had no choice but to tell the truth. This justifies thus Minos' warning to Dante not to trust all 
that he hears. 
74 Shapero, Woman, Earthly and Divine, p. 104. 
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directed by and existing for the satisfaction of her own desires, Dante's use of pagan 
imagery reinforces and underlines this Christian message. 
3. MIRROR 
Reflecting Adam's identification with Eve (Genesis 2: 23), Francesca's influence 
upon the pilgrim Dante is such that he mirrors her. Consequently after her description in 
line 100-106, Quand' io intesi quell'anime offense, china' il viso, e tanto il tenni basso, 
fin the `1 poets mi disse: `Che pense? ' ("And when I heard these afflicted souls I bent my 
head and held it down so long that at last the Poet said to me: `What are thy thoughts? '). 
The moment when Dante bends his head in silence indicates a moment of deep reflection 
and an "act of sympathy" and thereby emotional imitation75 by which Dante 
"symbolically participates in their sin, the essence of which is the submission of reason to 
desire" (Musa, Commentary, p. 79). 76 Dante is falling into their sin because he identifies 
himself with their love so intimately. This identification is shown by the way the notion 
of love in the Vita Nuova parallels Guinizelli's cor gentile, and through the apparent 
influence of Guinizelli in Francesca's first tercet, while the perversion of Guinizelli's 
donna angelica in her second tercet suggests not only their fall but his. Therefore that he 
lowers his head suggests that he fears being condemned to a like fate, as if this is the 
consequence of his own poetry and the conception of love revered in the poetry of the 
Dolce Stil Nuovo. Francesca's surrender of reason to passion makes him recall his own 
passionate (irrational) state at the time, particularly, of the writing of the poetry of the 
Vita Nuova77, a state which up until this point he had greatly valued and idealized, but 
which subsequently he begins to reevaluate and perhaps even judge. 
This self-examination is continued when in response to Virgil's question "Che 
pense? ", Dante answers : "Alas, how many sweet thoughts, how great desire, brought 
them to the woeful pass! " (V, 112-114), 78 "sweet thoughts" being suggestive of the 
75 Masciandaro, p. 85. 
76 Musa notes that Bosco and Reggio believe this passage points to a rethinking on the part of the Poet with 
regard to stilnovistic poetry leading to a later opposition of Love-Virtue to Love-Passion. 
77 Musa, Commentary, pp. 79-80. 
78 For Boyde (p. 299) at this moment Dante's fall begins, as it represents the moment he "surrenders reason 
to desire". However this surrender seems a gradual process (De Sanctis, p. 48) fully achieved at the 
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medieval theory of courtly love held by Capellanus. 79 It however seems a moment in 
which Dante is deeply perplexed, Dante's response to Virgil reflecting an aporia with 
regard to love's ambiguous nature. 80 Given this aporia between what seemed initially 
wholesome/good desires and their tragic sinful end, Dante is caught, perplexed and 
bewildered. How can what seemed to him in the Vita Nuova sweet desires and emotions 
upon which he feasted and which nourished his soul lead to damnation? This is a moment 
of alarm in which he draws into question everything he believes and has believed about 
love and poetry, and thereby brings into question himself and his life up until this time. 
To traverse this aporia or lack of passage, within or expressed by the desire of 
Francesca, into which Dante falls thereby identifying himself with Francesca, Dante must 
distinguish himself from Francesca in order to escape the same fate. Masciandaro 
beautifully and intricately examines this problem and the ultimate formulation of a poros 
(passage) through the victory of the rational element within Dante, or over Dante's 
emotions, whereby Francesca's view is brought into question. 81 Reminiscent of the lovers 
of Socrates' second speech in the Phaedrus82 which we examined in the first part of this 
thesis, and like Lacan's mirror stage in which, through seeing the reflection of the self in 
another, one recognizes and comes to know oneself, likewise through his encounter with 
Francesca in whom he finds a kinship of sentiment derived from courtly love, Dante finds 
a reflection of himself, regardless of how distorted, and comes to know himself. This 
moment of the kiss, the recognition of which due to the tears of Paolo causes his fainting and submersion in 
the likeness of death. 
79 "Sweet thoughts" refers to the "obsessive presence of the beloved's image in the imagination. " (Durling, 
p. 98) 
80 Masciandaro, p. 86. "The wayfarer's exclamation reflects an aporia, an insoluble conflict between what 
is intrinsically good-the lover's sweet thoughts and great desire-and the `doloroso passo, ' the death that 
somehow that good has caused. " 
81 Masciandaro, p. 88. 
82 In the Phaedrus, through the vision of the beloved as reminiscent of the form of Beauty, the lover fills 
with love. Through the lover's gaze in turn the beloved fills with love which reflects back on the lover 
making him beloved. This interaction causes love to grow further so that both are lover and beloved, 
formulating the dialectic of love as presented in the Phaedrus. Though the beloved Francesca comes to love 
Paolo through his gaze, his appreciation of her physical beauty, Francesca and Paolo's love is different 
from that of the Phaedrus as it rejects the presence of any transcendental source of beauty. Francesca 
ignores God as being the source of the beauty which gives Paolo pleasure and which in turn causes her to 
be filled with love and love back. With Francesca and Paolo the dialectic is limited to the physical and the 
self as it mistakenly finds its source in the physical self. For this reason, given that it can not move beyond 
the physical, their love becomes obsessive, fixated and compulsive, and therefore ultimately destructive. 
Love which has its source beyond the physical must ultimately move through the physical and move 
beyond the physical back to God, as we shall later learn with regard to Beatrice, or it becomes destructive 
bringing death as in the case of Francesca and Paolo. 
231 
distortion, which Masciandaro describes as a lack of perfect symmetry or as a disunity 
between subject and object, allows Dante to take a step back and question, making 
mimesis creative. 83 It is precisely through this self-reflective tendency, his rational ability 
to draw both his and Francesca's thoughts, feelings and their outcomes into question, that 
enables Dante to separate himself from both her and her fate. 84 This separation occurs at 
the moment Dante poses the question: "Francesca, thy torments make me weep for grief 
and pity, but tell me, in the time of your sweet sighing how and by what occasion did 
love grant you to know your uncertain desires? " (V, 116-120) At this point Dante steps 
out of his state of immersion in compassion and pity for her and her fate as well as out of 
his inner personal suffering and pathos (Masciandaro, p. 89). Shaking off their 
domination and turning to inspect them, he asks for a rational, factual explanation of how 
this love and suffering occurred (See Nardi, "Filosophia dell'Amore", pp. 237-8). 85 
Although there is a sense in which the scene actually seems to lean more to 
Dante's increasing identification and submersion in the story of Francesca and notion of 
love, the reflective strand teased out/analyzed by Masciandaro is crucial and ultimately 
becomes dominant, thereby permitting Dante to change as opposed to being damned. 
Though this strand seems to remain under the surface for the moment, dominated by the 
obsessive love, the passion and compassion Dante feels for Francesca throughout the 
83 "In a sense, the `seed' of this opposition or its creative ground is already constituted by the contiguity- 
opposition of the adjective `sweet' and the noun `thoughts'. " (Masciandaro, p. 88) Although Masciandaro 
may to some extent be reading into and complexifying Dante's notion of the "sweet thoughts", the 
conclusion Masciandaro draws concerning what Dante feels and thinks within himself and what Dante feels 
and thinks with regard to Francesca and Paolo is persuasive. 
84 Masciandaro, p. 89. 
85 Singleton (Commentary, p. 92) sees Dante as being far more unified with Francesca at this point in the 
dialogue than Masciandaro (p. 88) suggests; more dominated by passion, and less able to make any rational 
judgment. Both Musa (Commentary, p. 80) and Masciandaro (pp. 87-89) question how this "courtly" love 
so exquisite and inevitable resulted in death and damnation. In their readings Singleton and Musa are 
focusing upon Dante's seduction by Francesca, his abandonment of reason out of compassion for and 
kinship with Francesca implying that Dante and Francesca have the same notions of love. Masciandaro, 
though showing this initial identity 'and subversion of reason for passion, focuses on making a substantial 
effort to track the distinction between Dante and Francesca within the unity created by Francesca's 
seduction of Dante to explain why Dante does not get "stuck" like Paolo in Hell with Francesca (cf. Cavell, 
Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome, Ch. 1). This difference permits a certain "creative ambiguity" 
(Masciandaro, p. 90). In terms of Cavell's (and Emerson's) perfectionist theory, what we find is that Dante 
though enthralled with Francesca does not become permanently fixated upon her but retains his ability to 
reflect. This space distances him from his feelings, enabling him to reflect upon and learn from his partial 
or near death (see Freud, Lay Analysis, p. 23), and so move beyond them, thereby escaping death. 
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course of the Canto, it exists in constant tension with the latter, an indication of the 
tension between pathos/pity and ethos/piety. 
Thus a closer reading of Canto V brings out the tension between unity and 
difference, the seduction into the sphere of Francesca by her obsessive narrow view of 
love versus the universal view of Francesca's position as a negative deviation from the 
greater view of which God is the centre. 86 These opposing views of love are encapsulated 
in the "[richly ambiguous]" (Singleton, Commentary) word dubbioso (V, 120), 87 
expressing the ambiguity of love and hence the resulting opposing perspectives88 and 
economies. 89 From this it appears that Dante the pilgrim's and Francesca's different fates 
are determined by the fact that originally they had different notions of love, testifying to 
the inherent ambiguity in the concept of love. 
Here distinguishing his fall from the Fall in Genesis, we see Dante can become 
other. Although he has thus far supported courtly love and a form of desire which 
suppresses reason as in the early Vita Nuova, making him a kindred spirit to Francesca, 
and though he is still held under Francesca's spell, trapped and captive, through his 
continued questioning or distance, characterized by Masciandaro as the caesura, he can 
become another, hence we see the potential for change. This potentiality lies precisely in 
his ability to question Francesca about her love, which brings into question the nature of 
her conception of love which in turn (particularly due to its limitation) suggests too that it 
86 This further implies that Francesca's autonomous sphere of eros exists within the heteronomous universe 
of God as a part within the whole, though her attitude implies that she denies the supremacy of the latter as 
we have previously seen. Many critics forget that the sphere Francesca creates in Canto V is part of the 
whole. Cambon (p. 53) critiques De Sanctis, Croce, Maud Bodkin and Domenico Vittorini for thinking that 
"the episode [is] poetically self-contained" as opposed to being part of the whole. Similarly Brandeis (p. 
23) criticises Busnelli, De Sanctis, Foscolo and Trombadori as having "context-blindness" seeing her as a 
portrait of a woman as opposed to a damned soul expressing something about Hell. It is only by seeing 
Francesca within the whole that she can be fully understood because she is a part of the whole. (See 
Chiampi p. 70) Acknowledgement of her context results in a judgement upon her while its denial incurs a 
judgment upon us. 
87 "Dubbioso, referring to the desire of the lovers,... can mean `hesitant', `not yet manifested, ' i. e., desire of 
which neither lover is wholly conscious (Barbi, 1932, p. 16). But dubbioso can also mean `dangerous', 'that 
which is to be feared'; cf. The verb `dubbiar' in Purgatorio XX, 135. " (Singleton, Commentary, pp. 92-93) 
Masciandaro (p. 91) sees "dubbiosi" as encapsulating Dante's engagement to Francesca; according to the 
first meaning the lovers are unified "binding like to like", eliciting pathos and pity, Francesca being the 
centre, and following the second, "distance" from Francesca and objectivity, resulting in and from ethos 
and fear through an awareness of God as the centre of the universe. (Masciandaro, p. 91) 88 Courtly love tradition and the poetry of Dolce Stil Nuovo versus Christianity (Masciandaro, p. 91). 89 Francesca's `restricted economy' of false love presenting itself as the "`general economy' of true love 
opposes an economy in which those two loves coexist, in creative opposition", the pilgrim versus 
Francesca. (Masciandaro, p. 91) 
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could be other; the failure of a limited finite love suggests its opposite, the possibility of a 
limitless infinite love. Therefore through drawing into question Francesca's notion of 
love Dante demonstrated his ability to think beyond her notion of love which further 
demonstrates, as we shall see, that he can think beyond himself and thereby (as opposed 
to Adam and Eve at the moment of the Fall) love that which is beyond himself. 
4. THE KISS 
Francesca answered Dante's question by exclaiming: `There is no greater pain 
than to recall the happy time in misery, and this thy teacher knows" (V, 121). This 
exclamation is measured to win Dante as a lover, a thinker and a poet. She gains the 
allegiance of his heart through suffering for him by remembering her prefallen state 
producing a mixture of guilt, sorrow and devotion in the pilgrim. 90 She stimulates his 
mind through the diversity of literary references (Virgil's Aeneid91, Augustine, Aquinas 
and Boethius92) which though misused93, captivate an emotional scholar, and lastly she 
captures the attention of the poet through the shift and simplification of her language. 94 
90 Durling, p. 98. 91 The sheer diversity of other literary references invoked in/by this line suggests a further effort to gain the 
compassion of Dante the intellectual and the scholar. Lines 121-6 recall Aeneid ii. 3 when Aeneas says to 
Dido, infandum, regina; jubes renovare dolorem... (0 queen, thou dost bid me renew an unspeakable 
sorrow... ) (See Boyde, p. 299 and Sayers, Commentary, p. 103) Also this echoes Aeneid, 11,10,12-13. 
"Yet if thou hast such longing to learn our disasters... though my mind shudders to remember, and has 
recoiled in grief, I will begin. " Sed si tantus amor casus cognoscere nostros ... quamquam animus 
meminesse horret luctuque refugit, incipiam. (Trans. Singleton, Commentary, p. 93) 
92 In this line Francesca invokes perhaps Augustine Confessions X, 14, Aquinas, but most probably 
Boethius. Augustine Confessions X, 14. "Aliquando et e contrario tristitiam meam transactam laetus 
reminiscor, et tristis laetitiam. " (Sometimes on the contrary, in joy do I remember my forepassed sorrow, 
and in sadness my joy. ) Aquinas writes in the Summa Theologiae, II-II, q. 36, a, 1, ad 4: "Memoria 
praeteritorum bonorum, inquantum fuerunt habita, delectationem causal: sed inquantum sunt amissa, 
causant tristitiam. " ('Recollection of past goods in so far as we have had them, causes pleasure; in so far as 
we have lost them, causes sorrow. ' Trans. Singleton) Taking these references into account, Singleton 
(Commentary, p. 93) notes however that Boethius (Consol. Philo. II, iv, 11.3-6) is "much closer. " "Sed hoc 
est quod recolentem vehementius coquit. Nam in omni adversitate fortunae infelicissimum est genus 
infortunii fuisse felicem. " (But this is that which vexeth me most, when I remember it. For in all adversity 
of fortune it is the most unhappy kind of misfortune to have been happy). " 
93 As in the case of Guinizelli and Cavalcanti, Francesca's reading of Boethius' Consolatione seems 
"distorted... she stops reading too soon... Happiness is wholeness, according to Boethius, and cannot be 
defined by any one material pleasure" (Musa, Commentary, p. 81), a position which stands in opposition to 
Francesca's view that her whole happiness lies in Paolo's desire for her. Therefore once again Francesca 
twists literature to her own ends of persuasion and self-expression as opposed to the pursuit of truth. 94 Twisting the use of "root" in Ephesians 3: 17-19 which should refer to Christ and the Bible as opposed to 
a romance (see Musa, Commentary, p. 81), Francesca continues, "But if thou hast so great desire to know 
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Francesca begins her story: "We read one day for a pastime of Lancelot, how love 
constrained him. " (Noi leggiavamo un giorno per diletto95 di Lancialotto come amor lo 
strinse) Given their idle time, that they read of Lancelot, a notorious romance96 of 
adultery perhaps paralleling their courtship97 hints at the coming disaster. To establish 
their innocence, when describing this romance, Francesca focuses upon "come amor lo 
strinse" employing "a violent verb, stringere, `to grasp' or `to squeeze, ' to indicate the 
violence of the passion mastering the knight's soul" (Poggioli, p. 61). Given that the 
force of Amor grasping Lancelot caused him to act, which in turn acted as the motivating 
principle for the rest of Francesca's story's action, 98 she blames Amor. However given 
the notorious ambiguity of the next line, "We were alone and had no misgivings" (soli 
eravamo e sanza alcun sospetto) (V, 129), this innocence is called into doubt. Sanza 
alcun sospetto translates as "innocent", 99 "without suspicion and fear" that their love has 
been discovered, 1°° but also may suggest an intentional short-sightedness and a limited 
view of love indicative of a self-willed attempt to "create [their] own innocence" 
(Masciandaro, p. 96), 101 the original having been lost. Even now they wish to return to 
innocence, yet as this return demanded a recognition of guilt, an acknowledgement of 
personal responsibility and repentance at a time which is now past, they are left in a 
perpetual state of unfulfilled desire of it. 
our love's first root, I shall tell as one may that weeps in telling" (V, 124-125); Paolo weeps while she tells 
(Masciandaro, p. 104; seen positively, De Sanctis, p. 46; seen negatively Masciandaro, p. 103). In telling 
she drops her sophisticated use of language, to express herself in a simple, unpretentious and direct manner 
which disarms the reader, provoking compassion and pity. (Boyde, p. 300; Musa, Commentary, p. 81) 
43 Mazzota, p. 166. 
96 For literature of French chivalry fashionable in Italy, see Sinclair, pp. 81-2 who also refers to P. Rajna 
(1920); "other allusions in Dante's writings include De vulg. Eloqu. I, x, 2: `Arturi regis ambages 
pulcerrime' (`the exquisite legends of King Arthur'), and the `prose di romanzi' of Purg. XXVI, 118. See 
also Par. XVI, 14-15, which is, in fact, a reminiscence of Lancelot du Lac. " (Singleton, Commentary, p. 
94) 
97 Cambon, p. 201. 
98 Cambon, pp. 58-9. 
99 Singleton, Commentary, p. 94; Musa, Advent, p. 140. 
'°° Musa, Commentary, p. 82. 
101 We see that, as in our prior discussion of Francesca's love which is autonomous and self-enclosed, 
unaware of cause and effect, likewise here her unawareness of danger is the direct result of this 
shortsighted and limited view of love rooted in a "desire to create [their] own innocence". Masciandaro (p. 
96) likens this to the desire of Adam and Eve for a "second innocence" and sphere of their own making as 
opposed to God's. Thus "being alone and suspecting nothing" implies a "denial of the presence of God (the 
Infinite Other)" as well as of evil. (Masciandaro, p. 97; The refusal to acknowledge God is "to remove from 
one's scene the dimension of ethos and fear", Masciandaro, p. 98. ) 
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At this time contrasting with this supposed "innocence", they knowingly 
continued. "Per piu fiate102 Ii occhi ci sospinse quella lettura103, e scolorocci 104 il Viso; 
ma solo un punto fu quel the ci vinse. Quando leggemmo il disiato riso esser baciato da 
cotanto amante, questi, the mai da me non fa diviso, la bocca mi baciö tutto tremante" 
(V, 130-136). 105 Paolo upon reading how "Lancelot" kissed Guinevere in turn kissed 
Francesca. Francesca curiously describes "those longed-for lips now being kissed by such 
a famous lover.. . "literally, `when we read the 
longed-for lips/to be kissed... ' (Musa, 
Advent, p. 25) which is an obscure construction of which Musa cleverly comments that 
the "break in Francesca's sentence [perhaps was] indicative of a break... in her 
conscience, as with a scratch on a record. "°6 
i. The Fall of the Ideal: Disiato Riso to Bocca 
This kiss resulted in a fall from "innocence", a fall from the ideal to real 
articulated in the movement from disiato riso to bocca. 107 Through comparing herself to 
Lancelot and Guenevere, she idealized herself and Paolo. 108 This physical kiss acts as the 
first step in the destruction of her ideal notion of romantic courtly love, which had thus 
102 "Fiala" (breath) suggesting "breathlessness" brings to mind the violence which with their hearts must 
have been beating. (Durling, p. 98) 
103 Francesca, Paolo and Dante would have read French medieval romances in French. (Poggioli, p. 70; 
Boyde, p. 300). 
'°4 Scolorocci is "a sign of love, `paling' often doubled as pity in romance literature. " Musa, Commentary, 
82) See Vita Nuova. ýös 
"Many times that reading drew our eyes together and changed the colour in our faces, but at one point 
alone it was that mastered us; when we read that the longed-for smile was kissed by so great a lover, he 
who never shall be parted from me, all trembling, kissed my mouth. " 106 Taking into account Francesca's cold, precisely constructed prelude to the kiss versus "Paolo's kiss, 
itself vibrating with passion, we are offered a most incongruous juxtaposition" (Musa, Advent, p. 25), also 
suggesting that something more has happened, particularly as Francesca is in the habit of blaming others. 107 The movement from disiato riso to bocca represents the movement from ideal/ fiction to real (Boyde, p. 
300) as we mentioned previously in the "Venus of Rimini". (Also see Poggioli, p. 62. ) Grandgent (p. 55) 
translates disiato riso as "the worshipped lips. " However, "the desired object, the `object of dreams and 
sighs, '... is not her lips, or even her smiling lips... but the smile itself which is the expression, the poetry, 
the sentiment of the lips-something incorporeal which one sees hovering on the lips as if detached from 
them, which you can see but cannot touch. " (De Sanctis p. 49) Poggioli supports this when he writes, the 
"curved lips of the loved and loving queen lose all physical reality, becoming as light and incorporeal as 
their inviting and wordless smile, tend to give a spiritualized and idealized vision of that imaginary 
embrace. " (Poggioli, p. 62) For this reason according to Masciandaro (p. 99), Roger Dragonetti has 
interpreted disiato riso as "the sign of beatitude-and therefore of paradise" so that "what binds Paolo and 
Francesca is an image of paradise" (Dragonetti, p. 112). 
108 Poggioli, p. 63; for differences see Shapero, Woman, Earthly and Divine, p. 99. 
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far been empowered by an appearance of spirituality, thereby moving the ideal into the 
actual. 109 Courtly love depended upon the fact that the desire experienced would remain 
unfulfilled, dwelling in the imagination and thereby remaining creative involving 
interpetation and complexity. Through the actualization of the kiss they destroyed the 
"creative space"110 and it has been "`filled' by one single image""' so that their love lost 
its romantic, ideal quality, and courtly love degenerated into fol Amor, lust and adultery, 
shattering and showing the falsity of the notion of love, 112 in which henceforth they are 
imprisoned in Hell. 113 
Francesca and Paolo do not get beyond the kiss of Lancelot and Guinevere. 
Francesca focuses on one element or moment, that of the kiss as opposed to seeing it in 
context and thereby seeking to understand the underlying significance of the entire 
passage. "4 "Conquered by a single point in their reading [the sinful kiss], they were 
unable to discover the evolution of the story and its `happy ending' the conversion of 
Lancelot and Guinevere to religious life, as Dante relates in the Convivio" (Masciandaro, 
p. 103). Had they completed the Vulgate Cycle ("a vast early-thirteenth-century prose 
compilation"' 15 which included the Book of Lancelot du Lac), they might have 
envisioned the consequences of their sin. "Lancelot's and Guinevere's adultery (with 
Arthur's incest) eventually [destroyed] the entire Arthurian world... though the lovers 
1°9 Ibid. 
1 10 Masciandaro, p. 102. 
111 Masciandaro, p. 103. 
112 As courtly love depends upon unfulfilled desire for its perpetuation the corresponding love poetry 
reveals an obsession with poetry and the self, "poetry obsessed with itself' (Tambling, Dante and 
Difference, p. 15), having a solipsistic nature. "Only an unfulfilled love can exist within the borders of this 
poetry-since poetry itself is the real desired object". (Menocal, pp. 22-23) Given the nature of this "self- 
enclosed poetry", the contents of this kind of poetry must not be applied to reality and made concrete as 
this would fulfill the narcissistic desire and therefore kill it, by taking its ideas out of the domain of the 
aesthetic and placing them under the scrutiny of the ethical. It is for this reason that Francesca's imitation 
of Guinevere's kiss failed. When Guinevere kissed, it was aesthetic having an idealized spiritualized 
fictional aspect. The moment Francesca took Guinevere's kiss and gave it to Paolo, it entered the ethical 
and was judged and condemned as she had chosen to put into practice the wrong text (Lancelot instead of 
the Bible; Chiampi, p. 65). 
113 "Thus, the undefinable has been `artificially' defined. This is Hell. " (Masciandaro, p. 103) 114 This is of substantial consequence given that her taking of the ideas and poetry of Guinizelli, Cavalcanti 
and Boethius and the section of Lancelot du Lac out of context is precisely what many commentators such 
as De Sanctis and Grandgent do with her in not seeing Canto V in context. They have fallen into her trap 
shown in that they have come to some extent to read as she reads. 
115 Durling, p. 99. 
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themselves repent and die saintly deaths" (Durling, p. 99). 116 This realization might have 
caused them to repent like Lancelot. 117 Tragically, Paolo and Francesca did not read to 
the end of Lancelot, having become "stuck" on the kiss118 and seeing the kiss as an 
absolute, 119 choose to mistake amor for caritas. Thus the kiss made real, not only 
shattered romantic aesthetic illusions but simultaneously incurred ethical judgements 120 $ 
so that they are condemned forever to the kiss, the expression of a false, empty love, 
12' which has become their Hell. 
ii. Who Kissed Whom? 
In Lancelot du Lac, Guinevere, beseeched by Gallehaut to reward Lancelot for his 
loyal service and love, turns and kisses him on the lips (Poggioli, p. 62), or more 
precisely, "Et la roine voit que li chevaliers n'an ose plus faire, si lo prant ele par lo 
menton, si lo baise devant Galehot assez longuement, si que la dame de Malohaut sot que 
ele 16 baise. " (Lancelot do Lac, ed. Kennedy, Non-Cyclic, 348, lines 28-30)122 Given that 
Francesca claims "when we read that the longed-for smile was kissed by so great a lover, 
he who never shall be parted from me, all trembling, kissed my mouth, " she indicates that 
like Lancelot who kissed Guinevere, Paolo kissed her. However as we have just noted, in 
Lancelot du Lac it was Guinevere who kissed Lancelot implying that she kissed Paolo, 
thereby bringing Francesca's account into doubt. 
16 According to the editor of the Non-Cyclic Lancelot do Lac, Elspeth Kennedy (p. vi) "Dante in the 
Inferno refers to Galeotto, which would appear to correspond to the non-cyclic Prose `Lancelot' as opposed 
to the Lancelot-Grail cycle or the Vulgate cycle. " As this "earlier non-cyclic form.. . 
does not include a 
Queste del Saint Graal or a Mort Artu" (p. v) it does not include the repentance of Lancelot and Guinevere 
and therefore might explain why on some level Paolo and Francesca "read no further". However as Dante 
was conscious of their repentance in the Convivio, this argument cannot be valid. The only other possibility 
is that Dante was implying that Paolo and Francesca had read and were misled by the incomplete wrong 
version, the Non-Cyclic as opposed to the Vulgate, which would be a deeply implausible suggestion since 
the possibility does not contribute to this scene. The most promising conclusion to draw is that the version 
does not matter. What is important is that Paolo and Francesca focused upon one moment, as opposed to 
the whole story and ending of Guinevere and Lancelot, and allowed their destinies to be defined by it. 
117 "Truly the knight Lancelot.. . did not wish to enter port with sails full set. [This] noble man indeed 
shortened the sail of [his] worldly [occupation], for in [his] extreme age [he] surrendered [himself] to 
religion, laying aside all worldly delights and pursuits. " (Convivio IV. XXVIII, 60-65) 
"8 Masciandaro, p. 102; also see Singleton, Commentary, p. 94. 
119 Masciandaro, p. 103. 
120 De Sanctis, p. 50. 
121 Musa, Commentary, p. 82. 
122 Also see Toynbee, Specimens of Old French, p. 161-2. 
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Commentators are divided on this issue. Masciandaro (p. 102) suggests that given 
Francesca's confusion as to who kissed first, the moment of this kiss must therefore have 
"immediately preceded or.... immediately followed the thematic point of the kiss" in 
Lancelot. If Francesca and Paolo had stopped reading before the kiss or if their emotions 
completely distracted them from what they were reading, this would be a reasonable not 
to mention realistic possibility. 123 Poggioli thinks Francesca was far more interested in 
the kiss she did receive and reshapes the story to conform with it. 124 Poggioli believes 
that though Paolo did kiss Francesca, as Lancelot kissed back, so Francesca did likewise 
and therefore is not exonerated from responsibility, a position Masciandaro calls a 
"reciprocal seduction". 125 However, most promisingly following on this theme of 
Francesca as seductress, Vinken argues that, in the "light of her imitatio of Guinevere, it 
must have been Francesca who kissed Paolo" and therefore is blamable, 126 and while 
Masciandaro objects that Francesca would not lie in front of Paolo and Dante, 127 Musa is 
convinced that this contradiction could not have been due to careless reading. 128 As in 
Lancelot Guinevere initiates, likewise Francesca kisses Paolo129 though Musa is not sure 
whether her manipulation of the story is due to self-deception13o, "wishful thinking, 
outright lying, or, as is most probable, a very confused state of mind. " (Musa, 
Commentary, p. 82) In support of Musa and to respond further to Masciandaro's 
objection that Francesca would not deceitfully accuse Paolo in his presence, and therefore 
must have kissed her, we must take into account Lancelot's role as knight, hence the 
ethical conflicts inherent in courtly love resulting in the protecting and honouring of his 
Lady. 131 Furthermore, Francesca was introduced as coming from the train of Dido, who 
123 Musa, Advent, p. 27-8. 
'24 Poggioli, p. 71. 
125 Masciandaro, p. 109. 
126 Vinken, `Encore: Francesca da Rimini, ' p. 405, cited by Masciandaro, p. 109. 
'27 Masciandaro, p. 109. 
128 Musa, Advent, p. 27-8. 
129 Musa, Commentary, p. 82; Musa, Advent, p. 28. 
130 Musa, Advent, pp. 28-9; Musa, Commentary, p. 82. 
131 Though I have not found this noted by the commentators, this conflict would explain whether, and if so 
why, Paolo would take the blame and therefore deceive Dante and the reader. As we recall, within courtly 
love there was an internal conflict between love of the Lord and Lady, the knight's allegiance to God and 
his lady (Lewis, Allegory, pp. 17-18). This conflict is exemplified by Lancelot, "la for des cheualiers del 
monde" (the flower of the knighthood of the world) in that due to his guilty love of Guinevere, Lancelot 
"failed in his quest for the Holy Grail. " (For manuscript version of the Lancelot du Lac, see P. Toynbee, 
Dante Studies and Researches, pp. 10-37) (Singleton, Commentary, p. 94) This conflict in Lancelot du Lac, 
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seduced Aeneas, 132 which suggests that Francesca has done likewise, ' 33 showing 
Francesca to be the seductress. 
However, Dante seems to retain an intentionally ambiguous position to keep the 
reader questioning. This forces the reader to weigh the situation back and forth, 
attempting to untie the knot of blame: who is more responsible and who is worse? 
Though this is the same technique with aporiai as we saw Plato use in the Phaedrus, it is 
to different ends. While Plato used the aporia as a means to stimulate thought which 
would lead to and participate in the pursuit of truth, Dante uses aporiai as a trap to close 
down thought while imprisoning the person experiencing the aporia in Hell. Confused by 
Francesca's literary aporia, Dante and the reader, curious and in their puzzled state, 
spend time in the depths of Hell having forgotten where they are and why they are there, 
through having become entirely entwined and enamoured with Francesca and concerned 
in and by her responsibility in this tragedy. This complex reversal acts as an aporia upon 
the reader, a lack of passage, also making Dante the pilgrim bewildered, unsure what to 
think and whom to trust. Because of this aporia, made potent due to our interest in 
Francesca, we participate in Dante's confusion and thereby join with him, through 
compassion and fascination in her guilt, in order that we not be mere passive spectators in 
the descent into Hell, but full participants with stakes of our own, so that the redemption, 
provided that we do not get stuck, be ours as well. 
given that Paolo imitates Lancelot, implies that "within the courtly convention the identification of Paolo 
and Lancelot touches on a further conflict: the difficulty of choosing perfection in the role of the knight or 
lover" (O'Grady, p. 78; also see Shapero, Woman, Earthly and Divine, p. 97). "Within the chivalric code 
Lancelot, in obeying his lady in all things, was departing from knightly duty. It was considered impossible 
that perfection could be achieved as both knight and lover. Paolo too abandons duty and fraternal loyalty in 
order to give himself completely to love" (O'Grady, p. 82). This favouring of the role of lover over that of 
knight would imply that in the name of love for his lady he would deceive, violating his commitment to and 
love for God, the major problem in courtly love. (This conflict we did not see within the pagan myth. Mars 
is both warrior and lover. However with the influence of Christianity in the Middle Ages, instilling a 
system of ethics within Chivalry, a conflict arose with the pagan culture transmitted through the insistence 
in courtly love on the cult ofAmor. ) 
Given this ability to deceive we must now understand why he would deceive. One of the tenets of 
courtly love is enduring the unjust treatment of the midons and "obeying his lady in all things" (O'Grady, 
p. 82). Lancelot obeys Guinevere's orders to lose the joust as a punishment for not mounting the cart 
quickly enough which showed a lack of zeal to serve her. As Lancelot lived according to this twisted 
standard of chivalry set out by courtly love and as Paolo imitated Lancelot, he too would have behaved in 
like fashion. Therefore to protect the name and honour of his midons Francesca, he took the blame. 
'32 Aeneid, Book IV, lines 36-39,60-72,85-91. 
133 Musa, Advent, p. 140. 
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iii. Galeotto 
Francesca turns once more to blame not herself but the text and its maker: "A 
Galeotto was the book and he that wrote it" (Galeotto fu il libro e chi lo scisse) (V, 137). 
The first half of Lancelot du Lac, called the Galehault after the prince who mediated 
between Lancelot and Guinevere 134, indicates that the prince, this part of the book and its 
creator served in differents ways as "their [guides] to love" (Grandgent, p. 55), 
"[fulfilling] the role of making [Francesca and Paolo] aware of their mutual love" 
(Shapero, Woman, Earthly and Divine, p. 97) and acting as a go-between. Because of this 
awareness, "that day we read in it no farther" (quel giorno piü non vi leggemmo avante) 
(V, 138). Poggioli (p. 65) believes "that day" indicates one of many occasions in which 
Paolo and Francesca read the book together, though not sufficiently to be confronted with 
the tragedy and repentance of Guinevere and Lancelot. However Francesca's words 
simultaneously allude to the physical consummation of her love for Paolo (Musa, 
Commentary, p. 83)135 in which they seem to have been imprisoned at the moment of 
death. Given this context, the use of Galeotto shows how Francesca while she still 
idealizes and is seduced by this courtly romantic view of love, simultaneously calls both 
book and its author panderers holding them as responsible for her fall. 
136 However while 
Francesca simultaneously accuses and absolves, 137 her use of Galeotto may further 
indicate an effort to put herself in the best light138 through subtle, eloquent, sophisticated 
rhetoric to distract the pilgrim from her sin. 
However given Francesca's misreadings of Guinizelli, Cavalcanti, Boethius and 
Lancelot du Lac, in which she has taken small sections of the works out of context and 
then has distorted their authors' original ideas to suit her own personal end, following 
these guidelines, any text can become a Galeotto. Francesca's use of Galeotto opens a 
134 At the intervention of Lancelot, Galehault `Roy d'outre les marches' was brought to terms of peace with 
Arthur, and was thereafter a great friend of Lancelot. After Lancelot confided in him concerning his love 
for Guinevere, Galehault acted as intermediary between the two arranging a meeting, encouraging them to 
kiss. (Singleton, Commentary, p. 95; see also Grandgent, p. 55; Sayers, Commentary, p. 103) 
135 "The power of the Old French romance and that of Paolo's kiss happened to find her vulnerable (as they 
might not have found another). " 
136 "Where but in a university, though, could you get to Hell for a misreading? " (Shapero, Knot of Body and 
Soul, p. 97) A good question! 
137 Poggioli, p. 64. 
139 Musa, Commentary, p. 82. 
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debate concerning the responsibility of reading and writing literature. Through blaming 
literature Francesca labels it as (at least in part) an evil, and herself its victim, 139 in 
contrast to Nardi who points out love was already in their hearts, the moment of reading 
providing only the occasion for its expression, 140 which seems to support the Biblical 
reading of sin in Mark 7: 21-23. 
Given this conflict of pathos and ethos, we can deduce that "true poetry, or good 
literature in general, is a deliverer, not a seducer". '4' As in Plato's Phaedrus (260E5-7, 
261A3-5), where ideally rhetoric and poetry must convey the truth, likewise Dante here 
indicates through his own poem that poetry should lead towards the truth, be a deliverer, 
a poros through the aporia as opposed to a seducer, rhetoric purely for the art of 
persuasion with no concern for the truth (Phaedrus 259E5-260A5,272D, E), 
"[pandering] to passion instead of sobering it". 142 Dante in short uses Francesca to 
express his critique of irresponsible literature and to exemplify its consequences and 
thereby to judge it. 143 
In so doing, however the question remains as to whether Dante like Plato in the 
Republic and the Phaedrus does not fall under his own condemnation of literature, an 
issue of which Dante is keenly aware and which he dramatizes through the fainting 
pilgrim. 144 "Dante's own text.. . does not simply claim the privileged position of 
demystifying `romantic' lies; it acknowledges itself as part of the unavoidable 
139 Boyde (p. 300) notes that for Francesca, and through her Dante, the act of reading of love prose and 
verse has become an evil. Dante indicates this through showing the values of the literature of courtly love 
applied or put into practice in the lives of Francesca and Paolo, "non-knights ... 
[to illustrate] more 
powerfully than legend the dangers to their own society of that kind of love" (Shapero, Woman, Earthly 
and Divine, p. 99; Mazzota, Dante, Poet of the Desert, p. 166. ). Because of this influence or according to 
Mazzota "possessed by literature", Chiampi (p. 68) calls them "victims of literature". 
'40 Nardi, "Filosofa dell'Amore", p. 91. 
141 Cambon, p. 52. 
142 Ibid. 
143 Poggioli, pp. 76-77; also Cambon, p. 46, note. 
144 Concerning the line, `Galeotto fu il libro e chi lo scisse, ' "Francesco D'Ovidio writes [Nuovi Studii 
Danteschi, H (Milan, 1907), p. 531], the poet confesses his horrified feeling at the thought that he too 
`could become a Gallehaut to somebody else'. " (Poggioli, p. 76-77) As Francesca's tercets echo not only 
Guinizelli but the Vita Nuova's "Love and the gentle heart are one thing" as we previously discussed, the 
pilgrim may have swooned because he "belongs as poet and lover specifically to the category of amorous 
transgressors... [Therefore] the enormity of his future task looms before him together with the 
misdemeanors of the past. " (Shapero, Knot of Body and Soul, p. 97; also Boyde, p. 281. ) Though Poggioli 
(pp. 76-77) thinks "there is no reason for such fear, since that line helps to destroy the very suggestion on 
which it is built", Mazzota (Dante, Poet of the Desert, p. 169) is more realistic: Dante "faints in the intense 
awareness, furthermore, that he, as an author, might trap the readers into the illusory self-enclosure of the 
romance, just as the stilnovistic poetry, which Francesca quotes in her speech, trapped her". 
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ambiguities of the language of desire" (Poggioli, pp. 76-77). One cannot help but 
sympathize with Dante's dilemma and consider that his critique of literature has some 
weight not only in its judgment on himself but moreover on the writer of this thesis. 
However the writer of texts, particularly one addressing the ambiguous subject of desire, 
is always vulnerable to misunderstanding and misappropriation, though it remains a 
question to what extent he or she is responsible for the errors of his or her readers, 
particularly of readers like Francesca. 
iv. Paolo Weeping 
Faced with this self-willed unity in which two have "become one flesh" (Genesis 
2: 24), condemned to remain inseparable eternally, "while the one spirit said this the other 
wept so that for pity I swooned as if in death and dropped like a dead body". (Meutre the 
1'uno spirto questo disse, 1'altro piangea, sl the di pietade io venni men cosi com' io 
morisse; e caddi come corpo morto cade; V, 139-142) Echoing the pilgrim's tears over 
the pain of Francesca, ("Francesca, your torments make me weep for grief and pity"; Inf. 
V, 116-117, Masciandaro p. 105), Dante is so moved and deeply upset that he swoons 
("as if in death"; Inf. V, 141). 15 This swoon clearly is "a mimetic response" 
(Masciandaro, p. 104) a "symbolic death [imitating] Francesca's (death-bringing) 
surrender to passion" (Durling, p. 99). For a few moments the pilgrim "becomes thus the 
equal of Paolo; and even of Lancelot, who for a while seems to swoon himself, while 
talking with the Queen of his still unrewarded love. In this brief moment, Dante himself 
is but a creature of pathos, a victim of pity and self-pity, like Paolo and Lancelot. " 
(Poggioli, p. 74) 146 
145 In contrast to Poggioli (p. 74) who believes that Dante fainted at Francesca's last words, O'Grady (p. 
82) thinks that Dante is reacting to Paolo's tears when he faints. Following the line in which they speak "as 
one may that weeps in telling" they are viewed as one being to represent a corrupted state of self-willed 
matrimony, "two becoming one flesh" (Genesis 2: 24). Given that after the Fall from Eden man was to rule 
over woman (Your husband "will rule over you"; Genesis 3: 16), to be dominated by Francesca seems part 
of Paolo's punishment; he has no escape from her which in itself seems cause for tears. This reversal of 
roles is culturally instantiated by the domination of the midons over the knight in courtly love which Paolo 
and Francesca are here not only imitating but now embodying for eternity. 
146 See also Brandeis, p. 34; Durling, p. 99. 
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However, he is not fully like Paolo, an embodiment of pathos; the mimesis is not 
total as this would "[negate] transformation and transcendence" (Masciandaro, p. 105). 
This ingredient of ethos, an awareness of ethics, implies judgment and justice which 
produces fear. Thus his fainting is a mixture of the identical pathos he feels for Paolo 
which is undercut by the terror he feels caused by the recognition of the judgment made 
upon himself and the punishment he deserves, echoing Augustine's critique of the 
Aeneid. 147 Through recognizing he has fallen unwittingly and the consequences of his 
errors, Dante loses consciousness. 
This is a moment that distinguishes Paolo and Dante. Paolo feels sorrow and self- 
pity and is inconsolable, frozen in death. In contrast Dante expresses regret for this 
pathos, his identification with and imitation of Francesca and Paolo, such as Augustine 
felt for Dido, which leads to repentance. Thus Dante the poet, through his implicit 
critique of the literature of courtly love calling both writer and text panderer, echoes 
Augustine's Christian/Neo-Platonic critique of the Aeneid in the Confessions concerning 
Dido, who was later considered to embody features of courtly love (Lewis, Allegory, p. 
41). Though making judgments on and censuring these elements of pathos, pity and self- 
pity (which Plato likewise censured in the Republic), both Dante and Augustine are 
ultimately led out of the Hell of their passions to ascend to God which is life (2 
Corinthians 7: 10-11). Taking this into consideration, "the pilgrim's pity, which will 
frequently figure in the rest of Hell, is presented as highly questionable. " (Durling, p. 
99)148 
141 Reacting to the echo of Paolo's tears, Dante feels self-pity and regret echoing Augustine's repentance of 
his devotion to the Dido of the Aeneid, turning to God. "What can be more pitiful than an unhappy wretch 
unaware of his own sorry state, bewailing the fate of Dido, who died for love of Aeneas, yet shedding no 
tears for himself as he dies for want of loving you?... But I did not love you. I broke my thoth with you and 
embraced another...! did not weep over this, but instead I wept for Dido, who surrendered her life to the 
sword. " (Augustine, Confessions, trans. R. S. Pine-Coffin, Book I, 13). Like Dante weeping for Paolo and 
Francesca, Augustine wept for Dido and thereby became an example of pathos. "Augustine's tears for Dido 
find a correlate in Dante's grief: `Francesca, I tuoi martin/ a langrimar mifanno tristo e pio... " (II. 116- 
7)" (Mazzota, Dante, Poet of the Desert, p. 168-70). Yet Augustine recognizes that he should have been 
weeping for himself because having succumbed to pathos and pity, he fell under ethical judgment. He was 
separated from God as he loved the creation more than the Creator. Rather than loving God which leads to 
life, Augustine loved physical encounters exemplified by Dido which leads to death. Parallel with this point 
in the Confessions when Augustine judges and condemns himself for his worldliness, likewise the pilgrim 
faints in horror that he too has fallen into the trap. 
148 However Brandeis (p. 181) argues, "Dante has less pity for the damned the deeper he goes into Hell. " 
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5. FALLING FOR EVE 
The role of Francesca in the Commedia is to seduce the Pilgrim. As seductress 
Dante portrays Francesca as a siren, '49 a beautiful woman who by "poetic utterances, like 
their songs.. . casts the spells". 
'5° She accomplishes her seduction leading to her 
downfall, '5' drawing first Paolo then Dante into her sin of passion, the subjugation of 
reason by desire, through the extraordinary beauty of her words/speech, which marks the 
rift between the aesthetic and ethics. 
Though the physical appearance of Francesca is never described, her personality 
and charm are obvious through her speech which is intricately constructed, passionate 
and real. From the speech she has such great appeal that De Sanctis considers Francesca 
to be Dante's "ideal woman". 152 The pilgrim is so fascinated and touched by her as a 
unique "individual lady" 153 that he is virtually blind to her sin though from a certain point 
of view she is "the incarnation of lust unrepentant". 
154 Like a Siren it is precisely 
Francesca's verbal expression, "the elegant words of the literary-minded Francesca" that 
made the pilgrim susceptible to her seduction and, as the pilgrim is the "younger self of 
the poet", Dante the poet also (Musa, Commentary, p. 83). 
This opposition of the aesthetic beauty of Francesca versus her ethical depravity, 
while paradoxical, reflected by the "apparent divergence in her episode between its 
undoubtedly Christian ethics and the astonishing beauty of its representation of courtly 
forms", '55 functions as the means by which the seduction is successful. She attracts Paolo 
and Dante through surface beauty like a siren upon which they become fixated and are 
149 See also Chiampi, p. 78; also Shapero, Woman, Earthly and Divine, p. 91; for Dante's view of women 
also see p. 85. 
150 Barker, 2002. In this way the Siren of Purgatory is present in the figure of Francesca in Inferno V, like 
those in the Odyssey XII, 158-9, "whose singing lured unwary sailors" to their deaths. 
ls' Musa, Advent, p. 34. 
152 De Sanctis, pp. 36-9. 
153 Musa, Advent, p. 34. 
154 Musa, Advent, p. 34; also see Musa, Commentary, pp. 83-84. Dante chooses Francesca to be 
unrepentant, (Boyde, p. 297; Brandeis, p. 32) and unaware of her sin (Brandeis, p. 24) in contrast with 
Buonconte da Montefeltro (Purgatorio V, 101) who at the last minute repents and is saved, in order to 
critique courtly love (Shapero, Woman, Earthly and Divine, p. 102). 
155 Shapero, Woman, Earthly and Divine, p. 96; also Chiampi, p. 51. 
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then led astray, pulled through their sensibility to aesthetic pleasure from the path of the 
ethical. 
In her role as seductress, 156 Francesca acts as an Eve-figure. 157 Like Eve 
"introducing" sin to the world, "Dante has given [the Paolo and Francesca episode] the 
function of introducing the protagonist to the realm of sin". 158 Reminiscent of Eve 
(Genesis 3: 8), Francesca tries to recreate this garden, a "second innocence", 159 a second 
marriage this time with Paolo while refusing to acknowledge the sin in this gesture 
(adultery and incest), hence the presence of evil in the garden. 
160 Pretending this love, 
amor, is good and feeding this fruit to Paolo, she causes both to be ripped from life. Then 
through Francesca as figura Eva, Dante is tempted and falls like Adam through the 
subjugation of his reason to desire. His fall however is not out of passion for Francesca as 
in the case of Paolo but due to the compassion he feels for them. 161 Yet this compassion 
results from the fact that he is touched and affected by their passion, as he feels with them 
and is progressively more attracted to and lured into it, his "ethos and fear" 
diminishing162 so he is tempted as a sinner163 and falls into sin-164 Thus as Adam fell for 
Eve, and Paolo for Francesca, so Dante falls for Francesca, a temptation and fall which 
ultimately extends and involves us. 165 
156 This brings into question Dante's vision of women. Shapero (Woman, Earthly and Divine, pp. 79-80) 
sees his vision of the seductress as not limited to Francesca but concerning all women. Bergin ("The 
Women of the Comedy", p. 71) thinks that, given "the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries were still a man's 
world", the only classification for women involves love. However, in contrast to Bergin Carroll thinks 
"Francesca has the mournful distinction of being the only Christian woman in the Inferno" his "worship of 
Mary, Beatrice and Lucia" indicating his "reverence for" and belief in the greater good in Womanhood. 
(Carroll, p. 92) 
157 Musa, Advent, pp. 34-5,137; also see Musa, Commentary, pp. 83-4. 
iss Shapero, Woman, Earthly and Divine, p. 96. 
159 By negating the tragic, Paolo and Francesca fail to experience the transfiguring, redeeming power of 
tragic vision" (Masciandaro, p. 62). However, in this negation of the tragic lies the tragedy, making them 
tragic figures. 
160 This falling is caused by sin which is peche (hamartia: missing the mark in archery; missing the good), 
indicative of evil which finds its source for the medieval Christian in the Garden of Eden. See Roger 
Dragonetti, "L'Episode de Francesca dans le cadre de la convention courtoise, " p. 94. 
161 "Although caused by sentimental participation rather than by moral complicity, his fall parallels their 
fall. " (Poggioli, p. 66) 
162 Masciandaro, p. 69. 
163 Musa, Advent, p. 35. Here reenacting "the Fall [is] a prerequisite for his journey to God (and 
redemption)" (Musa, Commentary, p. 83-4). 
164 Dante imitates and intensifies the action through "alliteration, assonance, and , especially 
here, rhythm" 
(Musa, Commentary, p. 83-4). 
165 This temptation extends beyond Dante to involve us. While the sinners theologically for Dante should 
"arouse no pity" but judgement, as human beings we feel for them (Grandgent, p. 47). While pity and 
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Francesca's role as Eve is further emphasized in that she refuses to take personal 
responsibility for her sin. Francesca rehearses both Adam's and Eve's refusal to take 
responsibility in Genesis. Adam blames God and Eve, "The woman you put here with 
me-she gave me some fruit from the tree and I ate it" (Genesis 2: 12), and Eve turns to 
blame the serpent: "The serpent deceived me and I ate" (Genesis 2: 14). Likewise, 
Francesca blames Amor, Paolo, God, Gianciotto, poets of the Dolce Stil Nuovo, the writer 
and text of Lancelot du Lac, and others, for her damnation; everyone but herself. 
Therefore Francesca ties together the responses of both Adam and Eve, as she and Paolo 
are tied together, being fully blameworthy. 
In building her own paradise, an imperfect or fallen imitation of the first myth, 166 
a pattern which we saw in "The Venus of Rimini" with regard to the myth of Mars and 
Venus, Francesca has willed her own ideal love at the centre of her world, her own dream 
and paradise. However in reformulating the true paradise according to her individual 
desires, creating not only her own personal myth but a sphere or bubble separated from 
but within the whole of God's universe, she has distorted and falsified the true paradise 
and separated herself from God. As she refused before her death to recognize her fall, her 
sin, and her need of redemption, her fiction in that it rivals, parodies and eclipses God's 
creation proves entirely destructive, 167 resulting in her damnation. 
However given that Francesca created her own paradise, denying evil which acts 
as the myth or central mystery of the cult of Francesca, there emerges a sense that things 
could have been otherwise. 168 As the infernal imitation points to its opposite, so an 
wishing her free of Hell is normal, "if the reader thinks that she ought not to be in Hell, that is another 
matter: Dante is telling us not what he thinks ought to be, but what he thinks is. " (Brandeis, p. 32; also see 
p. 26; Cambon, p. 46; Croce, p. 111; critiques of De Sanctis by Poggioli, p. 75 and Nardi, "Filosofia 
deli 'Amore", pp. 88-89) Nonetheless, identifying ourselves with their "love-longing", their passion which 
we likewise feel, we are moved to pity and even compassion. So as before a Siren "if we do not block our 
ears and eyes, we shudder simultaneously, for we hear the inevitable storm headed our way" (Brandeis, p. 
27), which ultimately causes us through our identification with them to fall into temptation and like Dante 
to fall. 
'66 Masciandaro, pp. 78-9. 
167 Masciandaro, p. 100. 
168 "The very fact that it is an infernal scene, whose character bears some proportion with the nature of both 
the sin and the punishment of the two lovers, calls into being its opposite, a paradisal scene, or its 
equivalent. It is too simplistic to say that the pilgrim idealizes the two lovers and their love, seeing them 
increasingly as attractive, sympathetic figures. It is more accurate to speak of a mimetic response to them 
and to their setting or scene, whereby he gradually moves into their world, analogously experiencing what 
they have experienced and now continue to experience: a love whose power and whose form proved and 
now proves to be a false, destructive imitation of the recovery of the paradisal, edenic state and, 
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"adulteration of caritas" suggests true caritas. Had Francesca chosen to participate in the 
universe of God (rather than building her own) and had the object of Francesca's desires 
been spiritual as opposed to carnal, she could have returned to Eden (Purgatorio 
XXVIII), and ultimately gone to Paradise (see the third Heaven, Venus, of Paradiso 
VIII). This evocation in Hell of Paradise, exemplified through the simile of the doves 
referring both to lussuria and a sign from God of the Holy Spirit, shows that "the infernal 
scene lives side by side with the paradisal scene in irreconcilable opposition". 169 This in 
turn points to a freedom of choice as to not only destiny, whether Heaven or Hell (apart 
from Dante's notion of grace), but the identity of the individual which determines the 
destiny. The invocation of the paradisal is echoed by the invocation in Francesca of the 
possibility of Beatrice. 170 She could have been like Beatrice, the aporia or lack of passage 
(of Hell) could have been the poros (resource or "pathway" to Heaven), a point which we 
will examine in the next chapter. Of consequence here however is that Francesca could 
have chosen otherwise, could have gone to Heaven, could have been like Beatrice, and 
this acts as a judgment upon her and a condemnation of her. 
Considering the Canto as a whole, we have seen how regardless of the extreme 
beauty of the text and Francesca's intoxicating charm, nonetheless Dante presents 
Francesca in a very negative light, showing that his major concern remains the conflict of 
correspondingly, an adulteration of caritas. In other words, in Paolo's and Francesca's inordinate love there 
is an ambivalence which makes it appear as true love, directed to the ultimate good. " (Masciandaro, p. 78) 
169 Masciandaro, p. 78. 
170 Shapero suggests the like when she writes, "The loveliness of Francesca's form tells us only that it 
would have been worthy of use in the service of virtue. But as a symbol of her principal delight and Paolo's 
it became unworthy and was taken from her. She is the outward semblance of the angelic lady in every 
respect but one. Pride and lust move her to action that is self-assertive and concupiscent. In action she 
broke the physical and spiritual unity of the Lady and descended to the moral level of pura femmina. 
Among her punishments was the deprivation of bella persona. But just as Dante never defamed the art that 
created her prototype he did not turn her into a monster. She speaks in the refined accents proper to the 
ambiance she represents. Morally condemned without reprieve, aesthetically a part of her is accorded 
leniency. Dante apparently had no wish to destroy the `beautiful form' of love poetry; yet the need to 
condemn its message is evident. Francesca is a warning to all who would transform the Lady into a 
Woman, and she is as such the embodiment and summary rejection of courtly love. " (Shapero, Woman, 
Earthly and Divine, p. 106) 
This positive possibility open to Francesca is represented by Francis of Assisi in Paradiso who, 
aside from sharing the same name, is also of aristocratic birth prior to joining the religious orders and 
furthermore possessed a great love for the tradition of the courts and chivalry. "The saint, whose very name 
indicates how fashionable the French culture was, and who sang in French when jolly, liked to name his 
companions after the characters in the Round Table, and [his] followers were nicknamed ioculatores 
domini (minstrels of the Lord). " (Brand and Pertile, Cambridge History, p. 5) Francis can be understood to 
be the redeemed masculine version of Francesca. 
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aesthetics and ethics. The intricate, fascinating and captivating depiction of Francesca is 
expressed not only in her beautiful, passionate language but also through Dante's use of 
pagan and Christian myth, expressed as her creation of her own myth marking the 
moment of her making and undoing. The expressiveness by which this myth is recounted 
and her appropriation of different literary techniques and theories of love to express 
herself, regardless of getting them wrong or misusing them, contribute to the most 
exquisite portrayal of any individual in the Commedia, which captivates the heart of all 
who read Canto V, at least for a moment. She wins us over because we love her, we 
relate to her desires and struggles and we are horrified by her punishment. Upon no other 
figure except, possibly, Beatrice, has Dante lavished so much attention or so exquisitely 
laboured with the complexities of myth and Biblical story, literary forms and philosophy, 
to represent with delicate eloquence a single soul. For this reason, taken together with 
Canto V's aesthetic unity, many commentators have seen Canto V as separate entity from 
the rest of the Commedia. However, as we have shown it is a part of the whole, a part- 
and soul-being condemned by the rest, showing ethics, as enforced through the choice 
of myth and Biblical'story, to triumph, hence Francesca's negative representation. 
This negativity is initially hidden by the beauty of the text and its portrayal of 
courtly love. However, through Dante's use of Classical myth as seen in "The Venus of 
Rimini", and through his implementation of the Fall of man in Genesis, which in this 
chapter "Falling for Francesca" simultaneously marks out medieval Christianity's 
conflict with and judgement upon courtly love, Dante shows how much appearances 
deceive. She who could have been part of Heaven, chose her personal heaven which 
became her hell, making Francesca the first substantial marker and trap of Hell recalling 
the words above the gate of Hell, "Abandon every hope, ye that enter" (Canto III, 9). 
Here we too hear the tears of Paolo, validating Minos' ambiguous warning (V, 19-20) to 
be careful of that in which we put our trust, hinting that Dante and we ourselves should 
not trust the words of Francesca. Furthermore, given this reading of Francesca, which 
shows through "The Venus of Rimini" the lovers' togetherness to be part of their 
punishment and Francesca to be a degraded finite image of the pagan goddess Venus, and 
how in "Falling for Francesca" she represents Eve, causing men to fall to their deaths, it 
seems just to conclude that this canto, regardless of its exquisite beauty, was not written 
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as a tribute to Francesca's family as De Sanctis (p. 34) {and Foscolo}, Carrol (p. 95) 
Grandgent (p. 47-8) and so many others have thought. Instead it represents an 
exemplification of and judgment upon uncontrolled earthly Bros/cupiditas which, causing 
the rift between the aesthetic and ethics, preys upon and overtakes the individual, 
destroying and corrupting all beauty within them regardless of appearances, and 
ultimately for Dante leaves them despairing, impoverished and imprisoned in Hell. 
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XII. BEATRICE AS POROS 
Turning back for a moment to our discussion of courtly love, it will be recalled 
that within the conflict of Christianity and courtly love, though the poet knows it to be 
unrighteous, the midons is raised above God, thus violating on some level the poet's 
conscience. Given this trespass, many of the Troubadours became religious at the end of 
their lives so, as Singleton ("From Love to Caritas", p. 65) writes, "recantation... became 
part of the tradition. " We have seen how Francesca imbibed and internalized the notions 
of courtly love so that she became a full articulation of them and their conflict with 
Christianity. As she is a seductress leading Paolo, Dante and the reader astray, away from 
God, so courtly love seduces its followers, causing them to abandon what Dante believed 
to be the true religion, Christianity, to follow false religion ("myth, " 2 Timothy 4: 4), its 
pagan parody. This seduction or fall is enacted by Dante falling into the trap of 
Francesca, which as we have seen is condemned and ends in death, dramatized by the 
pilgrim fainting, thereby showing Dante's condemnation of courtly love. Yet as with the 
tradition of the Troubadours in which recantation is part of the tradition of courtly love, 
so Dante is shown to repent. Though the journey up Mount Purgatory reveals a desire to 
repent and to restore his relation with God, only at the top of Mount ' Purgatory 
(Purgatorio, XXX, XXXI), when Beatrice reemerges and rebukes Dante severely, is he 
brought to recant fully his past actions and views on love. For this reason my discussion 
of Beatrice will first centre upon her rebuke of Dante. While prioritizing and adhering to 
Christianity and condemning courtly love, elements of the tradition of courtly love are 
redeemed and brought into accord with Christianity. In so doing, in contrast to his 
predecessors, through the figure of Beatrice, who unlike Francesca remains idealized, 
Dante seems to some extent to have achieved a resolution of the conflict of Christianity 
and courtly love. 
We have thus far examined Dante's seduction by Francesca, which enacts his fall 
from "innocence", thus placing her as an Eve-figure. We shall now turn to the moment 
after his arduous climb up the mountain of Purgatory when, having entered the Earthly 
Paradise, he encounters Beatrice. Beatrice his first love served from his youth to cultivate 
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in him the pursuit of virtue, transforming his ordinary life into a new life until her death, 
at which time Dante abandoned his spiritual path of virtue. Given that Beatrice, out of 
concern for Dante's soul, descended into Hell to plead with Virgil to act as Dante's guide 
(Inferno II) through Hell and up the mountain of Purgatory, and given that Beatrice takes 
over the role of guide from Virgil, bringing Dante to repentance and overseeing the 
enactment of the process of Christian conversion described in Acts 2: 36-8, she is the 
antithesis of Francesca. This is true in both the pagan sense as representing heavenly 
Venus, and with regard to Christianity as a representative of Christ, an expression of 
God's caritas. Rather than leading Dante astray, her function is to lead him to 
reconciliation with God and salvation. Through examining Dante's encounter with 
Beatrice in Purgatorio XXX and XXXI, we shall identify her role as the instrument of 
God leading to Dante's salvation, poros, a "way or passage, " to God, as opposed to the 
lack, penia, or privation of good leading Dante away from God into the aporia or lack of 
way in which Francesca finds herself in Hell, the ultimate state of penia. Beatrice is 
furthermore a poros-figure according to the third meaning of the term, the Plotinian 
meaning of poros as "resource, wealth and abundance" from Heaven as reinterpreted by 
Christianity, God pouring out his love upon Dante. But further, through displaying the 
structure of Purgatorio XXX with regard to the Aeneid which leads, at the end of XXX 
and in XXXI to an exemplifying of a biblical conversion whereby heavenly eros is 
converted to caritas, we shall observe an undermining of the Francesca of Inferno V in a 
way that serves to demonstrate the opposition of two loves, one a sinful carnal love and 
the other, Dante's love of Beatrice, which focuses upon virtue and righteousness, 
ultimately transcending heavenly eros to caritas which motivates and supports Dante in 
his pursuit of God, bringing him to redemption. Given this opposition, Dante will recant 
his love of Francesca ultimately for his love of Beatrice leading to God. 
The Transition "From Love to Caritas" 
Given this dichotomy of love in which Francesca embodies the penia of cupiditas 
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while Beatrice exemplifies the poros of caritas, 
l and given that Francesca could have 
been a Beatrice, we shall briefly turn, in order to make the transition from our discussion 
of Francesca to Beatrice, to the Vita Nuova which, as Singleton illustrates, marks out the 
transition "From Love to Caritas". 2 
This transition between eros and caritas is marked out in the Vita Nuova where 
Dante's love for Beatrice, which initially begins as a penia-dominant form of eros 
(though not entirely so3), transforms into a poros-dominant form of love, caritas, so that 
love of Beatrice leads to the contemplation of God. Holmes (p. 11) notes that the initial 
conception of love in the Vita Nuova resembles courtly love and the "early phase of 
courtly love poetry ' .4 However he holds Dante's later notion of love in the same period 
to be Cavalcantian, reducing Dante to "fainting, illness and almost death", which 
degenerates further to obsession and moral indifference aligned with Francesca's type of 
love. Nardi (Filosofia dell'Amore, p. 58) believes that Dante in the Convivio 
acknowledged that his love for Beatrice was initially the lower type of love. 
Dante's love of Beatrice, however, changes. Holmes (p. 12) notes the transition 
from a negative destructive form of love to one of praise and adoration of Beatrice, "so 
wonderful on earth that heaven craved her presence", leading to virtue which caused the 
poet to rise to heaven where she is enthroned. More precisely and informatively Singleton 
marks out this change through Amor. He notes that though Amor initially is represented 
as a personification, shortly before the death of Beatrice personified Amor makes his 
farewell by saying, "And whoever should consider subtly would call that Beatrice Love 
because of the great resemblance which she has to me" (Vita Nuova XXIV), 5 after which 
Beatrice replaces Amor and through her death directs Dante towards heaven. Though 
Dante initially chooses not to follow, her death marks the transition between amor and 
caritas as the passionate desire of amor is redirected and transformed into caritas through 
the grace of God, so at this point, as Singleton points out, following the tradition of 
recantation in the poetry of the Troubadours, Dante recants the amor of the courtly love 
' Cambon, p. 55. 
2 Also see Cambon, pp. 55-56. 
3 This conception of eros is not entirelypenia-dominant in that it ultimately transforms into caritas. 
° See also Menocal, Writing in Dante's Cult of Truth, pp. 33-34. 
5 Singleton, "From Love to Caritas" p. 57. 
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tradition for the Christian understanding that God is love, caritas. Yet as she enabled 
Dante to make this transition and, as we shall see, returns to help him, Beatrice is herself 
viewed as a miracle and gift from God, "a bearer of beatitude , 7, a channel or poros of 
God's abundant love to Dante which leads him back to God. 8 
6 Singleton, "From Love to Caritas", p. 75. 
Singleton, "From Love to Caritas", pp. 76-7. 
8 This synthesis of eros and agape in caritas shows Dante's adherence to the Augustinian notion of caritas 
in which desire for God is given by God while not being fully distinguished from the, arguably acquisitive, 
desire for God as supreme good. 
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BEATRICE AS HEAVENLY VENUS 
Upon meeting Dante in the earthly Paradise, Beatrice sharply demands, "How 
durst thou approach the mountain? Didst thou not know that here man is happy? " (XXX, 
74-5) These questions in conjunction with Beatrice's harshness have excited considerable 
dispute among commentators but when clearly understood indicate a parallel with 
Aeneas' encounter with his mother Venus in Aeneid I, 384-406, suggesting that like 
Francesca, Beatrice is also a Venus figure though of a heavenly maternal sort. 
In order more fully to understand Beatrice's question we must turn to this section 
of the Aeneid which Dante employed, in order to understand his intentions. In Aeneid I, 
384 amidst Aeneas' sorrow and moaning concerning the devastation of Troy, his personal 
loss and hardship implying that the gods are not with him, Venus disguised as a huntress 
aggressively interrupts him.. `But Venus chose to hear no more complaints and broke in, 
midway through his bitterness: `Whoever you are, I doubt Heaven is unfriendly to you, as 
you still breath life-giving air on your approach to the Tyrian town"' after which she tells 
him that his friends and ships are safely in or entering port, indicating that the gods have 
protected and preserved him so he should be happy. 
Our examination of Purgatorio XXX will note the parallels with Aeneid I as they 
arise and explore their implications for the interpretation of the Canto. Such parallels 
include a female divine-figure of love represented through the mixing of erotic and divine 
images, the covering of one's identity through veil or disguise, the ability to discern this 
identity, present discontent due to the past and a firm "maternal" rebuke. Though no 
individual element alone demonstrates a significant correspondence between Beatrice and 
the Venus of Aeneid I, when all the elements are taken together the cumulative effect is 
powerful. Ultimately, these parallels throw an instructive light on the person and 
behaviour of Beatrice, both here and in the Commedia more generally. 
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i. A Divine Figure of Love Represented Through the Mixing of Erotic and 
Divine Imagery 
Given that Venus is the goddess of love and beauty, her representation mixes 
erotic imagery of physical beauty with spiritual/divine imagery. "Her nape shone, her 
ambrosial hair exhaled Divine perfume, her gown rippled full length, and by her stride 
she showed herself a goddess" (Aeneid, I, 401-3). This indicates that her beauty is 
derived from a heavenly source and simultaneously this further indicates a 
spiritualization of desire. 
Similarly Beatrice, while maintaining her Christian identity and imagery, likewise 
coming from heaven, arrives evoking a mixture of erotic and divine imagery, causing and 
articulating the spiritualization of desire. Following the arrival in the Earthly Paradise of 
the imagistic "pageant of revelation" (Sinclair, p. 377)9, the pageant passes and one of the 
"truthful company"(XXX, 10) of elders, probably Solomon10, "like a messenger from 
heaven, called three times, singing: Veni, sponsa, de Libano (Come, bride, from 
Lebanon)" (XXX, 10-11) echoing "Come bride from Lebanon" of Song of Songs 4: 8. As 
the Song of Songs is a passionate love poem full of sensual/sexual imagery, perhaps by 
Solomon, probably concerning himself and his bride, but reinterpreted as Dante would 
have understood it by the church fathers to describe Christ's relationship with the church 
as the image of the soul espoused to Christ, ' this is therefore appropriate with regard to 
soon-to-be-arriving Beatrice. Beatrice, who evoked passionate bewilderment, stupor and 
fainting in his youth and continues to do so in Purgatorio XXX, 33-48, Dante now sees 
as a blessed soul, embodying God's grace, likened to Christ, sent as his only means of 
salvation, enacting the way Christ saves the church. The reclad voices singing Hallelujah 
9 See also Williams, The Figure of Beatrice, p. 177. 10 Singleton, Commentary, pp. 729-30. 
I1 This suggests that the soul coming who is Dante's old love Beatrice, who represents Christ and is going 
to be reunited with Dante, will oversee the wedding of Dante and Christ, Dante's conversion. Singleton 
reinforces this reading by reference to the later image of the crowning of Dante by the Muses infusing 
virtue in Purgatorio XXXI, echoing "Come from Lebanon, come and you shall be crowned". However this 
simultaneously suggests that the soul coming is wedded to Christ, indicating that Beatrice symbolizes the 
Church. Though Singleton (Commentary, p. 730) disagrees with this on the grounds that the Church, the 
sponsa in the orthodox interpretation, is already represented by the chariot, nevertheless, as the chariot 
carries one of its members to Dante, it is implicit that she is either the Church or the Spirit of the Church, 
the Bride of Christ herself. In this double role she fulfills two aspects of Christian life, being reunited with 
God, the bride of Christ herself, while also helping others to be reconciled with God. (Matthew 28: 18-20) 
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emphasizing this salvatory role12 "[rise] up on the divine chariot", pointing back to the 
basterna of Solomon in Song of Songs 3: 7-10.13 This indicates the mixing of desire of/ 
attraction of the daughters of Israel for Solomon (3: 11) with the Church's desire for 
Christ, 14 suggesting Dante's anticipation and passionate spiritualized longing for the 
arrival of Beatrice. Though suggesting an ambiguity in the nature of the desire, this 
desire, unlike that of Francesca's eros, is curbed to spiritual ends as exemplified by the 
change in Dante's love for Beatrice from amor to caritas, which Singleton demonstrates 
with reference to the Vita Nuova, 15 a change which Nardi notes as involving a form of 
recantation. 16 
In Purgatorio and Paradiso Dante describes the redeemed Beatrice, who evokes 
Amor in the Vita Nuova XXIV, 17 as an expression of God's caritas for him and the 
representative of Christ. In announcing Beatrice's arrival the ministers of eternal 
life/angels cry "Benedictus qui venis", and, throwing flowers, "Manibus o date lilib 
plenis". "Benedictus qui venis" means "Blessed are Thou that comest", which echoes 
Matthew 21: 49, the moment when Christ enters into Jerusalem, the throwing of flowers 
suggesting the strewing of palms before Christ. Through Beatrice, Christ comes to Dante; 
"Benedictus qui venis" refers not to Beatrice but Christ" as is later demonstrated by the 
reflection of the dual nature of Christ in her eyes (Purgatorio XXXI), so that the pageant 
12 This role is emphasized in the following lines in which, to the "voice of so great an elder", "a hundred of 
ministers and messengers of eternal life" (II Thess. 1: 7; see Singleton Commentary, pp. 732-733. ) are 
compared to "the blessed.. .. [rising] at the last trump each eager 
from his tomb", at the last judgement (John 
5: 28). "The reclad voices singing Hallelujah" (XXX, 15), evoke the victory of Christ over death, and 
images of salvation such as Revelation 14: 1: "And after those things I heard a great voice of much people 
in Heaven, saying, Alleluia" (Singleton, Commentary, p. 731; Grandgent, Commentary, p. 583). 
13 A basterna is a covered adorned vehicle lined in fabric and drawn by two animals used to carry 
aristocratic ladies on journeys (see Singeton Commentary, pp. 731-2). As this basterna carrying Beatrice is 
drawn by the dual nature of Christ, this image indicates the merging of Christianity with courtly love in 
Beatrice as both the midons and the representative of God. 
14 See Moore, "The Reproaches of Beatrice", Third Series, pp. 251-252 note on Purg. XXXI (p. 352 on 
? arallel from life of Bishop Ken). 
s Singleton, "From Love to Caritas". 
16 Nardi, "Filosophia del Amore, p. 58. 
"Also see Vita Nuova, I-Il. 
'$ Rather than "Blessed is He who cometh" Dante writes "Blessed are Thou that comest" changing venit, 
`cometh, ' to venis, `comest' (Grandgent, Commentary, p. 584). He maintains the masculine form so that 
while it is "applied to Beatrice, who is about to appear, [it] retains its original reference to Christ" (Musa, 
Commentary, p. 325). In this way Dante avoids the conflict between Ma Dame et Mon Dieu, making the 
love of Ma Dame serve Mon Dieu, and courtly love serve Christianity. It avoids possible heresies like those 
committed by the Troubadour poets, the forefathers of the Dolce Stil Nouvo. This tendency within Dante's 
poetry is evident given that the medieval Church censured the religious terminology used to describe 
Beatrice in the Vita Nuova prior to publication. (Williams, Descent of the Dove, Ch. VI) 
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is really welcoming Christ in Beatrice, Beatrice transformed. 19 This indicates that 
Beatrice, who has come down from heaven echoing the Logos becoming flesh (John 1: 1- 
18), will be Christ's instrument by which God will save the soul of Dante. ° 
ii. Concealing Identity by Disguise or Veil 
Both the Venus of the Aeneid and Beatrice cover or conceal their identity. Like many 
divine beings in antiquity Venus is disguised, in this case as a huntress, "[wearing] a 
girl's shape ... a Spartan girl" 
(215). Like the rising sun, 21 Beatrice emerges "amidst a 
cloud of angels tossing flowers", 22 "a lady appeared to me, girt with olive over a white 
veil, clothed under a green mantle with the colour of living flame"(XXX, 30-33), 23 the 
veil covering her face. 
Beatrice arrives as a redeemed soul covered with a veil representing simultaneously 
the Host and the Church. As "Benedictus qui venit" in Mass announces "the expectation 
of Christ's bodily presence" (Singleton, Commentary, pp. 22-23) in the form of the Host 
which arrives veiled so Dante relates Beatrice to Christ's body and blood which take the 
form of the Host. (See Sinclair, p. 415-6 24 and Sayers, Commentary, p. 311) In this way 
Dante suggests Beatrice is his bread of life, the means by which Christ is conveyed to 
him and reaches him. However simultaneously, as we have seen, as a redeemed soul 
19 Unlike Minos' warning to beware "in whom thou trusteth" (Inferno V, 22), here these prophecies 
indicate that Beatrice who is coming can be trusted as she who "comes in the name of the Lord". 
20 Beatrice concerning "the way of salvation of the individual soul... [represents] the `God-bearing image' 
which manifests the glory of God in His creation, and becomes a personal sacramental experience" (Sayers, 
Commentary, pp. 310-11). Beatrice arrives as a particularized extension of God's plan of salvation directed 
at Dante. However, through this modified citation Dante is making a correlation of Beatrice's arrival with 
the coming of Christ, and thereby is suggesting that on some level she symbolizes Christ for Dante. 
21 The rising sun is usually associated with the coming of Christ. See Luke, 1: 78-79; also Singleton, 
Commentary, p. 736, referring to Bernard of Clairvaux on Advent. 
22 See Acts 1: 9 and Vita Nuova (XXIII, 25); also Singleton, Commentary, p. 737. 
23 Francesca has no body but dreads the return of hers while Beatrice comes as a full pictorial 
representation with body, clothing, eyes and mouth. 
24 As Sinclair (p. 415) writes, "The total absence of the Eucharist from the Purgatorio would be strange in 
itself and it would be especially so in the conditions of the time, when the subject was prominently before 
the mind of the Church, when Aquinas had recently formulated its doctrine with authority and had written 
the office of Corpus Christi and hymns in honour of the Sacrament, and when, while Dante was writing 
these last cantos of the Purgatorio, the observance of Corpus Christi was authorized anew by Pope Clement 
V... Such a reading of the scene, if it can be made good, adds to it where it stands a high significance and 
solemnity. It is a fair question whether it is credible that Dante-'a transubstantially-minded man' as he has 
been well called-should have totally ignored the Eucharist in such a work as the Purgatario; and if the 
Eucharist is not here it is nowhere in the Divine Comedy! " 
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herself, the veiled Beatrice represents the Bride of Christ, the Church (Revelation 21: 
2), 25 as well as the spirit of truth or Revelation of the Church26 
Furthermore, wearing the colours of the three theological virtues, Faith, Hope, and 
Charity (white, green and red), she is "garlanded with olive over a white veil" which has 
both pagan and Christian implications. The olive frond being a symbol of peace forms a 
crown, the crown of Minerva which signifies wisdom, the olive tree being sacred to 
Athena/Minerva the goddess of wisdom. 7 As the antithesis of Francesca who was 
connected with earthly Venus, here Beatrice is associated with Athena/Minerva. 28 Given 
that the Theological virtues are veiled and crowned with wisdom, this may suggest that 
she is Sapientia, wisdom of a divine nature and origin, which is yet to be revealed. 29 
iii. Easily Discernible despite Concealment 
However despite the concealment of the identities of Venus and Beatrice both 
Aeneas and Dante immediately recognize them. Though Venus "wore a girl's shape" 
(215), Aeneas "[knew] her for his mother" (204). She was betrayed by her beauty (329), 
her voice (330) and her "stride [which] showed her a goddess" (406). Analogously Dante 
"trembling in [Beatrice's] presence, without having more knowledge by the eyes, through 
hidden virtue that came from her, felt old love's great power" (XXX, 36-9); Dante 
instantly recognizes the presence of Beatrice30, who from childhood31 provoked this type 
25 Brandeis, A Ladder of Vision, p. 109; Sayers, Commentary, p. 311. 
26 Grandgent, Commentary, pp. 582-3 and Sinclair, p. 411. 
27 Grandgent, Commentary, 584, Singleton, Commentary, p. 738, Sayers, Commentary, p. 313. "Buti sees 
these several meanings here in the crown of olives: `Si significa la pace, la quale j' nell'animo quando s'd" 
adornato difede, ea vittoria ... e significa 
la sapienzia: imperö the l'ulivo e consecrato a Pallade the ?' 
la Dia de la sapienzia, la quale e corona de la santa Teologia. '" (Singleton, Commentary, pp. 73 8-9). 
28 Significantly in Lucian's Dialogues of the Gods (which Dante probably used in his representation of 
Francesca and Paolo as Aphrodite and Mars), Athena is self-controlled, sober and wise, clad in armour. 
Faced with her sobriety and aggression towards him, "such horror comes upon [Cupid], that [he trembles] 
in every joint, and both bow and arrow drop out of his hands .... [so] that [he is] forced involuntarily to run 
away". (Trans. Tooke, p. 96) Like "an admiral", suggestive of Athena's armour, Beatrice is shown 
exemplifying the wisdom and sobriety of Athena as well as seen rebuking uncontrolled eros in Dante, 
making it run away. 
29 1 Corinthians 13: 12. 
'0 Having focused upon Beatrice's pageant and the analogy between Christ and Beatrice, in an instant all 
universality and grandeur is "shorn away" and vanishes, leaving us with the individual woman Beatrice 
(Sinclair, p. 411), or more precisely Dante's feelings about her (and the image that his feelings and 
imagination produced). (Gibert, 138-9, see Purg. XXXII, 1-2) 
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of emotional and physical reaction32 and through whom regardless of her early death" he 
had begun his "new life" as recounted through the Vita Nuova 34 Again she holds him 
captive, 35 "trembling before her eyes", "di stupor, tremando, affranto" 36 
iv. Discontent due to Fixation upon the Past 
However, faced with visions of loveliness neither Aeneas nor Dante is happy due 
to a fixation upon past loss, as opposed to the divine experience, reassurance and 
empowerment of the present. Aeneas bemoans his great sorrow over the fall of Troy, his 
loss of thirteen ships and his exile from Europe and Asia (Aeneid 366-383). Dante, also 
an exile, simply and most poignantly mourns the loss of Virgil, which is most appropriate 
as he wrote the Aeneid and created Aeneas. 
Dante's sorrow can best be explored through returning to the welcoming of 
Beatrice, when after "Benedictus qui venis" the angels cry, "Manibus, o, date lilia plenis" 
(XXX, 21). Lilies have a double meaning in this context. In the Christian tradition, lilies 
are one of the attributes of the Virgin Mary, and the throwing of lilies welcoming 
Beatrice is suggestive of the throwing of palms before Jesus, as mentioned above. 
However on another level, we should note that this specific citation is from Virgil's 
Aeneid VI, 867-86,37 Anchises' prophecy in the Elysian Fields concerning the soul to be 
born as Marcellus, the nephew and adopted son of Augustus, "doomed to die in the 
flower of his youth" (Sayers, Commentary, p. 312). One remembers that Virgil, having 38 
31 Vita Nuova II, 2, XII, 7 and Rime CXI, 1-2. 
32 See Vita Nuova II, 4; XI, 3; XIV, 4-5; XXIV, 1; see Gilbert, p. 140. Also see XXXI, 118-119 in which 
Dante mentions "a thousand desires hotter than flame held my eyes on the shining eyes" which accentuates 
her mortal nature by describing the physical effects that he experiences as a human being in her presence 
(see Boyde, "Perception" for a full physiological description; also see Musa, Commentary, pp. 340-1). 
33 According to Vita Nuova XXX, 1-4, as Beatrice had died in 1290, with the exception of dreams Dante 
had not been in her presence for the last ten years (cf. Purgatorio XXXII, 2, Grandgent, Commentary). 
34 As when Dante first met her (Vita Nuova 11.3), she is wearing the colour of living flames, red/crimson, 
suggesting that underneath she is still the same Beatrice. 
33 See Dante's dream in Vita Nuova II. 
36 This recalls Dante's reaction to Francesca's seduction thus suggesting that Dante's initial attraction to 
Beatrice was amor as distinct from caritas, a position held by Nardi ("Filosophia deli'Amore", p. 58). 
37 Singleton (Commentary, p. 735) points out these are "the last spoken words of the sixth book of the 
Aeneid". 
38 With upwelling tears Anchises cries, "Ah! child of pity, if haply thou couldst burst the harsh bonds of 
fate, thou shalt be Marcellus! Give me lilies with full hand: let me scatter purple flowers; let me heap o'er 
my offspring's shade at least these gifts and fulfil an unavailing service. " 
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been born in a pagan context prior to Christ, was also in an important sense doomed from 
birth. 
This reference to the Aeneid acts indeed as the most extraordinarily touching 
farewell to Virgil, who on the arrival of Beatrice must return to Hell. 39 Regardless of his 
fate, this verse pays the highest tribute to him since his poetry is placed on the same level 
as the Bible, and is spoken through the mouths of angels, 40 thereby underlining Virgil's 
cooperation with Heaven in the saving of Dante's soul 41 By placing this citation in the 
mouths of angels, together with the Bible, Dante further extends its meaning suggesting 
Virgil to be prophesying in Aeneid VI, 867-86 the early death of Christ 42 This further 
suggests Virgil prepared the way for the Christ-like figure Beatrice, as John the Baptist 
prepared the way for Christ 43 In this way he participated in the opening of the possibility 
of salvation and reconciliation with God for Dante, though that possibility remains closed 
to Virgil. 
Despite Dante's journey having been motivated by the desire to see Beatrice, 
upon her arrival, trembling and bewildered seeking "consolation and reassurance" in his 
friend, master, father and teacher, Dante turns back to Virgil, ` as "a little child that runs 
to his mother when he is afraid or in distress". 45 Dante states "Not a drop of blood is left 
39 Singleton, Commentary, pp. 734-5. 
ao Musa, Commentary, p. 326 and Grandgent, Commentary, p. 584. 
41 At the moment the angels recite this phrase we do not read it as the realization/hint that Virgil has 
fulfilled his role and must redescend into Hell. Instead we read it only as the moment of fulfillment in 
which Heaven is acknowledging Virgil's great contribution to saving the soul of Dante, that without 
Virgil's assistance both through the written Aeneid in Dante's education and as his guide through Hell and 
Purgatory, Dante may not have arrived at the top of Mount Purgatory. Therefore as Virgil shared a common 
goal/purpose (Brandeis, A Ladder of Vision, p. 108), cooperating with Beatrice and Heaven with regard to 
saving Dante's soul, the angels show their appreciation and "kinship" taking Virgil's words as their own. 
42 By borrowing Virgil's words the angels extend them or show the extent of their meaning/implications to 
cover Jesus' early death. (Acts 8: 33, Isaiah 52: 7-8) Sayers (Commentary, p. 312) writes, "translated here 
from an occasion of pagan mourning to one of Christian rejoicing, it is at once Dante's tribute to Virgil as a 
prophet of Christ and a gesture of tender regret for his imminent departure". We may ask ourselves the 
question whether in doing this Virgil did not grasp something of the divine and in so doing might not gain 
access to heaven at the last Judgement, whether by his writing as here conceived, or by his action within the 
Commedia which includes preparing the way for Beatrice, or whether by prayers made by Dante when he 
returns, in gratitude for the help Virgil gave to Dante, the possibility of which is perhaps suggested by 
Paradiso XXX, 100-131. However, more pessimistically, Virgil only prophesied the death of 
Marcellus/Jesus and not his resurrection indicating that Virgil had no conception of (and therefore no faith 
in) a Christian resurrection. As faith is necessary for salvation (Colossians 2: 12), he is without hope, and 
must return to Limbo. 
43 cf. Matthew 11: 11. 
44 Sinclair, p. 411; Williams, The Figure of Beatrice, pp. 176-77. 
45 "Dolcissimo patre" becomes "la mamma" in line 44 (Singleton, Commentary, p. 740). 
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in me that does not tremble; I know the marks of the ancient flame"' (Conosco i segni 
dell'antica fiamma) 46 echoing Aeneid, iv, 23 "Agnosco veteris vestigia flammae" (I 
recognize the traces of the olden flame; Grandgent's translation) in which Dido refers to 
her ancient passion. Though Dante's citation of Virgil suggests their mutual 
understanding concerning love's signs and associated "rapture", 47 Dido refers to 
destructive erotic passion, a very different type of love48 from the constructive love which 
Dante is experiencing for Beatrice. Though Dante and Virgil are both critical of Dido's 
eros, this contrast is brought to the fore in that Virgil disappears as if he has slipped 
between these two loves. This disappearance suggests that Dante's love is beyond 
Virgil's conception, indicating that Dante has stepped beyond Virgil49 from virtuous 
heavenly eros of the virtuous pagan to caritas. 5° 
At this point Virgil, to Dante's shock and utter despair is gone. "But Virgil had 
left us bereft of him, Virgil sweetest father, Virgil to whom I gave myself for my 
salvation. " Echoing Orpheus despairingly looking back seeing Eurydice descending back 
down to Hell after all his efforts to rescue her, Dante looks behind him to find Virgil 
gone: Virgil, whose guidance led him out of Hell, but who could not free himself from its 
46 Singleton, Commentary, p. 740. 
"Brandeis, p. 111. 
48 Brandeis, p. 111. 
49 Furthermore, considering that Dido's carnal eros is self-destructive leading to suicide, through using this 
line Dante shows a recognition of Dido's destructive love from which he turns away through directing the 
passionate aspect of it to positive ends, reconciling it with the Christian tradition. However, "Through a 
rectification of Dido's love for Aeneas [Dante betrays]... its original sense. In doctrinal terms, the inversion 
of the object of love (from Dido to Beatrice) serves to postulate the ultimate discontinuity and inevitable 
caesura between fallen nature and the order of grace. " (Mazzotta, Dante, Poet of the Desert, p. 186) Virgil 
as a virtuous pagan likewise condemned Dido's eros seeing Aeneas' departure as necessary. However 
though the relation of Aeneas with Dido and his leaving of her is part of Virgil's understanding of the 
overall plan of Jupiter and Fate to make Aeneas into a hero who will found Rome, which will become the 
centre of the Christian world, for Dante nonetheless his understanding of love does not extend beyond 
heavenly eros, love of virtue, to caritas. Therefore in line 48 through showing the discontinuity between 
fallen man and grace, Dante the poet is simultaneously embracing Virgil but also, through theologically 
stepping away from him who did not follow the transition from amor to caritas to its completion, making a 
"farewell gesture to his mentor" (Musa, Commentary, p. 326). 
so Like Augustine Dante seems not to clearly distinguish heavenly eros from longing for God, caritas. (See 
Nygren, p. 470) As in Plato's Symposium, passionate love in itself remains the same, but is defined by its 
object whether carnal or spiritual and therefore, depending upon its object, it becomes a different type of 
love. Here likewise, depending upon its object love changes forms which promote either life or death, 
righteousness or sin. However given that there are two types of love, amor and caritas, for Dante true love, 
passionate desire, is now directed away from the finite and towards the infinite, promoting life and turning 
away from death. Yet this remains confusing as the signs of both loves are the same, causing the same 
"rapture". Furthermore, "each reader will notice with more or less of shock that Beatrice does not answer 
in kind the pilgrim's flood of emotion" (Brandeis, "Beatrice" in A Ladder of Vision, p. 111). 
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hold (Inferno I, 63). Like Orpheus to Eurydice as she descends back into Hades, 51 and as 
Daedalus called three times to Icarus as his son's wings melted making him fall into the 
sea and drown, Dante thrice repeated the name Virgil. 52 In contrast to Daedalus, Virgil 
was able to save his "son" but could not save himself. 53 Furthermore neither could Dante 
by his craft/poetry nor by any other action do anything to save his "dolcissimo patre". 54 
Dante beside himself with grief states, "Nor did all the ancient mother lost avail 
my cheeks washed with dew that they should not be stained again with tears. " (52-4) 
What Eve the first mother lost, the "Earthly paradise" (Sayers, Commentary, p. 52), had 
just been regained (XXIX) and therefore should be the source of much joy and gladness 
of heart. Yet this victory/joy could not prevent Dante's cheeks, which had been washed in 
dew by Virgil at the base of Mount Purgatory (I: 121-129) cleansing them from the soot 
of Hell which had darkened them, from "being darkened once more by weeping" 
(Grandgent, Commentary, p. 585)55 suggesting a re-descent into Hell. Dante is so devoted 
to Virgil that the pilgrim's heart and mind slide back down into Hell with him, 56 as 
Beatrice seems to notice when in XXX: line 74, she says "How durst thou approach the 
mountain? " The reference to "mother lost" and the allusion to Virgil's maternal gesture 
of washing Dante's cheeks in Purgatorio I : 24 point to Dante's awareness of his personal 
loss, 57 Virgil having acted as both father and mother to him (see line 44). For this reason 
even getting back all that was lost in the original Fall of man could not prevent him from 
mourning his loss of Virgil. 
S' "It is also by deliberate design that Virgil is named once in vs. 46, then thrice in a single tercet observing 
that he is gone (vss. 49-5 1), then finally once in vs. 55 by Beatrice, following the unique naming of Dante 
himself' echoing his Georgics IV, 525-27 (Singleton, Commentary, p. 741). 
52 See Ars Amatoria 2.93- 95 and Smarr, "Poets of Love and Exile", p. 146. 
53 This echoes Christ on the cross being mocked; "He saved others.. .. 
but he can not save himself" (Mark 
15: 3 1). However Christ as the Son of God could have saved himself. This reference points to the fact that 
Virgil at best is a prophet of Christ, though not a redeemed prophet like John the Baptist (see Matthew 3: 3, 
Isaiah 40: 3) nor a "true son" (Hebrews 12: 7-8). Virgil prepares the way for Beatrice, though Virgil is 
neither a follower of Christ nor will be redeemed. As we noted earlier, Virgil's description of Marcellus' 
early death, though perhaps acting as a prophecy concerning Christ's death, shows no understanding of a 
resurrection. 
54 "The lament of Dante for his `dolcissimo patre' (Purg. 30.50; `sweetest father') remains a warning that 
human art and intelligence are not sufficient for salvation. " (Smarr, Poets of Love and Exile, p. 146) 55 "Ivi mi fece tutto discoverto quel color the 1'inferno mi nascose. " (Purg. I, 128-9). "Compare 'atre'with 
the Latin `ater', `black, ' `dark, ' and see Inf. VI, 16" (Singleton, Commentary, p. 742). 
56 This is also true of the reader (Sayers Further Papers on Dante: "Dante's Virgil" pp. 59-60). 
57 Williams, The Figure of Beatrice, p. 180. 
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v. The Rebuke 
To the sorrow of both Aeneas and Dante, Venus and Beatrice respond with a 
rebuke showing no 'sympathy. In the Aeneid, Venus will not tolerate hearing Aeneas 
moan. As previously quoted, "Venus chose to hear no more complaints and broke in 
midway through his bitterness" (384-5), interrupted him saying, "I doubt Heaven is 
unfriendly to you, as you still breath life-giving air"; as you are still alive, the gods have 
protected you so you are blessed and should be grateful. 
Similarly, though far more harshly faced with Dante's despair, Beatrice rebukes 
him stating, "Dante, because Virgil leaves thee weep not, weep not yet, for thou must 
weep for another sword" (55-57). No longer treated as a universal pilgrim, Dante is 
named here for the first and only time58 indicating that the moment is a dramatically real 
event59 in the life of a real person who before the world makes a personal confession of 
his sins 60 Furthermore this represents a personal moment of introspection and self- 
knowledge after which he can change. 61 This naming therefore indicates a shift from the 
universal man to personal Dante, 62 suggesting that though the way of salvation is 
universal, the same for all people, the conversion itself is extremely personal involving a 
personal confession and repentance. 
In threatening/warning that Dante "must weep for another sword, " Beatrice refers 
to a sword other than the wound left from the emotional loss of Virgil. She sees the 
condemnation of Virgil unsentimentally in terms of the righteous judgement 
of God. 3 Though Musa thinks this second "`wound' will be that caused by the harsh 
words of Beatrice" (Musa, Commentary line 55-57), Grandgent more precisely refers to 
58 This is the "first time that the Pilgrim hears his own name during his journey" (Musa, Commentary, p. 
326), or more accurately names himself. An author naming himself in his work was normally viewed as 
"egotistical and unbecoming" (Sayers, Commentary, p. 313), "except on needful occasion" as stated by 
Dante (Convivio I, ii, 3). (see Singleton, Commentary, p. 744) 
59 Singleton, Commentary, p. 743, Musa Commentary, p. 327. 
60 As a personal confession see Singleton, Commentary, p. 743; Grandgent, Introduction 31, and 
Commentary, pp. 582-3; also Mazzotta (Dante, Poet of the Desert, p. 186) who notes parallels with the 
autobiographical confessions of Augustine. 
61 Sinclair, p. 411. 
62 Musa, Commentary, p. 327, and Singleton, Commentary, p. 743. 
63 "Beatrice's will is perfectly conformed to God's [so] that she desires what He desires and rejoices in His 
judgement. It is thus implicit that she takes pleasure in God's damnation of Virgil to Limbo, where he must 
spend eternity in hopeless desire for the beatific vision. Her attitude, like her language, is relentlessly 
economical: she wastes no pity on one whose condition cannot be changed. " (Chiampi, pp. 51-53) 
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the Word of God of Hebrews 4: 12, which is "sharper than any two-edged sword, 
piercing even to the dividing asunder of soul and spirit, and of the joints and marrow, and 
is a discerner of the thoughts and intents of the heart". Therefore although Virgil's 
departure cut Dante's heart, the true pain and wound which is yet to come will be caused 
by the word of God, which in this context comes through Beatrice, and which will judge 
and convict Dante of his sins. This judgement is intensified and impressed upon him by 
her harsh words which act as a spur (Hebrews 10: 24), though it also may suggest the 
avenging sword of God if he does not repent. 
vi. The Difference 
Beatrice is thus shockingly different from what Virgil leads us to expect and what we 
know of Beatrice through the Vita Nuova. Firstly, in contrast to Virgil's description of 
Beatrice as a "donna angelica" coming with shining eyes (Purg. XXVII, 136), she 
appears a severe mother or madre superba (XXX, 79)65, which recalls that Venus too is 
the mother of Aeneas (Aeneid I, 404,406). Secondly in contrast to the image in the Vita 
Nuova of a gentle girl "crowned and clothed with humility", Beatrice is represented as 
harsh, indignant and dominating. 66 This image is perpetuated in line 59 by Dante's 
masculine authoritarian description of Beatrice as "an admiral who goes to poop and 
prow to see the men that serve on the other ships and to hearten them in their work". 
Though Musa through Porena minimizes the implications of this image67, Shapero's 
strong reading heavily stresses this masculization of Beatrice concerning "role and 
mastery" through a comparison of her and Ulysses (which results in the feminization of 
both Dante and Virgil) 68 Supported by line 71 "Royally, still stem in her bearing", 
Singleton most appropriately explains that this simile "[conveys] the regal and haughty 
bearing of Beatrice (cf. vs. 70: `regalmente, ' `proterva'), 69 as that of a great personage, 
64 Revelation, 19: 15; also Shapero, Dante and the Knot of Body and Soul, p. 128. 
65 Singleton, Commentary, p. 742. 
66 Gilbert, pp. 141-6. 
67 Musa, Commentary, pp. 326-7. 
68 Shapero, Dante and the Knot of Body and Soul, p. 128; see Aeneid X, 224-275. 
69 Singleton, Commentary, p. 742; Gilbert (pp. 141-6) translates proterva as "haughty", noting that this 
adjective "does not fit the lady of the Vita Nuova", while Grandgent (Commentary, p. 586) translates it as 
"wrathful", "her anger [showing] itself in the impetuousness of the following speech". 
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such as a... king", 70 recalling the fact that as a heavenly Venus-figure she is goddess-like, 
superior to men71 and therefore to Dante. 
However unlike Venus who "[teases her] son so often with disguises" (Aeneid, I, 
406) and keeps her identity secret, Beatrice reveals her identity and ultimately unveils her 
eyes XXXI and her mouth in the gap between XXXI and XXXII. She continued "like one 
who while he speaks holds back his hottest words; Look at me well; I am, I am indeed 
Beatrice" (XXX, 71-76). Having addressed Dante by name she now identifies herself or 
confirms her identity as the verse seems to suggest Dante is squinting at her through her 
veil. 72 This line accentuates the sharpness of her tongue73 representing her as a particular 
individual. However, when Musa interprets these lines, "I am that Beatrice that you 
abandoned; you have still to know what I, Beatrice represent! " he underlines the fact that 
still Dante does not know what he has abandoned, a lack of knowledge which is 
dramatized in that she is still veiled. Only at the end of XXXI when she unveils her 
mouth will he begin to understand the extent to which she transcends the particular, and 
therefore to what extent he missed the mark (hamartia) in abandoning her, and therefore 
is deserving of her harsh treatment. 
vii. The Question 
Returning to the original question with which this section opened, "Come 
degnasti d'accedere al monte? ", we mentioned that it can be read several ways. Sinclair 
translates line 74 as "How durst thou approach the mountain? " In somewhat similar 
spirit, Grandgent and Singleton translate it as "How is it that you deigned to climb? " 
which suggests the sharply sarcastic attitude mixing "how did you? " and "How dare you 
approach the mountain!? " Differently, and less conservatively, Musa translates line 74 as 
70 Singleton, Commentary, p. 742. 
71 This is emphasized by the use of the word "ministra" echoing Aeneid VI, 302, "Unaided, he poles the 
boat, tends the sails" (Grandgent, p. 586). 
'Z Singleton, Commentary, p. 746. 
" Some have considered this sharpness to be sarcasm. (Singleton, Commentary, p. 745) However, also 
quite appropriately Musa notes, "what I have translated as `look at me! ' is in the original guardaci ben, in 
which I have taken the ci to mean `here'. It could, of course, represent the first person plural, being the 
plural of majesty. In that case, the rest of the line, ben son Beatrice, must be changed to ben sem. To me the 
mixture of sarcasm with the plural of majesty is hardly appropriate". (Musa, Commentary, p. 327) 
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"So, you at last have deigned to climb the mountain? " implying that he is too slow in his 
ascent74 and simultaneously that she is eager for his salvation. 75 The passage can be read 
in any of the three ways; however they can be combined to reveal Beatrice's 
psychological complexity: indignant about his sin, jealous and concerned to humble her 
lover, yet eager for Dante's salvation. Beatrice is "easily as much a mother as a maiden 
and offended muse. '76 
However given the Virgilian background, Beatrice's question, "How durst thou 
approach the mountain? Didst thou not know that here man is happy? " (XXX, 74-5) 
suggests a further range of significance. As noted above, Venus responds to Aeneas "I 
doubt Heaven is unfriendly to you, as you still breath life-giving air on your approach to 
the Tyrian town", then tells him that his men and ships are all safe; she is indicating that 
the gods, specifically herself, are with him supporting and protecting him, as is evident 
through her pleading with Jupiter for her son earlier in Aeneid I: 22-24.77 For this reason 
Aeneas should be grateful and happy, not focused upon what he has lost but upon what 
he possesses. Therefore, taking into consideration the connection of Purgatorio XXX, 
74-75 with Aeneid I: 384-406, Singleton is correct when he indicates that Beatrice is 
referring to the fact that she helped Dante to climb the mountain, 78 and went to greater 
lengths to save him, empowered and motivated by God. God has rescued him, therefore 
'a "From his point of view, these sarcastic words of Beatrice are not meant to be taken literally. She is 
reproaching the Pilgrim, for his slowness in learning what constitutes true human bliss. " (Musa, 
Commentary, p. 327) Cf. Guinevere's punishment of Lancelot for not mounting the cart quickly enough. 
75 Despite Musa's reading of line 74 that Beatrice seeks Dante's rapid ascent and transhumanization, 
Singleton's reading of Beatrice's righteous indignation seems more accurate given the next line (XXX, 75), 
"non sapei tu the qui e I'uom felice? " Didst thou not know that here man is happy? (Sinclair trans. ) By 
"qui" Beatrice means the summit of the mountain, the Earthly Paradise. Dante ought to be happy in the 
earthly paradise but he is not; weeping as he is for the loss of Virgil, and backsliding in his compassion for 
and attachment to the lost. For that reason initially Beatrice rebukes him as Virgil rebuked him in the 
Inferno for having compassion on the damned, insisting that Dante find praise in God's just judgment (cf. 
Chiampi p. 5 1-53; also see Inferno VIII, 37-9). She rebukes him for possessing greater love for the damned 
than the heavenly, darkness than light as in John 3: 19 where Jesus states, "Light has come into the world, 
but men loved the darkness instead of the light because their deeds were evil"; see also John 1: 5. (This 
could perhaps also be taken to indicate that Dante is more attached to reason than revelation; Beatrice is 
read often to personify revelation, as we shall soon see, while Virgil is frequently read to represent reason. 
Though in a sense accurate, reading these characters through personification produces a decidedly narrow 
limited vision of exceptionally human and rich individuals. See T. S. Eliot, "The Vita Nuova" in Dante. ) 
76 Brandeis, A Ladder of Vision, p. 113. 
" Shapero (Dante and the Knot of Body and Soul, p. 130-1) discusses "Beatrice's immediate identification 
with male roles and mastery at the summit of Purgatory ... Virgil's Aeneid... provides one of the most 
symbolically freighted masculine images attending Beatrice's return". (See Aeneid 10: 224-275) 
78 See Purgatorio II, 60; also Singleton, Commentary, p. 745; also Paradiso XXXI, 80-1. 
267 
his mourning so deeply the departure of Virgil is ungrateful and improper as a higher 
good is before him. For this reason he should be "happy" given that God and she herself 
have been aiding and preserving him79 and that she, his original "Eurydice" stands before 
him as his new guide. 80 This does not indicate that she is personally insulted or jealous, 
which would make her seem all the more an actual woman , 
81 but that her sense of justice 
has been affronted as Dante has not understood the greater good and has been ungrateful 
when his greatest spiritual needs as well as long-term personal desires have been met by 
God. Furthermore this question in turn reflects back on Dante the poet as a self-critical 
moment where, through Beatrice challenging the pilgrim on his attitude towards Virgil, 
Dante the poet challenges himself (and his reader) on his (and our) own sentimentality 
concerning Virgil. The poet, like the pilgrim still troubled by Virgil's condemnation, does 
not grasp the higher good of God's justice, feeling deep sorrow and personal loss by the 
condemnation of Virgil, showing his and our incomprehension of the higher good, our 
limited vision of God's justice, as Dante has portrayed it. 
viii. The Responses 
Aeneas and Dante respond in opposite ways when faced with the goddess or 
messenger of God. Aeneas challenges Venus' deception. "You! Cruel, too! Why tease 
79 Chiampi (pp. 51-53) argues that she was a "reluctant saviour at best" and would not have left her vision 
of God in Heaven to journey to Limbo to help Dante of her own accord but only at the prompting of St. 
Lucia and Mary according to God's will and grace (Inferno H, 71). She is unsympathetic to Dante's 
hardships (Inferno II, 91-3) and cried not due to compassion but over his affront to God (Inferno II, 116). 
However in contrast to Chiampi's view of her total indifference, she cares for the well-being of his 
soul. As shown in Inferno II, 70, "she is the woman `che soffristi per la mia salute in Inferno lasciar le tue 
vestige ;- who endured for my salvation to leave your footprints in Hell' (Paradiso XXXI, 80-1). It was 
she who entreated Virgil, who wept to Virgil, for I' amico mio. 'La tua magu jcenza in me custodi-guard 
your magnificence in me' (Paradiso XXXI, 88)". (Williams, The Figure of Beatrice, p. 181) 
Furthermore, when taking into consideration that Beatrice rebuking Dante is modelled on the 
heavenly Venus of Aeneid I scolding her unfaithful son Aeneas, Chiampi's interpretation seems short- 
sighted. Beatrice is not indifferent to Dante nor are her actions only led by obedience and love for God 
alone, though that is the primary motivation. This correlation between Purgatorio XXX and the Aeneid 
suggests that Beatrice has maternal protective feelings for Dante (echoing God's love for Dante). Though 
harsh on the surface, the inner core of imagery used shows her far deeper feelings for him. 
80 For this reason Dante's reformulation in lines 49-51 of Orpheus' lines in Georgics IV are simultaneously 
ironic and undercutting in that as Orpheus had lost Eurydice to death so had Dante lost Beatrice. However 
now though Dante unlike Orpheus has got her back, he is still unhappy. 
81 For the more human side of Beatrice see Charles Williams, The Descent of the Dove pp. 133-4 and The 
Figure of Beatrice, p. 181; for a comparison with Vita Nuova XVIII concerning Dante's appreciation of 
other women see Gilbert, p. 141-6. 
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your son so often with disguises? Why may we not join hands and speak and hear the 
simple truth? " (I, 405-408). Venus, through continuing to disguise herself and therefore 
maintaining a distance, tries to deceive Aeneas, which Aeneas considers to be cruel. He 
desires her to reveal herself as a divine being and her relation to Aeneas her son. Instead, 
though continuing to protect him (409-412), she sends him to Dido whom she makes fall 
in love with him, thereby causing Aeneas to enter into an immoral destructive 
relationship resulting in Dido's suicide. This seems hardly to be seeking their immediate 
moral good, though Virgil shows Aeneas' experiences with Dido ultimately contributing 
to the overall purposes of Jupiter and Fate through his moral development enabling him 
to become the hero who founds Rome. 
In contrast to the Venus of the Aeneid, Beatrice has exposed her identity directly, "I 
am Beatrice" (XXX, 73), and will progressively unveil the truth to Dante, gradually 
leading him to God until he sees himself, her and God clearly. Therefore rather than the 
love of Venus which is distant, hidden, and morally ambiguous, in Christianity God's 
love is revealed. The initial effect of Beatrice's question is not only the recognition by 
Dante the pilgrim that he is looking back due to his compassion for Virgil, but it also 
reduces him to his initial stage of desolation at the beginning of the Commedia prior to 
his encounter with Virgil. Like Socrates' use of aporia to call into question and deflate 
false knowledge, likewise Beatrice entirely deflates and humbles Dante to the point that 
he sees who he really is as he was prior to his climb when lost in the dark wood82 and 
becomes conscious of the extent to which he has fallen. 83 However simultaneously Dante 
the poet may also in part be critiquing and deflating the conception of the pagan goddess 
of love, pointing the reader to a truer kind of divinity gestured towards by Plato as we 
discussed earlier in this thesis, but which Dante now through Beatrice is going to reveal, 
God as Caritas. 
Following this rebuke, Dante in his shame can no longer look at Beatrice. "My 
eyes fell down to the clear fount, but, seeing myself in it, I drew them back to the grass, 
$Z As Brandeis writes, "Her question ignores all that the climb through Purgatory has done to bring him out 
of the misery of the Dark Wood; it reflects him as he was when Virgil found him in the beast-ridden 
obscurity of the wood; and one gets the impression from the agony of his response that he now consciously 
sees this miserable image of himself for the first time. How did you deign to come here? she asks, and the 
question is bitter, but medicinal. " (Brandeis, A Ladder of Vision, p. 112) 
33 Sayers, Commentary, p. 319. 
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so great shame weighed on my brow" (XXX, 76-78). As in Lacan, Dante knows himself 
through otherness, through the reflection in the other. Dante sees who he really is in 
Beatrice's eyes. Dante cannot stand to look at his own image reflected, whether in 
Beatrice's eyes or in the clear water of the stream, thereby drawing a connection between 
her eyes and the reflective mirror-like quality of the stream. Contrasting with the 
narcissism of Francesca, who facing Paolo her lover becomes absorbed in self-love, 
Dante faced with his beloved Beatrice experiences shame and self-hate84, as he truly sees 
himself fully, recognizing his failing and the gravity of his sins. This mirror-like quality 
indicates again that Beatrice is likened to the Word of God as described in James 1: 23- 
25. Unlike Francesca's narcissistic self-love with Paolo which is based on "false goods", 
the temporal beauty of the body, physical and carnal pleasures (which lead away from 
God ending in their damnation), Dante's relation with Beatrice functions like the Word of 
God calling Dante higher as it leads him here to contrition of heart and ultimately to 
repentance, metanoia, change of heart. 85 This indicates that their relationship is based on 
the pursuit of righteousness exemplified in Beatrice which leads to ultimate happiness, 
the contemplation and knowledge of God. 
Unlike the reluctant, deceitful and therefore in one sense cruel mother of Aeneas, 
in the Commedia Dante's maternal depiction of Beatrice is cruel because she tells him the 
truth since she loves him with Dante the poet's understanding of God's love. Thus 
despite these images of harshness, the depiction of Beatrice is not devoid of love. 86 Like 
Venus however, "postponing her beneficent effects" 87 and loving Dante like a child 
whom she disciplines (Hebrews 12: 5-11), her pity is as yet "acerba", "unripe" as it is not 
yet ready to be revealed, since she has not yet brought him to a full recognition of sin 88 
84 Boyde, pp. 155-8. 
as "As Lady Philosophy greets with stem rebuke the captive Boethius, in the Consolatio Philosophiae, I, Pr. 
ii, so the divine Beatrice bitterly chides Dante for his recreancy after the death of her mortal part. " 
(Grandgent, pp. 582-3) 
86 "Beatrice's speech is a `sword', well-aimed and sharp. She is a stern `admiral' and a harsh `mother', and 
`queen-like in bearing'. Yet images of love dilate all through her merciless putting of the case. " (Brandeis, 
A Ladder of Vision, p. 112) 
87 Shapero, Dante and the Knot of Body and Soul, pp. 130-1. 
88 This suggests that in lines 81-82, Beatrice seems harsh to Dante as "does the mother seem harsh to her 
child as she seemed to me, for savour of the stem pity tastes bitter". Grandgent defines "acerba" as "unripe 
pity: pity that is not yet ready to reveal itself'. (Grandgent, Commentary, p. 587) Singleton elaborates on 
this by stating that "the pity of the mother is `acerba' (`unripe'), that is, it is not yet the moment for her to 
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and repentance. This suggests that Dante the pilgrim knows that, though painful at the 
present, she will ultimately have pity on him and lead him to God. Therefore more deeply 
considered this harshness is actually righteous indignation and sharp maternal concern for 
Dante's spiritual wellbeing. She as the Word of God is inspired by God, "useful for 
teaching, rebuking, correcting, and training in righteousness so that the man of God may 
be thoroughly equipped for every good work" (2 Timothy 3: 16-17). Like the action of 
the Word of God which is active (Hebrews 4: 31), and never goes out without effect 
(Isaiah 55: 11), and is intended to help men (2 Timothy 3: 16-17) by humbling them and 
bringing them to their knees before God (Philippians 2: 10), her comportment towards 
Dante brings him to his knees for his own good. 
Through Beatrice, Dante has rewritten the roles in courtly love of which Dido in 
Medieval circles was viewed as exemplary once the tradition was established. 89 First, 
Beatrice's harshness suggests that Dante still holds to the feudal relationships of courtly 
love in which the midons dominated their lovers. Furthermore though still harsh and 
dictatorial, Beatrice, the midons, is beautiful and virtuous like an angel, as in Guinizelli's 
donna angelica. However though in this position of power she does not prevent the lover 
from reaching God90 which would have fuelled Christianity's conflict with courtly love, 
the struggle between the knight's allegiance to Mon Dieu et Ma Dame which extended 
into the poetry of the Dolce Stil Nuovo. Instead the lady Beatrice, "the courtly lady whose 
power proceeded from a preordained proximity to the "lord" of the domain", 91 through 
her harshness, authority, beauty and virtue is the means by which her lover Dante 
ultimately is led to God and reconciled with God. Thus the new midons acts like the 
Word of God as the means by which her lover is saved and reaches God. In this way, 
rather than an aporia in his path towards God, she functions as poros, a way to salvation 
whereby Dante reconciles courtly love and Christianity. 
Thus Purgatorio XXX can be understood as critiquing the understanding of love 
of Aeneid I, in that the love attributed to and endorsed by heavenly Venus tends to 
degenerate into carnal desire, prefiguring the courtly tradition in which the virtuous ideals 
reveal it, though the child knows it is there and will finally manifest itself". (Singleton, Commentary, p. 
746) 
89 Lewis, Allegory, p. 43. 
90 Brandeis, pp. 29-30. 
91 Shapero, Dante and the Knot of Body and Soul, p. 112. 
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degenerate into carnal love. But Dante, following in the path of Virgil, in this section is 
not only critiquing Dido's love but is reworking Virgil's notion of heavenly Venus the 
goddess of beauty and love through Beatrice, making her lead towards God rather than to 
degeneration, thereby following the path of Aeneas which led to the founding of Rome, 
which is crucial in the Commedia as it became the centre of Christendom. In so doing 
Dante bridges the divide between Virgil and Christianity, making Virgil a precursor and 
prophet of Christianity. However simultaneously, through his reformulation of a new 
heavenly Venus embodied in Beatrice, Dante acknowledges the rift between the pagan 
and Christian worlds which causes Virgil to recede into Hell while Dante rises up to 
Heaven . 
92 Thus analogously to the way that he rejects some elements of courtly love 
while retaining others compatible with Christianity in order to bring courtly love to serve 
Christianity, so Dante reformulates the role of the heavenly Venus as portrayed in Aeneid 
I to make it compatible with Christianity, though he loses Virgil in the process. 
Returning to lines 74-75, "How durst thou approach the mountain? Didst thou not 
know that here man is happy? ", these questions serve the purpose of situating Beatrice as 
the figure of heavenly Venus, contrasting with Francesca representing earthly Venus. 
This contrast, as we will see, is mirrored by that in the Christian tradition between Eve, 
the mother of mankind who caused the Fall, and a new personal Eve, resembling a 
Christ-figure, Sapientia and the Word of God, who here participates in Dante's return to 
God. In both cases the primary difference between the earthly Venus and heavenly Venus 
(or the Eve-figure and the new Eve-figure) can be seen as relating to free will. As 
love/desire is determined by its object, whether carnal/pleasure/self-focused or 
spiritual/virtue/God-focused, clearly articulated through the difference between earthly 
and heavenly Venus, but also in Eve versus the new Eve-figure, so we see once again that 
Francesca could have been a Beatrice. This further suggests that earthly eros can be 
redirected to heavenly eros and heavenly eros can lead to Christian caritas, as indeed 
Augustine thought, which brings us to the subject of Dante's "conversion" which will be 
the focus of our next chapter. 
92 This in turn causes him to critique himself, as Beatrice does the pilgrim, for his own sentimentality which 
suggests a lack of appreciation and true understanding of the highest good. 
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XIII. CONVERSION TO CARITAS 
In the Commedia, Heavenly eros becomes Christian caritas through the 
intervention of God's grace, which is expressed through Beatrice. As we have thus far 
seen in Purgatorio XXX, through his paralleling of the rebuke in Aeneid I Dante has 
represented Beatrice as a new Heavenly Venus-figure while maintaining his use of 
Christian imagery, so that the pagan text is modified to render it compatible with 
Christianity. However mid-Purgatorio XXX, a shift occurs at the point in the narrative 
when in the Aeneid Aeneas is directed by Venus to go to the town of Dido. This suggests 
that Heavenly Venus' notion of Heavenly eros may degenerate to carnal love, which for 
Lewis is a critical problem of courtly love, the medieval antique exemplar of which is 
Dido. ' The redeemed Beatrice rather than being deceptive like Venus, is shown to be a 
messenger of the Christian God from the beginning of XXX, and acts as the Word of God 
showing Dante the truth about himself, his sins. As the Word of God she shows Dante a 
fixed standard of righteousness before which he is broken, hence Beatrice's harshness. 
She enacts the coming of the law (Romans 7: 9) which convicts Dante of his sin so that 
he "dies". Thus far, though Beatrice is the instrument of God's grace she initially, like the 
law, convicts him of his sin and, though appearing to be without mercy, ends up being a 
true expression of God's mercy, since he must recognize his sin in order to change and be 
saved. In doing this she as the new Eve functions as a midwife, initiating and overseeing 
his full conversion to Christianity whereby Dante's Heavenly eros will be converted to 
caritas. 
In Purgatorio XXXI, Dante undergoes a biblical conversion. Beatrice's role as 
instrument of Dante's salvation is to bring about in him contrition of heart, a repentant 
heart which confesses its sins in order to undergo the forgiveness of sins which, 
following the pattern of a biblical conversion, involves a baptism after which he receives 
the gift of the holy spirit. In contrast to Singleton's reading in terms of sacramental 
1 Lewis (Allegory, p. 43) notes that Aeneid IV is "sometimes mentioned in discussions of Courtly love. The 
story of Dido provides material that can be used, and was used, in courtly love poetry, after Courtly Love 
has come into existence: but until then, it will be read for what it is-a tragic exemplary story of ancient 
love". 
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penance, 2 a closer biblical reading of this passage offers perhaps a richer understanding 
of what Dante is doing. Dante seems to be focusing in this canto upon a passage which 
describes the first baptisms after the death of Jesus, on Pentecost which marks the 
beginning of the Church. 
"Therefore let all Israel be assured of this: God has made this Jesus, whom you crucified, both Lord and 
Christ" When the people heard this they were cut to the heart and said to Peter and the other apostles, 
"Brothers, what shall we do? " Peter replied, "Repent and be baptized, every one of you, in the name of 
Jesus Christ for the forgiveness of your sins. And you will receive the gift of the Holy Spirit. " (Acts 2: 36- 
38) 
After Peter's testimony and accusation, the people present recognize individually that 
they have crucified Jesus (vs. 36), not necessarily by their presence and participation at 
the Crucifixion, but through their individual sins which caused/necessitated Jesus' death 
(I Peter 2: 243). Upon recognizing their personal responsibility and guilt in Christ's death, 
they are "cut to the heart" (vs. 37) and ask Peter what they can do to make amends. They 
want to take action to "die to sin and live for righteousness". Peter replies that they must 
"repent" (vs. 38) (metanoia: Greek for "change of mind", which clearly results in a 
change of actions; also see 2 Corinthians 7: 10-11). Prior to repenting they would have to 
have understood what sin is (peche, hamartia, to miss the mark of perfection) in order to 
confess their sinss which is an integral part of repentance (Mark 1: 4-5; also see Matthew 
3: 2,6) as Dante so well understood, as they must know what they are repenting of in 
order to change their lives. Then they must be baptized (baptidzo: Greek for "immerse"), 
fully immersed. At the moment of baptism all their sins will be forgiven so that the wall 
of sin separating them and God (Isaiah 59: 1-2) is dissolved (Romans 6: 3-7; Ephesians 2: 
14) at which time they will receive the gift of the Holy Spirit. Through his imagery, 
Dante describes precisely this process of salvation. 
2 Singleton, Commentary, p. 767. 
3 Isaiah 53: 5-6. 
` This incidentally shows Virgil's comment in Inferno IV that the virtuous pagans "did not sin" (Inferno IV 
34) incorrect as "all have sinned and fall short of God's glory" (Romans 3: 23) and "if we claim to be 
without sin, we deceive ourselves... [and] make [God] out to be a liar" (I John 1: 8-10). 
51 John 1: 9; James 5: 16; These verses are addressed to people who are already Christians. 
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1. Convicted of Sin 
Like Peter in Acts 2: 22-36, Beatrice initiates Dante's process of conversion by 
seeking to convict him of his sins, making him see his own guilt. She, representing the 
Word of God, tells him the truth and reveals God's standard, his divine law, so that Dante 
may see where he went wrong and how he can change. The intensity of this 
toughness/harshness indicative of the law, which convicts Dante of his sin becomes 
apparent in XXX when the angels entreat Beatrice to have mercy on Dante 7 However 
working in conjunction with the harshness of Beatrice, the compassion, pity, and mercy 
of the angels, expressing/reflecting the love and compassion of God, causes the 
softening8 and awakening in Dante's heart of a deep sense of contrition which leads to 
repentance. 9 
Endeavouring to bring about repentance in his heart, 1° at this point'she begins to 
6 In contrast to Francesca's narcissistic self-pitying love, "Beatrice's harshness is the necessary counter to 
falseness, for her harshness (which is opposed to the Siren's sweet song) puts in relief the contours of the 
ethics of love she embodies" (Mazzotta, Dante's Vision, p. 151). Her love though in this context "hard" is 
actually true (Brandeis, The Ladder of Vision, p. 111). 
Despite her "higher purpose" the angels, while praying for Dante simultaneously pray for Beatrice to have 
mercy upon him (See Psalm 31: 1-8; cf. Musa, Commentary, p. 327 and Singleton, Commentary, pp. 746-7) 
and have pity for him. Beatrice does not take pity on him for the reason that this would mean that she had 
compassion upon him, which implies a participation in his passion, putting herself in his place as we saw in 
Inferno V. Thus in contrast to Dante's immediate compassion for Francesca and Paolo which leads to his 
fall, Beatrice does not allow herself to put herself in his place until he is fully broken by his sins and 
repentant, at which point he has experienced a mind change and is on the right path, thereby avoiding any 
trace of sin. (She would have made a good guardian in Plato's Republic. ) 
* Though dry-eyed when faced with Beatrice's harshness, the compassion of the angels through the sweet 
harmonies (Grandgent refers here to Paradiso I. 78,82) melts Dante's heart into a flood of tears (Boyde, 
pp. 156-8) so that "the ice that was bound about my heart turned to breath and water and with anguish 
came forth from my breast by mouth and eyes" (XXX, 85-90; See Musa, Commentary, p. 328; Grandgent, 
Commentary, p. 587 refers to Lucan, Phars. IX, 528-32,538-39 and Psalm 68: 2). This is a palpable 
expression of the outpouring of grief which realistically describes sorrow, imagistically using all phases in 
the water cycle (Boyde, pp. 156-8). 
9 Grandgent, Commentary, p. 588. 
10 "Pur ferma" (100) unmoved, in her lack of pity, Beatrice addresses the angels, "the pitiful spirits" 
(Grandgent, Commentary, p. 588; Singleton in Commentary, p. 750 refers to Convivio II, iv, 2), as those 
who are eternally present before God (XXX, 103-5). Given then that they see everything, though she 
addresses them she speaks for Dante's benefit, "that he should hear me who weeps yonder, so that sin and 
sorrow may be of one measure" (XXX, 107-9), that his sadness for his sins be equal to the amount and 
severity of his sins committed, so that in being deeply and proportionately grieved concerning every sin he 
has committed, he may have a "Godly sorrow" (see 2 Corinthians 7: 9-11; Also see Matthew 5: 34). This 
assumes the existence of a hierarchy of sins which considering Romans 3: 23 and 6: 23 is not biblical though 
firmly established in medieval Christian doctrine. 
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indicate in what way Dante sinned. She explains how he has wasted his good potential. 
" 
Not only was he born with great natural gifts/ "advantages" due to the arrangement of the 
stars at his birth (Convivio IV, xxi, 7 and Grandgent, p. 588), a potential which he applied 
to negative sinful uses, but also he was allotted by Heaven a special gift of God's grace, 
which includes the presence and influence of Beatrice herself during his youth (Sayers 
Commentary, line 115), "Beatrice" meaning a woman who "confers 
blessedness.. 
.. 
blessed (benedetta, Beata)" see Vita Nuova 23,29 (Gilbert, p. 139); 
"Never did nature or art set before thee beauty so great as the fair members in which I 
was enclosed" (XXXI, 49-51). 12 This second kind of grace "ne la sua Vita Nuova" (in his 
young life, XXX, 116, referring to the "Vita Nuova") brought about a rebirth through his 
love for Beatrice13 through pointing him towards God. 14 However when she died, when 
she "changed life" from temporal flesh to eternal spirit15 thereby increasing in "beauty 
and virtue", she became "less dear to him and less welcome and he bent his steps in a 
way not true following after false images of good which fulfil no promise" (XXX, 127- 
132). Dante did not recognize this "improvement" as he was too concentrated upon the 
things he could see, 16 things of the flesh as opposed to those of the spirit (cf. Augustine, 
11 Uneven distribution of grace (see Thomas Aquinas, De virtutibus cardinalibus a. 2, ad 1 in Basic 
Writings) is explained by the stars in Convivio, IV, xxi, 7, and as incomprehensible for man (Singleton, 
Commentary, p. 750 and Grandgent, Commentary, p. 588). 
12 Resembling Song of Songs 2: 2, Beatrice was the most beautiful creature whether in nature or art that 
ever Dante encountered, a "miracle" performed by God. She exemplified the donna angelica of Guinizzelli 
causing utter delight in her lover referring back to the joie of courtly love (Symonds, "The Dantesque and 
Platonic Ideals of Love", p. 77) and perhaps resembling a mystical ecstasy. Though piacer (line 49) means 
both beauty and pleasure/delight, Singleton believes that in this context Dante is speaking about Beatrice's 
beauty in that it outshines everything else in creation for him. 
Here, as before, piacer is ambiguous. Line 50 speaks of a "`beauty' or perhaps a `delight, ' but the 
meaning `beauty' seems predominant, as Beatrice's `placer' is said to surpass any created by nature or by 
art. [Furthermore] `placer, ' two verses later, continues with the meaning `beauty' as the predominant 
sense" (Singleton, Commentary, p. 764). 
13 Though line 116 may be translated in his "new life", it means "possibly merely `his early life'... In view 
of the title of the Vita Nuova, Beatrice probably means that `new life' on which he entered when, through 
her means, he first knew himself to be in a state of grace" (Sayers, Commentary, p. 313). 
'4 In line 123 this journey's description as drittaparte volto "turned toward God" is comparable to Inf. I, 3: 
"la diritta via" (Singleton, Commentary, p. 752). 
is What Dante in the Convivio (IV, xxiv, 2) calls "mutai vita, " changed life (Sinclair, p. 125). "Mutaa" 
(XXX, 125) suggests the change from "the temporal for the eternal. " (Grandgent, Commentary, p. 589) or 
as Sayers writes "life for life exchanged: exchanged this life for the life of eternity" (Sayers, Commentary, 
p. 314). 
16 "According to the codifications of courtly love and the practice of the Stilnovists, [love] is tied to the 
eyes. He who is blind, we are told, cannot love. We also know that love, though itself blindfolded, opens 
the lover's eyes. What we are probably less familiar with is the insight that was overtly formulated by no 
less an intellectualist than St. Thomas Aquinas. Among all the senses, sight is the one the lover values 
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Confessions 10: 38) and turned away on the wrong path (Inferno 1: 3) to pursue false 
images of the good rather than the Good itself, which would be reached through the 
mediation of Beatrice. '? These false images of the good "fulfill no promise, " the nulla 
promession rendono intera (XXX, 132), 18 in that while they promise a true eternal 
perfection, they are actually temporal and false, hence imperfect and in this deceitful 
nature prove treacherous. 19 
So far Dante's specific sins remain ambiguous and undefined, but in Purgatorio 
XXXI lines 58-60, Beatrice returns to the matter: "No young girl or other vanity of such 
brief worth should have bent thy wings downward to await more shots. " While pargoletta 
means "young maid" suggesting an actual girl or temptation away from an old 
fidelity/commitment, the youth of pargoletta is connected to "fledgling" (augelletto, line 
61) which stresses the youth and immaturity of Dante which, as Singleton notes, is later 
emphasized by Beatrice's comment concerning Dante's beard (line 75), suggesting that 
though he is a man he is behaving childishly. 20 Yet this does not clarify the nature of the 
sin concerning the pargoletta which is subject to considerable debate among 
commentators. Grandgent maintains that the pargoletta was an actual woman, 21 perhaps 
most: `ubi amor ibi oculus'. More than anything else-as even the story of Psyche spying Eros asleep 
reminds us-he who loves wants to see the beloved. Seeing is privileged because it is never partitioned, 
but, on the contrary, it affords direct, immediate Perception of the whole: ' (Mazzotta, Dante's Vision, "The 
Dream of the Siren", pp. 152-3) Once Dante loses sight of Beatrice he loses his devotion, his love and his 
way. Beatrice's message to him is not to focus upon the outer beauty which fades but to cherish the inner 
beauty and virtue which last eternally. 
"Boethius uses the phrase "imagines veri bona" (the images of the true good) in Cons., III, Pr. ix. Cf. Purg. 
XVI, 91 (Grandgent, Commentary, p. 589). Also "compare the dream of the antica strega, Purg. XIX, 7- 
24" (Singleton, Commentary, p. 753). 
18 Boethius, III, viii, 11.1-3,31-35. 19 In Convivio IV, xii, 2-4, Dante states: "And here be it known that defective things may harbour their 
defects in such fashion that they appear not at first sight, the imperfection hiding under a pretext of 
perfection... And those things which at first conceal their defects are the most dangerous; because, in many 
cases, we cannot be on our guard against them... The false traitoresses ever promise to make him who 
gathers them full of satisfaction ... and with this promise they 
lead the human will to the vice of avarice. " 
(cited by Singleton, Commentary, pp. 753-4) Such, in fact, was the significance of all the physical defects 
of the woman in the dream of Purgatorio, XIX. See also Smarr, "Poets of Love and Exile", p. 146. 
20 Musa, Commentary, p. 337. 
21 Also see Musa, Commentary, p. 328; Singleton, Commentary, pp. 752-3; Moore, "The Reproaches of 
Beatrice", Third Series, p. 230. Grandgent points firstly to "Dante's second dream of a siren (Purgatorio 
XIX, 19) [which] represented the sins of the flesh". Secondly to the fact that the angels sing Psalm 51 
which David wrote after committing adultery with Bathsheba among other things. Thirdly to the emphasis 
on placer as physical beauty implying physical desire for which the other poets of the Dolce Stil Nuovo are 
being purged on the mount of Purgatory. And fourthly to Dante's identification of Francesca's notion of 
love in Inferno V which echoes his early poetry, explaining why at the end of Canto V he faints in that he 
recognizes himself in her and also recognizes that he has been deceived. Shapero (Woman, Earthly and 
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the donna gentile who pitied him after the death of Beatrice, an infatuation of which he 
was ashamed (Vita Nuova, XXXVII-XXX X) and about which he was defensive 
(Convivio, I, ii, 15-17), covering it up through naming her Lady Philosophy in the 
Con-vivid (II, xii) until his confession in the Commedia. 22 Others have considered this a 
moral lapse and/or intellectual offence, 23 the forsaking of Theology for Philosophy, as in 
the case of Pietro, 24 Nardi, u Moore'26 and Thompson'27 though as Grandgent points out 
this seems a transition for which there is no clear evidence. 28 However as we saw in the 
last chapter, whether involving a woman or a moral/intellectual lapse or both, Dante's sin 
can be seen as his prioritization of and devotion to deceptive lesser forms of goodness 
above the greatest good which indicates an inappropriate "ordering of love", 29 as we saw 
in our discussion of Purgatorio XXX 71-6. 
As a result of turning away from Beatrice, and therefore from the path leading to 
God, though Beatrice tried to elicit his attention without success, 30 "he fell so low that all 
Divine, p. 80) believes the pargoletta is either a woman or a symbol of femininity of which the pilgrim 
must be purged. 
u Musa, Commentary, p. 328; Grandgent, Commentary, p. 592, Singleton, Commentary, p. 764. 
23 Musa, Commentary, p. 337. 
24 Pietro viewed "Beatrice allegorically as Theology, which he abandoned to follow his little maid 
symbolizing poetry and worldly knowledge, philosophy". (See Pietro, On Cantos 30,31 in Gilbert, pp. 
141-6; cf. Augustine's discussion of the Aeneid in the Confessions and Plato's view of the poet in the 
Republic. ) 
25 Nardi ("Filosofia dellAmore", p. 63) seems to believe that Dante forsook Beatrice for philosophy but 
realizing her to be a cold, unloving mistress returned to Beatrice and theology. 
26 For Moore, Dante's love for God and his devotion to theology and religion which had cooled because of 
the death of Beatrice was substituted with philosophy, though he never rejected theology completely. 
(Moore, "The Reproaches of Beatrice", Third Series, pp. 238,248-9; see also Sinclair, pp. 411-12). 
27 Thompson considers that the pargoletta represents an abortive philosophical voyage leading to death. 
"The Convivio is unfinished because it represented a via non vera that led towards spiritual shipwreck: 
Philosophy cannot do what Boethius' lady had claimed, and Dante must make a different journey-the 
Augustinian journey of the self. " (Thompson, Dante's Epic Journeys, pp. 66-71) 
28 According to Grandgent (p. 592) "his admiration [for philosophy] never waned; throughout the 
Commedia as in the Convivio, she is the handmaid of religion and, though not omniscient, the guide to 
revelation". Clearly Dante has made a decisive turn towards an Augustinian path but this turn is informed 
by philosophy. 
29 Mazzeo, Structure and Thought, pp. 120-121. Beatrice is charging Dante with sinning against God, 
echoing Psalm 51: 4, through idolatry (Galatians 5: 20), putting things before God, or in this case the pursuit 
of God through the mediation of Beatrice, thus resulting in a lowering of Dante's moral standards (see 
Moore, "The Reproaches of Beatrice", Third Series, p. 249). 
30 "Nor did it avail me to gain inspirations from him with which both in dream and in other ways I called 
him back, so little did he heed them. " (See Vita Nuova, XXXIX, 1-3; XLI, 10-13; and the "mirabile 
visione" ("wondrous vision") of XLII, 1; Grandgent, Commentary, p. 589. ) She tried to attract his attention 
through visions and unrecorded dreams (Singleton, Commentary, p. 754) echoing Acts 2: 17 (and Joel 2: 
28-32), which she gained through imploring God on his behalf, indicating her love for him. However he did 
not heed the dreams and visions "so little did it matter to him". (Singleton, Commentary, p. 754) 
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means for his salvation now came short except to show him the lost people" (XXX, 136- 
138). Given the level of Dante's degradation, 31 Dante's descent into Hell was necessary, 
the only possibility open to him, a point made by Virgil in Purg. I, 62-63 (Singleton, 
Commentary, p. 755) when he said to Cato "there was no other way but this on which I 
have set out. " Therefore, out of necessity to save his soul Beatrice journeyed to the gate 
of the dead (Inferno II, 52) and cried for him both to God and to Virgil (Inferno II, 11632; 
also see Purg. XXVII, 137) which reflects her concern for him and his salvation 33 
2. The Confession 
According to XXX, 142-145, in obedience to God's highest decree34, Beatrice 
must make Dante face and confess his sins which separate him from God35 and weep in 
deep regret (2 Corinth 7: 9-11) so that his heart will be contrite (Psalm 51: 17) and may 
change deeply within. Following her explanation, she turns again to Dante and scolds 
31 Musa, Commentary, p. 329. 
32 Shapero, Dante and the Knot of Body and Soul, pp. 130-131. 
" With regard to Beatrice's feelings for Dante, Chiampi (pp. 51-53) incorrectly believes that Beatrice only 
really cries from Dante's violation of God's law. However Chiampi seems not to have noted, first that 
Dante correlates Beatrice's relation to Dante with Venus' relation to Aeneas in Aeneid I, which is that of a 
mother to a son indicating maternal concern and protection as we saw in the last chapter. And, second, 
Chiampi seems not to have fully recognized the role of Beatrice as the expression of grace for Dante. In 
contrast to Chiampi's image of an iron clad Beatrice who is entirely indifferent to Dante, Charles Williams 
holds that Beatrice is motivated by both Divine and personal love for Dante to descend into Hell to save 
him. "It is thus the passionate and directed love of Beatrice which begins and sustains the Comedy - she of 
whom we know nothing except that she could be believed to do so, nothing but that she is the great 
archetype in poetry of all the shes, and yet they are themselves and not she, nothing but that there was a girl 
who was that as she walked and chattered and laughed in Florence.. . It 
is so that she laughs and teases and 
chatters and explains in Heaven, only with a greatness about her, the greatness of Heavenly fate, and the 
customs and metaphysics of the redeemed City. It is through her that energy comes, and as by her the New 
Life had once been written and the poetry of Dante had begun, so now in the newer life it is she who moves 
Virgil and poetry to initiate the Return. " (Charles Williams, The Descent of the Dove, p. 135) Though 
Williams sadly exaggerates the actual romantic character of Beatrice, Beatrice's true affection for Dante, 
already noted through her connection with the Venus of the Aeneid, is evident in Christian imagery through 
her role as the messenger of God bringing God's grace, and in that she acts as his attentive guide through 
Paradiso. Nonetheless though more subtle than Williams suggests, her personal feeling is indicated at the 
end of Paradiso (XXXI, 91-3) when Beatrice gazes back at Dante. (See the Italian or the Singleton 
translation, as the Sinclair translation seems misleading concerning these specific lines. ) 
34 Fato di Dio means "Decree of God, which is what the pagan concept of fate became in Christian 
doctrine, See Augustine, De civ. Dei V, i-ix, 4; Boethius, Consol. Philos. IV, vi, Il. 1-86; Thomas Aquinas, 
Summa theol. I, q. 116, a. 2 and a. 4" (Singleton, Commentary, p. 755). 
3,5 Addressing him as "0 thou that art on that side of the sacred river, "(XXXI, 1) indicates that he has not 
crossed Lethe nor has he "crossed over from death to life" (John 5: 24) meaning that he is still separated 
from God (Isaiah 59: 1-2) still walking in darkness (1John 1: 5-6). 
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him; 36 Beatrice as the Word of God (Hebrews 4: 12-13) speaks as "turning against [him] 
the point of her speech which even with the edge had seemed sharp to [him]" (XXXI, 2- 
3) and insists, "Say, say if this is true; to such an accusation thy confession must needs be 
joined" (XXXI, 5-6). Having addressed him directly by name (Purg. XXX, 55), then 
indicating his guilt to the angels and indirectly to him which "`wounded' [the pilgrim] 
only with the `blade' [she now]... has turned the `sword point' on him, " (Musa, 
Commentary) to attack him directly and cut him with her "double-edged" words 
(Hebrews 4: 12) in order to bring about his own personal confession which is necessary 
for him to be reconciled with God (I John 1: 9_10). 37 
With this encouragement, "confusion and fear mingled together drove forth from 
my mouth a [Si] Yes such that to hear it there was need of sight" (XXXI, 13-15). Still 
resembling the shy Dante of the Vita Nuova the "si" seen only through the movement of 
the lips is "completely inaudible". 38 This weakness of speech Dante compares to a "cross- 
bow [which when] shot with too great strain breaks the cord and bow and the shaft 
touches the mark with less force, so I broke down under that heavy charge, pouring forth 
tears and sighs, and my voice failed in its passage" (XXXI, 16-21). Compared to a cross- 
bow cranked too far back39 Dante breaks under the tension, resulting in an "[eruption] in 
a storm of sighs and tears" (Boyde, pp. 156-8), recalling his melting into tears in XXX, 
85-99. Appropriately "breaking" means contritio40, so the breaking of the bow 
corresponds to the breaking of the heart. 41 Echoing the powerlessness resulting from deep 
36 Boyde, p. 155. 
37 Confession is an integral part of repentance. If one does not understand how one has sinned, what sin is, 
and acknowledge one's guilt, it is impossible to change, repent, metanoein. Examples of pre-Christian 
confession- Leviticus 26: 40-2, Psalm 38: 18, Matt 3: 6. 
38 Boyde, pp. 156-8. 
39 "Porena notes that the crossbow could be cranked up mechanically to a tension far greater than that 
possible with the ordinary hand-drawn bow. " (Singleton, Commentary, p. 757) 
40 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol. III, suppl. I writes, "As stated in Ecclus. X. 15, pride is the beginning of 
all sin, because thereby man clings to his own judgment, and strays from the Divine commandments. 
Consequently that which destroys sin must needs make man give up his own judgment ... And since, 
for the 
remission of sin, it is necessary that man should put aside entirely his attachment to sin, which implies a 
certain state of continuity and solidity in his mind, therefore it is that the act through which sin is cast aside 
is called contrition metaphorically.... Another definition is given by Isidore (De Sum. Bono, ii, 12) as 
follows: Contrition is a tearful sorrow and humility of mind, arising from remembrance of sin and fear of 
the Judgment. Here we have an allusion to the derivation of the word, when it is said that it is humility of 
the mind, because just as pride makes the mind rigid, so is a man humbled, when contrition leads him to 
give up his mind. " (Singleton, Commentary, pp. 758-9) 
41 Singleton, Commentary, p. 758. 
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sorrow expressed in the Aeneid42, with a "voice about to fail" (XXXI, 21) his voice like a 
"shaft" hits its target "with diminished force". Due to the accuracy of her blow, the truth 
of her accusations which pierce his heart, he is left powerless, confessing as if pouring 
out "insieme parole e sangue" like Pier della Vigna in Inferno XIII, 43-44 ("so from the 
broken splinter came forth words and blood together ")a3. 
Dante confesses, 44 "Present things45 with their false pleasure turned my steps as soon 
as your face [vostro viso] was hid" (XXXI, 34-36). In line 35, "colfalso for placer", 
there remains some ambiguity concerning piacer. 46 While referring to "false pleasures" it 
also means "false beauty" which opposes the true beauty of Beatrice and the placer of 
Beatrice of line 50. This false placer furthermore resembles the use of placer by Paolo 
and Francesca in Inferno V. Francesca says "Amor.. mi prese del constui placer s`i forte" 
("Love ... seized me so strongly with 
his charms"; Inferno V, 104). As we saw in "Falling 
for Francesca", for Francesca false pleasures are related to false beauty, both of which 
are temporal and carnal. Likewise the false pleasures of Purgatorio XXX, 35-36 from 
the moment of her death turned Dante aside from pursuing the truer spiritual beauty of 
Beatrice which leads to the ultimate pleasure and beauty of God. 
7 This confirms Dante's 
great compassion and weakness for Francesca are derived from their mutual weakness, 
42 This image of powerlessness through sorrow echoes Aeneid XI, 150-151: "He clings to him weeping and 
moaning, and scarce from sorrow at the last does his speech find open way" (Grandgent, Commentary, p. 
594). Virgil departed lives on through Dante the pilgrim as if Virgil like liquid runs through his veins, 
informing the way he reflects upon and understands the universe. 
43 For discussions concerning emotional tension within the soul see Phaedrus 253d-254e and Republic 
Books 3 and 4 as well as within the Christian tradition Romans 7 and Galatians 5. 
" Boyde, pp. 156-8. 
's "Le presenti cose, 'present things' refer to things that were before Dante's eyes and his mind's eye after 
Beatrice's death, as her face no longer was. `Presenti' is thus opposed to Beatrice's absent beauty, which 
once led toward God (vss. 23.24). " (Singleton, Commentary, p. 761) 
46 "Piacere in Dante's usage lends itself to this ambiguity (cf. Inf. V, 104; Purg. XVIH, 21 and 27). The 
`placer' of present things anticipates and opposes Beatrice's 'placer' (vs. 50), where again the ambiguity of 
the term continues" (Singleton, Commentary, p. 762). 
" Beatrice then mentions Dante's "desires for me which were leading thee in love of the good beyond 
which there is nothing to be longed for" (XXXI, 22-24). The good, bene, which is the end of desire is God. 
"This `bene' is, by definition, God, since only in Him can our desires and our love find rest and so have no 
need to aspire further. " (Singleton, Commentary, p. 760) Singleton's reading seems influenced by 
Augustine's Confessions 1,1 and XIll, 10. Virtuous love of the creation (in that it is directed at an object of 
virtue) leads to love of the Creator (see Confessions X, 9; also Sayers, Commentary, p. 319) Thus the love 
of Dante for Beatrice, made in the image of God, leads him beyond her to the ultimate good which is God. 
In this way Dante is reworking courtly love and thereby rewriting Guinizelli and the Dolce Stil Nuovo to 
serve Christian ends. This also explains the repeated analogy between Christ and Beatrice. Christ the Logos 
of God is reflected in "beloved" Beatrice, God's creation as the particularized means by which Dante's 
salvation and reconciliation with God is brought about. 
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love of false temporal carnal forms of beauty and pleasures48. 
3. Acknowledgement of Confession and Instruction in Repentance 
As God is the omniscient judge before whom we must give an account (Hebrews 
4: 13), Dante cannot fool God. If he had tried to deceive Beatrice and therefore God, his 
sin would have remained (1John 1: 8-10; also see John 9: 41). Through admitting that he 
has sinned/confessing his sins, God forgives him and he is purified of all 
unrighteousness 49 
Beatrice then explains how Dante may "now bear the shame of thy wandering and 
another time, hearing the Sirens, be stronger" (XXXI, 44-45) and avoid making the same 
mistakes in the future 50 Dante's interaction with Beatrice will make him self-aware, 
possess self-knowledge "waking him up" through unveiling the Siren's false promises, 5' 
so that he may "prove [his] repentance by [his] deeds" (Acts 26: 20). To this end he must 
stop weeping and listen52 to avoid being controlled by his emotion thereby falling into 
self-pity. 53 As her fair members "crumbled in dust [so that] ... the 
highest beauty [failed 
him in] death, what mortal thing should then have drawn [him] into desire for it? " 
48 Augustine's Confessions 3: 1; also see Confessions 4: 10 concerning physical beauty and pleasure. 
" "But when from a man's own cheek breaks forth condemnation of his sin, in our court the wheel turns 
back against the edge" (XXXI, 42). When a man in confessing blushes (or his blush may be a confession; 
Grandgent, Commentary, p. 595), he is ashamed of and condemns himself for his sin. In contrast to earthly 
courts (Musa, Commentary, p. 336) at this moment in Heaven, "`the grindstone turns back against the 
edge': the sword of justice is blunted... tempered with mercy" (Grandgent, Commentary, p. 595). Drawing 
upon the image of the sword wound (cf. )CXXI, 3-4 and XXX, 56-57), as the sword is made blunt by the 
grindstone, so the sword of God's justice is made blunt by God's mercy, the image echoing Isaiah 2: 4 in 
which an instrument of war and death is made into a instrument of cultivation, life and peace. 
50 Mazzotta, Dante's Vision, "The Dream of the Siren, " p. 150. 
51 Mazzotta, Dante's Vision, "The Dream of the Siren, " p. 150. 
52 To this end she says "pon giu il seme del piangere, ed ascolta", "lay aside the sowing of tears and 
hearken"(Sinclair) indicating that he is so overcome with sorrow and emotion that he cannot rationally 
focus upon what she says, or according to Musa, "put down the seeds of crying and listen". However 
according to Psalm 126: 5; "Those who sow in tears will reap with songs of joy" (NIV), which indicates 
that he is truly grieved over his sins, but that this sorrow will lead to joy. Now, however, he must stop being 
controlled by his emotions which could at this point lead to worldly sorrow (2 Corinthians 7: 10), and listen 
to her as opposed to the Sirens. 
s' This points to a problem with the Medieval Christian judgment that passion/emotion dominating reason 
is sin. While the sin in lussuria is passion dominating reason, the moment of ultimate sorrow and regret is 
likewise reason dominated by the passion/emotion of sorrow. As the first is sin and the latter is positive and 
absolutely necessary for salvation, there appears to be a problem with the Medieval view of lussuria which 
Dante subscribes to, particularly as the Christian God is a God of compassion (Exodus 34: 6) and grace 
(John 1: 14,16). 
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(XXXI, 49-57) Rather than being fixated upon the physical beauty of Beatrice, thereby 
losing his way at her death, he should have concluded from her death54 that, as the 
physical realm is transitory and false, he henceforth should have devoted himself to and 
followed Beatrice to God 55 
Up to this point we have watched Beatrice rebuke Dante for his sins until his heart 
is contrite and repentant upon which she demands a confession. Thus with a broken heart 
he confesses after which she proceeds to admonish him and instruct him as to what he 
ought to have done faced with her death so that he may prove his repentance by his 
deeds. This takes us through recognition of error and confession of error. Then to make 
the recognition complete she tells him to look into her eyes56 which reflect the knowledge 
of God, and likewise act as a reflection of God, as a means to drive home his error and to 
begin the unveiling of the beauty of God, which will act as a lure to lead Dante to 
Heaven. 
Though at the end of Paradiso, Dante will look up at Beatrice "exalted" beneath 
the Virgin Mary and Eve echoing Acts 2: 3357, here looking up, Dante focuses in upon 
Beatrice who "turned towards the beast which is one sole person in two natures. Beneath 
her veil and beyond the stream, she seemed to me to surpass her former self more than 
she surpassed the others here when she was with us" (XXXI, 80-84). 58 Immediately 
Dante recognizes the truth in what Beatrice has said, indeed how more beautiful and 
virtuous she has become since her "vita mutat"', and therefore how much more loveable 
and more deserving of love . 
59 Though according to the Vita Nuova before her death, 
"Beatrice was not only a woman but one of the most beautiful angels of Heaven" (Musa, 
Commentary, p. 338) now Beatrice's beauty surpasses the conception of the donna 
54 Mazzotta, Dante's Vision, "The Dream of the Siren", p. 150. ss Beatrice's correction may be pointing towards Augustine's response to the death of his friend (see 
Confessions 4: 4) which developed a deep awareness of the "transitoriness of all things set against the 
undying beauty of God" (Watson, Greek Philosophy and the Christian Notion of God, p. 96; see 
Confessions 4,10). Augustine thereby recognized the temporality of the physical world and so began a 
pursuit of the eternal good, God. Augustine responded to the death of his friend in precisely the way 
Beatrice wished and thought Dante should have responded to her death. (Also see Barolini, "Dante and the 
Lyric Past", p. 24. ) 
$6 Singleton, Commentary, p. 765. 
s' This is a moment when Dante the poet has been seen as moving towards heresy. 
58 The two natures of the beast "who in two natures is one single being, " symbolize the "two natures of 
Christ: divine and human" (Musa, Commentary, p. 338). They are formulated imagistically as "literally, 
part eagle and part lion" (Singleton, Commentary, p. 766). 
s' Mazzotta, Dante's Vision, p. 151. 
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angelica of Guinizelli and the Dolce Stil Nuovo which influenced the Vita Nuova, 
through the augmentation of her already angelic beauty through her relation with Christ. 
This mixture of divine and human beauty in Beatrice continues the symbolism of the dual 
nature of Christ, so that she represents the image of God gazing towards God therefore 
leading the pilgrim towards God. This image of the beautified Beatrice turned towards 
the Griffin therefore eliminates the opposition between ma Dame et mon Dieu, inherited 
from the tradition of courtly love, reconciling the courtly love tradition and Christianity. 
This fact for Dante the poet makes her infinitely more beautiful, because she becomes the 
solution to the problem, the point where the different traditions come together and are 
renegotiated, reconciled and this reconciliation is affirmed empowering her as a poros 
figure. 60 
4. Conversion by Immersion 
Upon this recognition of her increase in beauty, rather than being the source of 
"unalloyed delighti61, "the nettle of remorse so stung [Dante] there that of all other things 
that which had most bent [him] to the love of it became for [him] the most hateful; such 
self-conviction bit [him] at the heart" (XXXI, 85-90). At the sight of Beatrice he 
recognizes the fullness of his betrayal in turning away from both her and God to follow 
worldly "false pleasures". The word "pente? ' or nettles may perhaps suggest the idea of 
thorns, referring to Christ's crown of thorns worn by Jesus during the crucifixion (Mark 
15: 17-18), and/or be suggestive of the cutting by nail when he was crucified. This 
allusion to the piercing of Christ at the crucifixion is made or strengthened by the next 
line 88, "self-conviction bit me at the heart" (Tanta riconoscennza il cor ini morse) in that 
it seems to refer to the moment in Acts 2: 36-7 when those listening at Pentecost to Peter 
were "cut to the heart" upon recognizing that they were personally responsible for the 
death of Christ due to their sins. This suggests that Dante the pilgrim recognizes the 
relationship between the cross and his sins, that Christ died for his sins (I Peter 2: 24) and 
that he through his sin crucified Christ (Acts 2: 36). At this point "all other things that 
60 As a Christ-f igure this echoes Acts 2: 28: "You have made known to me the paths of life; you will fill me 
with joy in your presence". 61 Boyde, pp. 156-8. 
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which had most bent me to the love of it became for me the most hateful" (XXXI, 86-7), 
recalling Paul's description of his change of heart in Philippians 3: 7-8: "But whatever 
was to my profit I now consider loss for the sake of Christ' . 
62 
As a result of this recognition, Dante "fell overcome and what [he] became then 
she knows who was the cause of it" (XXXI, 89-90); Dante swooned and passed out 
having recognized the full extent of his sin. 3 However this swooning and ultimately 
finding himself in the river of Lethe in which he in turn is baptized/immersed (again 
following Peter's instructions in Acts 2: 38), is participating in the death, burial and 
resurrection of Jesus Christ. He has been crucified with Christ in recognizing and being 
cut by his sins (Romans 6: 6; the rebuke leading to the penter nettles, thorns, nails-Acts 
2: 37) has died to his sins (Romans 6: 7; 1Peter 2: 24) dramatized by his swooning to be 
raised to a "new life" (Romans 6: 4), a true Vita Nuova. 
This fainting recalls Dante's fainting in Inferno Canto V. However, once again 
this correlation has a far deeper meaning. When Dante swoons in Inferno V, he 
symbolically dies because through his compassion he participates in the passion of Paolo 
and Francesca and therefore dies in sin (Ephesians 2: 1), associating him with Hell. This 
distinguishes Francesca as aporetic-without a way or passage, unable to find a way out 
of the Hell of her mind as she is so tangled with sin, denying all guilt both morally and 
socially, refusing to repent of it, but instead denies her own responsibility while shifting 
the blame to everyone else for her fate. Here Dante's fainting is out of repentance, a 
dying to sin and participating in the death, burial and resurrection of Christ. Dante in 
contrast with Francesca accepts responsibility for his sins and is so cut by his guilt that he 
cries, sweats, is overcome and distraught and finally faints, showing his full recognition 
of guilt and desire to repent. The weakness in Dante's description biblically is that at no 
point does Dante articulate a decision to live differently, repentance meaning "mind 
change" (metanoia), but is swept away in a tide of emotion/passion and poetry which, as 
we saw in Inferno V with Francesca, is Dante's basic problem/issue. In this context we 
see that his repentance opens the passage, made possible by Jesus' death and sacrifice, 
allowing Dante to escape the aporia of Francesca while showing Jesus to be the true 
62 See also Luke 14: 26 and Matthew 10: 37-8. 
63 Grandgent, Commentary, p. 597; Musa, Commentary, p. 338. 
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Poros (or Resource) or "the Way" to salvation (John 14: 6) the messenger of whom is 
Beatrice. Therefore Dante, rather than swooning as with Francesca participating in her 
death and damnation, here faints out of horror over his sin, out of repentance, dying to his 
sin into which he was lured by the sirens, which as with godly sorrow leads to life and 
salvation (2 Corinthians 7: 10). While Inferno V ends with Dante's swoon into death, in 
Purgatorio XXXI, following the swoon into baptism, the canto continues describing his 
rising to a new life through being crowned with the holy Spirit and being reunited with 
Beatrice, who then leads him to God. 
Having been drawn across the river by Matilda" who is walking on the water, 
resembling Christ walking on the water65 (XXXI, 91-96), when Dante had almost reached 
"the blessed shore66, [he] heard `Asperges me'... sweetly sung", Asperges me, borrowed 
from Psalm 51: 7, meaning "Cleanse me of sin". 67 As the "frgura Christi, cleansing man 
of his sins" (Musa, Commentary, p. 339) Matilda "the fair lady opened her arms, clasped 
my head and plunged me under, where I must swallow the water" (XXXI, 100-103). She 
fully immerses him in the waters of baptism completing his biblical path according to 
Acts 2: 38 towards the forgiveness of his sins, 68 and the receiving of the Holy Spirit, as we 
6' "Matilda seems to be assigned the task of administering the waters of Lethe and Eunoe to all those souls 
who reach the Earthly Paradise. That she does not perform the task only for the Pilgrim will be 
demonstrated in Purgatorio XXXIII, 134-35, when she invites Statius, too, to drink from the waters of 
Eunoe. " (Musa, Commentary, p. 339) 
65 Matthew 14: 25; incidentally Peter like Dante sinks and must be held onto, Matthew 14: 30-31. 
66 Singleton, Commentary, p. 769. 
67 "Cleanse me of sin with hyssop, that I may be purified; wash me, and I shall be whiter than snow. " This 
extraordinary psalm is a psalm of deep repentance written after Nathan confronted David for committing 
adultery with Bathsheba, getting her pregnant and killing her husband. This represents the moment when 
David was at his worst spiritually having done the most grievous sins of his lifetime. It also represents 
David at his best as he is fully broken before God, fully repentant and desperate for God's forgiveness. For 
these reasons it is an appropriate psalm for the angels to sing. Firstly, because as David, a "man after God's 
own heart" (1 Samuel 13: 14) had fallen into sin so Dante, a man blessed by God both in birth and grace, 
has likewise done. Secondly, like David, Dante was at his lowest point but also most humble point before 
God, and fully repentant. And lastly, this may also suggest that as the psalm was written after David slept 
with Bathsheba, got her pregnant and murdered her husband, Dante's sins are predominantly sins of the 
flesh, lust. 
68 There is an internal debate between the traditions around baptism which Dante practised and the 
scriptures which he accepted from the Bible concerning baptism. Singleton writes, "Dante's crossing of 
Lethe, immersed therein, is therefore the absolution which completes the act of penance as well as the 
pattern of justification.... The immersion [is]... a kind of baptism (but not an actual baptism, for the 
sacrament of baptism is not to be repeated). " According to the traditions of the Catholic Church of the 
Middle Ages, baptism "absolves from the guilt of original sin, penance from that of personal sin" 
(Singleton, Commentary, p. 770). Dante believed in infant baptism; in Inferno IV: 28-35 "little children" 
experienced "grief without torments" because "they have not baptism". However, Dante marks out the 
"pattern of justification" using scripture by which all sins are forgiven through baptism which demands a 
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shall soon see, which is the beginning of his new life as he is "born of water and 
spirit"(John 3: 3-5). During this baptism, Dante drank from the river Lethe following the 
pagan belief that the soul after death drinks from Lethe which wipes it clean through 
erasing memory of the past. 9 Therefore through both Christian and pagan imagery, the 
pagan always subordinate to the Christian, the poet enacts the purification of the soul of 
Dante the pilgrim and his rebirth. 
After his immersion and drink, the purification of his soul and intellect/mind, she 
"led me bathed [cleansed] into the dance of the four fair ones, and each covered me with 
her arms" (XXXI, 103-5). The "fair ones" are Beatrice's handmaids, the four infused 
cardinal virtues; Fortitude, Justice, Prudence and Temperance (see Musa, Commentary, p. 
340) who in covering him with their arms form a crown of virtue over him. 70 
Given the reading thus far of Acts 2: 36-9, these infused virtues can be interpreted 
as being the "gift of the Holy Spirit". Prophesying the coming and reign of Christ, in 
Isaiah 61: 1-3, Isaiah inspired by "the Spirit of the Sovereign Lord preaches good 
news.. . the year of the Lord's 
favour.. . to comfort all who mourn, and provide 
for those 
who grieve in Zion-to bestow on them a crown of beauty". The bestowal of crowns is 
rational/informed decision and personal faith (Col. 2: 12-14) as well as belief and repentance (Acts 2: 38, 
Ephesian 2: 12). The New Testament pattern of Baptism does not match that sketched by Singleton, and 
indeed appears to give little encouragement to the latter doctrines concerning infant baptism. This indicates 
that there is some discrepancy between the traditions Dante followed concerning baptism and what the 
scriptures prescribe concerning baptism. Significantly, as an adult Dante used the scriptures as the basis to 
inspire his imagery concerning his turning back to Beatrice and God, so that what has been called his 
"second baptism" (Musa, Commentary) describes a fully biblical baptism as described in Acts 2: 36-42, 
with some slight modifications concerning the drinking of Lethe. Nonetheless we must keep in mind that 
this tension is unresolved and that Dante tends to affirm both the traditions and the scriptures as both true, 
attempting to make peace and reconcile them as he did with Christianity and courtly love. 
69 We must distinguish between this baptism by immersion and drinking of the river Lethe, drinking of 
Lethe being an original addition to the Christian scheme of salvation by Dante. In antiquity the river Lethe 
was often referred to as the river from which souls drink after death causing them to forget the past. (In the 
"Myth of Er" of Plato's Republic all souls drink of the river Lethe after death before being reincarnated. 
The souls who drank less remembered more and made wiser choices concerning their next life. ) This is 
significant for Dante in that Hell is a place in which the soul cannot forget, being forever bound to its past 
memories. Dante's use of Lethe is a means to purify the souls' "emotional memory of sin" after baptism so 
that not only have they been forgiven but they forgive themselves and are unaffected by their past sins. 
Similarly "drinking of the waters of Eunoe, which the Pilgrim and Statius will do later on (XXXIII, 133- 
35), restores the memory of all good deeds" (see Purgatorio XXVIII, 127-29; Musa, Commentary, pp. 339- 
340). The image of drinking from the water of Lethe, alongside and at the same time as the immersion, 
suggests the coming together of the Christian and pagan culture, once again showing Dante's desire to 
affirm both, but which in their coming together and affirmation revive questions as to whether Virgil will 
be ultimately forgotten and damned, drawing into question the ethical design of the whole. 70 Musa, Commentary, p. 340; Singleton, Commentary, p. 773. 
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associated with the receiving of salvation through Christ. Thus possession of salvation is 
described as a "crown of life" (Revelation 2: 3), "a crown of righteousness" (2 Timothy 
4: 8), and "a crown that will last forever" (I Corinthians 9: 25). As the writer of Revelation 
warns "Hold onto what you have so that no one will take away your crown" (Revelation 
3: 11), it is clear that the disciples can lose their salvation. Given that David writes, "take 
not your holy Spirit from me" (Psalm 51: 11), this would imply that the crown is not only 
salvation but the Holy Spirit, so that to possess the Holy Spirit is equivalent to the 
promise of eternal salvation. Thus there seems to be an identification of crowns of virtue, 
salvation and the gift of the Holy Spirit. This view seems strengthened by Acts 2: 3-4, 
when the Holy Spirit, like "tongues of fire", came to rest on each of the apostles' heads. 
Thus it would seem that Dante's crown is salvation, a crowning with the Holy Spirit. This 
is further suggested in that the Virtues are infused into Dante's head after baptism. In 
Acts 2: 17 echoing Joel 2: 28, "in the last days, God.... will pour out [his] Spirit on all 
people" suggesting a sort of infusion, thus suggesting that Dante is in fact representing 
the giving of the gift of the Holy Spirit (following Acts 2: 38) as the infusion of the 
Virtues in the shape of a crown. 
The crowning with the cardinal virtues, suggesting the coming of the Holy Spirit, 
causes the inner strengthening of Dante resulting in the revelation of the nature of 
Beatrice. The four cardinal virtues say, "`Here we are nymphs and in Heaven we are 
stars. Before Beatrice descended to the world we were ordained to be her handmaids. We 
will bring thee to her eyes; but for the happy light that is within them the three on the 
other side, who look deeper, shall quicken thine" (XXXI, 106-111), the other three being 
the theological virtues. 7' "Preordained handmaids" does not indicate that the mortal 
Beatrice had a "pre-natal existence" but she was given natural cardinal virtues and 
scientia from birth to prepare her to receive the "revelation of grace"72 and sapientia and 
in this way was predestined (Ephesians 1: 4) specifically to be the instrument of Dante's 
salvation. Thus the virtues of scientia, the cardinal virtues, pursued through philosophy, 
as well as the theological virtues were with Beatrice by grace. The cardinal virtues, 
71 See Convivio (III, xiv, 15) referred to by Singleton, Commentary, p. 773. Dante in discussing Beatrice is 
also playing with the image of Athena as Sapientia, and Athens as Heaven, as the place where wisdom is 
achieved. 72 "The Natural Virtues were given to Man from the beginning, to attend on and prepare the special 
Revelation of Grace which entered the world at the Incarnation. " (Sayers, Commentary, p. 321) 
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through calling themselves the "preordained handmaids" of Beatrice, indicate that 
Beatrice is Sapientia73 as Philosophy is the handmaid to Theology, Scientia to Sapientia 
(Augustine, de Trinitate), 74 her understanding ultimately covering both scientia and 
sapientia. 75 Thus-following Dante's crowning with the Holy Spirit, Beatrice is revealed 
as Sapientia, thereby indicating that the Holy Spirit reveals wisdom and truth. 6 
5. The Unveiling of Beatrice 
Sapientia's identification with Beatrice makes more complex the representation of 
Beatrice in "that while echoing Sapientia's descent into the world accompanied by the 
virtues, Beatrice maintains her particular identity. 77 As Singleton reminds us, Dante takes 
Beatrice from the Vita Nuova both as a particular individual and as an ideal woman78 and 
merges her with the Lady Sapientia from the Convivio79 in the Commedia, thereby 
bringing together real life, courtly love and Christian theology into one individual, 
Beatrice. 
This complexity in turn is articulated more fully once the Virtues bring Dante 
towards Beatrice who faces the Griffin, at which point Beatrice assumes the role of 
"Revelation" (Singleton, Commentary, p. 775), revealed wisdom, as her wisdom begins 
" This is further suggested in that she has seven handmaids which represent the seven pillars of wisdom. 
See Proverbs 9: 1: "Wisdom has built her house, she has set up her seven columns. " 
" This suggests that Pietro's reading is incorrect. Philosophy is not the pargoletta but, as Grandgent 
maintains, acts as a support to Theology-acts as the handmaid of Theology-indicating in retrospect that 
the pargoletta is general worldliness including the sins of the flesh. 
75 Brandeis, A Ladder of Vision, p. 114. 
76 Given that Dante has been crowned with the Holy Spirit and then sees Sapientia, this raises the question 
as to what is the relationship between Sapientia and the Holy Spirit. Jesus says that he will send the Holy 
Spirit of truth (John 16: 7-11; John 1: 17; Acts 2: 18). Awareness/recognition of truth is wisdom, sapientia. 
Furthermore, in Genesis 1: 2 "the spirit of God was hovering over the waters. " This passage Augustine in 
his Confessions interprets as the Holy Spirit, part of the Trinity which along with the Logos was with God 
in the beginning prior to creation. Sapientia says in Proverbs 8: 22-23, "The Lord brought me forth as the 
first of his works, before his deeds of old; I was appointed from eternity, from the beginning, before the 
world". Clearly there is a close relationship between Sapientia and the Holy Spirit. Though Sapientia is not 
identical with the Holy Spirit as she is the first born, with the coming of the Holy Spirit Sapientia is 
revealed, wisdom is recognized. Thus the Spirit of truth reveals/brings the Wisdom of truth. 
77 Singleton, Commentary, p. 774. 
7e In Vita Nuova X, 2 "she is declared to be the `regina de le vertudi' ('queen of the virtues') and (in Vita 
Nuova XXVI, 6) `una Cosa venuta / da cielo in terra a miracol mostrare' ('a thing come from Heaven to 
earth, to show forth a miracle')" (Singleton, Commentary, p. 774) and a true example of the donna 
angelica. 
79 Singleton, Commentary, p. 774. 
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to be revealed. This unveiling is accomplished first through her eyes which at this point 
become the means by which her mortal and divine natures are revealed. The Nymphs 
initially direct Dante to "the emeralds from which love once shot his darts at thee" 
(XXXI, 115-117), the beautiful green eyes80 of the mortal Beatrice which in Florence ten 
years ago had overpowered him. 1 
However now Beatrice's eyes simultaneously reveal spiritual truths which 
strengthen Dante's hope. "Beatrice's shining eyes, which remained still fixed on the 
Griffin, and even like the sun in a mirror the two-fold beast shone within them, now with 
one, now with the other nature. Think, reader, if I marvelled when I saw the thing still in 
itself and in its image changing" (XXXI, 118-126). In the eyes of Beatrice, which 
functioned as a mirror reflecting the true nature of God, Dante saw the two-fold nature of 
Christ changing back and forth from mortal to immortal aspects which is the central 
mystery of Christianity82 suggesting Wisdom of Solomon 7: 26 in which "Sapientia is 
termed a mirror of the majesty of God. "83 Dante refers to Beatrice as being "like the sun 
in a mirror", he comparing her to a mirror reflecting the light of God. This image recalls 
Exodus 34: 29; when Moses wore a veil because his "face was radiant because he had 
spoken to the Lord". 84 Similarly, this image refers to disciples/Christians "who with 
unveiled faces all reflect the Lord's glory, are being transformed into his likeness with 
ever increasing glory, which comes from the Lord, who is the Spirit" (2 Corinthians 3: 
18). These are the precise terms in Paradiso I in which Dante describes Beatrice: as a 
mirror reflecting the sun giving the impression of two suns. 85 - There Beatrice as the 
reflection/image of God (Genesis 1: 27), reflects so strongly the light of God that it causes 
Dante to change within and empowers Dante to ascend to God. However, here the idea of 
her eyes as mirrors, reminiscent of First Alcibiades 132c-133c, 86 also suggests 1 Cor. 
13: 12: "We see now through a mirror in an obscure manner, then we shall see face to 
80 Contrary to Sayers (p. 321), Grandgent (p. 598) believes the meaning of green eyes has spiritual 
implications symbolically extending beyond the literal in that "green is considered to be the color of hope 
and the emerald, too, was thought to preserve and strengthen the sight". 
81 See Phaedrus 255c-d in which love is transmitted through the eyes. 
82 Singleton, Commentary, p. 766. 
83 Singleton, Commentary, p. 775, also p. 779. 
84 Also see Plato's Phaedo 99d. 
85 Paradiso I, lines 46-75. 
86 According to Barker (2002), as First Alcibiades was a text favoured by Neo-Platonist commentaries, 
there may be a Platonic influence with regard to this imagery. 
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face. " Dante sees God obscurely through her eyes rather than face to face and he can not 
understand the natures in Christ in their unity, 87 which will remain a mystery to the last 
moment. 88 
Thus we see that while maintaining her human nature, the "green eyes", she also 
through her eyes reveals Christ and in doing so her immortal nature. 89 Furthermore this 
human and divine alternation illuminates the use of Beatrice as a Christ-like figure and 
also the analogy between Christ and Beatrice. 90 In a sense she is a vessel that Christ has 
filled. (See 2 Corinthian 4: 7. ) While still her old self, she is now the new Beatrice with 
indwelling Christ, the human and immortal nature of Christ which she echoes and 
therefore doubly reveals. 91 
When Dante continues, "While my soul, full of amazement and gladness, tasted of 
that food which, satisfying with itself, for itself makes appetite" he alludes to the spiritual 
fulfilment he experiences gazing at Beatrice92 as satisfying his hunger for the truth of 
God 93 As if it is Beatrice through whom this food comes, Dante, as we also saw earlier, 
draws a correlation between Beatrice and the Host. 94 Therefore, Dante suggests that 
87 Musa, Commentary, p. 341. "Revealed theology analyzes the nature of Christ into its two component 
parts, although in reality they are eternally joined into one. " (Grandgent, p. 598) p. arts, 
at present Dante sees in part through the reflection of Beatrice's eyes eventually he will see 
face to face. (I Cor. 13: 12-13; Paradiso XXXIII, 127-45. For a different perspective see Charles Williams, 
The Descent of the Dove pp. 133-4. ) 
89 This is a significant modification of sight and eyes. Previously, as with the Dolce Stil Nuovo and courtly 
love, the lover loved with his eyes and the physical vision of the beloved was inseparable from the act of 
love, then Beatrice's physical beauty was Dante's "highest delight" (Purgatorio XXXI, 52). However, here 
the eyes and mouth have become the vehicles whereby spiritual truths are expressed. This marks the 
transition from eyes used to perceive false images of the good to the use of eyes to reveal and perceive the 
good itself. This latter view resembles Phaedrus 250d, 254b and also see Romans 1: 20. 
90 Brandeis, A Ladder of Vision, p. 117. 
91 Brandeis, A Ladder of Vision, p. 114. 
92 "The food that makes one hungrier is the Truth that comes through Revelation (Beatrice) and that points 
always to something higher, to Christ himself. " (Musa, Commentary, p. 341) 
93 First, Dante is paraphrasing the words of Sapientia in Ecclus. 24: 21: "They that eat me shall yet be 
hungry, and they that drink me shall yet be thirsty, " showing Beatrice to provide nourishing truth and 
wisdom as "man does not live on bread alone" (Matthew 4: 4). Second, Dante, seems to paraphrase 
Augustine's Confessions, 10,38: "I taste you, and I feel but hunger and thirst for you. " Sayers 
(Commentary, p. 128) interprets the "food" as meaning literally, love; allegorically the "food" is Christ 
(Sayers, Commentary, p. 321). Christ is referred to as the bread from Heaven; John 6: 35,48-51,53-56. (In 
the Bible, images of hunger and thirst are often used to describe a passionate desire for God: Psalm 42: 1-2; 
John 4: 13-14. To the Samaritan woman Christ says "He who drinks my water will never thirst". This is 
continued in the Christian tradition by thinkers like Augustine in Confessions 3,1) Lastly Jesus commands 
his disciples to eat his body and drink his blood "in memory of [him]" (Luke 22: 19; 1 Corinthian 11: 24- 
25) which is the taking of communion-the bread and wine, the Host. 
94 Sinclair, pp. 415-416. 
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Beatrice spiritually nourishes him like wisdom and Christ. 
Yet to increase this fulfilment further, the Virtues referring to Dante as Beatrice's 
"faithful one"95 requests that of her "grace do us the grace to unveil [her] mouth to him" 
(XXXI, 133-135). While the eyes of Beatrice in reflecting the incomprehensible double 
nature of Christ represents the central mystery of Christianity which enables the human 
soul to be redeemed, the mouth reveals the inner light that expresses the joy of the 
revelation/comprehension of God, the unity of the double nature of Christ and the effect 
of this revelation on the soul, seeing God face to face and therefore salvation. 6 For this 
reason the beauty of Beatrice's eyes and smile act as a lure through their increasing 
beauty by which Dante reaches Paradise, 97 as we shall discuss in the next chapter. 
The revelation of Beatrice's mouth, the inner joy and light of her soul, as it 
expresses the joy in seeing God face to face and of salvation, moves beyond not only the 
comprehensible but also the representable. Dante the poet writes 
O splendour of living light eternal, who has ever grown so pale under Parnassus' shade or drunk so deep of 
its well that he would not seem to have a mind disabled, trying to render thee as thou appearedst there, 
Heaven with its harmonies overhanging thee, when in the free air thou didst disclose thyself? (XXXI, 139- 
145) 
As "splendour" in the Commedia refers to "reflected light", Beatrice in the sun images 
and in particular Paradiso I is the reflection or revelation of God's light98 which will be 
intensified, increasing in brilliance as Dante climbs towards the throne of God in 
95 Dante in XXXI, 133-135 is again referred to as Beatrice's "faithful one" (cf. Inferno II, 98) having been 
forgiven for straying after her death. Yet as Musa points out beneath the surface he had always been 
"[unconsciously faithful which guided]... his steps back to his beloved Beatrice" (Musa, Commentary, p. 
341; see also Sinclair, p. 413). "For sight of thee, has made so great a journey" (XXXI, 135) clearly 
indicates that Beatrice has been thus far the telos of Dante's journey. 
% The mouth in the Convivio is of particular importance as it and the eyes are the areas where the soul 
reveals itself; "For what is a smile but a coruscation of the joy of the soul, like the outward shining of an 
Inward light? " (Cony. iii. 8; Singleton, Commentary, p. 777) In Convivio III, 15, "the eyes of wisdom are 
her demonstrations, whereby the truth is seen most certainly, and her smile is her persuasions, whereby the 
inner light of wisdom is revealed behind a certain veil; and in these two is felt that loftiest joy of 
blessedness which is the supreme good in Paradise. " "With Beatrice's smile comes the unveiled or inner 
light of wisdom: the promise of salvation for all mankind" (Musa, Commentary, p. 342). 
97 Sayers, Commentary, p. 321. 
98 "The word `splendour' in Dante always means reflected light: Beatrice is the reflected image of the 
Divine light" (Sayers, Commentary, p. 321). "A mirror or reflection of God's light... (Her name Revelation 
and her name Sapientia are emphasized here, for revelatio means an `unveiling'). " (Singleton, 
Commentary, p. 778) 
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Paradiso. God is incomprehensible until the sudden revelation of God at the end of the 
Paradiso XXXIII, though the content, the vision itself, Dante immediately forgets after 
experiencing it. He remembers having had the vision and the feelings though he is 
entirely incapable of representing and expressing it as he has no terms by which to define 
even those memories. Likewise at this lower level in the earthly Paradise, at the 
revelation of the smile of Beatrice Dante is left without words or any means to express 
the beauty and goodness to which he bears witness. Therefore he asks who of the poets 
like himself in their labours towards excellence could portray the beauty of Beatrice 
unveiled 99 
The only remaining veil over Beatrice is "Heaven with its harmonies, " which as 
Singleton notes seems to refer to the canopy of "the seven streamers of light", 
comparable to a rainbow and which symbolize "the seven-fold Spirit of the Lord". 10° 
With this Heaven as a constant background, suggesting God's first covenant of grace 
with the world, Beatrice through her analogy with Christ acts as the entrance of God's 
grace'°' into Dante's life echoing John 1: 16-17, the unveiling of which reveals the 
9' Unlike the Sinclair translation of "chi" as "who" which tends to be misleading, a more appropriate 
translation is "`Whoever', i, e., whichever poet, in his dedication to his art and inspiration" (Singleton, 
Commentary, p. 778). "Dante is referring to these who, like himself, labor tirelessly at mastering the art of 
poetry. Even the best of poets would have difficulty describing the unveiled beauty of Beatrice" (Musa, 
Commentary, p. 342). Not only is the beauty of Beatrice incomprehensible and indescribable but also even 
his description stretches beyond a "systematic reading" (Brandeis, A Ladder of Vision, pp. 109-110). 
100 Singleton, Commentary, p. 778. 
101 Singleton refers this to the spirit which the prophet Isaiah had foreseen would come to rest over the 
Christ who was to come-see Isaiah 11: 2: "Et requiescat super eum spiritus Domini. " ("And the spirit of the 
Lord shall rest upon him. "). This allusion, though significant, is rather ambiguous as the rainbow and the 
Spirit descending as a dove are related images, yet are not the same. In Mathew 3: 16, the sign of the spirit 
resting upon Jesus is not a rainbow but a dove. It must be remembered that in Genesis 8: 8-11 Noah sent 
out a dove to see if "the water had receded.. . 
When the dove returned... there in its beak was a freshly 
plucked olive leaf! " (Beatrice, of course, is crowned with olive leaves and Jesus was taken from the Mount 
of Olives). Following the recession of the waters, God made the rainbow as a sign of the first covenant 
between God, mankind and every living thing for all generations to come; "never again will the waters 
become a flood to destroy all life" (Genesis 9: 15). By making the rainbow the background and only 
remaining veil of Beatrice, we are pointed back to the first binding promise of God to his creation (after 
creation itself) not to destroy by water. Given man's original transgression and repeated offence to God, 
this is a sign of his continued fidelity and desire for a relationship with his creation and therefore is the first 
sign of grace which ultimately came through Jesus Christ (John 1: 17), who is seen in the eyes of Beatrice. 
(See in I Peter 3: 20-21 the connection of Noah, salvation and baptism. ) The beginning of Jesus' ministry 
was marked by the descent of the Holy Spirit onto him in the shape of a dove (Matthew 3: 16, Mark 1: 10; 
Luke 3: 22), as this was the moment that Christ was revealed to Israel (John 1: 31). The dove is therefore the 
extension of this grace and peace from God to man, that commitment of love and forgiveness like the 
rainbow making them related in signification and comprehensible in terms of Dante's linking them to 
Beatrice, given her repeated analogy with Christ. 
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"splendour of living light eternal" through the eyes and mouth of Beatrice as we shall 
discuss in the next chapter with regard to the Paradiso. In this way Beatrice, having in 
the Vita Nuova initiated his new life through his love of her, here oversees Dante's 
Biblical conversion resulting in his salvation which involves understanding the cross, 
confession of sins, repentance, baptism for the forgiveness of sins and receiving the gift 
of the Holy Spirit. Through acting as a midwife, Beatrice having descended from Heaven 
enables Dante to be reborn and spiritually transformed, leading him to be reconciled with 
God. In this way she is an expression of God's love and grace for him and as such a new 
Eve-figure. Therefore in Paradiso "in the seats of the third rank" just below "Eve, so 
lovely, at Mary's feet" ( Paradiso XXXII, 7-9) sits Beatrice (see Pelikan, p. 75). While 
Dante, following in Christ's steps descends into Hell and ascends to Heaven, thereby 
acting as the new Adam (Romans 5: 14), so Beatrice redeemed and now a saint, 102 
represents the new Eve. Yet the journey does not end with Beatrice, for she points 
beyond herself to Mary who ultimately points to God. 103 This shows her to be a poros 
figure causing not only self-knowledge but initiating a full rebirth in Dante bringing him 
to salvation and reconciliation with God. 
Thus Dante has employed both pagan myth and sections of the Bible to formulate 
the role of Beatrice, as he did with Francesca. Francesca is represented through the pagan 
myth of Venus and Mars as earthly Venus and through the Bible as Eve. Functioning as 
two sides of a coin, the pagan and Christian imagery reinforce her role as seductress 
embodying earthly eros, concupiditas, and its penia. Likewise Beatrice's role is 
supported by both pagan and Christian sources. 104 Dante through the majority of 
Purgatorio XXX represents Beatrice as Heavenly Venus as articulated through his 
continued allusions to Aeneid I in which Venus rebukes Aeneas. Yet this correlation 
shows its limitation in that, like courtly love which begins as virtuous ideal love and 
degenerates, so Venus sends Aeneas off to Dido. For this reason Dante corrects Virgil 
102 For a discussion of the literary and theological risks see Pelikan, p. 71. 
103 Pelikan (p. 75) notes how "one Eternal Feminine, the Lady Beatrice as donna mla, points beyond herself 
to thg other two Eternal Feminines: the Bride of Christ, the Church as bella donna; and the Mother of God, 
the Blessed Virgin Mary as nostra regina". 
104 Francesca is treated with the intimacy of a real human being and individual for whom Dante has great 
feeling and compassion while Beatrice is a beautiful ideal, someone he adores, aspires to and would do 
anything for but whom he does not know. In this way Beatrice remains forever Dante's donna angelica. 
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through showing Beatrice to always have been from God, an expression of God's grace 
and love for Dante (indicating the transforming of Heavenly Bros into caritas). As the 
new Eve acting as midwife she causes him to see his sins and initiates, oversees and leads 
him through a biblical conversion according to the pattern of Acts 2: 36-41. After this 
Dante understands her to be Sapientia, the wisdom of God, the unveiling of which is 
revelation, leading Dante to God through Paradiso. Through both types of imagery, her 
pagan role as Heavenly Venus and her Christian roles as a Christ-like figure and the new 
Eve, she acts as a poros (way through). The pagan poros of Heavenly eros is subsumed 
by the greaterporos of Christian caritas and therefore enacts the conversion of Heavenly 
eros into caritas, the means of which is Beatrice who is foremost an expression of God's 
grace, a gift from God sent to help Dante and lead him back to God through the coming 
together of her beauty and his Word. 
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XIV. BEATRICE AND ANALOGY 
We turn now to the role of the figure of Beatrice in the Paradiso where, we shall 
find, she and the other blessed souls are the bearers of central metaphors and analogies 
for both the nature of Bros and the object which eros desires, God. In the Paradiso most 
of the analogies are of a body-involving nature. ' They include primarily images of the 
face, the smile, the eyes, music and dance, although more conventional images such as 
that of light are also employed. Given that Dante uses essentially a Thomist 
epistemology, for him the divine is positively understood only in analogical terms, 
primarily through the analogy of proper proportionality, so that an analysis of these 
images in the context of his understanding of the role of analogy, is crucial to grasping 
how Dante conceives of the object of heavenly eros. Such an approach also sheds light on 
why for Dante the individual is not dispensable at any stage of the ascent. This is not 
merely an afterthought or an isolated idiosyncrasy on Dante's part, but is structurally 
connected with his epistemology and his ontology of the divine. Central to this discussion 
is how Dante conceives of the object of heavenly eros; the goal of desire being 
intellectual vision of the divine is clearly of Thomist (and ultimately 
Aristotelian/Platonic) inspiration, which is not to say of course that his analogies always 
unambiguously support the orthodox Thomist view. 
1. Analogy 
Before examining how Dante uses analogy in his depiction of Beatrice and the 
other heavenly souls, we must first consider what analogy is and in particular the analogy 
of proper proportionality. In order to understand the term "analogy" in a theological 
context it is useful to turn to Ferre'. Ferre (p. 67) maintains that the central problematic or 
issue with regard to theological language is the need to avoid both anthropomorphism 
and agnosticism. Yet the fact that we think and express ourselves in human language 
results in the "[imposition] of human categories" upon everything so that theological 
1 As noted by Poellner, Personal Communications, 2002. 
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language ultimately reveals more about "man than God"? With the first extreme of 
anthropomorphism, which tends towards and results from the affirmative way (or the way 
of affirmation), God is reduced to a mere "part of a natural order, `for clearly causes and 
effects are terms in a single series and belong to the same order of reality', and God's 
perfections are reduced to the level delimited by human imagination"? With the other 
extreme, which tends towards agnosticism by following the way of negation or the via 
negativa, "`cause', `mover', `perfection', `existing', `being', and the like, are emptied of 
meaning when predicated of God" 4 This results in an aporia in that "if God exists in the 
same sense as finite beings, God is incapable of fulfilling the function which makes him 
necessary", 5 hence God is not God is the inevitable consequence of the use here of 
univocal language. 6 However if God is seen "as cause and existence in a completely 
different sense then we can attribute to him `no intelligible content"', 7 whereby the term 
"God" is meaningless, "emptied of meaning", the consequence of interpreting theological 
language as equivocal8 (equivocation here tends towards an undisciplined and 
meaningless use of language). 9 According to this aporia "God" is shown as "either 
useless or unthinkable". 10 "If univocal, then language falls into anthropomorphism and 
cannot be about God; if equivocal, then language bereft of its meaning leads to 
agnosticism and cannot for us be about God". 11 
2 See also Mascall, p. 62 and Farrer, p. 2. 
3 Ferre, p. 68. 
4 Ferre, p. 68. 
s Mascall, p. 87. 
6 "The univocal language, which makes the object of his talk no longer `God' because merely comparable 
to the rest of his experience". (Ferre, p. 69) 
7 Mascall, p. 87. 
8 "Equivocal language... 'cleanses' the terms used in describing God entirely of any anthropomorphism 
they might ordinarily possess but thereby forces the theist into a position of total agnosticism, capable of 
knowing nothing as to the meaning of his words-about-God-not even knowing whether `existence' when 
applied to 'God' has any relationship to its ordinary human use. " (Ferret p. 69) 
9 If seen in the "formal" mode, the central problem is "how human language, despite its anthropocentric 
nature, may be given a use within a theological context while escaping both the univocality which gives 
rise to anthropomorphism and the sheer undisciplined meaninglessness of equivocation. " (FerrCp. 76) 
lo FerrS, p. 68. 
11 Ferre, p. 69; also see Mascall, p. 117. According to Copleston ("The Meaning of the Terms Predicated of 
God" in Contemporary Philosophy, p. 96): "It would appear. .. that the theistic philosopher is faced with a 
dilemma. If he pursues exclusively the negative way, he ends in sheer agnosticism, for he whittles away the 
positive meaning which a term originally had for him until nothing is left. If, however, he pursues 
exclusively the affirmative way, he lands in anthropomorphism. But if he attempts to combine the two 
ways, as indeed he must if he is to avoid both extremes, his mind appears to oscillate between 
anthropomorphism and agnosticism. " 
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According to St. Thomas Aquinas, it is not possible to say anything univocally of 
God and creatures since creation does not represent its cause perfectly, so what is unified 
and simple in the cause, God, is divided up and in different forms in its effect, creation, 
like the sun and what it produces. Thus diverse and multiple perfections in creation 
"preexist in God as one". 12 However, the words used to describe the perfections of 
creation are different pointing to different perfections, as in man's wisdom which is 
distinct from his existence, powers and essence. Yet in God, wisdom, essence, existence, 
and powers are one, not each signifying something different as God is a unity. When man 
is called "wise", the word "contains and delimits the aspect of man that it signifies" .13 
When this word however is used about God goes beyond the normal meaning of the 
word, since for Aquinas though the names applied to God "designate the divine substance 
and are predicated of God substantially... [they] fall short of representing him". 14 Thus 
neither "wisdom" nor any other word can be used univocally of creatures and of God. 
Nor however do we equivocate when we speak with regard to the relationship of man and 
God because man knows God through his creation, as shown through Romans 1: 20.15 
Therefore given that both equivocating and speaking univocally are insufficient means of 
discussing the relationship of God and man, Aquinas turns to a middle way, that of 
analogy. 
Farrer (p. 88) explicates analogy as "a relation between objects capable of being 
classed as `likeness' [which is] reducible to the presence in the similars of an identical 
abstract characteristic", a position Ferre disputes but one which we shall later see, with 
the aid of Mascall, to have substance. 16 In the traditional view analogy is divided into two 
types, analogy of attribution and analogy of proportionality. With the analogy of 
attribution, in which the two analogates may be vastly different, "the prime analogate 
possesses the characteristic predicated of it in a `formal' manner, that is, in a wholly 
proper (univocal) and actual sense, while the other analogate has predicated of it a `like' 
12 Summa Theologiae, Ia. 13,5. 
"Summa Theologiae, Ia. 13,5. 
14 Summa Theologiae, I, xiii, 2C. 
15 Summa Theologiae, Ia. 13,5. 
16 This implies the proposition that God shares one abstractable characteristic, "being", with finite beings, a 
position examined and critiqued by Ferre as analogy's "ontological presupposition". 
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characteristic in a relative or derivative sense". 
17 This indicates an unequal relation in 
which only one analogate is deserving to have the predicate in a formal sense18 though 
there is nonetheless a real relation or a "prior relationship". 19 "In its theological 
application, where the analogates concerned are God and a creature, the relation upon 
which the analogy is based will be that of creative causality; creatures are related to God 
as his effects.. . 
for example, by the Thomist Five Ways". 
20 This indicates that "God has 
goodness or being in whatever way is necessary if he is to be able to produce goodness 
and being in his creatures". 21 Thus God necessarily possesses goodness and being 
virtually, though this does not exclude the possibility that he may possesses them 
formally also. Indeed God is said to possess them "eminently". Ontologically speaking, 
God is the prime analogate, "the Father, from whom all fatherhood in heaven and on 
earth is named" (Ephesians 3: 14-15)-thus from this perspective, since all fatherhood 
other than that of the Creator is derivative, its "naming" with respect to creatures may be 
understood as, in this sense, involving secondary predication. 
With the analogy of proportionality, while both terms possess the common 
characteristic or analogue formally "in a literal and unmetaphorical sense", 22 each 
possesses it only proportionately or in a mode or way which is appropriate to and 
determined by the nature of the analogates involved, 23 as shown by the example that the 
ocean and Jonathan's eyes are blue. In terms of its theological application, "`God's 
goodness' is neither something unrelated to `man's goodness' nor merely identical to 
human virtue". 24 God's goodness is to God as human goodness is to man. 
God's goodness = Man's goodness 
God Man 
17 Ferre, p. 70. 
IS Fern( (p. 70) uses the example that both mountains and men are healthy. Mountain resorts are 
derivatively healthy because they cause health in men formally. 
19 A mountain resort is healthy as it produces health in men. (Ferre, p. 70) 
20 Mascall, p. 102. 
21 Mascall, p. 102. 
22 Ferre, p. 70. 
23 Ferre, p. 71; also see Mascall, p. 104. 
24 Ferre, p. 71. 
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However certain problems arise with these types of analogy. Mascall critiques 
analogy of proportionality claiming that a problem arises in the "unambiguous equals 
sign"25; "the equal sign means not identity but similarity". 26 Ferre first claims that this 
results in an infinite regression away from univocal meaning and secondly points to the 
problem of the presence of two unknowns in the equation which shows the equation to be 
unsolvable27, providing no knowledge concerning the nature of God nor any justification 
for the language used to describe his characteristics. Again, from analogy of attribution 
we deduce only that what can produce an effect can produce an effect, God as the cause 
of goodness in men possesses goodness virtually while men possess it formally though 
this does not necessitate that he is not formally good in himself. 28 Thus analogy of 
attribution "tells us nothing beyond God being the cause of finite phenomena". This is 
problematic as analogy of attribution is dependent on the reality of a relation which in 
itself "determines whether the analogy is appropriate. The existence of the relation cannot 
be proved by analogical argument but needs independent grounds for asserting it". 29 The 
second problem with analogy of attribution is that it "admits no control" to the predicates 
used in a virtual sense to describe God many of which are inappropriate. 30 Ferre (p. 75) 
suggests that any claim that some of God's perfections are formally and others virtually 
appropriate also implies a prior understanding of the words describing God's nature 
which returns us to the same problem. 
However in contrast to Ferre who places the weight of his critique of the 
traditional understanding of analogy on its ontological presupposition 31, Mascall argues 
that its ontological basis may be seen as justifying/validating the theological use of 
analogy where analogy of attribution and analogy of proportionality are treated as 
25 Ferre, p. 72. 
26 Mascall, p. 105. 
21 Ferre, p. 72; and also see Mascall, pp. 104-6. 
28 Ferre, p. 74 
29 Ferre, pp. 73-4. 
30 Ferre, p. 74. Analogy of attribution is far too permissive as it always applies "all conceivable predicates 
to [God] in the virtual sense" so that God as maker of the earth is heavy, multi-coloured etc. 
" With regard to the problem of ontological presuppositions, Ferre (pp. 75-6) draws attention to the view 
that analogy depends upon an underlying abstract characteristic, being. He relates this to the theory of 
universals, which he finds problematic, and then goes on to emphasize the difficulty in assuming the 
existence of a common characteristic present in both God and man. This, he believes, is rebutted by the 
theological position of total depravity and the philosophical view that the supposition of common quality 
between man and God is incompatible with God as infinite. The finite can not be identical to the infinite, so 
the ontological foundations on which the logic of analogy rests must be abandoned. 
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inseparable. 32 As God's qualities, whether goodness or wisdom, are part of his essence so 
all statements about God have "existential reference... Since in God essence and 
existence are identical, any assertion about God's essence is at the same time an assertion 
about existence; anything which is affirmed to be included in God's nature is at the same 
time affirmed to exist and indeed to be self-existent". 33 By this "inherently existential 
element" Mascall maintains "the possibility of analogical knowledge of God and of 
analogical discourse. " The attempt to conceive "God's goodness-an attempt which is 
doomed to failure-issues in an affirmation that self-existent goodness exists... Goodness 
exists self-existingly [by which] the fundamental dependence of analogical predication 
34 upon the metaphysical analogy of being is made clear". Thus, 
Goodness of finite being = Goodness of God 
Finite being God 
This is an existential judgement which articulates the synthesizing of analogy of 
attribution and analogy of proportionality. This synthesis is necessary because analogy of 
attribution asserts in the conceptual and existential order that finite being can exist only in 
dependence upon God. 
Thus in contrast to Ferre who conceives of the use of analogy as a means not to 
inform but to limit the use of language, 35 Mascall views analogy not as enabling "us to 
conceive God's goodness as identical with his essence but to affirm it as identical with his 
existence. Hence all our assertions about God are grossly inadequate in so far as they 
apply concepts to him, but they are thoroughly adequate in so far as they affirm 
32 Mascall (p. 113) argues that in order "to make the doctrine of analogy really satisfactory, we must see the 
analogical relation between God and the world as combining in a tightly interlocked union both analogy of 
attribution and analogy of proportionality. Without analogy of proportionality it is very doubtful whether 
the attributes which we predicate of God can be ascribed to him in more than a merely virtual sense; 
without analogy of attribution it hardly seems possible to avoid agnosticism" (Mascall, p. 113) 
33 Mascall, pp. 119-120. 
34 Mascall, p. 120. 
35 Ferre indicates that analogy is not able to inform us concerning the actual nature of God but instead is 
useful if understood as "one means of providing criteria for the disciplined use of ordinary language in 
theological contexts, looking for its value on the `formal' rather than `material' mode of speech. " (Ferre, p. 
76) In this way the logic of analogy rests on no ontological assumptions of an identity between God and 
man. "Its function is not to inform but rather to limit the proper employment of language within the 
framework of theistic systematic assumptions. " (Ferre, p. 77) 
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perfections of him. °'36 This is not the place for an assessment of Mascall's analysis, but 
some form of synthesis of the analogies of attribution and of proportionality can plausibly 
be seen as required by the Thomist tradition and seems to be implicit in Dante. Given 
such an understanding of analogy we shall now turn back to Beatrice in Paradiso to 
explore in which ways she is an analogical figure. 
2. Beatrice and analogy 
Through Dante's representation of Beatrice he articulates the nature of love and 
God, the object which this love desires. Therefore the two questions we must ask 
ourselves are how does Beatrice articulate the nature of love and secondly how does she 
represent the nature of God. The answer is that through Beatrice, both love and God are 
understood and represented through images of the body, analogies of proper 
proportionality which are connected to analogies of attribution. 
One of the central challenges of the Paradiso is the difficulty in the representation 
of the pilgrim's pursuit of a personal vision of the infinite eternal God37 who exceeds 
comprehension. The pilgrim desires an intellectual vision, suggesting a Thomist influence 
(and therefore perhaps a Platonic/Aristotelian inspiration). "I see man's mind cannot be 
satisfied unless it be illumined by that Truth beyond which there exists no other truth. 
Within that Truth, once man's mind reaches it, it rests like a wild beast within its den. 
And it can reach it-if not, all desire is vain! " (Paradiso IV, 124-129)38 However as 
Pertile points out while "Dante seems to favour in theory a form of active contemplation 
through knowledge, placing first `1'atto the vede' [`the act of vision'] and second "quel 
ch'ama" ["that which loves"] (Paradiso, XXVIII. 110-11), in practice however his 
pilgrim's vision is poetically portrayed and lived through in affective terms", 39 diverging 
from Thomism and Aristotelianism. The presence of both the intellectual and affective 
36 Mascall, p. 120. 
37 A personal vision of God involves seeing God face to face which "means both seeing Him and being 
seen by Him" (Pertile, p. 146). 
38 "A ray of God's light focuses on me and penetrates the light enwombing me, whose force once joined to 
that of my own sight lifts me above myself until I see the Primal Source from which such might is milked. 
From this derives the joy with which I burn; the clearness of my flame will ever match my clarity of 
spiritual vision. " (Paradiso, XXI, 83-90) 
39 Pertile, p. 163. 
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aspects is demonstrated when Dante writes, "We have gone beyond-from greatest 
sphere to heaven of pure light, light of the intellect, light full of love, love of the true 
good, full of ecstasy, ecstasy that transcends the sweetest joy" (Paradiso, XXX, 38-45). 
"The supreme aim, hope and... promise implicit in the pilgrim's ascent is precisely to 
restore the unity and identity, beyond desire, of knowing and possessing. s40 However, 
this union with God which the pilgrim achieves in his final vision can not be penetrated 
with the intellect as it is beyond comprehension, description and even memory, though 
remaining an affective experience, God being the ultimate object and telos of eros 
41 "I 
have been in His brightest shining heaven and seen such things that no man, once 
returned from there, has wit or skill to tell about; for when our intellect draws near its 
goal and fathoms to the depths of its desire, the memory is powerless to follow. " 
(Paradiso, I, 1-12) 42 Due to this limitation in language and thought, the pilgrim resorts to 
familiar body-images to form analogies for his pursuit of the divine and for God himself 
as the divine can only be understood in analogical terms. 
Analogies involving the body are maintained throughout Dante's ascent in Paradiso. 
This employment of the body can be understood in three ways. First, the object of 
heavenly eros is God. Christ is God in the flesh, God embodied. At the centre of the 
depiction of God in Paradiso XXXIII, Dante describes the presence of man's image in 
God's "first reflected light", his Logos (John 1: 1-3) which is God. "That circling which, 
as I conceive it, shone in You as Your own first reflected light when I had looked deep 
into It a while, seemed in Itself and in Its own Self-colour to be depicted with man's very 
ao Pertile, p. 164. 
41 "And I, who was drawing near to the end of all desires, raised to its utmost, even as I ought, the ardour of 
my longing. " (Paradiso. XXXIII. 46-48) 
42 Also see Paradiso, XXXIII, 127-139; "Here, clearly, is God one and triune; yet still a symbol, not God's 
reality, face to face, but a geometric figure that tantalizes more than it satisfies. The pilgrim gazes at it, until 
he perceives painted in the second circle-that of the Son of Man-and, amazingly, in the same colours as 
that circle, the image of our human likeness (lines 127- 31); but how that image fits the circle and how it 
finds its place in it remains a mystery (lines 137-38). The poet and we, his readers, know that this is the 
very vision the pilgrim has been yearning for all through Paradise; yet, now that we have come to it, the 
vision does not release the secret of its making. The pilgrim still stares at it, he vainly strives to find the key 
that will unlock its mystery, as a geometer who eagerly seeks the formula for the squaring of the circle 
(lines 133-36); his desire to see and comprehend now reaches its peak, but the wings of his understanding 
are much too weak to carry him on such a flight (line 139). At this crucial, climactic point the 
"disagguaglianza" ["inequality"] between "voglia e argomento" ["will and faculty"], which he has been 
striving to overcome all along, reemerges unabated as a peremptory reminder of his, and our own, 
inescapable humanity. " (Pertile, p. 170) 
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image. " (Paradiso, XXXIII, 127-131) He then goes on to say, as if a geometer trying to 
square a circle so "I yearned to know how could our image fit into that circle" (Paradiso, 
XXXIII, 137). Thus being in accord with the Biblical physical ascension of Christ (Acts 
1: 9; also John 20: 1-18), at the very pinnacle of heaven, in God himself, God is depicted 
in man's image. Thus in Paradiso, the body is never totally dispensed with, as Dante 
ascends towards the resurrected Christ. 
Secondly, after the resurrection according to Aquinas man regains his physical body. 
Following this Thomist position, Dante believes that at the Final Judgment man will 
receive back his physical body (Inferno, XIII. 103). This may result in the intensification 
of the soul's punishment and humiliation as in the case of Francesca and Paolo of Inferno 
V, or in the forming of a more perfected state as with the redeemed souls of Paradiso, 
reflecting Christ who according to Aquinas was a "perfectly embodied [soul]" 43 
Therefore, it is perfectly justifiable that images of the body are used in the depiction of 
Dante's ascent for the reason that the body is not ultimately rejected or transcended but is 
resumed in the New Jerusalem as being part of man's perfected state. 
Lastly, significant and central to the concern of representation, in Romans 1: 20 Paul 
writes "For since the creation of the world God's invisible qualities-his eternal power 
and divine nature-have been clearly seen, being understood from what has been made". 
As God's qualities are visible in creation, through examining creation man comes to 
understand the nature of God. Thus through examining the beauty, goodness, truth, etc., 
in the physical creation, man is pointed beyond the visible, thinkable and knowable to the 
inexpressible beauty, goodness and truth of God who is the true object of love from 
which all beauty, goodness and truth are derived. " This is a proof of the existence of God 
through contingency which both Augustine45 and Dante after him46 see as merged with 
43 Brandeis, p. 127. 
44 Beatrice "[explains] that the eternal light of truth is the true object of love and that any other becomes 
such only because the Eternal Light shines through it in its beauty. 'If I flame on thee in the warmth of 
love, beyond the measure witnessed upon earth, and so vanquish the power of thine eyes, marvel not; for 
this proceedeth from perfect vision'... (Paradiso. V, 1-5)" (Mazzeo, Structure and Thought, p. 155). 
45 According to Augustine, creation points towards God in two ways. First, Augustine in Confessions X. 9 
traces the ladder of Beauty when he describes his search for God in creation: "And I replied unto these, 
which stand so round about these doors of my flesh: Answer me concerning my God since you are not he, 
answer me something of him. And they cried out with a loud voice: He made us. My questioning with them 
was my thought; and their answer was their beauty. " (Also see Psalm 144 and Augustine's analysis of it 
concerning the "revealing power of beauty" Mazzeo, Structure and Thought, p. 72. ) "God ordered his 
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the ladder of beauty by which God is pointed to and pursued. 7 In contrast to 
Neoplatonism48, for them the purpose of these qualities in creation is to act as a lure by 
which man is drawn back to an awareness and relationship with his creator. Thus for 
Dante "All human beauty, natural or portrayed, is bait, serving to capture and fix the eyes 
so as to possess the mind"49 and ultimately reveal God and draw the lost soul back to 
him. (See Paradiso 1: 103-108. ) 
In this context, the beauty of the body acts as a lure towards the divine according to 
analogy of attribution. Analogy of attribution, as we saw, describes an unequal relation 
between God and creation, cause and effect, God being the prime analogate possessing 
beauty, goodness and truth primarily and eminently while Beatrice and the other 
heavenly beings as God's effects are predicated of these characteristics by a likeness in a 
relative and derivative sense. Thus all the characteristics of God are seen in a likeness 
through his creation, or creation reveals or points towards God and heaven which are 
beyond comprehension and indescribable in human language. (See Paradiso, I, 5-9). 
50 As 
creation like the steps of a ladder extending from earth to heaven, from the visible to the invisible, from the 
mortal to the immortal" which form a scale of beauty (sed dissimilibus temperata) which causes both 
participants and observers to praise God "admiring him in his creation. The beauty of the earth (species 
terrae) is a kind of silent voice, the voice of the dumb earth proclaiming its Creator. " (Mazzeo, Structure 
and Thought, p. 74) Secondly, proving the existence of God by contingency as in Romans 1: 20, when "we 
judge external corporeal beauty we are necessarily driven to the conception of an immaterial standard by 
which we judge it. This internal standard we possess is, however, mutable, so that we are again driven to 
posit a beauty which is eternal and immutable... From the mutable nature of all things we must infer an 
immutable, eternal being on which their being depends. St. Augustine, however, is also arguing from the 
nature of beauty at the same time, merging both proofs by means of the particular meanings he makes his 
terms carry. This, as we have seen, was made possible by his conception of the relation between beauty and 
the formal principle which constitutes the being and intelligibility of things. Thus, by contemplating 
corporeal beauty, the mind is forced to turn in upon itself to find an even higher beauty. It cannot rest at this 
stage, however, and must go even further until it arrives at that uncreated beauty who created all the lower 
forms through which the mind had passed on its upward journey". (Mazzeo, Structure and Thought, pp. 74- 
5) 
46 "The ladder of beauty was a recurrent motif in St. Augustine's thought and was fully developed in his 
early dialogue De quantitate animae, a work which Dante referred to in the letter to Can Grande for 
authority in his claim to having had a supernatural vision. " (Mazzeo, Structure and Thought, note 42, p. 
193) 
47 For Dante "the world points to God, instructs him in God" (Brandeis, The Ladder of Vision, p. 198). 48 Mazzeo, Structure and Thought, p. 69. 
49 Mazzeo, Medieval Cultural Tradition, p. 122. so "Silence is where this enigmatic God of knowledge and love lives, who is promised to us in the life to 
come by the experience of the pilgrim, but presently denied to us by the poet's final renunciation of the 
attempt to describe Him; there also is where true Paradise begins. It is when the word ceases to be, beyond 
language and beyond poetry, that Dante the pilgrim, finally resolving the pull of opposite emotions, 
achieves his journey and intuitively attains the supreme joy of the Godhead; and it is an achievement that 
the poet cannot and does not articulate in words, for it is no longer a matter for poetry but for faith. The 
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the body reveals the characteristics of the divine (Romans 1: 20) yet is knowable as it is 
physical, aspects of it are used as analogies whereby the unknowable and indescribable 
God may find expression. 1 
This use of analogy of attribution in the Paradiso is inseparable from analogy of 
proportionality which indicates that God's goodness and beauty are to God as human 
goodness and beauty are to man. God's goodness and beauty in the Paradiso are one with 
his essence whereas man's essence goodness and beauty are different things so that the 
goodness of God is determined by the nature of God while the goodness of man is 
appropriate to the nature of man. These two forms of analogy are inseparable in this 
context as the nature of God is that he is self-existent so that whatever perfection is 
attributed to him he not only embodies but is the source of, while Beatrice who as 
creature is dependent upon God, possesses beauty which according to her nature as a 
contigent being is contingent upon God. 
For the reason of this connection between analogy of attribution and analogy of 
proportionality, ladders of increasing beauty, goodness, truth and light in Paradiso52 
which lure Dante towards God53 are brought together at the highest point of the ascent in 
the unity of God in whom beauty, goodness, truth and existence are one with his essence. 
As not only physical beauty points towards eternal beauty as in Romans 1: 20, but also as 
Paradise that Dante describes before the pilgrim reaches God tells the drama of approaching Him; but 
Paradiso as a poem is all, and can only be, on this side of that God; it is a preparation for and an 
approximation to a vision and a bliss that remain unsaid and unrevealed. And rightly so. For Dante knows 
that only when language pours itself out into silence is there union with God; and where there is no desire 
left to fulfil, he knows there is no language and no poetry. " (Pertile, pp. 171-172) 
sl "In fact the words, images and sounds of Paradiso as text are not presumed to be the Paradise 
experienced by the privileged pilgrim, but, paradoxically, only a non-representation of it. It is a non- 
representation not merely because it is limited by the natural defect of human language as such (this applies 
to the whole poem), but more especially because as a representation it is rendered inherently inadequate by 
the "trasumanar" ["passing beyond humanity"] (Paradiso, I. 70) which is now its object. " (Pertile, pp. 145- 
146) 
SZ "We journey simultaneously through the ladder of love, the scale of being, and the hierarchy of all value 
rendered as light. " (Mazzeo, Medieval Cultural Tradition, p. 115) Mazzeo traces the ladder of beauty 
showing a like pattern of influence. The increase in beauty which is represented as light lures Dante to 
ascend to God. Simultaneously as the beauty and light increase, so does his desire/love and understanding 
of truth/wisdom and being. In this way "the ladders of light, being, love, knowledge, and beauty are all 
actually fused; this fusion permits Dante to ascend to God as poet, lover, philosopher, and mystic seer all at 
once" (Mazzeo, Medieval Cultural Tradition, p. 117). 
s' "In the process of ascent, the emphasis is placed on love's demand for more light as beauty and 
knowledge, since vision is not yet complete and love must therefore demand and obtain more of the light 
which is beauty (Xll, 31-32). " (Mazzeo, Medieval Cultural Tradition, p. 116; also see Mazzeo, Structure 
and Thought, p. 83. ) 
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God is embodied in Jesus even at the height of Paradiso, and the redeemed soul after 
judgment receives back his body so that the body is part of the redeemed state, this ascent 
is articulated through images of the body which increase in their beauty, goodness, love, 
truth and being according to their growing proportional nearness to God. For this reason 
love and the object of love, God, are reflected through the body, or the body-involving 
images particularly of Beatrice who, as Dante's angelic lady, is the "the meeting point 
between corporeal beauty and spiritual beauty in the hierarchy of incarnations of beauty 
leading to God". 54 
Before discussing Beatrice's specific bodily images used analogically to articulate 
the divine, it is important to recognize that Beatrice "resembles, except for her greater 
translucence and beauty, the living Beatrice". 55 The individual Beatrice that Dante met in 
the Vita Nuova II, causing violent inner trembling in him as a youth, is physically the 
same form as the more mature, luminous and beautified Beatrice whom he meets in 
Purgatorio XXX and who through her increasing beauty and light leads him towards God 
in Paradiso. This distinguishes her from the other heavenly creatures whose appearances 
in Heaven have undergone radical change causing them at times to be unrecognizable 
from their earthly selves except through their enduring desire. 56 These, for Brandeis (p. 
127), form a successive chain of appearances of increasing truth with each acting as a 
"symbolic mask" until the revelation of the last, after which he is "no longer capable of 
being deluded by what is delusive in the human form". In contrast Beatrice, while from 
the beginning suggesting "divine things; now she makes them manifest. Her beauty is 
uniquely a reflection of her spiritual being. The pilgrim loves her more with each increase 
of her beauty because with each he sees more clearly what she is" 57 This is so because 
from the Vita Nuova II Dante was inspired by the youthful purity of his love and by the 
God of Love to see her correctly. However on a different level Brandeis, referring to 
Aquinas' view of Adam and Christ as "perfectly embodied souls" being the direct 
54 Mazzeo, Structure and Thought, p. 83. 
55 Brandeis, p. 127. 
56 "The preservation of desire in the blessed allows him to portray them as individual characters, for 
without the psychological differences of individual desires all identities would necessarily merge and be 
lost. Which means, theologically speaking, that the achievement of beatitude does not entail the end of 
individual entitities, but their fullest and freest realization. " (Pertile, p. 155) 
57 Brandeis, p. 127. 
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handiwork of God, underlines Beatrice's continued analogous relationship to Christ 
throughout the Commedia58 indicative of a "transcendent vision" and further 
demonstrating that in Beatrice there "had never been any discord between appearance and 
reality". 59 There may be an echo here of St. Bernard's view that "whatever external 
beauty there is in the human being-the beauty of his body-is simply a radiation from 
the luminous beauty of the soul", 60 a view which influenced Convivio III, viii in which 
the sensible beauty of the donna angelica reveals the beauty and goodness of her soul 
acting as a temporary taste of the divine. 61 In this way Dante suggests "that an earthly 
thing may be perfect, and that it may be experienced in its perfection. And thus it 
expresses his ingrained sense of the world's redemption", 62 underlining that the individual 
Beatrice, likened to the Christ becoming flesh, acted as a miracle in Dante's life leading 
him to God. 63 
Although Beatrice does not radically change due to this accord between 
appearance and divine reality, the aspects in which her appearance does change relate to 
the intensification of beauty and light. This is apparent particularly through the alteration 
in images of the body relating to Beatrice and the heavenly souls which through the 
intensification of their beauty and lightM, itself determined by their proportional nearness 
to the divine, more fully articulate Beatrice's vision of God which increases the clarity of 
Dante's vision of her and in turn of God. God being the Supreme Light, the "Prima Luce" 
58 Brandeis, p. 127. 
59 Brandeis, p. 127. 
60 Mazzeo, Structure and Thought, p. 81. 
61 In Convivio III, iii, "Beauty is an external light that makes manifest an internal splendor, an internal light. 
Dante then uses this principle to explain the beauty of a creature who is the highest perfection of her 
species. In such a person the soul is of such a high degree of goodness that its beauty is made to appear 
visibly in her body. Let us recall again that the soul of man is his species, the form which constitutes his 
being, and that this species is continually radiating or generating the species which is the object of the 
human faculty of apprehension. As St. Bonaventura said along with so many others, this species gives us 
pleasure as beauty and creates joy in him who apprehends it, a joy which resembles the joy existing in the 
Triune Creator. In a creature like the lady who is perfect in her species, the joy engendered is of such a high 
degree that it is a foretaste of the joys of paradise; the only difference between the joy of beholding such a 
creature and the joys of paradise are that the latter are perpetual. " (Mazzeo, Structure and Thought, pp. 81- 
82) 
62 Brandeis, p. 127. 
63 "The Son of God was indeed the Son of Man. Flesh and the pure light are not inimical. And although 
Dante perceives the light to be more often than not blurred in the human creature, he knows it is there, 
capable of being apprehended and loved, capable of irradiating the obscurity of pilgrim eyes, and thus of 
leading towards God. " (Brandeis, p. 127) 
64 With regard to one of the inhabitants of Heaven Dante writes, "How that light glowed and grew more 
beautiful from those few words of mine as it took on new happiness upon its happiness" (VIII, 46-8). 
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(Paradiso XXIX, 136)65 which is essential truth66 from which all creation emanates as 
reflections of this first light67, is supremely beautiful. Like God, Beatrice's beauty and 
light, which are derived from God, extend beyond Dante's capacities in appropriate 
proportion leaving him not only without words but also lacking the ability to appreciate 
and conceive it 68 
These body-involving analogies involve images of the face, smile, eyes, music 
and dance. Images of Beatrice's face, whether as a whole, her eyes, or her smile, offer the 
principal lure by which Dante is led towards God and understands God who transcends 
his comprehension. Beatrice's smiling face functions as a lure whereby through her 
beauty she causes him to "[burn] more than ever to bring back [his] eyes to her" 
(Paradiso, XXVII, 97-99) and which takes possession of his mind in a way incomparable 
with anything experienced in ordinary reality. 69 Yet this is not a carnal desire as such. 
The vision of Beatrice's face produced in Dante the virtues which led him from a carnal 
oriented form of Bros, physical desire, to caritas as shown when he writes, "the virtue 
that her look granted me drew me forth from the fair nest of Leda and thrust me into the 
swiftest of the heavens. " (Paradiso, XXVII, 88-100) "The beauty of the smiling lips 
appeals to the eyes, not that they may be fed as if vision were like the sense of taste, but 
rather that it may elicit love, a love which is a special case of universal love, helping to 
s7 initiate a process which begins in a vision of beauty and ends in a vision of paradise. ° 
65 In XXXIII, God is also referred to as somma luce, 67; luce etterna, 83 and 124; etterno lume, 43, as 
noted by Mazzeo, Medieval Cultural Tradition, pp. 110-111. Dante like "St. Augustine adopted the famous 
platonic metaphor of the Good as the sun of the intelligible world, a metaphor widely used by both pagan 
neoplatonists and Christian fathers. It is largely through his influence that the platonic interpretations of the 
sun symbol became widely diffused among medieval thinkers" (Mazzeo, Structure and Thought, pp. 143-4) 
and reached Dante. 
66 Paradiso, XXXIII, 52-54, see Mazzeo, Medieval Cultural Tradition, pp. 110-111. 
67 Pertile, p. 164 and Paradiso XXXIII. 
68 "The beauty I saw there goes far beyond mortal reach; I think that only He Who made it knows the full 
joy of its being. At this point I admit to my defeat: no poet, comic or tragic, ever was more outdone by his 
theme than I am now; for, as sunlight does to the weakest eyes, so did the mere thought of her lovely smile 
strike every recognition from my mind. From the first day that I beheld her face in this life till the vision of 
her now, I could trust in my poems to sing her praise, but now I must stop trying to pursue her beauty in my 
verse, for I have done as much as any artist at his best. " (Paradiso, XXX, 19-33; also see Purgatorio XXXI 
139-145) 
69 "If nature or art have made baits to take the eyes so as to possess the mind, in human flesh or in its 
portraiture, all these together would seem nothing besides the divine delight that shone on me when I 
turned to her smiling face. " (Paradiso, XXVII, 88-96) 
70 Mazzeo, Structure and Thought, p. 83. 
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Throughout the Paradiso, Dante expresses the incomprehensible delight he feels 
when his "eyes were feeding on that blessed face" (Paradiso, XXI, 19-21) whereby with 
St. Bernard he sees physical beauty as being a foretaste of the delights of heaven. This is 
demonstrated through images of the eyes and mouth as when Dante writes, "I was 
amazed, for within her eyes glowed such a smile that I thought I touched with mine the 
depth of my grace and of my paradise" (Paradiso, XV, 33-6). Through Beatrice's smile 
reflected in his own eyes he experiences the ultimate end of his own desire/eros and his 
own paradise. 
This taste of heaven comes from the fact that Beatrice's smile reflects God's joy, 
as shown when Dante writes, "She who saw my desire, began, smiling with such 
gladness that in her face seemed to be God's own joy" (Paradiso, XXVII, 103). 
Awareness of the divine light, God, causes the soul to rejoice because of this internally 
perceived light which produces the external light, the smile, which with the eyes are the 
most beautiful spiritual parts of the body. 7' This external light acts as a taste of Paradise 
luring the pilgrim to God through producing "in Dante's mind the implied `interior light', 
a shining of the eternal light of truth (Paradiso, V, 79)". 2 
As they reflect God, Beatrice' face, eyes and mouth function as a lure through 
their increasing beauty caused by her closer proximity to God causing them to ascend 
towards God. Beatrice's "lovely eyes" her "vivid crowning beauties73 grow in strength 
the higher they ascend". This produces in Dante a "sacred joy" which "grows in 
perfection as we rise" (Paradiso, XIV, 127-139). Dante expresses the indescribable 
" "Dante's doctrine of the internal and external lights of beauty is made clearer in his discussion of the 
beauty of the smile of this angelic lady. Her soul reveals itself through the mouth as color through glass and 
what is the smile or laughter but a coruscation of the soul's joy, an external light which is an image of the 
internal light? Indeed, man is called a divine animal by the philosophers precisely because the rational soul 
is so spiritual, so free from, or superior to, the sheer potentiality which is matter that the divine light, the 
ultimate source of the splendor of the soul, can shine through it. Dante thus mingles the Augustinian notion 
of beauty as the translation through sensible particulars of the informing principle with the conception of 
light as the principle of beauty. The same species which is the principle of knowledge, being, and beauty is 
itself a kind of light, for the metaphysicians of light conceived of lux as the principle of being, knowledge, 
and beauty. It therefore follows that the most beautiful parts of the body are those in which the soul, the 
divine light, is most active-the eyes and the mouth, balconies looking in upon the dwelling places of the 
soul. " (Mazzeo, Structure and Thought, p. 82) 
72 $ee also Mazzeo, Structure and Thought, pp. 78-9 for the debate concerning light as real or intellectual. 
" "The lure of beauty for the eyes and the eyes themselves as the most beautiful of bodily parts run as a 
unifying thread through Dante's works from the first visions of the Vita Nuova to the final visions of the 
Paradiso. " (Mazzeo, Medieval Cultural Tradition, p. 127) 
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beauty of "the song those splendours sang", "jewels too precious and too rich to be 
brought back to Earth from out that realm", which leave him "tongueless". 74 
Beatrice's face, by reflecting the light of God, causes Dante to change from 
within and enables him to ascend. 
I saw Beatrice... looking at the sun... [and through her] I fixed my eyes on the sun [whereby it seemed] as 
if He that is able had decked the sky with a second sun. Beatrice stood with her eyes fixed only on the 
eternal wheels, and on her I fixed mine, withdrawn from above. At her aspect I was changed within ... The 
passing beyond humanity cannot be set forth in words; let the example suffice, therefore, for him to whom 
grace reserves the experience. If I was only that part of me which Thou createdst last, Thou knowest, Love 
that rulest the heavens, who with Thy light didst raise me. (Paradiso I, lines 46-75) 
Through looking into Beatrice's face not only does Dante see the sun, God's light, 
reflected but it seems as if she, illuminated within by the love of God, becomes a second 
sun through the light she received from God. Upon taking in this vision of light, Dante is 
likewise illuminated from within. This filling with light causes him to pass beyond 
humanity and rise towards God. Therein the image of Beatrice's face reflecting God and 
exemplifying caritas for God, produces caritas in Dante changing him from within 
causing him to ascend towards God who is Caritas. 
Likewise images of dance and music, while rooted in physical experience, are 
used analogically to express the indescribable state of bliss resulting from this vision of 
God. Dance represents a higher state of bliss, the participation in God as shown when 
Beatrice becomes "silent, and it seemed her thoughts were drawn to something else, for 
she had joined the dancing wheel where she had been before" (Paradiso, IX, 64-66). In 
her mind, she had returned to a state of the contemplation of God, the bliss of which is 
described as a dance, the dancing wheel being the unifying bliss which she shares with 
the other inhabitants of heaven. 
Like the gradations of Beatrice's beauty and light, the speed of the souls dancing 
reveals the level of their ecstasy or bliss, their proximity to God and therefore in a sense 
their ontological level. "Just so those whirling wheels by differently dancing, through 
their movement, fast or slow, revealed to me the measure of their bliss. (Paradiso, XXIV, 
74 See also Paradiso, XII, 4-6. 
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19-27) Dante expresses this more clearly when he writes, "I saw lights revolving in that 
light, their movements slow or swift, each, I suppose, according to how clearly it sees 
God" (Paradiso, VIII, 19-21). It is the clarity of the vision of God which determines the 
souls' measure of bliss which is reflected by the speed of their rotations. Thus the 
spinning revealed inexpressible and indescribable radiance, joy and brightness which is 
derived from seeing God, from the heavenly Light. "From one that spun so radiant with 
joy, no greater brightness danced within the sphere; three times it circled Beatrice's soul 
accompanied by music so divine my memory cannot recapture it, and so, my pen skips 
over such detail-not fantasy nor words are good enough to paint the subtle floods of 
Heaven's light. " (Paradiso, XXIV, 19-27) 
Yet regardless of the heavenly inexpressible nature of these images of dance and 
music, Dante roots them in lived bodily experience as when he writes, "When singing, 
circling, all those blazing suns had wheeled around the two of us three times like stars 
that circle close to the fixed poles, they stopped like ladies still in dancing mood, who 
pause in silence listening to catch the rhythm of the new notes of the dance" (Paradiso, 
X, 70-81). This life-likeness he also captures in lines 19-24 when he writes, "As partners 
in a dance whirl in their reel, caught in a sudden surge of joy, will often quicken their 
steps and raise their voices high, so at her eager and devout request the holy circles 
showed new happiness through their miraculous music and their dance" (Paradiso, XIV, 
19-24). Thus through the analogies of dance and music Dante suggests heavenly states 
which extend beyond the comprehensible and describable. 
And in so doing these analogies of dance and music enable the pilgrim and poet to 
transcend the physical towards God. This is shown when the poet writes, "This music 
raised my soul to heights of love: until that moment nothing had existed that ever bound 
my soul in such sweet chains" (Paradiso, XIV, 127-139). The beauty of the music which 
transcends the human experience of music also has the power to lift the soul, binding it 
with sweet chains through filling it with love; hence it is lifted through emotion and 
feeling towards God. As we saw with Beatrice's face, smile and eyes, so we see with 
music and dance. While these analogies concerning Beatrice and the heavenly beings 
express heavenly eros, the ascent towards the divine through love, and reflect aspects of 
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God, the divine itself can only be understood in analogical terms, as God is beyond 
description and comprehension. 
As we have seen, one of the primary challenges in the Paradiso is the 
representation of God who is beyond understanding and representation, hence the 
representation of the unrepresentable. In order to solve this problem, Dante resorts to 
analogy. Dante uses body-involving imagery first because Christ is God incarnate, 
second as the body forms an integral part of the redeemed soul after judgment, and third 
because God's nature is revealed through his creation. In this latter point lies the basis 
and justification for Dante's use of analogy, analogy of attribution which as we have seen 
is connected to analogy of proportionality in the Paradiso. Beatrice the individual acts as 
a lure for Dante. Beatrice, retaining her individuality both inside and outside, due to an 
accord between appearance and reality, remains physically the same throughout Dante's 
works. However, through the increasing beauty and luminosity of her face, eyes and 
smile, she does nevertheless change revealing the intensity of her love for and proximity 
to God and therefore indirectly aspects of the divine. This is further shown through body- 
involving analogies concerning music and dance. These images concerning Beatrice and 
the other heavenly beings cause desire through presenting Dante with a foretaste of 
heaven in that they reflect God's light, beauty, joy and therefore his being. In so doing 
they function as a lure illuminating Dante and causing him to change within. This vision 
of God produces a state of bliss articulated through the analogies of Beatrice's eyes and 
smile, together with music and dance, which remain rooted in physical reality while 
describing the indescribable and incomprehensible. In this way through making the 
divine accessible through analogy, as the divine can only be understood through analogy, 
the pilgrim and reader are led beyond the physical towards an awareness of Dante's 
understanding of love and his conception of God through the figure of Beatrice. 
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XV. CONCLUSION 
Having completed our discussion of Dante, we shall now turn back to the 
beginning in order both to trace our analysis of love as a historical progression 
illuminating Plato's influence upon Dante, and to consider what the various phases of this 
progression reveal about the dynamics and potentialities of love. 
1. A PATH FROM EROS TO CARITAS 
In the myth of the Birth of Eros when Plato through Diotima describes Eros as the 
child of Poros and Penia, complexities arise. As we discussed in Chapter 1, Poros has at 
least three meanings. The first meaning, evident in the myth itself is "cunning 
resourcefulness", Poros being the child of Metis. The second meaning is "path or way 
through" and the third, a reinterpretation emerging from Plotinus onward, refers to the 
downpouring of "resource, wealth or possession". This later meaning is problematic in 
that on some level it is in tension with the first meaning of poros, though it is connected 
to and a reinterpretation of the second. In contrast to poros, penia meaning lack or 
poverty, that which is aporos, without way, remains relatively consistent over time, being 
often associated with matter and therefore at times the carnal aspect of love. Given that 
this latter term remains consistent by comparison with poros, in order to understand the 
changes in eros over time we overall focused upon the meanings of the term poros. 
We demonstrated how Eros as the child of Penia and Poros, sharing the natures 
of both, is forever both lacking and possessing, and how in Socratic terms eros is thereby 
similar/analogous to the aporia of knowledge of the philosopher, knowing nothing but 
knowing enough of the truth to be conscious that he knows nothing so that the lover of 
wisdom is therefore always desiring to know without ultimate satisfaction. 
In this context we contrasted Poros the son of Metis or Cunning in the myth with 
the wise (204a), good, beautiful and happy gods who possess a different type of wisdom. 
In doing so we discussed how Plato seems to critique the tendency in antiquity to 
associate gods with non-divine worldly qualities therein pointing to the possibility of a 
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purer, more-divine conception of the divine, a point underlined in that Poros and Penia 
through their actions each undermine what they personify. In this way, the seeds of the 
third conception of Poros may be read as implicit within the Symposium. Given that the 
beauty, goodness and eudaimonia of the gods suggest Poros as plenty wealth and 
possession, Plotinus' view seems a conflation of Poros as cunning with the wisdom of 
the gods of 204a whereby Poros makes a new turn, which then becomes integrated into 
and a linguistic resource for the Christian tradition. This pointing to a higher conception 
of the divine in turn points to a purer and higher form of eros directed beyond the 
physical, which is both Diotima's project and the subject of this thesis. 
Turning to the myth's description of Eros, we demonstrated how the philosopher 
Socrates of the Symposium may be read as personifying Eros, having the characteristics 
of both Penia and Poros. We examined the correspondence between Eros and Socrates as 
intermediaries between wisdom and ignorance and mortality and immortality, and how in 
him is articulated the interconnection of eros and philosophy, he being the ideal Platonic 
lover and philosopher. Therein he embodies all the characteristics of Poros according to 
the first definition of cunning and the second definition of pathway, having the 
resourcefulness to find a pathway through his aporia of knowledge, his lack of pathway. 
This resourcefulness takes the form of mental rational technique though in making this 
pathway he uncovers increasingly more problems, so the wisdom he has is constantly 
slipping away. This continued presence of the penia element maintains a certain 
dominance regardless of his efforts to overcome it, showing Socrates to exemplify the 
path of penia. Nonetheless this philosophical notion of eros transcends the physical, 
functioning as a pathway or poros towards truth showing his concern for the well-being 
of the soul. 
We further examined the role of Socrates as intermediary through an analysis of 
the relation between Diotima's revelation of the beautiful and the arrival of Alcibiades, 
representing the opposition of abstract reality versus symbolic representation. This 
opposition functions on three levels. On the first level, though for Diotima the lover's 
ultimate goal is immortality through the procreation of virtue, it is brought about through 
the pursuit of the form of the beautiful as love object, which is here opposed to 
Alcibiades as the finite reflection of the beautiful, the highest rung on the ascent to the 
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beautiful contrasted with the lowest. As love is determined by its object this denotes a 
difference in type of eros, heavenly and earthly Aphrodite; a poros-dominant form of 
eros, eros directed towards the forms seeking immortality through the procreation of 
virtue, hence the well-being of the soul, as opposed to a penia-dominant form of eros 
directed towards physical beauty, the body, hence appetitive desire which when not 
controlled by reason becomes detrimental to the soul. On the second level, Socrates and 
Alcibiades display conflicting types of eros as shown through Plato's use of Apollonian 
and Dionysian elements which articulates the tension between them. Socrates seeking the 
well-being of the soul is trying to lead Alcibiades away from the physical to the good in 
order to procreate arete while Alcibiades incompatibly is trying physically to seduce 
Socrates to learn what he knows, his logoi. This tension relates to the third level where 
Socrates and Alcibiades may be seen as opposing each other with regard to their 
understanding of love of the individual. Alcibiades' conception involves a slavish 
devotion/ fixation upon the individual. In general governed by the lower aspects of the 
soul, though he loves Socrates predominantly for his philosophical logoi, Alcibiades is 
torn between his love for these logoi and his desire for fame, both of which are based 
upon self-interest. In contrast, Socrates represents a more workable notion of love of the 
individual in that he seeks the well-being of the souls of both himself and others, striving 
to procreate arete in order to attain permanent ethical perfection and perfection of 
understanding. Socrates effectively plays out the role of philosophical Eros who, seeking 
the beautiful beyond the physical, returns to help others to ascend to this vision. In this 
way he effectively acts as a daimon mediating between man and the heavens, showing 
the demise of Alcibiades to be the latter's own fault. 
In order better to understand Socrates' methodology in aiding others with regard 
to their souls, we discussed the relationship of eros and irony. Still focusing upon the 
Symposium, we explored various types of irony. The traditional form of irony separates 
essence from existence which allows for the progressive unveiling of essence. Socratic 
irony, which is generally the inverse, is the calling of apparent knowledge into question 
through rational dialogue to reveal a genuine underlying emptiness, ignorance or penia. 
Though Kierkegaard views Socrates as ironist sadistically reducing others to ignorance, 
Socrates seeks the well-being of others while maintaining a slight ironic aloofness to 
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create a caesura to get others to think for themselves, calling on their own inner resources 
rather than giving them a formula for the truth, though remaining close at hand guiding 
their path through questions as opposed to answers. Nonetheless, Kierkegaard is correct 
in seeing that Socrates' irony clears away false belief of others which opens the way for 
reflective thought. Though pointing to personal ignorance (penia), which is at the heart of 
Socratic irony, this lack once acknowledged points beyond itself, emphasizing not only 
what one lacks, whether understanding or arete, but the capacity of rational engagement 
to provide a way (poros) through the aporia making possible the pursuit and gradual 
acquisition of arete and understanding. In this way Socrates' penia-dominant tendency 
therefore points to the poros element in philosophical eros. 
The third and all-encompassing form of irony that we discussed was Platonic 
irony. Plato presupposed fullness in that each element in the dialogue is meaningful. 
Though Plato is not represented directly, for Platonic irony involves the manipulation of 
all elements in a dialogue to convey a common end, he strives to make the readers reflect 
for themselves enabling them to pursue and procreate arete, hence seeking the well-being 
of their souls and immortality. Given the presuppositions of Greek virtue-based ethics, 
this is no doubt inseparable from a quest for ethical self-perfection. This irony focuses on 
the poros-dominant tendency in eros in that it seeks to find a pathway through the 
reader's lack which is Plato's overall project. In this way irony is a means to demonstrate 
love through allowing the other or others to think for themselves, discover themselves 
and be themselves. In order to better understand Platonic irony and its relation to eros we 
turned to the Phaedrus, focusing upon the recantation and its relation to the text as a 
whole. 
In the Phaedrus the central aporia is the recantation; in this context we examined 
Plato's understanding of eros and aporia which Plato deploys ultimately to the end of 
poros (pathway). This recantation as to whether Eros is good and a god is simultaneously 
the matrix and aporia of meaning. Clearly stressing the ambiguity of eros, it creates a site 
of meaning through which the various speeches are reinterpreted and weighed against one 
another, and at the same time it creates a lack of meaning and aporia thereby leaving 
meaning in flux and open to reinterpretation. We then looked at Nussbaum's reading 
emphasizing the aporetic nature of the recantation as indicating a change in Plato's 
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thought. Having transcended the dichotomy of sophrosune and mania set out in the 
Symposium, eros from the Phaedrus onward is viewed as a constitutive element of an 
orderly and pious life, indicating what Nussbaum perceives to be the attribution of a new 
higher value to love of the individual than in the middle dialogues which, as we 
demonstrated, was inaccurate. Contrasting with Nussbaum's understanding of the 
recantation as pointing to a radical change in Plato's view of interpersonal love, 
Hackforth closely reads the sequence of speeches in the Phaedrus as a gradual 
uncovering of the truth concerning eros which is represented in Socrates' second speech. 
In this speech the soul turns from the world through love of the individual towards virtue 
and the forms which govern that relationship. This represents a turning from a utilitarian 
callous lust to a more virtuous love, from uncontrolled selfish eros to a more selfless 
love. Eros remains the same in itself but is defined by its object so the value of the love is 
defined by the end it seeks to achieve. However Hackforth's reading does not take into 
account the fact that, regardless of the sincerity of the sequential unveiling, Plato inserts 
an aporia into the form of the recantation which undercuts meaning, thereby suggesting 
the possibility that none of the mentioned uses of eros are to be taken as the "truth". In 
this way the aporetic structures undermine both Hackforth's and Nussbaum's readings. 
This suggested that within the framework of the Phaedrus exemplifying Platonic 
eros, Plato uses the recantation which is an aporetic structure as a tool of education to 
stimulate philosophical reflection, both in the listener and reader, so that the dialogues act 
not only as on some level an endorsement of writing but as an invitation and introduction 
to philosophical reflection. This is underlined by Plato's consistent support of anamnesis 
achieved through dialectic, which seems to be the one element which survives the aporia 
of the recantation. Irony in that it causes others to reflect for themselves and draw on 
their own resources facilitates anamnesis whereby, for Plato, true understanding can be 
achieved. For this reason Platonic irony, under which we may here subsume Socratic 
irony, functions as a means by which others are led along the path towards true arete and 
understanding. 
Through this analysis of the recantation we uncovered a nested set of irony. 
Hackforth's understanding of unveiling irony is undermined by Socrates' aporia, itself a 
use of irony. Socratic irony is undermined by Plato's irony which provokes philosophical 
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reflection to achieve the well-being of the soul through anamnesis which acts as a poros 
beyond the limits of the present, itself presupposing a heteronomous (though internalized) 
system hence a speculative faith in fullness. These forms of irony, each extending beyond 
the last, form a "path" or poros of irony out of the aporia of Socrates, showing that 
overall Plato uses irony to exemplify aporos-dominant form or tendency in eros in that 
it acts as a means to stimulate philosophical reflection whereby the individual may gain 
access to the truth, increasing in virtue and understanding. In this way eros and irony are 
inseparable in the Phaedrus given that for Plato irony is one of the ways in which love 
for others is shown. 
Eros, as revealed through this discussion of Plato's conception of love, is now 
seen to possess two strands, penia and poros. The penia-dominant tendency in eros 
emphasizing lack, related both to uncontrolled physical eros and, at an intellectual level, 
to ignorance as displayed through Socratic irony. The poros-dominant tendency, as we 
have just seen, is displayed through Platonic irony. Both Socratic and Platonic irony 
represent means by which Plato seeks to beget virtue in others, including the reader, 
seeking to enable them to reflect for themselves so that as opposed to poros as cunning, 
in the Platonic project poros represents a pathway through the lack of virtue and aporia 
of knowledge, the facilitation of which for Plato is a great gesture of love. This poros- 
dominant strand which seeks the well-being of the other, is indicative of a relatively 
selfless element in philosophical eros (though the selflessness is of course qualified by 
the ideal of self-perfection), which shows eros to be more complex than Nygren suggests. 
As we discussed in Chapter I, while the meaning of the penia element in Eros 
remains relatively consistent, signifying lack, we have explored thus far two meanings of 
poros, cunning or pathway. From Plotinus onward poros takes on the very different 
meaning of possession, resource and wealth. For Plotinus, poros is the down-pouring of 
Reason Principles from the One to creation so that the individual receives this wealth 
through turning upward and contemplating the One. While being in tension with the 
conception of poros as resourcefulness, this third meaning (wealth) seems connected to 
the second (pathway) in that through contemplating the One, receiving the wealth of the 
Reason Principles, the pathway is opened whereby the individual can return to the One 
freeing them from the penia and aporia of the world. This third meaning of poros became 
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integrated into and provided a linguistic resource for the Christian tradition; in Christian 
thinkers such as Augustine and Ambrose God is the true Poros, Resource or Wealth, 
which pours down on creation in the form of his Logos, Grace and the Holy Spirit, 
expressive of the selfless love of God for his creation, opening the Way mankind can 
return to him, the return involving eros in so far as it is necessary to recognize lack and 
need of God to desire him. Yet a return is impossible without God's intervention, his 
agapic loving of man which motivates man's love for him, allowing him to return. 
Nygren in his judgement of eros as self-love seems not to have taken into account 
the double nature of eros, having paid less attention to the poros strand of eros, nor its 
diverse meanings interpreted differently over time. For this reason Nygren did not fully 
appreciate the progression from Plato through Plotinus to Augustine which marks the 
gradual reinterpretation of the poros element in eros until it is seen as transformed 
through God's grace, its encounter with agape into what Augustine calls caritas. 1 
In this process the crucial difference between the Platonic conceptions of love and 
those of Plotinus, Augustine and Dante is that, unlike the Platonic view which is a self- 
willed movement upward, love for the latter three involves a downward movement from 
creator, the One or God, towards creation, hence it is God's love, not our own. In this 
context, rather than the nature or value of love being determined by its object as in 
Platonism, in Christianity it is God who is Love who determines the value of his object, 
creation, hence us. Here lies the central difference between eros and agape, Platonic love 
and Christian love. 
Furthermore, though some have seen this selfless love in Plotinus as the same as 
Christian caritas, it is not quite identical. Plotinus' poros-dominant eros, though 
seemingly selfless in that it is an outpouring of the One who is Eros, is different from 
Christian agape which is more truly selfless, the true Poros, God as Agape. We must for 
a moment return to Plato. For him, eros is always the same yet is defined by its object, 
whether directed towards a carnal or spiritual object, and is therefore earthly eros or 
heavenly eros. Though heavenly eros, which emphasizes poros as pathway, is directed 
towards virtue, nonetheless this does not make it agape, God's selfless love for mankind. 
1 See Augustine, De Doctrina Christiana, Book I, vii, 18. "I mean by charity that affection of the mind 
which aims at the enjoyment of God for His own sake, and the enjoyment of one's self and one's neighbour 
in subordination to God". 
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Augustine rightly states that in the Christian understanding God's love and grace is in 
part expressed in that he puts in our hearts a desire to seek him, a moment when agape 
motivates heavenly eros, explaining why Nygren says that Augustine's understanding of 
caritas involves the coming together or merging of eros as he understood it from Neo- 
Platonism and agape. Nonetheless, the two remain distinct. Heavenly eros must be 
converted through a Biblical conversion and therefore receive God's grace and agape at 
which point Heavenly eros is transformed into agape, or according to Augustine who 
spoke no Greek, caritas, the Latin term avoiding the "colourless" neutrality and lack of 
intensity and warmth of agape. In this sense the poros strand of Heavenly eros, through 
its encounter with God's love, agape which is the true Poros (Resource or Wealth), is 
converted into what both Augustine and Dante understood as caritas which is likewise a 
form of poros (passage) to God. This addition of agape shows caritas to be the telos of 
the eros tradition, but a significantly different and higher form of love from Platonic eros 
given its contact with, and subsequent transformation through, agape. 
In this gradual transformation of eros, though emphasis has been placed on 
different understandings of the term poros, we must take into account penia as well. This 
progression may be read as a movement from lack or penia-centered love, focused on 
lack, to a poros-centred love focused on fullness, further interpreted as a movement from 
a self-love to a truly selfless love. If seen according to a Christian reading, this parallels 
and might by the incautious be equated with the movement from carnal pleasure-based 
love through love of virtue to love of God. Penia, while meaning lack or poverty, is 
associated with the indeterminate and matter, and even in the myth of the birth of Eros 
has a carnal element, hence earthly eros as mentioned in the first section of Chapter III. 
However the aspect of penia focused upon in our discussion of the penia-tendency in 
eros is the intellectual meaning, Socrates' use of lack which reduces others to ignorance 
deflating false knowledge in order to open a path towards truth, as distinct from 
physically seducing them. Nonetheless the penialporos opposition influencing Christian 
thought tends to re-align with the heavenly and earthly eros distinction, focusing upon the 
opposition of the body versus the soul as evil versus good, mortal versus immortal, 
poverty versus wealth as conceived from Plotinus onward, simply expressed asfol amor 
versus fin amor. Given this opposition within the Christian tradition, this movement 
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involving the transition from penia-dominant earthly eros to poros-dominant Heavenly 
eros to caritas is perhaps most fascinatingly articulated by Dante in his Commedia. 
In light of this passage of and transformation in eros from the Platonic to the 
Christian traditions which is exemplified in the poetry of Dante, we took account in Part 
2 of two means through which a Platonic influence may have arrived at Dante, a poet 
emerging from the Christian tradition of the Middle Ages, greatly influenced by Platonic 
culture. The first, the philosophical approach, traces the passage of Platonic ideas 
concerning love from Plato through Plotinus to Augustine. Through Augustine and many 
other Neo-Platonic Christian thinkers, this notion of eros entered the monastic schools 
and medieval culture, informing Dante's conceptions of amor and caritas as expressed in 
the Vita Nuova and the Commedia. The second approach, which concerns the literary 
tradition, involves the emergence of Platonic discussion concerning love's ambiguity and 
the lover's desire for wholeness with the beloved in Ovid, which informed the tradition of 
courtly love in which the opposition of fol amor and fin amor echoed earthly and 
heavenly eros, which was perhaps also subject to the influence of Neo-Platonic ideas 
upon the Troubadours independent of Ovid. Evident particularly through Christianity's 
conflict with courtly love, Platonic influences surfaced in part, though without reference 
to Socrates' Palinode, through the poetics of recantation. Among the Troubadour poets 
debates emerged concerned with the ambiguity of love, with their poetry of recantation 
influencing the Sicilian and Tuscan schools and through them the Dolce Stil Nuova. As a 
member of the Dolce Stil Nuova, Dante was concerned with positive and negative forms 
of love, articulated in the opposition of amor versus caritas, which subtly though 
decisively deviates from the dichotomy of earthly and heavenly eros. 
Within this framework, and articulating this transformation of eros, in Part 3 we 
examined Francesca as Dante's most eloquent articulation of courtly love, amor. First we 
explored how Dante likens Francesca to earthly Venus in the "Venus of Rimini", 
embodying earthly eros. Through using the myth of Venus and Mars to articulate her 
very similar relationship to Paolo, Dante simultaneously ennobles her through pagan 
myth and debases/condemns her through Christianity. This condemnation is continued in 
the next chapter, "Falling for Francesca", a full analysis of Inferno V, in which we saw 
that while Dante identifies Francesca with earthly Venus he is simultaneously, as if on 
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the opposite side of the coin, condemning her according to the Christian tradition as an 
Eve figure, a trap into which both Paolo and Dante the pilgrim fall. By identifying her as 
a trap/snare (reminiscent of the net of Vulcan), she is demonstrated to be an aporetic 
figure, who through her penia causes others to fall and be caught forever in the aporia of 
Hell. This in turn expresses Dante's condemnation of courtly love as aporetic, which 
through its conflict with and parody of Christianity leads its followers astray through 
causing them to follow Amor and their carnal pleasure hence their self-love, as opposed 
to the Christian God who is Caritas, resulting in their condemnation. 
When considered in terms of Plato's notion of eros, Francesca resembles the 
uncontrolled eros of the tyrant who has not re-channelled her desire through sophrosune 
towards the good, beautiful and true. The point which is renegotiated here however is the 
notion of aporia. When seen with regard to Socrates' technique, we discussed the 
deflation of false wisdom to an aporia in order to begin the pursuit of true knowledge. 
Not evil in itself, the use of aporia as exemplified by Plato when handled properly 
became a tool to stimulate reflective thought, provided the student did not remain trapped 
in the aporia but through faith in a fullness accessible through anamnesis climbed out of 
the pit. However, Dante's use of the aporia of eros seems purely negative, the 
inescapable trap of Hell which, accurately seen, misses the subtlety of the relation of eros 
and aporia in Plato but in a black/white way exemplifies Christianity's critique and 
judgment of pagan thought, though apparently not being fully conscious of its subtleties 
and of the shifts which occurred in its appropriation and integration into the thought of 
Medieval Europe. 
Furthermore, Francesca's seduction echoes Plato's use of irony which formed an 
intricate and complex structure to seduce students to philosophy and provoke 
philosophical reflection. As with the poetics of recantation, there appears to be no direct 
Platonic influence, but the fact that Dante is drawn to a parallel structure is instructive 
about the potentialities for representation of their related concepts of love. Francesca is 
the site of irony in so far as she indicates the splitting away of the good from the beautiful 
showing that appearances are deceiving. Though Francesca on the surface is ideally 
beautiful, a donna angelica who should lead Dante to God, she is morally questionable 
and condemnable for lussuria and by this sin she seduces and infects Paolo and Dante 
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leading them astray. This in turn indicates Dante's negative implementation of the 
Socratic aporia and therefore his ironic judgment on the seemingly beautiful/appearance 
as being in opposition to the good. However as Dante maintained a distance or caesura, 
demonstrated by his ability to reason and draw Francesca into question, the irony of her 
seduction, which produced a trap echoing Socratic irony, was undermined by a form of 
Platonic irony resulting in Dante's rational reflection and change. Thus though on a 
significantly simpler scale than in Platonic dialogues, we find analogues of Plato's use of 
irony in Francesca's seduction of Paolo; with regard to Socratic irony through being 
stuck in an aporia through presupposing lack, showing its ultimately destructive ends, 
and with Platonic irony through reflective thought having presupposed a fullness of God 
and Beatrice which ultimately enables him to escape Francesca's aporia of 
passion/compassion. 
From Francesca as earthly eros/concupiditas, drawing upon both pagan and 
Christian sources, we turned to Beatrice's rebuke which acted as Dante's recantation of 
his falling for Francesca, his repentance of amor in favour of caritas. In Purgatorio 
XXX, Dante represents Beatrice as Heavenly Venus through a correlation with Venus' 
rebuke of Aeneas in Aeneid I. However this correlation ends when, in the manner in 
which in courtly love fin amor degenerates tofol amor, Venus sends Aeneas off to Dido. 
Given from a Christian point of view this tragic sinful experience (though the experience 
ultimately contributes to making Aeneas into the hero he becomes), Dante extends his 
conception of love beyond that conceivable by the pre-Christian Virgil. Beatrice is from 
God, an expression of God's grace and love for Dante which further suggests the 
subsequent transforming of Heavenly eros into caritas. Beatrice, a Christ-like figure, 
represents the Word of God, who in contrast to the deception of the Venus of the Aeneid 
tells Dante the truth, however harshly, causing him to face his sins, and oversees his full 
biblical conversion according to the pattern of Act 2: 36-41. After his conversion, Dante 
recognizes Beatrice to be Sapientia, Divine wisdom, which when unveiled is Revelation, 
ultimately leading Dante to God therefore acting as the new redeemed Eve. Thus in both 
Beatrice's pagan role as Heavenly Venus and her Christian roles as a Christ-like figure 
and new Eve-figure, she acts as a poros (pathway). In this way the pagan poros of 
Heavenly eros is subsumed by the greater poros of Christian caritas and thereby enacts 
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the conversion of Heavenly eros into caritas. The means by which this occurs is Beatrice, 
an expression of God's grace and agape, here resembling the third meaning of poros as 
the down pouring wealth, possession or resource from Heaven. The status of these figures 
and images was considered through a discussion of Beatrice and analogy. Beatrice, sent 
by God to aid Dante and lead/lure him back to God through what we earlier described as 
"the coming together of her beauty and his Word", for Dante embodies the merging of 
Heavenly eros and agape. 
In contrast to Francesca seen as aporia, lack of passage, Beatrice is Dante's 
passage way or poros to God. Resembling more the use of aporiai by Plato in the 
Phaedrus discussed with regard to Platonic irony, the rebuke or deflation of Dante by 
Beatrice is a tool, the means by which he will truly and deeply repent and change. Given 
that Christianity presupposes fullness, God as good, beautiful and true, only through a 
deflation of false knowledge, producing a temporary emptiness and penia, is the pilgrim 
led to a wholehearted pursuit of righteousness. Thus though the Commedia seems to 
present the descent into Hell as an aporia and the ascent out of Hell to Heaven as poros, 
as in Plato's Phaedrus the deflation of false knowledge into aporia is a tool to cause the 
pilgrim to change and pursue truth. 
Furthermore, in terms of love of the individual, Francesca embodies carnal 
uncontrolled eros in contrast to Beatrice who embodies caritas. Dante is personally 
interacting with both women, one a temptress and the other a saviour, one an aporetic 
figure seen as evil and the other a poros leading to the good. As an aporetic figure 
Francesca blocks Dante from God. As a saviour and poros Beatrice leads Dante to God. 
Thus interpersonal love relationships in Dante can be destructive or constructive, like 
eros determined by the object on which it is focused (though ultimately, as we have seen, 
the agape element in caritas is a gift of God which itself determines the worth of its 
object). If a relationship is destructive involving a permanent fixation upon the 
individual, the beloved must be abandoned as in Diotima's speech in favour of the form 
of the beautiful, or as in the case of Dante Francesca must be abandoned in pursuit of 
God, a requirement which Paolo failed to accept. However if the relationship causes the 
lover, as in the Phaedrus, to envisage and pursue beauty and goodness, which in the 
Commedia is God, to which the beloved remains subordinate, then like the lovers of 
325 
Socrates' second speech in the Phaedrus, the love relationship contributes to and is an 
integral part of the pursuit of virtue, enabling the lovers to ascend together towards the 
Good, Beautiful and True. This latter relationship is exemplified vividly by the 
interaction between Dante and Beatrice as they ascend through Heaven, Beatrice feeding 
the love of God to Dante through her mouth and eyes. In this case the beloved is an 
integral part of a dialectic of desire which transcends earthly attraction in a spiritual 
movement towards God, here exemplified through Beatrice's aid of Dante whereby 
Heavenly eros is converted into caritas. In this way, Beatrice enacts the reconciliation of 
the reverence of woman of courtly love with Christianity, and is thereby a poros out of 
the conflict between courtly love and the Christian faith. 
Representing these ways informed by poros and penia, 
2 as we have seen, while 
Francesca represents penia and acts as an aporia (lack of way) in the path of Dante, 
Beatrice represents poros as in downpouring resource, wealth from God3 and poros, a 
way or pathway by which Dante may return to God. Francesca representing earthly 
Aphrodite and Eve in two-fold manner represents earthly eros/concupiscentia, 
5 or lust, 
resulting in her damnation. Beatrice is presented as a poros figure, Dante's way or 
passage to God figured as Heavenly Venus and the new Eve-figure, or the manner in 
which he is lured to God. In this capacity, like Socrates who acts as a midwife as well as 
a daimon (Symposium 202d10,202e1-203a8), Beatrice mediates between the human and 
divine acting as a channel of God's grace 6 in order to beget not only virtue and 
understanding but a new creation, a new Dante. Beatrice mediates between God and man 
in a manner which extends beyond the myth of eros, resolving its aporia, exemplified by 
Beatrice in Paradise in which she simultaneously desires and is fully satisfied and 
fulfilled by God. 
2 Cambon, pp. 64 and 66. 
3 Chiampi, p. 62 
4 Brandeis, pp. 107-8 
5 Augustine, de Trinitate, Book IX, sec. 12. 
6 Smith, The Greatness of Dante Alighieri, p. 27; Brandeis, p. 104; Mazzeo, Medieval Cultural Tradition,, 
pp. 129-130. 
"Francesca and Beatrice are related to each other like the two faces of the moon, and the antithesis is so 
subtle that a glimpsed ray of lost Paradise illumines Francesca's visage, while a deadly power inheres, 
before Dante is ready for it, in Beatrice's radiance. Francesca is a victim, self-defeated despite all the 
extenuating circumstances Dante knows, and Beatrice a victor, the former shows him love as despair, the 
latter introduces him to heavenly joy. " (Cambon, p. 55) 
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This dichotomy created by the opposing forms of love, Beatrice redeemed and 
fulfilled as opposed to the condemned and unfulfilled Francesca, results from a choice of 
the object of love, the beloved. As in Plato's Symposium, love is the same, a mixture of 
poros and penia, yet, from the human point of view, is determined by its object. 
Augustine points to this when he writes that both concupiditas and caritas have a single 
source in amor (de Trinitate, IX, 12). The choice of loved object determines the outcome 
whether good or bad. However in the Symposium, given that Eros is the child of Poros as 
well as Penia, providing that it possesses a strand of poros, "intelligent reflection" on 
carnal love has the capacity in principle for transforming or transcending it. 8 In contrast 
for Dante given that lussuria, uncontrolled earthly eros exemplified by Francesca as sin, 
results in death and damnation, Romans 3: 23,6: 23, it seems to contain no seeds within 
itself to a higher more transcendent form of love, though as is evident in the Vita Nuova 
amor has this potential. Given that the sinner is dead in his or her transgressions, it is 
only through a full repentance made possible by God's love and grace that the sinner can 
be forgiven of this sinful love and thereby transcend this condition. In the Commedia the 
subjugation of reason by desire represents a choice by which amor, which can possess 
virtue, degrades to uncontrolled carnal desire, lust, while the choice of virtue which is 
inspired by caritas results in spiritual desire, caritas. Given the element of free choice 
and that God's love and grace are constantly offered to us if only we reach out and accept 
them, the situation could have always been otherwise .9 Francesca could have been 
Beatrice had she not abandoned reason for desire and focused upon physical satisfaction 
of her desires. 1° Likewise Dante could have been Paolo trapped in Hell, though he chose 
not to be. " The Commedia could have been a tragedy, but it is not. Thus as Platonic eros 
is determined by its object so, due to God's love and grace which opened the way of 
8 "Intelligent reflection on the `lower' (Francesca-type) object of love will itself give the lover good reasons 
for transcending it and moving `upwards'; and there are analogous ideas in the Phaedrus ... In the Symposium the fact that someone's love is focused on a quasi-Francesca figure (or is the sort that Francesca 
herself experiences) does not necessarily condemn it as a dead end, or identify it with unsurmountable 
penia. It already contains within itself the seeds of progress to a higher state, no matter how carnal it may, 
at present, be" given that it likewise possesses a strand of poros "which provides a route towards a real 
fulfilment in which love itself is (perhaps) transcended" (Barker, 2002). 9 "The very fact that it is an infernal scene, whose character bears some proportion with the nature of both 
the sin and the punishment of the two lovers, calls into being its opposite, a paradisal scene, or its 
equivalent. " (Masciandaro, p. 78) 
10 Shapero, Woman, Earthly and Divine, p. 106. 
" Cambon, p. 55 
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salvation by "[setting] eternity in his heart" (Ecclesiast 3: 11), Dante's potentiality is 
determined by the destination of his desire, whether or not he chooses to respond. 
Thus we see that Dante like Plato presupposes a fullness, but Dante understands 
this fullness to be the ultimate object of fulfilment, God. In contrast to Plato who 
tentatively presents fulfilment only as a distant possibility, Dante believes that for us in 
this life it is constantly available, or capable of being reached, achieved and possessed, 
though by fulfilment he means an eternal personal relationship of fulfilling love with 
God. Quite different from Diotima's hungry lover/philosopher who lacks and knows that 
he lacks, for Dante union with God is a state simultaneously of desire and complete 
fulfilment (Pertile, p. 155). In Paradiso all desire for knowledge and affection is 
constantly and eternally fully satisfied. Thus Dante does not emphasize lack but stresses 
fullness. However unlike Plato who only considers this fullness a distant possibility, 
Dante believes complete fulfilment with God to be constantly offered to us12; this through 
repentance and continued righteousness due to and in response to God's gift of grace, 
which allows Dante to return to God thus forming a cycle of love. For Plato fullness is 
only a possibility in that as it is achieved through a "gradual self-enlightenment with 
strongly intellectual as well as emotional and ethical components" (Barker, 2002). In this 
sense man's capacity for fullness is dependent upon himself, his will and capability on 
many levels. In contrast fullness for Dante, though involving a long journey demanding 
much struggle and effort, nonetheless is ultimately dependent upon revelation and grace 
which allow for repentance. In this case, it is God's fullness expressed in his abundant 
love and forgiveness of Dante which allows Dante to perceive God, to be given the grace 
to repent and be forgiven by God, whereby he accepts and receives God's fullness (1 
John 4: 19,1 John 4: 8-10). This is the distinction between eros and agape. Eros 
involving the pursuit of ethical self-perfection is a self-willed ascent while agape is a 
downpouring of God's selfless love and forgiveness on the individual which in 
12 Barker (2002) points out that this contrast needs sensitive handling "since Dante's setting is (in Platonic 
terms) `mythological', it is hard to be sure exactly how it relates to the ordinary human lives it allegorizes. 
In another rather obvious sense, too, what Dante attains is `distant' from most people [in]... that he only 
achieves this fullness after much struggle and pain (and in the poem's terms, long journeying). " As we have 
seen, though, in Plato fullness becomes possible through the bootstrapping operations of intelligent 
reflection, of which not all may be capable, while in Dante it is the gift of grace, universally and always 
available. 
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Augustinian thought is fused in his notion of caritas causing man's return to God. 
Nonetheless, in similar fashion to Plato's philosophical deflation of others through 
aporia, only through acknowledging his poverty, sin, penia, can Dante advance towards 
fulfilment and reconciliation with God. 
This leaves open the question of irony which, as previously noted, though crucial 
and interwoven with Bros and aporia in Plato, is little mentioned with regard to Dante, 
thus indicating an aspect of the Platonic tradition to which Dante had not been exposed. 
Dante was enabled under the influence of Platonism to present eros as having the form of 
a dynamic which leads to a positive transformation of love in part through the dialectic of 
love involving a form of recantation. We have noted certain analogues of Socratic and 
Platonic irony in Dante's treatment, but beyond these there may be a further, strategic, 
irony. For it is at least worth asking whether Dante does not structurally capture the ironic 
dimension in that any dialectic of love inevitably remains open-ended whereas the 
Commedia, through the vision of God as the ultimate object of desire, presents a formal 
closure. It is a question strongly analogous to that which Plato surely invites us to press 
with respect to Aristophanes' lovers in the Symposium.. 
2. DIFFERENT CONCEPTIONS OF LOVE 
We have explored a Platonic influence on Dante's conception of eros. First we 
traced Dante's philosophical Neo-Platonist heritage, then examined it through the 
influence of courtly love and the Troubadours upon him. This was followed by an 
analysis of Francesca and Beatrice, seen as echoing the opposition of penia and poros. 
Through this Dante shows Christianity to extend beyond Platonism, positing the actuality 
of the fullness of the Christian God while the fullness in Platonism remains only a 
possibility. In order to understand this extension, the point at which Dante goes beyond 
Plato, we must examine precisely how they differ. 
When we ask what change has occurred in the notion of love between Plato and 
Dante, we find that the key areas are the relation of the lover and beloved, the love of the 
individual, and redemption through grace. 
That Beatrice the beloved acts as poros (pathway) leading Dante to God (Poros as 
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Resource) indicates a reversal of roles in the relationship of erastes (lover) and eromenos 
(beloved). In terms of the relation of lover and beloved13 in ancient Greece, the erastes 
loves though gradually intellectualizing his desire in the Phaedrus and the Symposium, 
while the eromenos traditionally remains indifferent. Likewise, 
Dante's emphasis in his early work began to fall almost exclusively on the part of the lover; more 
specifically, on the moral progress resulting from his sublimation of erotic feeling. The lover overcome by 
desire begins in a state of passion and wrath; the beloved is in a state of meekness desiring nothing. The 
Vita Nuova is the story of the gradual development of love from this bewildering tension of inner emotions 
to the achievement of inner peace by sublimating intellectualization. (Shapero, Woman, Earthly and Divine, 
p. 85) 
Despite being the expression of God's grace, and Charles Williams' reading of Beatrice 
as being truly in love with Dante, she as an individual seems less in love with him than he 
with her as an individual despite her descent into Hell for him, her efforts in bringing him 
to God, and her backward/downward gaze in Paradiso XXXIII. 14 However in this 
process, for Plato the elder and more knowledgeable person is lover while for Dante his 
beloved younger Beatrice has the wisdom of God. While continuing to follow 
perfectionist ends, Dante and Beatrice, as with the love of Alcibiades for Socrates, twist 
the conventional/traditional roles of erastes and eromenos as she who is wise is the 
beloved aspenia loves poros. Dante inverts the relation of erastes and eromenos not only 
in that Dante defines his view as pertaining to heterosexual relations but also in that he 
with less knowledge loves, humanly speaking, more. However this view exists within the 
greater dialectic that God loved us first and is therefore the true lover and Dante the 
beloved, while Beatrice acts as the expression of God's love, a point to which we shall 
13 The most apparent difference is that Plato discusses relations between men. Phaedrus 252D5-4 and 
253B7-8 indicate the relation is between a man and a youth. Dante discusses heterosexual relations, 
particularly as homosexuality is classified as sin in the Bible (see Romans 1: 26-27 and 1 Corinthians 6: 9- 
10). Therefore, "the antique Platonist, as appears from numerous passages in the Platonic writings, would 
have despised the Petrarchis; as a vulgar woman-lover. The Petrarchist would have loathed the Platonist as 
a moral pariah" (Symonds "The Dantesque and Platonic Ideals of Love", p. 82). 
14 Chiampi's (pp. 51-53) and Williams' (Descent of the Dove, p. 135) opposing arguments as to Beatrice's 
personal feelings towards Dante are equally extreme. In contrast Dante always loves her deeply and 
passionately as an individual, while she consistently loves him in Dante's understanding of a God-inspired 
maternal way seeking his spiritual good. Though a higher form of love, Beatrice's love remains less 
personal and is non-acquisitive as it is an expression of God's love. 
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soon return. 
Given that Beatrice acts as the poros or pathway to God, Dante in his 
understanding of God's love for man attributes a higher value to the role of the individual 
and to love of the individual than Vlastos acknowledges in the Symposium's scala 
d'amor. Mazzeo as we have previously seen takes an extreme and perhaps misguided 
view of this issue. He writes, 
In spite of all the similarities, there is one crucial difference between platonic Eros and Dante's "amore. " 
The soul of the lover of beauty in both Dante and Plato ascends to immaterial beauty, but in Dante the 
beloved is not left behind on the bottom rung of the ladder, or at the first stage of the process. The beloved 
is transformed and elevated in her death-she achieves a greater, immaterial beauty. (Mazzeo, Structure and 
Thought, p. 132) 
However, as we have discussed, in the Symposium since the individual in seeking 
immortality strives to beget arete in the other, Plato does not leave the beloved on the 
first rung of his ascent. More explicitly in the Palinode of the Phaedrus, the lovers are 
engaged in a dialectical ascent involving eros and understanding, imaged as love passing 
through eyes which is echoed in the ascent of Beatrice and Dante in Paradiso. Whether 
Dante's attribution of value to the love of the individual indirectly finds its origins in the 
Phaedrus is highly debatable, whether through Ovid or through Neo-Platonism, however 
one thing is certain: this value of the love of the individual is the immediate contribution 
not only of Christianity but also of courtly love and the Troubadours, showing the 
integration of courtly love into the Christian framework, 15 hence the reconciliation of 
courtly love and Christianity. 16 
Within the Commedia, in contrast to some extent with the Phaedrus and the 
Symposium, Dante fully develops the personality and history of the individual (a reading 
Nussbaum might object to given her over-emphasis on the individualization of the lovers 
in her reading of the Phaedrus in The Fragility of Goodness). Mazzeo rightly says this 
shows 
'5 Mazzeo, Structure and Thought, p. 132. 
16 Maueo, Structure and Thought, p. 137. 
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the importance Christianity gave to personality in its scheme of values and its plan of salvation. Its God is 
personal, and the death of one of the elect involves survival of personality as well as increase in value, in 
goodness and beauty. Dante turned to Beatrice after a period of error, doubt, and confusion because through 
her supernatural aid, her personal interest in him which survived death, he care to realize that he should 
have loved her more, not less, after she died. (Mazzeo, Structure and Thought, p. 132) 
This emphasis on the individual, though not entirely new (as we saw in Part One of this 
thesis), is accentuated in Dante. Furthermore, given that the beloved is a woman, this 
increase of emphasis shows the influence of the most positive of the contributions of 
courtly love, an increase in man's valuation of and respect for women, though at times 
both in courtly love and in the Commedia this is exaggerated. Dante marks an increase in 
value of the individual as an object of love and lover mainly due to God's love for man as 
an individual soul, and Dante's belief in God's desire for a personal relationship with 
man and for man's individual salvation which involves the confrontation with and 
repentance of his personal sins. In this way the new emphasis on the importance of the 
individual, the actual person, as a continued active element in the ascent to truth'? seems 
to open the way to the love of the individual like, but in a more fully articulated form 
than, that expressed in the Phaedrus. 
Given that for Dante God, who is perfect, selflessly loves and desires to redeem 
man who is imperfect, Dante believes in the necessity of grace, a concept not available to 
Plato. For Plato, desire (coupled with intelligence) is enough to ascend to the form of the 
beautiful. Though Socrates says "he must approach or be led", giving the impression that 
the journey is part personal desire and part instruction (Symp. 211 C 1), it is the effort and 
power/desire of the individual which determines whether or not he sees the forms (Symp. 
211C1-8). (In this vision men are seen as powerful and self-determined; Republic 617E. ) 
In contrast for Dante, holding to a Christian position, desire is not enough. In 
Christianity "all have sinned and fall short of the glory of God" (Romans 3: 23) and the 
"wages of sin is death" (Romans 6: 23), so every man deserves to die. Given man's fallen 
nature/propensity to sin and thus inevitable condemnation, man must be forgiven of his 
sins in order to have a relationship with God, (because "[his] sins have hidden [God's] 
17 Mazzeo, Structure and Thought, p. 132. 
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face from [him]"; Isaiah 59: 2) and be with God for eternity. "Because God so loved the 
world he gave his one and only Son" (John 3: 16) as a perfect sinless sacrifice in order to 
redeem man from his sins. Through being crucified and raised to life again/resurrected, 
Jesus enabled those who believe in him and follow him and his teachings wholeheartedly 
to be saved and reconciled to God. This forgiveness of sins received at baptism 
(subsequently through the confession of sins and repentance) is a gift which because of 
man's sins he did not deserve, "the gift of God [being] eternal life in Christ Jesus" 
(Romans 6: 23). Adhering to this Christian position Dante, the pilgrim, in Inferno I 
desired to climb the mount of Purgatory directly; however he was prevented by his sins, 
taking the form of the three beasts. (Also see Virgil in Purgatorio XXX who cannot 
ascend to God regardless of his desire. ) Therefore for Dante desire is insufficient for 
salvation. 
Though man comes from God and remembers God, partially resembling on some 
level anamnesis, '8 it is only through God's intervention, his grace, that man can be saved 
(a position we mentioned with regard to Augustine). "Desire for the final vision is not 
enough [though].... with Beatrice's help he finally achieved his aim. " (Mazzeo, Medieval 
Culture, p. 126-7) Following his descent into Hell and his climbing of Mount Purgatory, 
and after being rebuked by Beatrice confessing, repenting and being baptized, his sins are 
forgiven and he receives the gift of the Holy Spirit, an expression of God's grace, a gift 
undeserved, and is therefore redeemed. He is then led by Beatrice, representing God's 
grace, up through the Heavens of the Paradiso to the vision of God in the highest point 
and centre of Paradise. 19 Therefore, for Dante, this gift of grace comes through Beatrice, 
exemplifying the wisdom of God though not as unconverted reason might understand 
18 This is demonstrated in that the memory of God is substituted for anamnesis. Associated with the notion 
of reincarnation and transmigration of soul, Plato believed in anamnesis, the remembering of the forms 
from a prenatal existence (248A1-3) as shown in the Phaedrus 254B6 "the driver's memory goes back to 
that form of beauty". Likewise in the Commedia Dante expresses nostalgia "for a beauty once seen and 
then in part forgotten". "The sight of Plato's plain of truth which each man saw in a disembodied pre- 
existent state is replaced by that instantaneous contact of the soul with God at the moment of its creation" 
(Mazzeo, Structure and Thought, p. 22; also pp. 59-60), which "[implants] love for the Creator `your life 
the Supreme Beneficence breathes forth immediately, and He so enamours it of Himself that it desires Him 
ever after"' (Mazzeo, Structure and Thought, pp. 59-60). This causes it unfathomable joy which through 
the body is dulled causing nostalgia (see Paradiso XXXIII, 57), an "imprinted passion" like a good though 
forgotten dream motivating a continued search through inappropriate objects until it finds God. (Mazzeo, 
Structure and Thought, p. 24) 
19 Mazzeo, Structure and Thought, p. 133. 
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wisdom; Beatrice's presence in his life is an expression and proof of God's love and 
grace upon him. "The beloved girl is a miracle, a beatrice (or blessing-bearer)" (Brandeis, 
p. 107) as she is "a channel of grace. Dante's cosmology of love and light as beauty 
would have remained merely the framework of a possible salvation20 had there not been 
grace, and, in its ultimately incomprehensible way, it was bestowed through the 
instrumentality of the beauty of a person" (Mazzeo, Structure and Thought, p. 133)21 
Grace is this "additional aspect, the love of God for man which makes his salvation 
possible and which makes the flight to God possible" (Mazzeo, Structure and Thought, p. 
1334) 22 Salvation is ultimately determined, as we saw in the case of Virgil and in the 
exclusion of Plato and Aristotle from Purgatory and Paradise, by a Christian faith in God 
and forgiveness of sins, grace which allows a proper reconciliation through Jesus Christ, 
a point which distinguishes Dante from Platonism. 
In this way Christianity and Dante judge and condemn Platonism as an aporia 
(lack of way), a belief system directed towards and founded upon the pursuit of self- 
perfection, hence the self, and therefore, as we saw with Francesca on penia, not founded 
on God. Platonism did not recognize God to be the source of all resource and complete 
fullness, the ultimate and true Poros. Admittedly Plato does posit an initial fullness 
through anamnesis of the forms. However though Dante and Plato both posit a fullness or 
truth, Dante and Christianity would consider the Platonist to be worshipping "an 
unknown god" (Act 17: 23). Dante following Christianity is opening himself beyond his 
personal determinations, through recognizing his personal weakness and sin and 
20 Plato expresses only the possibility of salvation. In Symposium 212A6, he writes "if ever it is given to a 
man to put on immortality". "Virgil as well as Beatrice is a `natural' instrument of salvation, but they only 
remain possibilities unless they are actualized as instruments by God, and this actualization is charismatic. 
The ladder of love and beauty remains only a possibility unless we climb it. That it exists is a natural fact. 
That certain particular individuals climb it and others do not is a function of both grace and free will. " 
(Mazzeo, Structure and Thought, p. 134) 
2'Foster seems inaccurate in his criticism of Dante's use of grace. He writes, "The theory of grace, if theory 
it can be called, is the weak point in Dantean theology. " And in note 13, "Here it may suffice to say that I 
have in mind: (a) the Good Pagans in Dante's Limbo, (b) the rarity of his allusions to the Sacraments. True, 
there is the impressive allegory of Purgatorio IX: but taking the Comedy as a whole, there is a lack of 
emphasis on life in the Body of Christ on earth, I think. " (Foster, "The Mind in Love", p. 48) Foster has not 
recognized that Beatrice symbolically represents the Host, and therefore has not understood her to represent 
the presence and articulation of God's grace in Dante's life. 
22 In his whole discussion Mango is conflating Platonic and Plotinian/Neo-Platonist thought as would have 
been received through Augustine; this also is how, in part, Dante would have received the Platonic 
influence as we have seen. 
334 
acknowledging the existence, influence and desire of God. Thus in recognizing God as 
the ultimate Poros of mankind whether he chooses to follow it or not, Dante progresses 
far beyond Platonic desire. Rather than focusing upon his own desire, strength, 
knowledge and poros, he realizes his own human fragility, ignorance, sin and therefore 
penia. He recognizes his inability to achieve fullness by himself. However by humbling 
himself before the omnipotent and omniscient God who is knowable through his Son, but 
simultaneously recognizing God's desire for a relation of mutual love with him as an 
individual, 23 demonstrated through the crucifixion, he can through God reach fullness, 
salvation, and Heaven, unlike Platonism in which salvation is only envisaged as a remote 
possibility. For this reason it seems that Christianity is the way (poros) out of the aporia 
of the world as well as out of the recurring aporia of knowledge, and hence philosophy. 24 
Through Grace, the expression of God's agape, Dante expresses the raising of Platonic 
eros to a new level, extending it beyond itself, so that Christianity responds to the 
questions posed by Platonism. Dante converts the aporia in Platonic eros, integrating it 
into and causing it to contribute to the poros of Christianity. Christianity can thus be read 
as the poros out of the aporia of Platonism, and similarly caritas/agape as the poros out 
of the aporia of eros. 
23 Maueo, Structure and Thought, p. 134. 
24 "Jews demand miraculous signs and Greeks look for wisdom, but we preach Christ crucified: a stumbling 
block to Jews and foolishness to Gentiles, but to those whom God has called, both Jews and Greeks, Christ 




Allen, M. The Platonism of Marsilio Ficino. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984. 
Apollodorus. The Library. Trans. J. G. Frazer. Vol. 2. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1979. 
Arieti, J. A. Interpreting Plato: The Dialogues as Drama. Savage M. D.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1991. 
Aristophanes. Plutos in Aristophanes' Eleven Comedies. Trans. unknown. London: The Athenian 
Society, 1912. 
Aristotle. Metaphysics. Trans. W. D. Ross. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1908. 
Armstrong, A. H. The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1967. 
Auerbach, E. Mimesis. Trans. W. R. Trask. Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press, 1953. New York: 
Doubleday, 1957. 
Barker, A. Personal Communication. 2002. 
Barker, A. Personal Communication. 2003. 
nett, R. "Immortality and the Nature of the Soul. " Phronesis, 21(1986). 
Billings, G. B. The Art of Transition in Plato. New York: Garland Publishing, 1979. 
Bowra, C. M. Greek Lyric Poetry. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961. 
Brown, R. Analyzing Love. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987. 
Burger, R. Plato's Phaedrus: A Defense of a Philosophical Art of Writing. Alabama: The University of 
Alabama Press, 1947. 
Burkert, W. Greek Religion. Trans. J. Raffan. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985. 
Bury, R. see Plato Symposium. (b). 
Buxton, R. G. A. "Blindness and Limits: Sophocles and the Logic of Myth" JHS. 100 (1980). 
Cairns, D. L. Aidos. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993. 
Campbell, D. A., ed. and trans. Greek Lyric. Vol. II. Anacreon, Anacreontea, Choral Lyric from Olympus 
to Alcman. Loeb Edition. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1988. 
Cavarero, A. In Spite of Plato: A Feminist Rewriting ofAncient Philosophy. Trans. S. Anderlini- 
D'Onofrio and A. O'Healy. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995. 
Cavell, S. Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome: The Constitution of Emersonian Perfectionism. 
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1990. 
Cicero. Tusculan Disputations. Trans. J. E. King. Loeb Edition. London: Heinemann, 1971. 
Cixous, H. "The Laugh of the Medusa. " Trans. K. Cohen and P. Cohen. Journal of Women in Culture and 
336 
Society. 1.4 (1976). 
Cobb, W. The Symposium and The Phaedrus: Plato's Erotic Dialogues. New York: State University of 
New York Press, 1993. 
Comford, F. M. Principium Sapientiae. Ed. W. K. C. Guthrie. New York: Harper and Row. 1965. 
The Unwritten Philosophy and Other Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967. 
"The Doctrine of Eros in Plato's Symposium. " Plato, A Collection of Critical Essays. Vol. H. Ed. G. 
Vlastos. New York: Anchor Books, 1971. 
Crespo-Perona, M. A. An Aesthetics of Sacredness: A Nietzschean Reading of James Joyce and T S. Eliot. 
Diss. University of Warwick, 1999. 
Crombie, I. M. An Examination of Plato's Doctrines. 2 vols. London: Routledge, 1963. 
Deb, P. "Socrates and Alcibiades: Plato's Perfectionism. " Unpublished paper, 1998. 
Delatte, A. Les Conceptions d'Enthusiasm chez les Philosophes Presocratique. Collection d'Etudes 
Anciennes. Paris: Societe d'Edition "Les Belles Lettres", 1930. 
Derrida, J. "Plato's Pharmacy. " Dissemination. Trans. B. Johnson. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1981. 
Detienne, M. Les Jardins d'Adonis. Paris: Gallimard, 1972. 
Detienne, M. and Vernant, J. P. Cunning Intelligence in Greek Culture and Society. Trans. J. Lloyd. 
Sussex: Harvester Press, 1978. 
de Vries, G. J. A Commentary on the Phaedrus of Plato. Amsterdam: Hakkert, 1969. 
Diderot, D. Rameau's Nephew. London: Penguin,. 1966. 
Diodorus Siculus. The Library of History ofDiodorus of Sicily. Vol. Ill. Trans. CA Oldfather. Loeb 
Edition. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1935. 
Diogenes Laertius. Lives of Eminent Philosophers. Trans. R. D. Hicks. Ed. T. E. Page. Loeb Edition. 
London: Heinemann, 1925. 
Dodds, E. R. The Greeks and The Irrational. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1951. 
--. See Plato Georgias. 
Dover, K. J. see Plato Symposium. (c). 
---. Greek Homosexuality. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989. 
Emmet, D. The Role of the Unrealisable. London: Macmillan, 1994. 
Empedocles. Fragments ofEmpedocles. Trans. W. E. Leonard. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1908. 
Euripides. Helen. The Complete Greek Tragedies. Vol. 3. Trans. and intro. R. Lattimore. Chicago: The 
University of Chicago, 1956. 
337 
Ferrari, G. R. F. Listening to the Cicadas. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987. 
"Platonic Love. " Cambridge Companion to Plato. Ed. R. Kraut. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1992. 
Ficino, M. Commentary on Plato's Symposium on Love. Trans. S. Jayne. Woodstock: Spring Publications, 
1985. 
Fontenros, J. Python: A Study of Delphic Myth and Its Origins. Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1959. 
Fraenkel, H. Early Greek Poetry and Philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell, 1975. 
Freud, S. The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud 24 vols. London: 
Hogarth Press, 1966. Toronto: Hogarth Press 1975. 
"Analysis Terminable and Interminable" (1937). Standard Edition. Vol. XXIII. London: Hogarth 
Press. 
Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920). The Essentials of Psycho-Analysis. Trans. J. Strachey. London: 
Penguin, 1991. 
Civilization and its Discontents (1930). Standard Edition. Vol. XXI. London: Hogarth Press. 
"On the Universal Tendency to Debasement in the Sphere of Love" (1912). Standard Edition. Vol. XI. 
London: Hogarth Press. 
"The Dynamics of Transference" (1912). Standard Edition. Vol. XII. London: Hogarth Press. 
"Observations on Transference-Love" (1915). Standard Edition. Vol. XII. London: Hogarth Press. 
The Question of Lay Analysis (1927). The Essentials ofPsycho-Analysis. Trans. J. Strachey. London: 
Penguin, 1991. 
"Transference" (1917) Standard Edition. Vol. XVI. London: Hogarth Press. 
Friedlander, P. Plato: The Dialogues of the Second and Third Periods. Trans. H. Meyerhoff. Bolligen 
Series LIX. Princeton N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1969. 
Gatti, M. L. "Plotinus: The Platonic Tradition and the Foundations of Neoplatonism. " The Cambridge 
Companion to Plotinus. Ed. L. Gerson. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. 
Gorgias. Encomium of Helen. Trans. D. M. MacDowell. Edit. C. Rowe. Bristol: Bristol Classical Press, 
1982. 
"Praise of Helen. " (Provenance Unknown). 
Gould, T. Platonic Love. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963. 
Griswold, C. Self-Knowledge in Plato's Phaedrus. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986. 
-. "Irony in the Platonic Dialogues. " Philosophy and Literature. 26.1. (2002). 
Guthrie, W. K. C. "Plato's Views on the Nature of the Soul " Plato. Vol. II. Ed. G. Vlastos. New York: 
Doubleday, 1971. 
338 
"Plato, the Man and his Dialogues. " Vol. IV of his A History of Greek Philosophy. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1975. 
Hackforth, R. see Plato Phaedrus. (b). 
Hall, J. Dictionary of Subject and Symbols in Art. London: John Murray, 1974. 
Halperin, D. M. "Why Diotima is a Woman. " One Hundred Years of Homosexuality and Other Essays on 
Greek Love. New York: Routledge, 1990. 
(a) "Platonic Eros and What Men Call Love. " Plato Critical Assessments Vol. III. Plato's Middle 
Period: Psychology and Value Theory. Ed. N. Smith. London: Routledge, 1998. 
(b) "Plato and the Erotics of Narrativity. " Plato Critical Assessments. Vol. III. See above. 
Hegel. Phenomenology of Spirit. Trans. A. V. Miller. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977. 
Aesthetics. Vol. II. Trans. T. M. Knox. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998. 
Heidegger, M. "Building Dwelling and Thinking. " Basic Writing. Trans. D. E. Krell. London: Routledge, 
1993. 
Herodotus. The Histories. Trans. A. D. Godley. Vol. I. Loeb Edition. London: Heinemann, 1921. 
The Histories. Trans. A. de Selincourt. Notes A. R. Bum. London: Penguin, 1972. 
Hesiod. The Epics of Hesiod. Trans and comment. F. A. Paley. London: Whittaker, 1861. 
Theogony. Trans. R Lattimore. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1970. 
-"-. Theogony. Trans. M. L. West. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988. 
Hobbs, A. Plato and the Hero. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. 
--". Personal Communication. 2001. 
Homer. The Odyssey. Trans. E. V. Rieu. London: Penguin, 1946. 
The Iliad. Trans. E. V. Rieu. London: Penguin, 1950. 
The Homeric Hymns. Trans. J. Edgar. Edinburgh: James Thin, 1891. 
Homeric Hymns to Hermes. Trans. M. L. West. Loeb Edition. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 2003. 
Hornblower, S. and Spawforth, A., eds. The Oxford Classical Dictionary. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1996. 
Inge, W. R The Philosophy of Plotinus. Vol. H. London: Longmans, Green, 1948. 
Irwin, J. Reviving An Ancient-Modern Quarrel: A Critique of Derrida's Reading of Plato and Platonism. 
Diss. University of Warwick, 1997. 
Janaway, C. Images of Excellence. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995. 
Jevons, F. B. A History of Greek Literature. London: Charles Griffin, 1889. 
339 
Joyce, M. see Plato Symposium. (a). 
Kierkegaard, S. Fear and Trembling. Trans. H. Hong and E. Hong. Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University 
Press, 1983. 
The Concept of Irony. Trans. H. Hong and E. Hong. Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press, 1989. 
The Seducer's Diary. Trans. H. Hong and E. Hong. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997. 
Kirk, G. S., Raven, J. E. and Schofield, M., eds. and trans. The Presocratic Philosophers. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1957. 
Kosman, L. A. "Platonic Love. " Facets of Plato's Philosophy. Ed. W. H. Werkmeister. Assen: Van 
Gorcum, 1976. 
Koyre, A. Discovering Plato. Trans. L. C. Rosenfield. New York: Columbia University Press, 1945. 
K'Wm, W. La Fin du Phedre de Platon. Firenze: Leo S. Olschki Editore, 2000. 
Lacan, J. "Le stade du miroir comme formateur de la fonction du Je. " Ecrit I. Paris: Editions du Seuil, 
1966. 
Laplanche, J. and Pontalis, J: B. Tiie language of Psychoanalysis. Trans. D. Nicholson-Smith. London: 
Karnac Books, 1988. 
Lattimore, R., ed. and trans. Greek Lyrics. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1949. 
Lebeck, A. "The Central Myth of Plato's Phaedrus. " Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies. 13 (1972). 
Lewis, C. S. The Allegory of Love. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1936. 
---. The Four Loves. London: Fount, 1977. 
Liddell, H. G. and Scott, R., eds. Greek-English Lexicon. Seventh Edition. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1883. 
Lobel, E. and Lloyd-Jones, 11. "Oxyrhynchus Papyri. " Classical Review. New Series. VIII (1958). 
Lyotard, J. F. Just Gaming. Trans. W. Godzich. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1985. 
Markus, R. A. "The Dialectic of Eros in Plato's Symposium. " Plato, A Collection of Critical Essays. Vol. 
H. Ed. G. Vlastos. New York: Anchor Books, 1971. 
Moravcsik, J. M. "Reason and Eros in the "ascent"- passage of the Symposium. " Essays in Ancient Greek 
Philosophy. Eds. J. Anton with G. Kustas. Albany: State of University of New York Press, 1971. 
Murdoch, I. The Sovereignty of Good. London: Routledge, 1970. 
-. The Fire and the Sun. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977. 
Nagel, T. The Possibility ofAltruism. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970. 
Nehamas, A. and Woodruff, P. see Plato Symposium. (d ). 
Nietzsche, F. Birth of Tragedy and The Genealogy of Morals. Trans. F. Golffing. New York: Doubleday, 
1956. 
340 
Norris, C. Truth and the Ethics of Criticism. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1994. 
Novotny, F. The Posthumous Life of Plato. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977. 
Nozik, It Philosophical Explanations. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981. 
Nussbaum, M. C. The Fragility of Goodness. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986. 
"Serpents in the Soul: A Reading of Seneca's Medea. " In her The Therapy of Desire: Theory and 
Practice in Hellenistic Ethics. Martin Classical Lectures. Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University 
Press, 1994. 
Nygren, A. Agape and Eros. Trans. P. S. Watson. London: SPCK, 1957. 
O'Meara, D. J. Plotinus, An Introduction to the Enneads. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993. 
Origen. Contra Celsum. Trans. H. Chadwick. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987. 
Osborne, C. Eros Unveiled Plato and the God of Love. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994. 
Outka, G. Agape, an ethical analysis. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972. 
Oxford Classical Dictionary. See 1-lornblower, S. and Spawforth, A. 
Page, D. Alcman, The Partheneion. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1951. 
-. "Oxyrhynchus Papyri XXIV. " Classical Review IX (1959). 
Pausanius. Description of Greece. Vol. I. Trans. W. H. S. Jones. Loeb Edition. London: Heinemann, 1918. 
Penner, T. "Thought and Desire in Plato. " Plato II. Ed. G. Vlastos. Indiana: University of Notre Dame, 
1971. 
Penwill, J. L. "Alkman's Cosmogony. " Apeiron 8 (1974). 
Person, E., Hagelin, A. and Fontagy. P., eds. On Freud's "Observations on Transference-Love. " New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1993. 
Pickstock, C. After Writing. Oxford: Blackwell, 1998. 
Pieper, J. Love and Inspiration. Trans. R. Winston and C. Winston. London: Faber and Faber, 1964. 
Pindar. "Pythian Odes. " and "Olympian Odes. " The Odes of Pindar. Trans J. Sandys. Loeb Edition. 
London: William Heinemann, 1915. 
Plato. The Dialogues of Plato. Fourth Edition. Trans. B. Jowett. Oxford: Clarendon, 1953. 
The Collected Dialogues of Plato. Series LXXI. Eds. E. Hamilton and H. Cairns. New York: 
Bollingen Foundation and Pantheon, 1961. 
--. Oeuvres Completes IV. 3: Phedre. Trans. L. Robin. Fifth Edition. Paris: Belles Lettres, 1961. 
Gorgias. Trans. and comment. E. It Dodds. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1959. 
Letters VII and VIII. Notes by It Bluck. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1947. 
341 
Lysis. Trans. K. J. Dover. London: Cambridge University Press, 1968. 
The Phaedrus of Plato. (a) Ed. and comment. W. H. Thompson. London: Whittaker, 1868. 
Phaedrus. (b) Trans. and comment. R. Hackforth. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1952. 
Phaedrus. (c) Trans. and comment. C. J. Rowe. Wiltshire: Aris and Phillips, 1986. 
Symposium (a) Trans. M. Joyce. The Collected Dialogues of Plato. New York: Bollingen Foundation 
and Pantheon, 1961. 
Symposium. (b) Trans. and comment. R. Bury. Cambridge: W. Heffer, 1973. 
Symposium. (c) Ed. K. J. Dover. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1980. 
Symposium. (d) Trans. and comment. A. Nehamas and P. Woodruff. Cambridge: Hackett, 1989. 
Plotinus. The Enneads. Vol. III. Trans. A. H. Armstrong. Loeb Edition. Heinemann: London, 1967. 
-. The Enneads. Trans. S. MacKenna. London: Penguin, 1991. 
Plutarch. De Iside et Osiride. Trans. J. G. Griffiths. Wales: University of Wales Press, 1970. 
Table Talk. Moralia VIII. Trans. P. A. Clement. Loeb Edition. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard, 1969. 
Table Talk. Moralia IX Trans. E. L. Minar. Loeb Edition. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard, 1961. 
Dion. Lives. Vol. VI. Trans. B. Perrin. Loeb Edition. London: Heinemann, 1918. 
Popper, K. R. The Open Society and its Enemies. Vol. I. Plato. London: Routledge, 1945. 
Price, A. W. Love and Friendship in Plato and Aristotle. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989. 
---. "Loving Persons Platonically", Phronesis XXVI (1981). 
Propertius. Elegies. Trans. G. P. Goold. Loeb Edition. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990. 
Raven, J. E. Plato's Thought in the Making, A Study of the Development of his Metaphysics. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1965. 
Richardson, A. A Theological Word Book of the Bible. London: SCM Press, 1957. 
Ricoeur, P. Freud and Philosophy. Trans. D. Savage. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970. 
Rist, J. Eros and Psyche, Studies in Plato, Plotinus and Origen. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
1964. 
Platonism and its Christian Heritage. London: Variorum Reprints, 1985. 
Robey, D. Writers and Society in Contemporary Italy. Eds. M. Caesar and P. Hainsworth. Leamington 
Spa: Berg, 1984. 
Robin, L., ed. and trans. Platon: Oeuvres Completes IV. 3: Phedre. Fifth Edition. Paris: Belles Lettres, 
1961. 
342 
---. La Theorie Platonicienne d'Amour. Second Edition. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1964. 
Robinson, T. M. "The Argument for Immortality in Plato's Phaedrus. " Essays in Ancient Greek 
Philosophy. Vol. I. Eds. J. Anton with G. Kustas. Albany, New York: State University of New 
York Press, 1971. 
Rose, G. The Broken Middle. Oxford: Blackwell, 1992. 
---. Love's Work. London: Chatto and Windus, 1995. 
Rowe, C. J. see Plato, Phaedrus. (c ). 
Rutherford, R. B. The Art of Plato, Ten Essays in Platonic Interpretation. London: Duckworth, 1995. 
Ryle, G. Plato's Progress. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966. 
Santas, G. X. Freud and Plato, Two Theories of Love. Oxford: BlackweU, 1988. 
Santayana, G. The Realm of Essence. London: Constable, 1928. 
Sayre, K. Plato's Literary Garden. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1995. 
Scruton, R. Sexual Desire: A . Moral 
Philosophy of the Erotic. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1986. 
Shorey, P. What Plato Said. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978, c 1933. 
---. Platonism Ancient and Modern. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1938. 
Sinaiko, H. Love, Knowledge, and Discourse in Plato: Dialogue and Dialectic in Phaedrus, Republic, 
Parminides. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1965. 
Singer, I. The Nature of Love. 3 vols. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984-88. 
Skilleäs, O. M. "The Critique of Writing in Plato's Phaedrus: A Meta-Fictional Heuristic? " Philosophical 
Writings. 8 (Summer 1998). 
Soble, A. The Structure of Love. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990. 
St Cartmail, R K. The Love Ethic. New Zealand: Cicada Press, 1979. 
Stewart, J. A. The Myths of Plato. London: Macmillan, 1905. 
Stokes, M. Plato's Socratic Conversations, Drama and Dialectic in Three Dialogues. London: The 
Athlone Press, 1986. 
Taylor, A. E. Plato: The Man and His Work. London: Methuen, 1926. 
Taylor C. Sources ojthe Self. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989. 
Thompson, W. H. see Plato Phaedrus. (a). 
Thucydides. The History of the Peloponnesian War. Trans. C. F. Smith. Loeb edition. Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1996-1999. 
Vlastos, G. "The Individual as an Object of Love in Plato. " Platonic Studies. Ed. G. Vlastos. Princeton, 
NJ.: Princeton University Press, 1973. (referred to as "Vlastos") 
343 
-. Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991. 
Wallis, R. T. Neo-Platonism. London: Duckworth, 1972. 
Wardy, P. E. The Birth of Rhetoric. London: Routledge, 1996. 
Warner, M. Philosophical Finesse. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989. 
"Dialectical Drama: The Case of Plato's Symposium. " The Language of the Cave. Eds. A. Barker and 
M. Warner. Alberta: Academic Printing and Publishing, 1992. 
"Cognition, Rhetoric and Love: Appropriating the Phaedrus. " Working paper, 1998. 
Watson, G. Greek Philosophy and the Christian Notion of God. Dublin: Columba Press, 1994. 
West, M. L. "Three Presocratic Cosmologies. " Classical Quarterly 13 (1963). 
. "Alcman and Pythagoras. " Classical Quarterly 17 (1967). 
Ancient Greek Xfusic. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992. 
Wilamowitz, W. Platon 1. Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, 1940, c1920. 
Williams, B. A. O. "Moral Luck. " In his Philosophical Papers 1973-1980. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1981. 
Shame and Necessity. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993. 
Zaslavsky, R Platonic Afyth and Platonic Writing. Washington D. C.: University Press of America, 1981. 
DANTE: (supplementary to above) 
Anderson, W. Dante the Maker. London: Hutchinson, 1983. 
Aquinas, T. Summa Theologiae. 60 vols. Trans. T. Gilby and T. C. O'Brien. London: Eyre and 
Spottiswoode, 1964-1981. 
Basic Writings of Saint Thomas Aquinas. Vol. II. Ed. A. C. Pegis. Cambridge: Hackett, 1997. 
Aristotle. Ethica Nicomachea. Trans. W. D. Ross. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1925. 
Armstrong, A. H. "Platonic Eros and ChristianAgape. " Downside Review 79 (1961). 
"Plotinus. " In his The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy. First 
Edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967. 
Auerbach, E. Dante: Poet of the Secular World. Trans. R. Manheim. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1961. 
Augustine. The City of God. Trans. W. Green. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963. 
Confessions. Trans. H. Chadwick. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991. 
Confessions. Trans. W. Watts. Loeb Edition. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1912. 
344 
De Quantitate animae. Soliloquiorum libriduo; De Immortalitate Animae. Corpus Scriptorum, 
Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum; 84 Sancti Aureli Augustin Opera-, Sect. 1. Pars. 4. Vindobonae: 
Hoelder Pichler-Tempsky, 1986. 
de Trinitate. Trans. A. Haddan. Vol. M. A Select Library of The Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of 
the Christian Church. Ed. P. Schaff. Michigan: Eerdmans, 1993. 
On Christian Doctrine. Trans. and ed. R. P. H. Green. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995. 
Barbi, M. Dante. Firenze: G. C. Sansoni, 1933. 
Barkan, L. The Gods blade Flesh New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986. 
Barolini, T. The Undivine Comedy: Detheologizing Dante. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 
1992. 
"Dante and the Lyric Past. " The Cambridge Companion to Dante. Ed. R. Jacoff. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1993. 
Bergin, T. G. An Approach to Dante. London: Bodley Head, 1965. 
Dante. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1965. 
Perspectives on the Divine Comedy. New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1969. 
"The Women of the Comedy". A Diversity in Dante. Ed. T. G. Bergin. New Jersey: Rutgers 
University Press, 1969. 
Bigongiari, D. "The Philosophical Culture of Dante. " Essays on Dante and Medieval Culture. Biblioteca 
dell' "Archivuni Romanicum", Series I, Storia. Firenze: Leo S. Olschki Editore, 1964. 
Blumenfeld-Kosinski, R. Reading Myth. Stanford; Stanford University Press, 1997. 
Boccaccio, G. "The Life of Dante". The Earliest Lives of Dante. Trans. J. R. Smith. Ed. L. B. Aretino. 
New York: Russell and Russell, 1968. 
Boethius. Consolation of Philosophy. Trans. H. F. Stewart. Loeb Edition. London: Heinemann, 1978. 
Boyde, P. Perception and Passion in Dante's Comedy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993. 
Brand, P. and Pertile, L., eds. The Cambridge History of Italian Literature. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999. 
Brandeis, I. A Ladder of Vision. London: Chatto and Windus, 1960. 
Bulfinch, T. Mythology of Greece and Rome. New York: Random House, 1993. 
Caesar, M., ed. Dante, The Critical Heritage. New York: Routledge, 1989. 
Cambon, G. Dante's Craft, Studies in Language and Style. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
1969. 
Capellanus. De Amore et Amoris Remedio. Trans. P. G. Walsh. London: Duckworth, 1982. 
---. The Art of Courtly Love. Trans. J. J. Parry. New York: Columbia University Press, 1969. 
345 
Carroll, J. S. Exiles of Eternity, An Exposition of Dante's Inferno. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1904. 
Cassell, A. K. Dante's Fearful Art ofJustice. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1984. 
Cervigni, D. S. and Vasta, E. see Dante Pita Nuova. (b). 
"From Manuscript to Print. " Dante Now. Ed. T. J. Cachey. Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 
1995. 
Chiampi, J. T. Shadowy Prefaces: Conversion and Writing in the Divine Comedy. Ravenna: Longo 
Editore, 1981. 
Chiarenza, M. M. The Divine Comedy, Tracing God's Art. Boston: Twayne Publications, 1989. 
Cicero. On Friendship. Trans. F. Copley. Ann Arbor. University of Michigan Press, 1971. 
Copleston, F. A History of Philosophy. Vols. lI and III. London: Doubleday, 1962. 
---. Contemporary Philosophy. London: Burns and Oates, 1965. 
Croce, B. The Poetry of Dante. Trans. D. Ainslie. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1922. 
Dante. Convivio. Trans. W. W. Jackson. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1909. 
De Vulgari Eloquentia. Ed. and trans. S. Botterill. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. 
The Divine Comedy. (a) Ed. H. W. Longfellow. London: Routledge, 1867. 
The Divine Comedy. (b) Trans. and comment. D. Sayers. Middlesex: Penguin, 1950. 
The Divine Comedy. (c) Trans. and comment. J. D. Sinclair. New York: Oxford University Press, 
1961. 
The Divine Comedy. (d) Trans. and comment. C. S. Singleton. London: Routledge, 1971. 
The Divine Comedy. (e) Trans. and comment. C. H. Grandgent. Revised C. S. Singleton. Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1972. 
The Divine Comedy. (f) Ed. and trans. R. M. Durling with notes by R. L. Martinez and R. M. Durling. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996. 
The Divine Comedy. (g) Trans. and comment. M. Musa. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
1996. 
De Monarchia. Trans. P. Shaw. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995. 
Paradiso. Trans. and comment. M. Musa. London: Penguin, 1985. 
Rimes. Ed. G. Contini. Turin: Einaudi, 1965. 
Vita Nuova. (a) Trans. M. Musa. London: Indiana Press, 1973. 
Vita Nuova. (b) Trans. D. Cervigni and E. Vasta. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1995. 
Dante, Piero di. Commentary. See Gilbert, A. Dante and his Comedy. 
346 
De Sanctis. De Santis on Dante. Eds. and trans. J. Rossi and A. Galpin. Madison: University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1957. 
Dragonetti, R. "L'Episode de Francesca dans le cadre de la convention courtoise. " Aux Frontie'res du 
Language Poetique: Etudes sur Dante, Mallarme, Valery. Gand: Romanica Gandensia, 1961. 
Dunbar, H. F. Symbolism in Medieval Thought and its Consummation in the Divine Comedy. New York: 
Russell and Russell, 1961. 
Durling, R. M. see Dante The Divine Comedy. (f). 
Eliot, T. S. Dante. London: Faber and Faber, 1965. 
Farrer, A. Finite and Infinite, A Philosophical Essay. London: Dacre Press, 1943. 
Fergusson, F. Dante's Drama of the Mind. Greenwood: Greenwood Press, 1981. 
Ferra, F. Language, Logic and God London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1962. 
Foster, K. "The Mind in Love: Dante's Philosophy. " Dante: a Collection of Critical Essays. Ed. J 
Freccero. Englewood, NJ.: Prentice-Hall, 1965. 
"Dante's Idea of Love. " From Time To Eternity. Ed. T. G. Bergin. New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1967. 
Fraenkel, H. Ovid A poet between Two Worlds. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969. 
Freccero, J. Dante: The Poetics of Conversion. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1986. 
Fulgentius. The Mythographer. Trans. L. G. Whitbread. Ohio: Ohio State University Press. 1971. 
Gilbert, A. Dante and his Comedy. London: Peter. Owen, 1964. 
Gilson, E. Dante et Beatrice, Etudes dantesques. Paris: Librarie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1974. 
Grandgent, C. H. see Dante The Divine Comedy. (e). 
Grayson, C., ed. The World of Dante. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980. 
Haren, M. Medieval Thought. London: Macmillan Press, 1992. 
Harrison, R. P. The Body of Beatrice. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988. 
Hatcher, A. and Musa, M. "The kiss: Inferno V and Old French Prose Lancelot. " Comparative Literature 
20 (1968). 
Holbrock, R. I. Dante and the Animal Kingdom. New York: AMS Press, 1966. 
Hollander, R. Allegory in Dante's Comedia. Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press, 1969. 
-. Studies in Dante. Ravenna: Longo Editore, 1980. 
Holmes, G. Dante. Oxford: Oxford Press, 1980. 
Huizinga, J. The Waning of the Middle Ages. Trans. F. Hopman. London: Penguin, 1990. 
347 
Jacoff, R. "Transgression and Transcendence: Figures of Female Desire in Dante's Commedia. " Dante. 
Ed. J. Tambling. London: Longman, 1999. 
Kennedy, E., ed. Lancelot do Lac. Oxford: Clarendon, 1980. 
Latini, B. Tresoretto. New York: Garland, 1981. 
Leigh, G. The Passing of Beatrice, A Study in the Heterodoxy of Dante. London: Faber and Faber, 1932. 
Limentani, U. Dante's Comedy: Introductory Readings of Selected Cantos. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1985. 
Longfellow, H. G. see Dante The Divine Comedy. (a). 
Lucian. The Works ofLucian ofSamosata. Trans. H. W. Fowler. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1905. 
The Dialogues of Lucian. Trans. W. Tooke, London: The Navarre Society. 1930. 
Lucretius. On the Nature of Things. Trans. R. E. Latham. London: Penguin, 1951. 
Mascall, E. L. Existence andAnalogy. London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1949. 
Masciandaro, F. Dante as Dramatist. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1991. 
Mazzeo, J. A. Structure and Thought in the Paradiso. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1958. 
Medieval Cultural Tradition in Dante's Comedy. New York: Cornell University Press, 1960. 
Mazzotta, G. Dante, Poet of the Desert. Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University, 1979. (referred to as 
"Mazzotta") 
Dante's Vision and The Circle of Knowledge. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University, 1993. 
"Why Did Dante Write the Comedy? Why and How Do We Read It? " Dante Now. Ed. T. J. Cachey. 
Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1995. 
Menocal, M. R. Writing in Dante's Cult of Truth From Borges to Boccaccio. Durham: Duke University 
Press, 1991. 
Mondin, B. The Principle ofAnalogy in Protestant and Catholic Theology. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 
1968. 
Moore, E. Studies in Dante. First Series. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969. 
Studies in Dante. Second Series. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969. 
Studies in Dante. Third Series. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969. 
Morgan, N. M. Love: Plato, the Bible and Freud. Englewood, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1964. 
Musa, M., ed. Essays on Dante. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1964. 
Trans. Vita Nuova. see Dante Vita Nuova. (b). 
Advent at the Gates: Dante's Comedy. Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1974. 
348 
Trans. Paradiso. See Dante Paradiso. 
Commentary. see Dante The Divine Comedy. (g). 
Nardi, B. "Filosofia dell Amore. " Dante e la Cultura Medieval. Nuovi Saggi di Filosofia Dantesca. Ban: 
B. Gius. Laterza and Figli, 1949. 
"Filosofia dell'Amore. " Dante e la Cultura Medieval. Unpublished Trans. Francesca Weinmann, 
"Dante and Medieval Culture. " Dante: a Collection of Critical Essays. Ed. J. Freccero. Englewood, 
NJ.: Prentice-Hall, 1965. 
Noakes, S. "The Double Misreading of Paolo and Francesca. " Philological Quarterly 62 (1983). 
Nuttall, G. F. The Faith of Dante Alighieri. London: S. P. C. K., 1969. 
O'Grady, D. "Women Damned, Penitent and Beatified in the Divine Comedy. " Dante Readings. Ed. E. 
Haywood. Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 1987. 
Ovid. The Art of Love. Trans. J. H. Mozley. Loeb Edition. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
1985. 
Fasti. Trans. J. G. Frazer. Loeb Edition. London: Heinemann, 1931. 
Heriodes andAmores. Trans. G. Showerman. Loeb Edition. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 1921. 
The Metamorphoses. Trans. F. Miller. Loeb Edition. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
1916. 
Paulinus. "Letters of Paulinus of Nola. " Ancient Christian Writers. Trans. P. C. Walsh. Westminster, Md.: 
Newman Press, 1966. 
Pelikan, J. Eternal Feminines. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1990. 
Pertile, L. "Paradiso: A Drama of Desire. " Word and Drama in Dante. Eds. T. Barnes and J. Petrie. 
Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 1993. 
Pio, R. "Dante e romanzi della Travola Rotunda. " NuovaAntologia (1920). 
Poellner, P. Personal Communication. 2002. 
Poggioli, R. "Paolo and Francesca. " Dante: a Collection of Critical Essays. Ed. J. Freccero. Englewood, 
NJ.: Prentice-Hall, 1965. 
Rose, G. Paradiso. Ed. H. Caygill. London: Menard Press, 1999. 
Rossetti, M. F. A Shadow of Dante. London: Longmans, Green, 1891. 
Saly, J. Dante's Paradiso: The flowering of the Self. New York: Pace University Press, 1989. 
Sayers, D. Commentary. See Dante, The Divine Comedy. (b). 
-- Introductory Papers on Dante. London: Methuen, 1954. 
349 
Further Papers on Dante. London: Methuen, 1957. 
"The Poetry of the Image in Dante and Charles Williams. " Further Papers on Dante. See above. 
. "Dante's Virgil. " 
Further Papers on Dante. See above. 
"The Divine Poet and the Angelic Doctor. " Further Papers on Dante. See above. 
Shapiro, M. G. Dante and the Knot of Body and Soul. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998. 
-. Woman, Earthly and Divine in the Comedy of Dante. 
Diss. Columbia University. 1968. 
Shaw, J. E. Guido Cavalcanti's Theory of Love. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1949. 
Simonelli, M. S. Contributial Testo Critico del "Convivio". Studi danteschi. 30 (1951). 
Sinclair, J. D. see Dante The Divine Comedy. (c). 
Singleton, C. S. "From Love to Caritas. " In his An Essay on the Vita Nuova. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1958. 
Commentary. See Dante The Divine Comedy. (d). 
Journey to Beatrice. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977. 
Smarr, J. L. "Poets of Love and Exile. " Dante and Ovia Essays in Intertexuality. Ed. M. V. Sowell. 
Binghamton, New York: Centre for Medieval and Early Renaissance Studies, 1991. 
Smith, H. W. The Greatness of Dante Alighieri. Bath: Bath University Press, 1973. 
Symonds, J. A. "The Dantesque and Platonic Ideals of Love. " In his In the Key of Blue and other Prose 
Essays. New York: Macmillan, 1893. 
An Introduction to the Study of Dante. London: Adam and Charles Black, 1893. 
Tambling, J. Dante and D jerence: Writing in the Comedia Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1988. 
Thompson, D. Dante's Epic Journeys. London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974. 
Tissol, G. The Face of Nature. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1997. 
Took, J. F. Dante: Lyric Poet and Philosopher. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990. (referred to as "Lyric 
Poet") 
"Dante, Augustine and the Drama of Salvation. " Word and Drama in Dante. Eds. T. Barnes and J. 
Petrie. Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 1993. (referred to as "Took") 
Toynbee, P. Dante Alighieri: His Life and Works. London: Methuen, 1910. 
"Boccaccio's Commentary on the Divina Commedia" In his Dante Studies. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1921. 
Dante Dictionary. Revised C. S. Singleton. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968. 
Dante Studies and Researches. London: Methuen, 1902. 
350 
---. Specimens of Old French. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1892. 
Umberto, L. ed. The bind of Dante. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965. 
Underhill, E. Mysticism. London: Methuen, 1911. 
Vessey, D. Statius and the Thebaid. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973. 
Vinkin, B. "Encore: Francesca de Rimini: Rhetoric of Seduction-Seduction of Rhetoric. " Deutsche 
Vierte jahrsschrift fur Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte, 62 (1988). 
Virgil. TheAeneid. Trans. Robert Fitzgerald. London: Harper Collins, 1993. 
-. Georgics. Trans. J. Dryden. London: Oxford University Press, 1961. 
Watson, G. "Celsus and the Philosophical Opposition to Christianity. " Irish Theological Quarterly, 58: 3 
(1992). 
Greek Philosophy and the Christian Notion of God. Dublin: The Columba Press, 1994. 
Wetherbee, W. Platonism and Poetry in the Twelfth Century. Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press, 
1972. 
Whitfield, J. H. Dante and Virgil. Oicford: Blackwell, 1949. 
Williams, C. The Descent of the Dove. London: Faber and Faber, 1939. 
The Figure of Beatrice. London: Faber and Faber, 1953. 
The Image of the City. Intro. A. Ridler. London: Oxford University Press. 1958. 
"The Recollection of the Way. " Dante a Collection of Critical Essays. Ed. J. Freccero. Englewood, 
NJ.: Prentice-Hall, 1965. 
Wind, E. Pagan Mysteries in the Renaissance. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980. 
Witte, K. Essays on Dante. Trans. C. M. Lawrence and P. Wicksteed. London: Duckworth, 1898. 
Zeller, E. Die Philosophie der Griechen. Trans. A. Nygren. Fifth Edition. London: Longmans, Green, 
1862. 
351 
